Thursday, 19 November 2026

An EU ban on West Bank settlement products: is unanimous voting required?

 



Should the EU follow the UK’s recent policy, and ban imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank, given that an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has said that the settlements are illegal? There are different views on the merits of the idea – and some Member States have introduced unilateral bans.

But the political feasibility of an EU-wide ban is strongly affected by a prior legal question: would EU Member States have to vote by unanimity on a ban (because it is foreign policy), or by qualified majority (because it is a trade measure)?

The following blog post presents the conflicting views on that legal issue. First of all, the view that unanimous voting is required, by Avraham Shalev and Jonathan Turner. Secondly, the view that qualified majority voting applies, set out in an open letter signed by a number of legal scholars (previously published in the Völkerrechtsblog, where you can find the list of signatories).

Photo: European External Action Service building; credit Masterdeis, via Wikimedia Commons

 

Politics vs. Policy: Why an EU Ban on Israeli Settlement Goods Requires Unanimity

Avraham Shalev* and Jonathan Turner.** 

The European Commission has been considering whether to propose an import ban on products originating in areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank (Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem) and, if so, on which EU Treaty basis. Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) be defined and implemented according to unanimity in the European Council, unless otherwise provided in the TEU or in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). This constitutes a significant hurdle to proponents of a settlement ban due to the opposition of a number of EU States to measures targeting Israel. However, several EU legal experts have argued that such restrictions would fall under Article 207 of the TFEU, governing the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which requires a qualified majority vote in the Council (at least 15 EU states representing at least 65% of the EU’s population).

The Legal Basis must be Determined by Objective Criteria

EU case-law is clear that the European Council or Commission cannot arbitrarily choose a legal basis for political convenience. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has ruled that the choice of legal basis must be determined by objective criteria. In Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), Case C-300/89 (1991), the CJEU held that “the choice of the legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which include the aim and content of that measure”. The measure in question in that case pursued both environmental objectives and harmonization of national measures to eliminate distortion of competition in the EU’s internal market. These were governed by separate Treaty provisions applying inconsistent legislative procedures. The CJEU ruled that the measure could not be based on both provisions and decided that it should be based on the harmonization provision, since provisions of the Treaty expressly contemplated that environmental protection requirements should be a component of other policies.

A series of CJEU judgments have held that “If an examination of a European Union measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it comprises two components and if one of these is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component”. In Parliament v. Council (Pirate-Transfer Agreement with Tanzania), Case C-263/14 (2016), the European Parliament argued that an agreement between the EU and Tanzania, relating to the suppression of piracy, was incorrectly concluded under the CFSP alone, as it had a dual purpose of judicial and police cooperation as well as foreign policy. Citing the above formulation, the CJEU held that the main objective of the Agreement was to “preserve international peace and security, in particular by making it possible to ensure that the perpetrators of acts of piracy do not go unpunished” and was therefore correctly based on the CFSP. Conversely, in Commission v. Council (CEPA / Armenia), Case C-180/20 (2021), the Court held that although the Partnership Agreement with Armenia had a CFSP component, the agreement should be considered as a whole, and its main purpose was trade and development cooperation. The EU’s position in relation to all aspects of its implementation should therefore be established by qualified majority voting.

The CJEU acknowledged in these and other cases that “Exceptionally, if it is established, however, that the act simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, or has several components, which are inextricably linked without one being incidental to the other, such that various provisions of the Treaty are applicable, such a measure will have to be founded on the various legal bases corresponding to those components.” On the other hand, the CJEU has also held that a measure can only be based on multiple grounds where the procedures under the separate grounds are compatible: Parliament v Council (European Investment Bank), Case C-155/07 (2008),  Parliament v Council (Usama bin Laden), Case C-130/10 (2012), Commission v. Council (CEPA / Armenia), Case C-180/20 (2021)

The “predominant purpose” of a proposal to ban imports of goods originating in areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank would clearly be to pressure Israel to end its policy of allowing and supporting settlement of Israelis in the West Bank. This is evident from many statements made by its proponents and from the fact that they do not propose any similar ban in relation to other territories regarded by the EU as occupied. Accordingly, there appears to be a strong argument that such a measure should be based on the CFSP, since its main purpose would be to promote a particular foreign policy and/or security objective, rather than to promote international trade or to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market or to further other objectives of different EU policies.

