Showing posts with label Dublin system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dublin system. Show all posts

Tuesday, 18 June 2024

Recent asylum case law of the CJEU: Distinction, Integration or Extension from 'Mainstream' EU law?

 


Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Luxofluxo, via Wikimedia Commons

 

Introduction

While attention has been focussed on the overhaul of EU law on asylum – which I have analysed in an upcoming article, reflected in an 8-part series of blog posts, starting here – the CJEU has been delivering a number of judgments on important asylum law issues. There have been no fewer than ten asylum law judgments since the start of the year, including five in June alone. The following blog post is an overview of these judgments, and also discusses recent Advocates-General opinions in pending asylum cases. Also, to give an idea of future developments, it discusses whether the new EU asylum laws would change the outcome of recent judgments, and other asylum cases pending before the CJEU are listed in an annex. Finally, this blog post develops a framework for analysis of the extent to which EU asylum law fits within the application of EU law more generally: is it distinguished from the ‘mainstream’, integrated into it, or used to build upon it?  

 

Qualification for asylum

Interpreting the Directive on qualification for refugee or subsidiary protection status, recent judgments have included, first the first time, two rulings on women qualifying for refugee status because of issues specific to being women. (Of course it is also possible for women to qualify for refugee status due to persecution on other grounds, such as their religion or political opinion).

The first of these judgments, back in January (Case C-621/21; see analysis of the earlier Advocate-General’s opinion by Dr Maja Grundler here), concerned the position of women facing domestic violence. First of all, the Court ruled that women in general could constitute a ‘particular social group’ being persecuted under the Refugee Convention (which defines refugees as people who are outside their country of origin who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, and who are unable or unwilling to return to that country due to this fear – a definition enshrined in, and elaborated upon, in the EU Directive).  The Court stated that interpretation of EU law had to take account of both the UN Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – which all Member States were party to, although the EU is not – as well as the Istanbul Convention on violence against women – which the EU is party to, although some Member States are not. The latter Convention in particular requires asylum law to be interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner.

Applying this principle, the Court found that women in general shared an ‘innate characteristic’, thus satisfying the first of the two cumulative grounds to be considered a ‘particular social group’, according to the wording of the Directive.  The first ground could also be satisfied by sharing ‘a common background that cannot be changed’, or ‘a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it’; the Court ruled that women who shared an ‘additional common feature’ could also meet the first part of the definition by meeting one of those criteria, or by sharing another innate characteristic – giving the example of ‘a particular family background’ as a ‘common background that cannot be changed’. In particular, the court stated that ‘women who have escaped from a forced marriage’, or married women who ‘have left their homes’ met that test.

Women in general also met the second part of the test set out in the Directive to be considered a ‘particular social group’, namely having a ‘distinct identity’, due to being perceived as different by others, ‘in particular because of social, moral or legal norms in their country of origin’. So did specific groups of women who ‘share an additional common characteristic, such as’ those mentioned by the court (ie family background), ‘where the social, moral or legal norms in their country of origin have the result that those women, on account of that common characteristic, are perceived as being different by the surrounding society’.  The rest of society may, in this context, be either the whole country concerned, or some part of it. Discrimination or persecution against the group (whether women as a whole, or women who refuse or end forced marriages) may also be relevant to defining that group.

Next, the Court ruled that there was a link between persecution and the Convention ground of ‘particular social group’ (as required by the Directive) either where the act of persecution took place on that ground, regardless of whether the failure to protect women was motivated by that ground, or whether the failure to protect was motivated by that ground, but the mistreatment was not.

Finally, the Court ruled that women in this situation could qualify for subsidiary protection if they did not qualify for refugee status – given that the risk of death or torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment (two of the three grounds for subsidiary protection) could emanate not only from the State but also from private actors. So a real risk of ‘honour killing’ could justify a subsidiary protection claim, as could a real risk of torture et al falling short of death.

The second judgment, issued more recently (Case C-646/21: see the further analysis of this judgment by Türkan Ertuna Lagrand and Salvo Nicolosi), concerns the position of women who are supporters of equality between men and women as recognised in European countries. In the Court’s view, building on its first judgment on women and refugee status, they could also be recognised as a ‘particular social group’. They met the first part of the relevant test to define ‘particular social group’ (as discussed above) because the importance of equality in daily life as regards matters such as choice of partner and economic independence meant that support for the principle was ‘a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it’. Moreover, staying in a Member State while they forged their belief in equality as part of their identity meant that they had a ‘common background that cannot be changed’. They also met the second part of the test, as it is possible that the surrounding society (which again, need not be the entire country) would regard them as having a distinct identity. There was no need (although it was possible) for their belief to have a religious or political link.

This judgment also pointed out that persecution could take the form of violence against women due to their gender – again taking account of the Istanbul Convention. Member States could not make the applicant solely responsible for supplying evidence about the situation in the country of origin, and (taking account of UNHCR guidance) had to gather evidence about the particular situation of women themselves. The Court also pointed out that, applying previous case law to these facts, becoming convinced of equality principles while on the territory could not be regarded as an abusive manufacturing of an asylum claim (see the next case discussed in this blog post), and that women could not be expected to hide their beliefs in gender equality when returning to their country of origin. In light of the age of the applicants, the Court also elaborated for the first time upon the requirements to take into account the ‘best interests of the child’ when assessing asylum applications, taking account of a General Comment by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.

Finally, the assessment of an application had to apply the same criteria regardless of whether it was a repeat application or not (see also another recent judgment – Case C-563/22). And while the uncertainty about the right to stay in the country was not a factor in assessing asylum claims, the possibility that long-term stay had strengthened the belief in equality between men and women had to be taken into account.  

The Court of Justice has also recently ruled (Case C-222/22) for the first time on obtaining refugee (or subsidiary protection) status sur place – ie, where the basis for the claim for refugee or subsidiary protection status is events that happened since the asylum-seeker left their country of origin. (For example, think of a coup that takes place while a national of that country is studying abroad, or working abroad as a diplomat appointed by the deposed government).  The Qualification Directive provides for an optional exception for Member States in this context: they ‘may determine that’ an asylum seeker while files a repeat application ‘shall not normally be granted refugee status if the risk of persecution is based on circumstances which the applicant has created by his or her own decision since leaving the country of origin’, although this is ‘[w]ithout prejudice’ to the Refugee Convention.

This case concerned a repeat application following a religious conversion. The Court pointed out that the word ‘normally’ implied that refugee status could still be obtained in some cases, and noted that sur place applications did not necessarily have to be based on opinions or beliefs held by the asylum-seeker in the country of origin. As an exception from the general rule, the prospect of refusing refugee status had to be interpreted narrowly, and could only refer to cases where an ‘abusive intent’ by the asylum-seeker had led to a ‘manufactured’ application. This intent could only be established by a thorough individual assessment; Member States could neither skip such an assessment nor create a presumption that all such applications fell within the scope of the exception, which the asylum-seeker would have to rebut. In this case, if the asylum-seeker had genuinely converted, then this ruled out any abusive intent. As for the requirement to apply the exception ‘[w]ithout prejudice’ to the Refugee Convention, the court ruled that this meant that the applicant could still rely on the provisions of the Convention which could not be subject to reservation – including the basic right of non-refoulement (ie not being sent to an unsafe country).

Next, a judgment last week (Case C-563/22) added to the case law on the distinct position of Palestinian refugees – who are subject to specific rules in the Refugee Convention, which are cross-referenced in the qualification Directive. Article 1.D of the Convention states that it ‘shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving…protection or assistance’ from UN bodies other than the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. In practice, this only covers Palestinians receiving support from the UNRWA. However, Article 1.D goes on to say that ‘[w]hen such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason’, without an overall settlement of those persons’ position in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions, ‘those persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention’.

Previous case law had already discussed the circumstances in which it could be concluded that assistance from the UNRWA had ceased for particular Palestinians, with the consequence that they would immediately be entitled to the benefits of the Refugee Convention (and, transposing this into EU law, to refugee status under the qualification Directive). The recent judgment – the questions in which were addressed by a national court to the CJEU before October 7th 2023 and its aftermath – examines again when UNRWA is unable to offer protection, in particular as regards Gaza. (This judgment is separate from the pending ICJ case alleging breaches of the Genocide Convention, and from the requests for ICC warrants as regards Hamas and Israeli leaders).