This conclusion does not exclude the fact that such a ban would also fall within the scope of the CCP. The CJEU has held in numerous cases that the CCP covers a measure “if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade”: Kadi, Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P (2008); Commission v Council (conditional access / illicit devices to receive broadcasts), Case C-137/12 (2013); Daiichi Sankyo v DEMO, Case C-414/11 (2013); Commission v Council (revised Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin), Case C-389/15 (2017). A ban on imports of goods produced in areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank would govern trade in these goods and have direct and immediate effects on such trade. It would fall within both the CFSP and the CCP, but since the procedures for adopting measures on these bases are incompatible, it could not be adopted on the basis of both of them. It could only be adopted on the basis required by its predominant purpose, namely the CFSP, by the procedure applicable to a measure adopted on that basis.

Article 24(1) of the TFEU states that the CFSP “shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties [the TEU or TFEU] provide otherwise”. (The European Council consists of its President, the Heads of State or Government of each EU Member State and the President of the EU Commission, while the Council consists of Ministers representing the Governments of each EU Member State.) However, decisions under the CFSP are not legally binding. Article 215 of the TFEU therefore states that where a decision adopted under the CFSP “provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures.” This provision would appear to apply to a ban on imports from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Thus such a measure would require first a unanimous decision by the European Council and the Council, and then implementing measures proposed jointly by the Commission and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, and adopted by qualified majority in the Council.

Proponents of an EU ban on imports from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank argue that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has advised that trading with Israeli settlements in the West Bank is contrary to international law, that this view has been accepted by other UN bodies, and that the EU must comply. However, even if this strongly disputed contention is correct, the Kadi case makes it clear that the EU must still respect its own constitutional processes and that a measure adopted in breach of those processes will be invalid. If an EU Member State or an EU body considers that the European Council or the Council has acted in breach of the EU Treaties, that State or EU body can apply to the EU Court of Justice for an annulment of the measure under Article 263 of the TFEU.

The Russia Precedent

The operation of these provisions is illustrated by the sanctions imposed by the EU in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. On 23 June 2014, the European Council took a unanimous decision, 2014/386/CFSP, under the CFSP to prohibit the import of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, unless they were granted a certificate of origin by the Government of Ukraine. The Council then adopted EU Regulation 692/2014 under Article 215 of the TFEU implementing the import ban.

On the other hand, the European Commission’s proposal for a Regulation to phase out Russian gas imports on the basis of the CCP rather than the CFSP was criticized by Szep and Schaupp, who argued that it blurred the boundary between foreign policy and trade in a manner that might be contrary to the EU legal framework. However, the proposal had a significant economic purpose, namely the reduction of the EU’s dependence on Russian energy. The ensuing Regulation 2026/261, adopted under the CCP on 26 January 2026, emphasizes Russia’s weaponization of the EU’s reliance on Russian gas, situates the measure in the wider context of diversification of Europe’s gas supply, and refers to the harm that Russia had caused to the European economy by withholding gas supplies. It remains to be seen whether these points will be sufficient to defend the Regulation in the EU Courts against challenges by Hungary and Nord Stream: Hungary v Parliament and Council, Case C-46/26, and Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, Case T-264/26. By contrast, no such points could be invoked to support a ban on the import of goods from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank based on the CCP. Such a ban would be aimed solely at pressuring Israel over its policies.

A Ban on Imports from Areas of Israeli Settlement in the West Bank is Country Specific

Szep and Schaupp distinguished between “horizontal” bans on goods made using forced labour or used for torture, which apply a neutral principle across goods and countries, and measures targeting specific countries and goods. In their view, the latter align “more closely with CFSP-style restrictive measures than with broader human rights trade instruments.” If and to the extent that this is a relevant consideration, it supports the view that a ban on imports from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank should properly be categorized as a CFSP measure.

Although proponents of banning imports from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank argue that this would merely apply neutral principles of international law, such as non-recognition or self-determination, comparison with other cases of disputed or occupied territories indicates it would be an Israel-specific measure.

UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 550 (1984) labeled northern Cyprus, part of an EU member state, as “occupied”, while UNSC Resolution 541 (1983) mandated the non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).  The duty of non-recognition of the TRNC was also recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in the Loizidou case as well as Cyprus v. Turkey. Despite this, the EU still imports goods from northern Cyprus through a specific legal channel. Under the EU's Green Line Regulation (EU Regulation 866/2004), goods produced entirely in northern Cyprus—mainly agricultural products like citrus fruits, wood furniture, plastics, and certified PDO Hellim/Halloumi cheese—can legally cross the UN-monitored buffer zone into the south of the island. Once they enter the government-controlled Republic of Cyprus and clear standard EU safety and sanitary inspections, they gain the status of legal EU products. From there, they can be freely shipped and sold throughout the EU’s single market.

Western Sahara is another territory generally considered to be occupied, with the local Saharawi people denied by Morocco their right to self-determination. In 1979 and 1980, the Un General Assembly (UNGA) condemned the “continued occupation” of Western Sahara by Morocco (Resolutions 34/37 and 35/19). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon referred to the Moroccan occupation in 2016. In 2012, the European Union General Court held that the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, signed between the European Communities and Morocco, could not apply to Western Sahara, as it had a “separate and distinct” status from that of the Kingdom of Morocco.

The ECJ has previously ruled that goods from Western Sahara may not be labeled as Moroccan. However, the European Commission has consistently opposed any limits or bans on the importation of goods from Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. In October 2025, the EU and Morocco concluded an amendment to the EU-Mediterranean Agreement that would essentially grant tariff preferences to products from occupied Western Sahara. This insistence on continued imports from this territory would appear to belie any claim that a ban on imports from areas of Israeli settlement in the West Bank would be a neutral application of international law.

In reality, while such a ban would fall with the scope of the CCP, its predominant purpose would be political and its adoption by the EU would require unanimity under the CFSP.

 

Open Letter: Legal basis for a Regulation prohibiting trade with the unlawful Israeli settlements (Article 207 TFEU)

Dear President von der Leyen, dear High Representative Kallas, dear Commissioner Šefčovič,

We write as scholars of EU and international law to set out why Article 207 TFEU is the correct legal basis for a Regulation prohibiting trade with the unlawful Israeli settlements, not unanimous Council action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).Claims that such a prohibition can only be adopted through CFSP unanimity are inconsistent with CJEU case law on the determination of the appropriate legal basis, and are grounded in political rather than legal considerations. As the Commission prepares options on trade measures concerning the settlements ahead of the July Foreign Affairs Council, any resulting proposal for a Regulation should, for the reasons set out below, be based on Article 207 TFEU.

An international legal obligation

The 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) confirms the unlawful nature of Israel’s occupation of the OPT and elaborates on the duties of other States with respect to the recognition and facilitation of the occupation. In that regard, it should be noted that the EU Court of Justice has ruled that, in its acts, the EU is “bound to observe international law in its entirety” (Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America, EU:C:2011:864). Thus, the EU is bound by the duties of non-recognition and non-assistance that the ICJ confirmed apply to the occupation. The former entails the obligation to abstain “from any recognition of its illegal presence in the [OPT]” in its diplomatic relations with Israel; the latter requires States to abstain from dealings with Israel concerning the OPT that “may entrench its unlawful presence in the territory” and “to take steps to prevent trade or investment relations that assist in the maintenance of the illegal situation created by Israel in the [OPT]” (2024 Advisory Opinion, 278).

The CJEU has recognised this obligation of distinction as binding under EU law. In Brita (Case C-386/08, EU:C:2010:91), the Court held that products originating in the West Bank fall outside the territorial scope of the EU–Israel Association Agreement and therefore do not qualify for the preferential tariff treatment granted to goods originating in Israel. In Psagot (Case C-363/18, EU:C:2019:954), the Grand Chamber went further, holding that foodstuffs originating in territories occupied by Israel must bear an indication of that territory of origin, and, where they come from an Israeli settlement, an indication of that provenance, reasoning grounded in part on the relevance of international humanitarian law and the EU’s duty of non-recognition. Settlement goods are thus already treated by the Court as legally and territorially distinct from goods originating in Israel.