Applying that prior case law, the most recent judgment confirms that the conditions in Gaza – both before and after October 7 2023 – could be considered as circumstances in which UNRWA protection or assistance has ceased, for reasons other than the will of the asylum-seeker, in particular because of a ‘personal state of serious insecurity, taking into account, where applicable, his or her state of vulnerability, and that UNRWA finds itself, for whatever reason, including by reason of the general situation prevailing in that sector, unable to ensure dignified living conditions and minimum security for that stateless person, taking into account, where applicable, the specific needs linked to his or her state of vulnerability’. The national authorities had to consider whether ‘the impossibility, for whatever reason, to receive UNRWA’s protection or assistance places that stateless person at real risk of being exposed to living conditions which do not ensure that, under UNRWA’s mission, his or her essential needs in terms of health, education and subsistence are met, taking into account, where applicable, his or her specific essential needs due to his or her belonging to a group of people being characterised by a reason of vulnerability, such as age.’

The Court also referred to a UNHCR position paper on returns to Gaza from 2022, which ‘in view of the indications of serious violations and abuses of internationally recognised human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the continuing instability in that sector, the HCR is said to have called on States to allow all civilians fleeing the Gaza Strip to enter their territories and respect the principle of non-refoulement. The HCR expressly emphasises that the situation in that sector may constitute an objective reason for Palestinian refugees to leave it, explaining therefore that UNRWA’s protection or assistance must be considered to have ceased for them.’ Since then, the Court noted that ‘both the living conditions in the Gaza Strip and UNRWA’s capacity to fulfil its mission have experienced an unprecedented deterioration due to the consequences of the events of 7 October 2023.’

Finally, a recent Advocate-General’s opinion concerned integration of refugees after obtaining refugee status from a Member State (the Keren case – Case C-158/23). In the Advocate-General’s view, it was open to Member States to make such courses compulsory – although the fines or other penalties for not attending or completing the courses must remain proportionate.  

 

Asylum procedures

The starting point of the asylum procedure in the EU’s asylum procedures Directive is the right of access to the procedure, which has been the subject of many important judgments. Last week, it was an important part of a judgment (Case C-123/22) fining Hungary for failure to comply with a previous judgment (Case C-808/18) on asylum law. While Hungary had closed the transit zones that were partly at issue in that judgment, it had maintained restrictions on applying for asylum; the Court also ruled that Hungary had still limited the right of asylum-seekers to stay pending appeal, as required by the Directive, and was still in breach of a number of provisions of the Returns Directive.

As a penalty for non-compliance with the prior judgment, the Court fined Hungary €200 million as a lump sum – a wholly unprecedented amount – as well as €1 million/day (also higher than usual) for continued non-compliance after the latest judgment. The latter sum was divided between penalties for non-compliance with asylum law (€900,000 day) and non-compliance with the Returns Directive (€100,000 day). The size of the sum – far more than the Commission had requested – was justified by the exceptionally serious nature of the breach, based on the importance of the rights at issue for the people concerned (taking account of the Charter, the Refugee Convention and the ECHR), the effect of transferring obligations to other Member States (taking account of the principle of solidarity in EU law, especially in asylum and immigration), the repeated breaches of EU law in this field (the Court also referred to its judgments in Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17 on relocation, C-821/19 on criminalising assistance to asylum-seekers, and C-823/21 on access to the territory), and the failure to cooperate with the Commission (Hungary had made no effort to comply with the prior judgment other than closing the transit zones, and had attempted to stall compliance by asking its constitutional court to rule; but the Court reiterated the primacy of EU law).

The procedures Directive includes several grounds of inadmissibility of asylum claims, including (optionally) another Member State having granted international protection. But the previous case law of the CJEU (for instance, Ibrahim) recognises that it might nevertheless exceptionally be possible to claim protection status in a second Member State in such cases, due to severe human rights problems in the first Member State. In such cases, does the second Member State have to mutually recognise the prior positive decision of the first Member State? Today’s new judgment (Case C-753/22) addressed this issue for the first time.

In the Court’s view, Article 78 TFEU, which provides for the power for the EU political bodies to adopt legislation to create ‘a uniform status of asylum…valid throughout the Union’, does not itself create an independent mutual recognition obligation for Member States. Rather it creates a power to legislate to that effect – but this power has not yet been exercised. In principle, therefore, the Syrian woman in this case, who had been recognised as a refugee by Greece, nevertheless had to convince the German authorities that she was entitled to refugee status (the latter authorities had rejected her application, but had agreed that she was entitled to subsidiary protection status). While Member States could exercise their power (under current EU asylum law) to set higher standards than the minimum set out in EU law, including mutual recognition of other Member States’ grant of status, Germany had not chosen to do so.

However, while the first Member State’s grant of refugee status was not binding on the second Member State, it was not wholly irrelevant either: the Court said when assessing an application for refugee status, the latter State’s authorities had to contact the first Member State’s authorities, and take into account the first Member State’s decision, considering that the logic of the Common European Asylum System was to ensure harmonised interpretation of asylum law.

This judgment is closely linked to a second judgment today, in Case C-352/22. In this case, Italy had recognised a Turkish man as a refugee; he subsequently moved to Germany (the Court did not state on what basis), after which Turkey had sent an extradition request to Germany for him.  Although the procedures Directive provides that asylum-seekers have the right to remain on the territory until the first instance decision is taken on their application, this is subject to very narrow exceptions, including extradition to a non-EU country – provided that the authorities are satisfied that there is no direct or indirect refoulement in breach of international or EU law (there is also a right to stay in principle when appealing a refusal of an asylum application, but in that case the exceptions are broader). Of course, the Turkish man in this case was no longer an asylum-seeker, but a recognised refugee – so the Court observed that a recognised refugee was entitled to non-refoulement protection under the Qualification Directive. This extended, in effect, also to Member States other than the one which granted refugee status, in conjunction with Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter (which concern the right to asylum and protection from non-refoulement). In the Court’s view, extradition could not be granted unless the first Member State decided to withdraw refugee status, subject to the EU law rules and procedures on that point – although the second Member State could contact that Member State with a view to obtaining further information about that person’s refugee status, possibly suggesting that status should be withdrawn.  

Another ground of inadmissibility (in this case, mandatory) is a repeat application for asylum. A recent judgment (Case C-216/22) adds to the case law on this issue. While the procedures Directive obliges Member States to find repeat applications inadmissible, there is an exception to that obligation where the repeat application raises ‘new elements or findings’ that ‘significantly add to the likelihood’ of qualifying for international protection. In this case, a Syrian man who had been refused refugee status (although granted subsidiary protection) in Germany made a fresh application for refugee status, arguing that a CJEU judgment delivered in the meantime, concerning asylum law and conscientious objection (Case C-238/19), was a ‘new element’ that meant that his repeat application should be admissible.

The CJEU confirmed its prior case law which said that its own judgments could be a ‘new element’ justifying the admissibility of a repeat application (see Joined Cases C-924/19 and C-925/19), clarifying that this could be the case for any of its judgments, not just those holding that national law was in breach of EU law – although the Court observed that its prior judgment would have to be relevant to significantly increasing the likelihood of obtaining international protection, as the Directive requires. But the Court stated that the failure to raise the issue earlier was not the ‘fault’ of the asylum-seeker (an important point because the Directive provides that Member States can optionally require this as a condition for the repeat application being inadmissible).

This judgment also addressed appeals, confirming the prior case law that Member States are not obliged to let courts, in the event of a successful appeal against the refusal of status, substitute their decision for the administration’s – provided that the administration, when making a fresh decision after their previous refusal being quashed by the courts, was bound by the court judgment (on the remedy if the administration fails to do so, see Torubarov).

Another ground of inadmissibility (in this case optional for Member States) is that the applicant arguably should have applied in a ‘safe third country’ before reaching the EU (for a map of national lists of such countries, see here). The Directive sets out criteria for defining a ‘safe third country’ (on which, see the recent Irish High Court judgment discussed here), and also requires both a ‘connection’ with that country and that the application must be considered on the merits if the non-EU country concerned does not allow the asylum-seeker to enter. A new Advocate-General’s opinion (Case C-134/23) examines the last point, given that Turkey does not readmit asylum-seekers from Greece. The national court asked if this prevented Turkey from being listed as a ‘safe third country’ in the first place, or had effect only at the point of deciding on the admissibility of the application or enforcement of the asylum-seeker’s removal.