Whereas Union policy is generally consistent with the duty of non-recognition, it is failing regarding its obligation of non-assistance. Although the EU–Israel Association Agreement does not extend to goods originating in the unlawful settlements, as the Court confirmed in Brita, a recent investigation by the Global Echo Litigation Center based on an analysis of over 30,000 export documents, Importing Occupation (June 2026), found that nearly one in five agricultural shipments bound for the EU originated in Israeli settlements were being mislabelled as Israeli-origin in order to claim the preferential treatment reserved for goods genuinely falling within the Agreement’s scope. Even where correctly labelled, however, settlement goods are not barred from the EU market: they are merely denied preferential tariff treatment and otherwise enter freely under standard customs duties.The result is that EU trade policy continues, in practice, to facilitate the economic integration of the unlawful settlements into the Union market, precisely the outcome the ICJ’s non-assistance obligation requires the EU to prevent.

Legal feasibility under EU law

There is a growing consensus that the EU must take action to restrict trade with the unlawful Israeli settlements, prompting discussions on how to do so either through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or the CFSP. We submit that Article 207 TFEU, falling under the CCP, is the appropriate legal basis, for three reasons.

First, CJEU case law establishing the boundary between the CCP and CFSP legal bases supports the use of Article 207 TFEU. The Court has ruled that Article 207 TFEU must be used where the measure “relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade” (Daiichi Sankyo, 51; Opinion 2/15 (Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 36). The relevant test under this case law therefore does not turn on whether a trade measure has a foreign-policymotivation (virtually every restrictive trade measure does). A measure prohibiting trade with the unlawful Israeli settlements satisfies that test: its operative content would regulate the import of goods and services, and any foreign-policy dimension, however salient politically, would be incidental to that content rather than constitutive of it. The ECJ judgment on the Partnership Agreements with Kazakhstan (Case C-244/17, Commission v Council (Kazakhstan), in which the Court found that the relevant measures had erroneously been adopted on CFSP provisions, confirms this approach.

Second, the contrary view (that a measure addressing trade with an occupying power’s settlements is necessarily a CFSP act) does not withstand scrutiny under this case law. If it did, virtually no trade restriction adopted in response to a violation of international law could ever proceed under Article 207 TFEU, since such measures are by their nature responses to conduct the EU considers unlawful. The Court’s case law asks a narrower and more precise question: not whether the measure has geopolitical significance, but whether its operative provisions govern trade. Settlement goods restrictions meet that narrower test.

Third, EU precedent supports the use of Article 207 TFEU for measures of this kind. EU measures adopted on a CCP legal basis, despite the presence of comparable foreign-policy elements, include the thematic prohibitions on products associated with forced labour, torture, and conflict minerals, as well as the Anti-Coercion Instrument. The regulations prohibiting Russian gas imports and increasing tariffs on Russian and Belarusian agricultural goods and fertiliser were likewise adopted on the basis of Article 207 TFEU. Article 207 TFEU is therefore the appropriate legal basis to prohibit EU trade with the unlawful Israeli settlements, consistent with both CJEU case law and recent legislative practice, and required for the realisation of the EU and its Member States’ obligations under international law.

 

*Avraham (Russell) Shalev is an Israeli lawyer specializing in international public law. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies from McGill University in Canada, and a Bachelor of Law, and Master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Bar-Ilan University. His research addresses law and international relations in the Middle East, with recent publications including "Hamas' October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the Weaponization of Reverse Accusations" in the Israel Law Review (2025), "The Qatar-Hamas Nexus: Complicity, State Responsibility, and the Quest for Accountability," forthcoming in the Washington University Global Studies Law Review, and "The Death of Siege? The Future of Siege Warfare in the Wake of Gaza" in the San Diego Journal of International Law (2024).

**Jonathan Turner is an experienced barrister specializing in intellectual property and competition law. His practice covers all types of intellectual property and a wide variety of subject matter. He is particularly well-known for litigation involving fabric designs, domain name disputes, and issues at the interface between intellectual property and competition or free trade law. He is the author of "Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law" (2d Edition, OUP 2015), which has been described as the leading work of reference on this subject. Jonathan Turner's publications include the article "Occupied Territories and the Exceptions to WTO and EU Rules on Grounds of Public Morality, Public Order and Public Policy" in the European Business Law Review (2023), and the treatise Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2015), which offers a detailed account of how EU competition law governs the exploitation and licensing of intellectual property rights.


Thursday, 12 November 2026

Mutual recognition, Retrospective Proportionality and the Expansion of the Two-Step Test: Case C-583/24 [Tagu] Criminal proceedings against DZ


 


Dr. Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Reader/Associate Professor in Law, Brunel University of London

Photo credit: Donald Trung Quoc Don (Chữ Hán: 徵國單) - Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

On 3 November 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its ruling in Tagu (C-583/24). The ruling was in response to a preliminary reference question lodged by the District Court of Amsterdam seeking clarification on whether judicial authorities executing a European arrest warrant (EAW) may refuse surrender because the sentence to be served is deemed disproportionate to the offence, contrary to Article 49(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). The Court ruled that the alleged disproportionality of the sentence alone cannot allow the refusal of the EAW’s execution unless the penalty is so excessive that this could be in breach of Article 49(3) of the Charter and the two-step test, well-established by previous case law, is satisfied.

The blog examines the case in Tagu and reflects on whether the Court has found the right balance between cooperation interests, criminal justice imperatives and the limit posed by the protection of fundamental rights. It is argued that while this development further expands the exceptions to mutual trust within the EAW framework, it also highlights the difficulty of meeting the two-stage test as a rigid mechanism for addressing concerns over the protection of fundamental rights. As a result, the balance remains tilted in favour of mutual trust and, in this case, respect for national criminal policy, while inviting for a rigorous engagement with alleged rights violations.

Facts of the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

The case concerns the execution of an EAW issued to enforce a final seven-year prison sentence imposed by the Constanța Court of Appeal on 20 December 2023. DZ was subsequently convicted for importing into Romania three grams of cannabis and four MDMA tablets together with his wife. According to the findings of the Amsterdam court, the drugs had been imported solely for personal consumption. The court also found no evidence that DZ intended to engage in the sale or distribution of the substances. Notably, Romanian law treats these acts as a single criminal offence, namely the importation of risk and high-risk drugs into the country.

The key issue before the Court was whether an executing judicial authority may refuse to execute an EAW issued for the enforcement of a custodial sentence where surrender would expose the requested person to a risk of receiving a penalty that contravenes the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 49(3) of the Charter. More specifically, the Court was asked to clarify whether, and under what conditions, concerns regarding the proportionality of the sentence imposed in the issuing Member State may justify a departure from the principle of mutual recognition that underpins the EAW system.

Specifically, the preliminary reference concerned the interpretation of Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, read together with Article 49(3) of the Charter and the relevant provisions of Framework Decision 2004/757 on harmonising the minimum provisions on the constituent elements of acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking. More broadly, the Court was asked to clarify the relationship between the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters and the Charter guarantee that penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence.

Against that background, the Court was required to determine whether, and under what conditions, an executing judicial authority may refuse to surrender a requested person where it considers that the custodial sentence imposed in the issuing Member State is disproportionate and that the execution of the EAW would therefore infringe the principle of proportionality of penalties protected by Article 49(3) of the Charter. More specifically, the Court was asked to clarify whether such a refusal is subject to the two-stage test developed in its case law and, if so, to define the precise scope and content of each stage of that assessment.

Opinion

In his Opinion, issued on 22 January 2026, Advocate General Richard de la Tour (AG de la Tour) reaffirmed that mutual recognition of judicial decisions constitutes a cornerstone of the EAW system and that the determination of criminal penalties falls, in principle, within the competence of the issuing Member State. However, he stressed that surrender cannot be regarded as automatic where fundamental rights concerns arise. In his view, the executing judicial authority may refuse surrender where it possesses objective, reliable, specific and up-to-date evidence demonstrating the existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing Member State's compliance with the principle of proportionality of penalties. Such deficiencies must be of a nature that prevents national courts from adequately individualising sentences for certain categories of offences. In addition, the executing authority must establish, in addition to the generic assessment of the first step concerning the finding of systemic deficiencies, that the requested person faces a real risk of being subjected to a manifestly and exceptionally disproportionate punishment. All in all, the refusal requires a two-stage assessment, combining evidence of systemic deficiencies with an individualised evaluation of the circumstances of the case.