In the Advocate-General’s view, the certain refusal of readmission (which he contrasted with the prospect that readmission might be uncertain) did not prevent a country from being listed as a ‘safe third country’, since the Directive did not require the readmission issue to be a factor when the listed was made. Instead, the rule applied first when inadmissibility was considered: a Member State could not hold an application inadmissible on ‘safe third country’ grounds where it was certain, at that time, that the application would be refused. On the other hand, if it was ‘likely’ or ‘plausible’ that the asylum-seeker would be readmitted, then the authorities could decide that the case was inadmissible. In the latter case, authorities would subsequently have to ‘verify’ readmission ‘in practice’; but if the asylum-seeker was then not readmitted in practice at the time of enforcement, the Member State ‘may not enforce’ the inadmissibility decision, and would have to consider the application on the merits. This interpretation was justified both by the objective of efficient procession of asylum applications (if the refusal to readmit was certain, adopting an inadmissibility decision which could not be enforced would be wasting time), and by its consistency with the newly adopted asylum procedures Regulation.

Finally, a recent Advocate-General’s opinion (Case C-406/22) concerned the ‘safe country of origin’ rules, which are currently an option for Member States (for a map of national lists, see here). These rules provide that an application for asylum can be fast-tracked on the merits because that country can be presumed safe, due to meeting the criteria set out in the Directive. According to the Advocate-General, in a case concerning the Czech government’s designation of part of Moldova as a ‘safe country of origin’, Moldova’s emergency derogation from the ECHR on the basis of Article 15 ECHR did not as such prevent it from being designated as a ‘safe country of origin’ – although the derogation was a factor to consider when assessing whether human rights were generally upheld in that country. However, the Advocate-General argued that it was illegal, under the current law, to designate only part of a country of origin as ‘safe’ – even if, as in the case of Moldova, the territorial distinction was based on which part of a country was effectively controlled (or not) by its government. Finally, as regards appeals, the opinion argues that courts hearing an appeal must raise the question of legality of designations of ‘safe countries of origin’ of their own motion.   

 

Dublin

The equivalent of ‘safe third country’ rules within the EU is the EU’s Dublin rules on responsibility for asylum applications, currently set out in the Dublin III Regulation. There are two recent judgments on the Regulation.

First of all, a judgment in February (Case C-392/22) applied the human rights exception to the Dublin rules – previously used to prevent transfers to Member States where the asylum system had collapsed, or which did not have adequate support for the asylum-seekers in question – for the first time to the issue of ‘pushbacks’, ie illegal returns to non-EU countries without considering asylum applications. According to the Court, pushbacks were a breach of EU law, as they did not give asylum-seekers an effective opportunity to apply for asylum, as required by the asylum procedures Directive. They may also be a breach of the principle of non-refoulement guaranteed by the Charter and the Refugee Convention, if the asylum seeker was pushed back to an unsafe country. Automatic detention at border posts was also a breach of EU law.

However, it did not necessarily follow that the human rights clause in the Regulation prevented transfers in such cases. There needs to be a systemic flaw resulting in a real risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, with the two parts of that test being considered separately. The Court confirmed that a ‘systemic’ risk had to apply to the entire asylum system or certain groups of applicants, clarifying that those crossing from Belarus into Poland could be such a group. As for the risk of torture et al, the national court had to examine whether there would be a ‘real risk’ after a transfer of being ‘taken to the border between Poland and Belarus and of being subjected there to a pushback to Belarus, possibly after being detained at a border control post, and, secondly, whether such measures or such practices would expose him to a situation of extreme material poverty that would not allow him to meet his most basic needs, such as, inter alia, food, personal hygiene and a place to live, and that would undermine his physical or mental health or put him in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity, placing him in a situation of such gravity that it may be equated with inhuman or degrading treatment’ (following prior case law on the latter point). The risk would have to be assessed at the time of transfer, not as of when the asylum seeker ‘originally entered the territory of that Member State’.

The Court also opined on the evidence needed to establish a Charter risk, ruling that the national authorities had to consider both evidence submitted by the asylum-seeker and any evidence they could obtain on their own motion. But it was possible, as noted in prior case law, to seek to obtain individual guarantees from the other Member State about the treatment of the asylum seeker following any transfer.  

Secondly, a judgment in April (Case C-359/22) reaffirmed the Court’s case law on the ‘sovereignty clause’, a provision in the Dublin III Regulation that allows a Member State to take responsibility for an asylum-seeker even if their asylum application is not the responsibility of that Member State under the Dublin rules. The judgment confirmed that asylum-seekers did not have an EU law right to bring a legal challenge against a Member State’s decision not to exercise that option, because it was wholly discretionary. Nor did the EU Charter confer a right to challenge such decisions, or to suspend their implementation. And the time limit to carry out a transfer runs from the time another Member State accepts it or an appeal with suspensive effect is rejected, not from the date of refusal to trigger the sovereignty clause.

 

Impact of new EU asylum law

Would the recent judgments and Advocates-General opinions be decided the same way under the revised EU asylum laws, mostly applicable from June and July 2026? Taking the judgments and opinions in turn, there is no significant change to the definition of ‘particular social group’ under the 2024 Qualification Regulation (Member States will be obliged to apply both parts of the definition of ‘particular social group’, but then the Court’s judgments examine both parts anyway). Nor does that Regulation alter the approach to the special position of Palestinian refugees. However, the exception on sur place asylum applications is different, so the recent judgment on the exception cannot simply be applied without modification (see detailed discussion in my article on the new asylum laws). As for integration conditions, the 2024 Regulation sets out more details than the current Directive, but is consistent with the recent opinion: Member States can make integration courses compulsory but they must in principle be free of charge; fees can be charged as a derogation, but only if beneficiaries of international protection have the means and are not being placed under an ‘unreasonable burden’.

For asylum procedures, the new Procedures Regulation will retain a slightly different rule on access to the procedure (see also recital 13 in the preamble), as well as most of the right to stay pending appeal, so Hungary would still be in breach of the provisions concerned if it does not comply with the Court’s recent judgment.

The Regulation will also retain the non-refoulement protection against exercising the extradition exception to an asylum-seeker’s right to remain on the territory awaiting a first instance decision; the qualification Regulation will likewise retain (more straightforward) non-refoulement protection for those with refugee or subsidiary protection status (although the rules on withdrawal of status will change somewhat). The inadmissibility rules in the procedures Regulation still provide for optional inadmissibility for those asylum seekers who have international protection from another Member State. But the exception to this rule was always solely a creation of the Court’s case law, based on the Charter. None of the new EU laws provide for recognition of international protection status conferred by another Member State. In light of all this, there is no reason to think that the Court’s new judgments on the issues of mutual recognition and extradition will be overruled. It might be argued, though, that in light of the additional harmonisation of law brought about by the new legislation, a prior grant of refugee or subsidiary protection status by another Member State must be even more taken into account in the event of an application in a second Member State.

As for repeat applications, there are some changes (the ‘fault’ test is now mandatory, and an option for Member States to allow other reasons for considering a repeat application has been dropped) but the core of the rule (mandatory inadmissibility; exception for ‘new elements’) remains intact, so again the Court’s recent judgment (which explicitly addressed the ‘fault’ test anyway) should still be relevant. The relevant provision on appeals has not been changed either. 

For ‘safe third countries’, the Regulation includes a slightly reworded rule about readmission to the non-EU country deemed ‘safe’; and as noted above, the Advocate-General expressly aligns his opinion interpreting the current Directive with the wording of the Regulation on this point. On the other hand, the ‘safe country of origin’ rule is amended in the Regulation to allow the designation of only parts of countries – so the position set out in the recent Advocate-General’s opinion would be different, as the Advocate-General notes. (There is no reason why the other aspects of that opinion would be different).

Finally, as for the replacement for Dublin, the ‘AMMR’ or ‘RAMM’ Regulation, there are minor changes to the human rights and sovereignty clauses – but nothing so significant that it would change the Court’s recent judgments.

 

Comments

Despite its voluminous prior case law on asylum, much of the Court’s recent asylum case law breaks new ground. In fact, it is striking that it breaks new ground in particular in three areas linked to the core of EU law: mutual recognition, sex equality, and enforcement of EU law. Interestingly, the Court takes three different approaches to the links between EU asylum law and these three basic principles.