Ruling

The Court held that the mere fact that a sentence imposed in one Member State would be regarded as unusually severe in another does not justify refusing surrender under an EAW. Rather, the case must be examined through the lens of the Court's established two-step test, which governs when fundamental rights concerns may limit mutual recognition. The first stage requires the executing judicial authority to establish whether there are systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing Member State's compliance with the principle of proportionality of penalties, amounting to a manifest and serious breach of Article 49(3) of the Charter and not capable of being effectively challenged through available remedies. According to the Court, the first-stage threshold is met where either the applicable sentencing regime permits inhuman or degrading punishment, or where it prevents courts from tailoring penalties to the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the offender. Only where such systemic deficiencies have been established must the executing judicial authority proceed to the second stage of the assessment. The second stage requires the executing judicial authority to assess whether, in the specific circumstances of the case, the requested person faces a real risk of being subjected to a disproportionate penalty if surrendered.

Applying the two-stage test, the Court concluded that Romanian law did not disclose the systemic deficiencies required at the first stage. Judges retained discretion to individualise sentences within the statutory range, account for mitigating circumstances, reduce penalties following an admission of guilt, and distinguish between high-risk and other drugs. As a result, the sentencing framework could not be regarded as manifestly incompatible with the principle of proportionality of penalties. The Court also added that effective judicial remedies were available in the present case, as DZ had challenged his sentence both on appeal and through a subsequent point-of-law procedure. As the first-stage threshold was therefore not met, there was no need to conduct the second-stage individual assessment.

Comment:

The Court has historically been careful at allowing for derogations from mutual recognition of EAWs, favouring their execution in the interest of criminal justice, cooperation among judicial authorities and as an expression of respect to the issuing state’s criminal policy. I believe that the court has overall succeeded in striking the right balance between the protection of fundamental rights and the interests of criminal justice cooperation in this case. The ruling is careful at both  

1) asserting respect for mutual recognition of judgments and national criminal policies by ruling that disproportionality alone cannot justify refusal and

1) allowing for the check of proportionality of a sentence when it is so excessive that it may amount to inhumane or degrading punishment while fitting the exception in the two-step test, in line with well-established case law.

Allowing for a proportionality review to be performed by executing authorities, whenever penalties imposed by the courts of the issuing state are deemed harsh by the standards of the executing state, would put national criminal policies under scrutiny negating mutual trust. Proportionality is already at the heart of the EAW’s operation in express and implied ways, providing for a carefully balanced equilibrium. While issuing authorities are expected to conduct a proportionality assessment when issuing a warrant, executing authorities are not allowed to do so because they are expected to trust their counterparts. Crucially, in the absence of complete harmonisation of criminal law, executing authorities are expected to respect the domestic legislation at the issuing state as an expression of national policy on criminal law which is a policy field associated with statehood and expressing societal choices. This is also in line with ECtHR case law concerning Article 3 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights accepts that a grossly disproportionate sentence can amount to inhuman or degrading punishment, but only on ‘rare and unique occasions’ (Harkins and Edwards v UK, 2012, §133, and restated in Sanchez-Sanchez v UK [GC], 2022, §80). In extradition cases, due regard must be had to the fact that sentencing practice legitimately varies between States (Harkins, §134).

Nevertheless, manifest disproportionality must not be ignored. The limit to mutual trust, is the protection of fundamental rights, which explains why the Court generally allows for carefully controlled exceptions, organised around the two-step test originally (Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pal Aranyosi and Robert Caldararu; Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM). Systemic deficiencies to criminal laws or judicial practices amounting to inhumane or degrading excessive punishment without an effective remedy that could affect the individual in question appears overall as not only a fair exception to mutual recognition but also owned to the EU value of protecting rights.