On mutual recognition, the Court takes what might be called a ‘distinction’ approach: keeping asylum law separate from the way in which the EU law principle more commonly applies. The Court passes up the opportunity to extend this basic EU law principle to the grant of refugee (or, implicitly, subsidiary protection status) by another Member State, in effect distinguishing this area of law from internal market law (and also the law on civil and criminal judicial cooperation). In comparison to internal market law, for example, it could be said that refugees who move between Member States have less protection in this context than, for instance, alcohol (Cassis), chocolate bars (Mars), or margarine (Rau) – reinforcing the bias of EU law towards protection of economic interests. This is so even though EU asylum law (and indeed international law) provides for far more underlying harmonisation of the law than many of the areas of the internal market where mutual recognition applies.

Having said that, though, the Treaty wording is different – referring to a power to adopt mutual recognition rules, rather than an obligation to ensure free movement – and in any event, today’s judgments do not reject any legal effect of the grant of refugee status by another Member State. There is not only an obligation for the second Member State to take the first Member State’s grant of status into account, if a fresh asylum application is lodged in the second Member State, but also the second Member State must give effect to the most fundamental aspect of refugee law – non-refoulement – until and unless the first Member State withdraws refugee status. And given the Court’s reference to non-refoulment generally, this should protect refugees not only against extradition, but also against expulsion or any other form of removal to their State of origin.

In contrast to mutual recognition, the Court’s approach to sex equality and asylum law could be described as an ‘integration’ approach: attempting to integrate asylum law into the mainstream of the application of the EU law principle (like sexual orientation equality previously). The Court’s second judgment on this issue in particular explicitly links the interpretation of EU asylum law to the sex equality rights in the Charter; and its reference to women’s identity including choices as regards work outside the home implicitly links to a well-known massive area of EU law. In fact its first judgment also now implicitly links to subsequent EU legislation on violence against women.

Of course, issues specific to asylum law remain: again like LGBT cases, attention may now turn to the definition of persecution, and to the credibility of asylum claims on this ground. An asylum-seeker who believes that a woman needs a man like a fish needs the Common Fisheries Policy is not likely to succeed. More seriously, the Court’s delinking of sex equality grounds with religion grounds may be a precursor of what is to come: authorities might argue that women can only succeed on this ground if they denounce religion and dress differently, for instance. And the case law on offensive questions and psychological tests in LGBT asylum cases may turn out to be relevant by analogy.

On enforcement of EU law, the Court’s approach could be described as an ‘extension’ of the EU law principle: further developing the case law on how fines against Member States for non-compliance with prior judgments work (for an analysis of previous case law on this issue, see the European Law Review article I co-authored with Marios Costa). The judgment against Hungary in effect sets out a new category of ‘extraordinarily serious’ cases in which vastly higher fines could be imposed. Although the criteria offered are necessarily specific to asylum law, they could arguably be adapted to other areas of EU law – for instance a particularly serious infringement of free movement rights, or exceptional damage to the environment (many of the cases on fines for non-compliance concern environmental law).

Finally, one striking feature of the recent case law is that it retains a broadly liberal approach to the interpretation and enforcement of EU asylum law. Nothing new, you might say; but by the judgments delivered in June, it is clear that the Court is maintaining its liberal approach despite the adoption of more restrictive asylum legislation by the EU’s political institutions. Even the arguably more restrictive interpretations have liberal elements: the Court requires both parts of the ‘particular social group’ test to be fulfilled (as the qualification Directive requires), but interprets them both generously; the Court leaves it to the EU political bodies to require the mutual recognition of refugee decisions (as the Treaty suggests), but gives an EU-wide non-refoulement effect to each Member State’s decisions. One key question in the years to come is whether the Court assumes the traditional position of centrist deference to right wing populism in this field – or whether it says no pasaran.

 

Annex - other pending cases

Qualification

Cases C-608/22 and C-609/22 – Afghan women – AG opinion of 9 Nov 2023 – see analysis of the opinion in a blog post by Türkan Ertuna Lagrand and Salvo Nicolosi 

Case C-747/22 – access to benefits

Case C-217/23 Laghman – ‘particular social group’ – blood feud

Case C-352/23 Changu – national protection status

Case C-454/23 – revocation of refugee status on security grounds

Case C-63/24 Galte – exclusion clause

 

Procedures

Case C-123/23 Khan Yunis – inadmissibility – repeat application following a negative decision by another Member State – AG opinion due 27 June 2024

Case C-202/23Baabda – see Khan Yunis

Case C-288/23 El Baheer – inadmissibility – repeat application following a positive decision by another Member State

Case C-551/23 Cassen – mutual recognition of asylum decisions

Case C-610/23 Al Nasiria – appeals

Case C-656/23 Karaman – access to the territory – relevance to date of residence permit

Case C-662/23 Izmir – six-month deadline to decide on applications

Cases C-50/24, C-51/24, C-52/24, C-53/24, C-54/24, C-55/24, C-56/24 – border procedure

 

Dublin

Case C-560/23 Tang – time limits for transfer

Case C-790/23 Qassioun – prior rejection in Denmark

Case C-185/24 Tudmur – human rights clause – Italian suspension of transfers

 

Reception conditions

Case C-97/24 – damages for breach of the Directive

Cases C-104/24 and C-105/24 – alternatives to detention

Case C-184/24 Sidi Bouzid – withdrawal of benefits

 

Temporary Protection

Case C-753/23 Kraslivamovement between Member States

Case C-244/24 Kaduna status of non-Ukrainians

Case C-290/24 Abkez – ditto 

 

Tuesday, 30 April 2024

High Trust Arrangements in a Low Trust Context: The Rwanda Policy’s impact on the Common Travel Area

 

 


Professor Colin Murray, University of Newcastle, and Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Zairon, via Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

The latest spat between the UK and Ireland over the knock-on consequences of the UK’s Rwanda policy exposes the tangled web of EU law and Common Travel Area (CTA) arrangements which now cover the interactions between both countries’ immigration policies. This post considers these interactions and proposals of the Irish Government to legislate in light of the Irish High Court decision in A v Minister for Justice.

The Realities of the CTA post-Brexit

The CTA has been a remarkably durable feature of relations between the UK and Ireland for over a century. In the immediate aftermath of a bloody war of independence, both countries recognised the mutual benefits of facilitating people moving across their new borders. And even at the height of the Brexit referendum campaign, pro-Brexit campaigners lined up to downplay any concerns around the land border because the CTA would continue after Brexit. Even if it was not, of itself, capable of ensuring an open border on the island of Ireland, the CTA was generally accepted as providing an important ongoing element of UK-Ireland relations. This always underplayed how difficult it was going to be to make these arrangements work post Brexit.

The CTA arrangement has been operable for so long on the basis that it works on two levels; unrestricted movement can take place between the parts of the CTA because each part enforces broadly comparable external rules of entry. For decades, the two states aligned their immigration policy and enforced a shared list of excluded individuals. After both joined the EEC at the same time, these arrangements were augmented by a range of EU law, but Ireland and the UK continued to jointly operate opt outs to let them maintain distinct elements of immigration policy and to provide more legal entitlements to each other’s citizens than they did to other EU citizens (see here).

Post Brexit, the immediate concern was over the UK’s commitment to the CTA. Once Brexit happened, the common external arrangement would no longer be operative, because EU citizens could continue to move freely into Ireland (whereas they would face new restrictions on moving directly to the UK). They could, however, then use the CTA to move into the UK, thereby circumventing the UK’s new immigration policy.  UK ministers, however, remained confident that they could deal with this issue by immigration enforcement away from the border (by requiring banks, landlords, etc to require individuals provide proof of status before accessing services). They therefore signed up to a new CTA deal with Ireland in 2019.

The latest spat in post-Brexit relations between the UK and Ireland, however, involves the necessary corollary of some of the concerns being raised before Brexit took effect. Once the UK set about tightening its restrictions on immigration, and particularly abandoning safeguards around refugees that it had implemented under EU law, would there be a displacement effect as people turned to Ireland instead to process asylum claims. This led to the claims by Ireland’s Justice Minister, Helen McEntee, that not only was there a sharp rise in asylum applications in Ireland in recent months, that 80% of new applicants were now crossing the land border from Northern Ireland. There has not been any evidence published to support this figure (a fact emphasised by some coalition government ministers from other parties, perhaps more alive to the consequences of ramping up these tensions for the CTA).

Groups like the Irish Refugee Council have pointed out that simply because the number of in-country applications has risen, this does not mean that all of those individuals have crossed the land border (people in the country on a different immigration status can make decisions to apply for asylum on the basis of a change in the circumstances of their home country, for example). But the impression that the UK Government’s Rwanda policy has had a direct knock on impact on Ireland, which needs to be addressed, has become central to ministerial thinking.

The position in Ireland

EU asylum law framework

The problem for Ireland is how to enforce returns to the UK, especially in light of the legislation closing off of routes to claim asylum in the UK. The starting point is that Ireland is bound by aspects of EU asylum law, having exercised the possibility to opt in to parts of it. In particular, Ireland opted into the first phase asylum procedures Directive, adopted in 2005, but not the second phase asylum procedures Directive, adopted in 2013 (the ‘2013 Directive’), both of which contain slightly different rules (optional for Member States) on ‘safe third countries’ – ie countries that asylum seekers could arguably make their applications in instead, other than their countries of origin or the country where they are applying now.

The ‘safe third country’ rules in the Directives refer to non-EU countries. If the argument is that the asylum seeker should have applied in an EU Member State or a Schengen associate (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein), a different set of rules (the ‘Dublin rules’) apply instead, which determine in detail which Member State is considered responsible for the application, how transfers of asylum-seekers to give effect to the responsibility rules work, and what rights asylum-seekers have to challenge the potential transfers. Ireland has opted in to the current version of those rules – the 2013 version of the Dublin Regulation, known as ‘Dublin III’ – which states that rather than apply those rules to transfer an asylum seeker to another Member State which is responsible, a Member State can choose (as an option) to send an asylum seeker to a non-EU country instead, in accordance with the ‘safe third country’ rules in the 2013 Directive. (One way for Ireland to get around difficulties sending asylum seekers back to the UK would be to revert to the Dublin rules and try to send more of them back to other Member States under those criteria; but that will not always work, for instance because there may not be enough evidence to apply those rules, or the responsibility for the Member State which they first entered illegally to deal with the asylum-seeker may have timed out).

Ireland intends to opt in to the 2024 versions of the Dublin Regulation and the procedures law – which will now become a Regulation – after they are formally adopted, which is scheduled for May 14 (on the details of the new Regulations, see here and here). The procedures Regulation will change the ‘safe third country’ rules again. However, this will not have an immediate impact, since these new Regulations will not apply until mid-2026. So the focus here is the current law.

According to the recent Irish High Court judgment, Ireland had ‘safe third country’ rules at several points previously, but reintroduced the possibility in 2020, when an omnibus law on Brexit amended the International Protection Act 2015 to provide again for ‘safe third countries’ to be designated. Obviously this legal change had the UK in mind – given that the Dublin rules ceased to apply to the UK at the end of 2020, when the Brexit transition period expired. Indeed, the Irish government promptly used these new powers to designate the UK as a ‘safe third country’.

EU ‘safe third country’ rules

The 2005 ‘safe third country’ rules, which apply to Ireland as such, state that a Member State can apply the concept ‘only’ if ‘the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking asylum will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:’

a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;

b) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva [Refugee] Convention is respected;

c) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and

d) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The Directive goes on to state that ‘[t]he application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules laid down in national legislation, including:’

a) rules requiring a connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country;

b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant’, which must ‘include case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for a particular applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe’;

c) rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds that he/she would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Next, Member States must:

a) inform the applicant accordingly; and

b) provide him/her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.

Finally, if the non-EU country concerned ‘does not permit the applicant for asylum to enter its territory, Member States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees described in’ the Directive.

The 2013 Directive is similar, except for adding ‘there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU [the EU Directive on definition of refugee and subsidiary protection status] to the list of principles that must apply in the non-EU country, and providing that the applicant must be permitted to argue that the non-EU country ‘is not safe in his or her particular circumstances’ and ‘to challenge the existence of a connection between him or her and the third country in accordance with’ the Directive.

The impact of designating a country as a ‘safe third country’ is that the application is inadmissible on the merits – on the assumption that it will be considered on the merits in the other country instead, because it is presumed that the asylum-seeker will apply for asylum in that country after being expelled there. The case will be fast-tracked, and it may be harder to stay on the territory in the event of an appeal against the decision than in some other cases.

The Court of Justice has ruled several times on the interpretation of the ‘safe third country’ rules in the 2013 Directive: Cases C-564/18, C-821/19, and C-924/19 and C-925/19 PPU, inter alia ruling that the principle does not apply to transit countries, and that Hungary had not fully provided for the guarantees related to the ‘safe third country’ concept’ required by the Directive in its national law.

The High Court judgment

The Irish High Court judgment ruled that the Irish government’s designation of the UK as a ‘safe third country’ was unlawful; but it did not rule on whether or not the UK was actually safe. This apparent paradox stems from the nature of administrative law, which often concerns itself with whether the public administration followed the correct procedure, rather than the merits of the decision – in part because courts are often more willing to review the procedure which a government applied to take a decision than the merits of that decision, which are seen as to some extent a matter of political discretion. So it’s possible that after a court quashes a government measure as unlawful on procedural grounds, the government could back and lawfully adopt the same decision again, provided that it now does so following the correct procedure. (And to knock on the head another common misconception: a minister taking an unlawful decision does not mean that the minister has committed a crime)

So why was the designation of the UK as a ‘safe third country’ unlawful? Mainly because the Irish law from 2020 providing the powers to designate such countries was not fully consistent with EU law, particularly because it did not provide the guarantees required in the 2013 Directive, which is cross-referenced in the Dublin III Regulation. (As noted above, the CJEU came to a very similar conclusion regarding Hungary’s lack of full application of those guarantees, but oddly the High Court judgment makes no reference to this case law). Also, there had not been a continual review of the position in the UK.

However, this did not mean – despite a popular misconception on this point – that the High Court judgment ruled that the UK was unsafe because of the UK’s Rwanda policy. In fact the judgment is at pains to point out that it was not reaching any conclusion on the Rwanda policy one way or another.

The Irish government’s response

The Irish government has announced plans to adopt legislation to designate the UK as a ‘safe third country’. Depending on the content, this may be sufficient to address the specific reasons why the High Court found that the previous designation was unlawful. But this is not the end of the story, because, as we have seen, the High Court did not get into the merits of whether the UK was ‘safe’ or not, particularly in light of the Rwanda policy, which has moreover developed since. Any fresh legislation could be challenged on those grounds. It’s even possible, if fresh challenges are brought, that an Irish court may want to send questions to the CJEU on this or other aspects of interpretation of the ‘safe third country’ rule. (Incidentally, as the Irish High Court did not rule on the merits of whether or not the UK was 'safe', the Irish government - unlike the UK recently - is not legislating to overturn a court judgment on whether another country is 'safe').

Furthermore, there are other elements to the EU rule, not discussed much in the High Court ruling. As noted above, there must be a ‘connection’ between the asylum seeker and the non-EU country (a point notably missing from the Rwanda policy, on the UK side), and the case law says that mere transit is not enough to create a connection. The two asylum-seekers concerned by the previous High Court judgment had been deemed to have spent enough time in the UK to have a ‘connection’, but that will arguably not be the case for all asylum-seekers who might make their way via the UK to Ireland.

Another point – also scrapped on the UK side in the Rwanda policy – is that the asylum-seeker must be readmitted by the non-EU country. The EU rules thus aim to avoid the very limbo that thousands of asylum-seekers are subject to in the UK, where their cases are inadmissible but with no country willing or obliged to decide their applications on the merits. While the High Court judgment refers to UK willingness to readmit asylum seekers previously (see para 44), the UK has now announced that it is not willing to do so, perhaps because it views the CTA arrangements as not binding. This obviously creates a further issue on the EU side (on the readmission/’safe third country’ nexus in EU law, see the pending Case C-134/23).

Immigration Policy for the whole of the UK?

As well as the Irish dimension to this argument, there is also a Northern Irish aspect. Notwithstanding the current wrangling, many question marks hang over the UK’s policy under the Illegal Migration Act 2023, as extended by the Rwanda Act 2024, and particularly over how they apply in the context of Northern Ireland. As part of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement the UK committed to ensuring no diminution of rights and equality protections operative in Northern Ireland law as a result of EU law because of Brexit (Windsor Framework, Article 2). It did so to avoid any claim that Brexit jeopardised the rights provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998, some of which had come to rely upon EU law in practice. This concession headed off a lightning-rod argument for opposition to Brexit in the Northern Ireland context, and enabled the deal to proceed.