The two-step test is also a clever construct to assert the significance of mutual recognition. More specifically, the possibility of meeting the threshold of it is actually thin. Proving systemic deficiencies on the first level and then their concrete effect on the requested person is challenging. Differences in penalties themselves are not sufficient, according to the Court, to justify the existence of systemic deficiencies. These need to be linked to broader legislation or judicial practice that amounts to inhumane or degrading punishment, without the chance of effective judicial remedy. The Court found this is not the case here and I agree with this assessment with respect to Romanian law. The sentenced person has the right to appeal, and the Romanian law allows for the individualisation of the sentence which might lead to the reduction of it.

While the exception to mutual trust cannot – and should not - be used simply to challenge national choices of sentencing it may – and must - be used to target deeper injustices stemming from draconian laws or pathologies in judicial practices revealing breaches of the essence of some rights. While I am not convinced that this is the case here, I disagree with the outcomes in previous rulings in relation the protection of fundamental rights in certain cases where systemic breaches of judicial independence was ascertained. More profoundly, my disagreement, analysed here, concerns the very structure of the test that requires both a systemic and a specific assessment where the verification of either step alone is not sufficient. This choice is structurally problematic and is likely not aligned with the ECtHR individualised assessment. While I agree that mutual trust and mutual recognition are undoubtedly worth protecting, they simply cannot exist without an effective protection of fundamental rights. Without the latter, trust fails to exist.

 

Wednesday, 11 November 2026

The School of the Unfortunate: Greek education spending and EU fiscal rules

 



Europe's fiscal rules now name which public shortfalls are exceptional. In Greece, the classroom is not one of them.

Joanna Demopoulou*

* Joanna Demopoulou holds a PhD in International Affairs and is a former Executive in Residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Her research examines the legal and institutional architecture of public authority and governance, focusing on how law structures, distributes, and constrains public authority across European and international institutions.

Photo: Greek parliament; photo credit A. Sivan, via Wikimedia Commons

 

On 9 October, EU finance ministers agreed that Greece may let its spending exceed the agreed path in order to strengthen energy security. Among the measures Greece intends to finance on that basis is a €45 million energy upgrade of 246 schools and childcare centres. The upgrade of a school building may count among the costs allowed to take spending above that path. The teacher who works inside it may not.

The decision landed in a school year already short of teachers, with pupils, students and teachers filling Athens' Syntagma Square and the steps of the Propylaea to say so. What the protests reject is a particular way of reading that shortage: that an empty desk belongs to the family that has to live with it, not to the state that was supposed to fill it.

Greek and European law answer that question from two different places. The Constitution gives the state a duty to provide education. The fiscal framework Greece operates under grants special treatment to other needs and leaves the shortfalls of education to ordinary budget management. What follows asks how those two answers coexist, and who ends up paying for the space between them.

The building and the teacher

Several weeks into the school year, the secondary teachers' federation OLME estimates that at least 15,000 teaching posts remain unfilled. In practice that means lost teaching hours, merged classes, more pupils in every room. The figure is the federation's estimate, not an official count, and official figures exist only for a smaller part of the system. For Greece's model and experimental schools, their own governing committee identified 473 staffing needs for 2026-27, to be met by substitute teachers in the hiring rounds: 199 in general primary, 190 in general secondary, the rest in special education. These are needs recorded at the start of the year, not posts shown to be empty today.

Energy upgrades are one kind of building need, and not the most urgent one everywhere. The music school of Vartholomio, in the western Peloponnese, has taught its pupils in prefabricated classrooms since 2008. Work on a new building began in 2023 and has not been finished. This autumn pupils and teachers began going home with bites from insects nobody has yet identified, with redness and itching; some were taken to hospital, and in-person teaching was suspended and moved online. According to a parliamentary question tabled by KKE MPs, the region's health directorate has since found the classrooms unfit. No European rule is involved here. Nor is Vartholomio alone: in three municipalities of Attica, a local teachers' association reported in September 2025 that 73 of 132 primary schools and kindergartens had at least some prefabricated classrooms.