But now that these arrangements are in place, and operative, it means that Northern Ireland has a separate (and higher) floor of rights protections than the remainder of the UK. It is arguable that many aspects of EU law applicable to asylum seekers, and providing protections for them (including the Trafficking Directive), continue in full effect in Northern Ireland post Brexit. As pointed out in previous posts (here and here) the courts have the ability to disapply statutes insofar as they conflict with the Windsor Framework arrangements. In other words, this casts doubt on whether the UK Government’s flagship policy on asylum seekers can apply equally in all parts of the UK. The issue has already been argued before the Northern Ireland High Court with regard to the Illegal Migration Act (judgment is pending). Even if the Rwanda Act closes off many legal challenges, asylum seekers within Northern Ireland are therefore likely to try to use the Windsor Framework to challenge any deportations under these measures for the foreseeable future. 

Conclusions

Amid the tangle post-Brexit arrangements, both countries appear to be talking at cross purposes. For the UK Government, Brexit removed its obligations to comply with the Dublin III regulations and the arrangements thereunder for return of asylum seekers to other EU countries (and it cites the restrictions on it being able to enforce the return of individuals to France post Brexit as evidence of this). For the Irish Government, the Dublin III process might have been used when both countries were EU Member States, but the underlying CTA relationship sprang back into full effect (although conditioned by its own EU obligations) once the overlaying EU law was removed post Brexit. In reality, so much of the CTA relies on shared understandings and reciprocal nods, that there is considerable scope for misinterpretation. Indeed, two countries which were engaging with each other in the close collaborative relationship that the CTA requires might well have been expected to publicly make the appropriate arrangements in advance of Brexit taking effect (but that, alas, is not where UK-Ireland relations are at – see Professor Bernard Ryan here).

Elections loom in both Ireland and the UK, and many politicians in both countries have decided that there are votes to be won in looking tough on immigration. When refugees and asylum-seekers are at issue, however, it is difficult to ignore the fact that both countries process a relatively low number of asylum claims on a European level. But both countries are at loggerheads over policies which increasingly put the CTA arrangements in jeopardy and which seek to ignore the fact that conflict and persecution necessarily create more refugees. Both, it has to be concluded, would like this to be someone else’s problem.

Saturday, 27 April 2024

The new EU asylum laws, part 6: the new Dublin rules on responsibility for asylum-seekers

 


Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway, University of London

Photo credit: Ggia, via Wikimedia Commons

(last updated 10 June 2024: changed text marked by an asterisk)

Just before Christmas, the European Parliament and the Council (the EU body consisting of Member States’ ministers) reached a deal on five key pieces of EU asylum legislation, concerning asylum procedures, the ‘Dublin’ system on responsibility for asylum applications, the ‘Eurodac’ database supporting the Dublin system, screening of migrants/asylum seekers, and derogations in the event of crises. These five laws joined the previously agreed revised laws on qualification of refugees and people with subsidiary protection, reception conditions for asylum-seekers, and resettlement of refugees from outside the EU. Taken together, all these laws are a ‘package’ of new or revised EU asylum laws.* The whole package was formally adopted on May 14 2024, and published in the EU Official Journal on 22 May 2024.*

I’ve looked at all the new legislation on this blog in a series of blog posts, which are based on a forthcoming article.* This is the sixth post in the series, on the Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management – which I will refer to as the ‘revised Dublin Regulation’ or ‘2024 Dublin Regulation’ for the sake of simplicity. The other blog posts in the series concern the new qualification Regulation (part 1), the revised reception conditions Directive (part 2), the new Regulation on resettlement of refugees (part 3), the revised Regulation on Eurodac (part 4), the Regulation on screening of migrants (part 5), the Regulation on asylum procedures (part 7), and the crisis Regulation and general conclusions (part 8). 

The 2024 package joins the previous Regulation revising the powers of the EU asylum agency, which was separated from the package and adopted already in 2021.* (On EU asylum law generally, see my asylum law chapter in the latest edition of EU Justice and Home Affairs Law).

The 2024 Dublin Regulation: background

After an early failed attempt to negotiate rules on responsibility for asylum-seekers in the broader Council of Europe framework, a group of EU Member States agreed rules on the issue as part of the Schengen Convention in 1990. These rules were then extended to all Member States in the Dublin Convention in the same year. Subsequently, the Dublin system became part of the EU development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS): the first phase of the CEAS included a ‘Dublin II Regulation’, adopted in 2003, and the second phase included a ‘Dublin III Regulation’, adopted in 2013. During the perceived ‘refugee crisis’, there were two emergency decisions on ‘relocation’ of asylum-seekers (moving some of them from Italy and Greece, who were responsible for their applications, to a different Member State, to reduce the burdens on those frontline States), but they expired in 2017. The case law on the Dublin II Regulation and Dublin III Regulation is presumably still relevant to the 2024 Regulation, except where the latter has changed the text of the rules.

The UK and Ireland both opted into the Dublin II and III Regulations. The UK is no longer part of the Dublin system, as a consequence of Brexit (for more on the Brexit angle, see my comments for the UK in a Changing Europe in 2020; note that since I wrote that, the UK has not negotiated any replacement for Dublin with the EU as a whole or individual Member States, resorting to the Rwanda policy instead). Ireland opted out of the 2024 Dublin Regulation, but has announced an intention to opt in to it after adoption.* Denmark is opted out of the Regulation as such, but nevertheless participates in the Dublin system via a treaty with the EU. There is also a Dublin association treaty with Norway and Iceland, and subsequently with Switzerland and Liechtenstein, in parallel to those countries’ association with Schengen.

The legislative process leading to the 2024 Regulation began with a proposal in 2016, which I commented on at the time. Since this proved particularly difficult to agree, a new proposal was tabled in 2020 as part of the relaunch of the proposed EU Immigration and Asylum Pact.

Substance of the Regulation

Like most of the new asylum laws (except the resettlement Regulation, which will apply almost immediately), the new Dublin rules will apply in about two years’ time - on 1 July 2026.* But certain provisions will have some effect earlier than that, as discussed below. Furthermore, the Commission must produce a ‘common implementation plan’ to the Council within three months of the Regulation’s entry into force (it is planning to issue this early, in June); Member States must produce national implementation plans by 12 December 2024.*

In addition to amending the traditional Dublin rules on criteria for responsibility for asylum applications, and also the process for the transfer of asylum-seekers to the responsible Member State, the 2024 version of the Dublin Regulation does two more (closely linked) things: it sets up an overall framework for asylum and immigration management within the EU, and establishes a solidarity mechanism to share the burden of applications between Member States. This blog post examines in turn the amendments to changes to responsibility, the related procedural rights, and the transfer process, followed by discussion of the new rules on migration management and solidarity, and concluding with an overall assessment.

Criteria for responsibility

As before, there is an underlying obligation for Member States to consider asylum applications, which will be considered by a single Member State responsible under the Dublin criteria; if the criteria do not indicate a responsible Member State, the default is where the application was registered (previously where the application was lodged; the procedures Regulation details the differences between these concepts). It is still possible to send an applicant to a ‘safe third country’ as defined by the procedures law rather than apply the Dublin rules (on which see the CJEU ruling in Mirza, and the recent Irish judgment finding that the UK was wrongly designated a ‘safe’ country in this context). A new provision allocates responsibility if an asylum seeker fails a security check: the Member State conducting the check then becomes responsible for the application.

The exception to the Dublin rules where there are serious human rights breaches in the responsible State (dating back to the CJEU’s interpretation of the Dublin II Regulation in NS and ME, and added to the text of the Dublin III Regulation), also remains. But there are some amendments to the exception: it now solely refers to Article 4 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (the ban on facing torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment), rather than also to ‘systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State’; the clauses on dependent persons and the sovereignty clause (both discussed below) must also be considered; and it is possible to consider all Member States (not just those responsible according to the Dublin criteria) before the Member State where the application was registered becomes responsible. The former change is perhaps due to CJEU case law which confirmed that asylum-seekers could also not be returned to a Member State where they faced an Article 4 risk because of their individual situation, or because of a risk of severe material poverty (see respectively CK and Jawo). On the other hand, the CJEU has rejected arguments that the exception applies where there are flaws applying the qualification criteria in the other Member State (Cases C-228/21 etc), although in some circumstances ‘pushbacks’ would be a ground for challenging Dublin transfers (Case C-392/22). (The position of those – other than resettled persons – who already have international protection in one Member State but seek it in another Member State due to human rights problems in the former State is governed by the procedures Regulation).

A new provision in the 2024 Regulation expressly obliges each asylum-seeker to apply in the Member State of first entry. This has long been the popular conception of what the Dublin rules do anyway, but in fact they previously only referred to obligations for Member States, not asylum-seekers – although of course this will often have amounted to a de facto obligation for asylum seekers in practice, to the extent that Member States attempted to enforce the rules. As a derogation from this new rule, asylum seekers must apply in a Member State that gave them a residence document or visa; if that residence document or visa has expired or been withdrawn et al, they must apply in the Member State where they are present. Asylum-seekers also have further obligations: to cooperate in providing evidence relevant to the Dublin rules; to provide biometric data for the Eurodac database; to be present in the Member State where they were obliged to apply, or which is responsible, or which they were relocated to; and to cooperate and comply with a transfer decision.

What if the asylum-seeker does not comply with these obligations? Another new clause sets out consequences for non-compliance: loss of certain reception conditions under the revised reception conditions Directive, subject to the conditions that the asylum-seeker was informed and that a basic standard of living is maintained. This exception was discussed in Part 2 of this series, commenting on that revised Directive. But there are exceptions, which are not mentioned in that Directive, if there are reasonable grounds to  believe that the asylum-seeker is a victim of human trafficking, as defined by EU law, as well as a general obligation to ‘take into account the individual circumstances of the applicant, including any real risk of violations of fundamental rights in the Member State where the applicant is required to be present’, together with the principle of proportionality.

Moving on to the criteria for responsibility themselves, they still apply in the order in which they appear – but there are some changes, both to those criteria and to that order of appearance. First of all, the criteria relating to responsibility for unaccompanied minors (starting with responsibility for the Member State where there is a legally present family member or sibling) are largely unchanged, although the default rule is now where the minor’s application was ‘first registered’, rather than where it was ‘lodged’; this seems to change the case law (see Case C-648/11). Secondly, the criterion assigning responsibility to the Member State where a family member has international protection has been widened, to include also Member States where the family member has EU long-term residence on the basis of the EU long-term residence Directive (or national long-term residence, if the Directive does not apply to the Member State in question). However, the third criterion – where family members are themselves asylum-seekers, if they are awaiting a first instance decision on the substance – is unchanged.

Underlying these criteria is the definition of ‘family member’, which has been amended. It now applies to family relationships that pre-dated entry into the territory, not only to families which existed in the country of origin; so it would now cover (for example) Syrians who got married or had a child while in Turkey. Otherwise the definition is the same (spouse or unmarried partner, if national immigration law treats spouses and partners the same; unmarried minor children of the couple or applicant; or the parent or other adult responsible for an unmarried minor). Similar changes were made to the family reunion definition in the qualifications and reception conditions rules, as we saw in Parts 1 and 2 of this series.

The next criterion remains holding a residence document or visa. Here, the rules have changed to provide for a longer period of responsibility where either the residence document (three years instead of two) or visa (18 months, instead of six) has expired (on the CJEU’s interpretation of ‘residence documents’ and ‘visa’, see Case C-568/21 on diplomatic cards, and Jafari on the Merkel waiver of the rules in 2015). Along the same lines, there is then a wholly new criterion: the Member State where the asylum-seeker obtained a diploma or other qualification, if it was attained less than six years before the asylum application. The next two criteria are not new, but rather have been moved higher up the list of criteria, now trumping irregular entry: those who entered on the basis of a visa waiver, or who applied in the international transit area of an airport.

The irregular entry criterion – the best known rule, but obviously not the only one, or even the first one – is now the bottom of the list (leaving aside the default of where the application was registered), and has itself been amended: responsibility now expires 20 months after the irregular border crossing of a Member State (instead of 12); the ‘Sangatte clause’ on responsibility for irregular stay on the territory of a Member State has been dropped; and there are new provisions on search and rescue cases (responsibility expiring after 12 months) and relocation (on interpretation of this criterion, see again Jafari). Finally, the special provisions on dependents, and the ‘sovereignty clause’ allowing Member States to accept cases that are not their responsibility under the rules (or to request another Member State that is not responsible to accept responsibility), remain largely unchanged (there’s extensive case law on the sovereignty clause, leaving Member States with discretion to apply it: see most recently Case C-359/22. In a dig at Merkel, the 2016 proposal would have curtailed its use substantially, but that proposal got nowhere).

Procedural rights

At the start of the Dublin process, the right to information for asylum-seekers has been expanded to include more issues. There is a new right to legal counselling at this point. The previous rules on the right to an interview have been amended, inter alia to add details on the questions to be asked and a requirement to record the interview (in place of a written summary). (On the scope and effect – under the Dublin III Regulation – of the rights to information and an interview, see Cases C-228/21 etc) Next, the previous rules on the rights of minors have also been amended, in particular to elaborate on the role of the child’s representatives, expand upon the notion of the ‘best interests of the child’, and require an assessment before transferring an unaccompanied minor.

As for remedies once a transfer decision has been made, Member States are still obliged to inform asylum seekers if another Member State has agreed to take back or take charge of them, with additional obligations to inform them of the obligation to comply. While there is still a right to an effective remedy against a transfer, the detailed rules on the remedy restrict it compared to the Dublin III Regulation. In particular, the scope of the remedy is now limited to assessment of specific issues (Article 4 of the Charter, new circumstances since the transfer decision, or an application of the responsibility criteria related to family members), effectively overturning prior case law which allowed for exercise of appeal rights in more cases (see, for instance, Ghezelbash). It is now specified that Member States must give asylum seekers at least one week, but not more than three weeks, to bring an appeal. Also, the prospects of suspensive effect of an appeal have been weakened by making the main rule merely a request for suspensive effect, dropping stronger options. Finally, the right to legal aid for such appeals is retained.

Moving on to detention pending a Dublin transfer, detention solely for being subject to a Dublin procedure is still ruled out. But the threshold to detain has been lowered (a ‘risk of absconding’, in place of a ‘significant risk of absconding’), and there is now a second ground to detain (‘where the protection of national security or public order so requires’). There is still a general rule that detention must be for ‘as short a period as possible’, and ‘for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to complete the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this Regulation is carried out’, and the previous time limits requiring a fast track application of the transfer rules where an asylum seeker was detained have been shortened. As for detention conditions, they are still governed by cross-reference to the reception conditions Directive (see Part 2 of this series), although specific procedural guarantees (reasons for detention in writing, speedy judicial review) have been added to the 2024 Dublin Regulation itself. This is potentially confusing, as these provisions in the Regulation are an abridged version of the guarantees in the Directive.

Transfer process

The detailed rules on Member States’ obligations have been amended, inter alia to extend the obligations to take back asylum seekers to include those who have been admitted under an EU or national resettlement scheme but move irregularly to the territory of another Member State (on the EU resettlement scheme, see Part 3 of this series). Apparently, the obligation for the responsible Member State to consider the merits of an application made by an asylum-seeker who moves to another Member State has been dropped; the procedures Regulation in fact treats such cases as normally withdrawn. Also, there are revised rules on the cessation of responsibility, meaning that Member States remain responsible for longer. The deadlines to request another Member State to take charge of an applicant are shorter, as are the deadlines to reply to those requests. There are similar changes to the rules on take back requests. If a request to take charge or take back is accepted, the requesting State must adopt a transfer decision within two weeks.

The next step in the process – the transfer itself – must still be carried out within six months of the acceptance of the transfer request or the final decision on appeal. But the previous exception extending the deadline to eighteen months when the asylum-seeker absconds has been extended further to three years, and now also applies when the asylum-seeker ‘is physically resisting the transfer, is intentionally making himself or herself unfit for the transfer, or is not complying with medical requirements for the transfer.’ (There’s extensive prior case law on this deadline, for instance as regards covid cases and trafficking in persons).

Migration management and solidarity framework

The new provisions on migration management start with a general obligation on the EU and its Member States to establish comprehensive migration management, which is further broken down into internal and external components. There is also a general obligation to ensure solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility, backed up by a ‘Migration Toolbox’ of EU policies. Member States must establish national strategies to manage migration and asylum, and the Commission must build on this to adopt a (non-binding) long-term EU Migration Management Strategy. The first of these strategies must be adopted within 18 months of the entry into force of the Regulation (so likely late 2025 or early 2026), and then every five years afterward, including a ‘prominent role’ for the case law of the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights.

Next, the Commission must adopt an annual report on asylum and migration, ‘assessing the asylum, reception and migratory situation over the previous 12 month period and any possible developments providing a strategic situational picture of the area of migration and asylum that also serves as an early warning and awareness tool for the Union’. The report must assess migration developments, provide a forward projection, examine preparedness and capacity, and judge whether solidarity measures are necessary. Reports must be issued by October 15 each year, starting in 2025. Together with the annual report, the Commission must adopt an implementing decision defining which Member States are ‘under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation’ – which, as we will see, is linked to the solidarity rules under the new Dublin Regulation.

Also at the same time, the Commission must present a proposal for a Council implementing measure establishing the ‘Solidarity Pool’ – ‘to address the migratory situation in the upcoming year in a balanced and effective manner’, and which ‘shall reflect the annual projected solidarity needs of the Member States under migratory pressure’. This will identify the EU-wide annual needs for solidarity, which must be ‘at least’ 30,000 relocations and €600 million in financial contributions, setting out indicative shares of these contributions from each Member State based on the annual key in the Regulation, to ‘with a view to facilitating’ a pledging exercise. The need for solidarity is the norm: the Commission can only propose that such contributions are unnecessary in ‘exceptional situations’. There seems to be no possibility to propose numbers of relocations between zero and 30,000, or contributions below €600 million.

Conversely, these numbers could be higher, and also the Commission ‘may identify other forms of solidarity…depending on the needs for such measures arising from the specific challenges in the area of migration in the Member State concerned’. But if the numbers are higher, the ratio between relocations and financial contributions ‘shall be maintained’ (ie raising the financial contributions to €900 million would mean raising the relocations to 45,000). In proposing the size of the Pool, the Commission has to ‘take into account relevant qualitative and quantitative criteria, including, for the relevant year, the overall number of arrivals, the average recognition rates as well as the average return rates’. Due to the political sensitivity of the discussion, the Commission’s proposal will be secret until the Council has adopted the implementing decision.

To follow up the Commission proposal, there is a ‘High Level Solidarity Forum’ of Member States’ representatives, chaired by the Council Presidency, which will consider the Commission proposals within 15 days. This Forum is the venue for Member States to pledge towards the solidarity requirements; it can be reconvened if arguably more solidarity is necessary. The process is assisted by a technical-level forum and an EU Solidarity Coordinator, appointed by the Commission.

The Regulation’s provisions on solidarity explain further what the Solidarity Pool will consist of: relocation of both asylum-seekers and (if both States consent) beneficiaries of international protection, if they obtained their status less than three years before the Council act adopting the Solidarity Pool (those with international protection must also consent to relocation, but asylum-seekers are only consulted); financial contributions as regards asylum and migration, including possibly to non-EU countries ‘that might have a direct impact on the migratory flows at the external borders of Member States or improve the asylum, reception and migration system of the third country concerned, including assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes’; and alternative measures, which focus ‘on operational support, capacity building, services, staff support, facilities and technical equipment’.

As for the Council decision establishing the Solidarity Pool each year, it shall be adopted by qualified majority (including amendments to the Commission proposal). Presumably the Council can amend the proposed number of relocations and financial support, either up or down. Crucially, ‘Member States shall have full discretion in choosing between the types of solidarity measures’, or a combination of them: in other words, they do not necessarily have to relocate asylum-seekers (the preamble also states that relocation is ‘voluntary’). The final decision will be based on what Member States are willing to pledge – a change from at least one of the 2015 relocation decisions, which set relocation numbers that some Member States disagreed with.

The Regulation then sets out the process by which Member States identified in the Commission’s decision as facing migratory pressure make use of the Solidarity Pool. Also, a Member State which was not identified as facing migratory pressure may apply to make use of the Pool; in that case the Commission must assess that Member State’s argument that it is facing such pressure. Presumably a refusal could be challenged. If the Commission agrees with the Member State, the Council will assess whether there is any capacity left in the Solidarity Pool for that year; if there is insufficient capacity, the Council will reopen the pledging process.

Member States facing migratory pressure, or a significant migratory situation (or which consider that they face such scenarios) can also ask to deduct some or all of their pledged contributions to the Pool. The Council will decide, following an assessment by the Commission, whether to agree to this request or not. Alternatively, under some circumstances, Member States’ relocation pledges can be offset by taking responsibility for applications that are not their responsibility under the Regulation. In other words, Germany might pledge to take 5,000 asylum-seekers from Greece to share its burden; but in practice this might take the form of Germany not transferring 5,000 asylum-seekers to Greece and dealing with their applications instead, even though Greece would normally have responsibility for them.

Assessment

A key objective of the 2024 changes to the EU asylum system is to ensure more migration control by enhancing the efficiency of the EU asylum system, in part by restricting secondary movements of asylum seekers (ie movements between Member States). The notion of restricting such secondary movements has always been in profound tension with the liberalisation of the movement of people across the EU. But the revised Dublin rules are internally contradictory on top. They aim simultaneously to make the Dublin system work via placing more restrictions on secondary movement, and yet to disapply aspects of that system because of the unacceptable strain it places on some Member States. Not since the grand old Duke of York had a favourite hill has there been so much pointless circular activity. And this comes despite the recent acceptance that the EU’s temporary protection regime for those fleeing the invasion of Ukraine should be run on an ‘applicants’ choice’ basis.

The main changes with a view to ‘making Dublin work’ are the restrictions on appeals against transfer, the (conditional) loss of benefits and rights to have an application considered due to secondary movements, the explicit obligations to comply, the wider grounds for detention, longer time periods for responsibility for applications, and shorter deadlines for administrative decision-making. Of these, the rules on appeals against transfers and loss of benefits and rights to apply particularly aim to achieve this aim by reducing the rights of asylum-seekers.

On the former point, the 2024 Dublin rules reduce both the scope of the right to appeal against a transfer and its effectiveness in practice (in particular by limiting the previous options for suspensive effect), potentially altering the dynamics of the whole Dublin system: there might be fewer cases reaching the CJEU due to the limitation of the scope of appeals, and more asylum seekers may be simultaneously challenging their transfer while starting their substantive application in the Member State they have been transferred to, due to the limits on suspensive effect. And because of the fast-tracks in the procedures Regulation, the latter process may even be completed before the former. The limits on the scope of appeal seems to be based on the cases in which the CJEU has explicitly mentioned the EU Charter in this context: see, for instance, Abdullahi (Article 4 Charter); Case C-19/21 (family criteria); and Shiri (information available after the transfer decision). Time will tell whether the CJEU accepts this limitation of the right to an effective remedy in other cases.

As for the ‘undoing the effects of Dublin’ provisions, they are new in the Dublin Regulation as such; but they can be compared to the previous relocation decisions. The mandatory relocation numbers in the previous decisions were never much complied with in practice, and so a more voluntary approach to relocations should at least reduce the prospect of non-compliance. But this misses the point: for the frontline Member States, the non-compliance was only a symptom; the underlying disease is the lack of sufficient solidarity. And the new Dublin Regulation does not cure the disease as such; it simply alters the dynamics of treatment. The issue will now be whether Member States will pledge enough relocations in the first place; and the compliance with those pledges in practice may yet be a further issue again on top.

Finally, as regards the possibility of the UK participating in the revised Dublin rules, the discussion of the new rules above confirms that the frequent (and previously debunked) claim from the UK government that the Labour party is seeking to take 100,000 asylum seekers a year from the EU is false. Quite apart from the lack of expressed interest from the EU (so far) in negotiations, the Labour party’s clarification that it seeks a much more narrow arrangement, and the voluntary nature of relocation under the Regulation, it is obviously mathematically impossible that the UK’s share of the 30,000 annual relocations that must be proposed by the Commission under the rules is…100,000. Perhaps the real intention is to provide further evidence for the Prime Minister’s proposal that all pupils should study maths until age 18?