Who pays

The gaps reach the subjects that decide university entry. At the general lyceum of Kythira, the Piraeus secondary teachers' union announced on 6 October uncovered hours in three nationally examined subjects, mathematics, chemistry and economics; a month into the year, final-year pupils had not been taught them. On Tilos, the mayor wrote to the ministry on 29 September that the five final-year pupils on the economics track had no economics teacher. Both accounts describe the situation as it stood when they were written; the posts may since have been filled.

Two cases do not make a statistic. According to ministry data reported by the Athens News Agency in early October, after two rounds of substitute hiring, 11 of 13 regions had covered close to all vacancies in exam-subject specialties. That is real progress. What Kythira and Tilos show is something the national figure cannot: what an uncovered post means to the pupils who are living through it, whose exam date does not move to accommodate them.

The Tilos letter adds a further detail. The island, the mayor noted, has no tutoring schools and none of the alternatives available elsewhere. It does not say what individual families did about that. What it establishes is narrower: the usual Greek remedy for a missing lesson, paying for it privately, presupposes a local market that does not exist everywhere. On Tilos, a family willing to pay would have to look beyond the island, or online.

Where that market does exist, its scale can be measured. An analysis by KANEP, the research institute of the Greek General Confederation of Labour, of ELSTAT's household budget survey found that Greek households spent almost €614 million on private tutoring in 2023, about 95% of it for secondary school pupils. In real terms the sum rose by about 36% between 2021 and 2023. Households in the three highest income groups devote 3.5 times as large a share of their consumption spending to tutoring as those in the three lowest. That is a comparison of shares, not amounts, and the gap has widened over the decade.

An unquantified part of that spending has nothing to do with missing teachers. Much of it answers the long-standing pressure of the entrance exams, preparation a family would buy regardless, on top of a school that works. Tutoring that replaces teaching the school owed is a different matter, and the figures cannot separate the two; nor does every vacancy become a private bill. What the figures do show is the channel that opens once a family decides to buy substitute teaching. That channel is open to those who can pay, and the gap in what households spend on it has been widening.

In late September, on live television, Greece's deputy foreign minister, Haris Theocharis, divided the country's parties into those that represent the kakomoirides, the unfortunate, and those, like his own New Democracy, that represent the noikokyrides, householders who manage their affairs responsibly. A few days later he said the phrase had been a mistake. The remark is party rhetoric, and it is read here as nothing more. The setting matters more than the remark. In a country that the Union's own surveillance found this spring no longer faces macroeconomic imbalances, continuing hardship is easily recoded as a private failing. The phrase gave that recoding a name. It did not invent it.

Private remedies make the recoding easy. Once a lesson has to be bought, a difference in results can be read as a difference in effort, or in how well a household manages its affairs. A pupil who falls behind after months without a teacher in an exam subject may come to be seen not as someone a public service failed, but as the unfortunate one in the class. Nothing here shows that this has happened to any particular pupil; what the arrangement does is make that reading available. There is a further possibility, though the figures cannot establish it: when a missing lesson becomes a private bill, a failure of public provision may also become less visible as a political problem.

Elsewhere I have described an informal constitution of access, in which rights are formally equal but worth different amounts in practice. In education the mechanism is more mundane, and for that reason more widespread. The right to free education belongs to everyone. When the state does not deliver it, what remains of the right depends on the family's purse, and on where the family lives.

Time that does not come back

A right can be lost through timing as surely as through denial. Writing in EU Law Live earlier this year about a Greek SLAPP case, I argued that delay can itself become the violation: a remedy that arrives after the harm is done protects very little. The analogy has limits; the standards that govern a defamation case do not transfer to schooling. What carries over is the question of effectiveness over time. A post filled in November does not return the weeks of syllabus lost in September and October, and on Kythira the union described a full month lost for the final year. For those pupils the national exams fall on a fixed date, and the time between an empty desk and that date is all there is. Teaching delivered late, for an examination that will not wait, delivers the right only in part.

The answer

On 21 October, the day of the nationwide education protest, Education Minister Sofia Zacharaki told the broadcaster ANT1 that her ministry hears the "real demands" of pupils and that occupying schools is no solution. She cited renovation work in 2,000 schools and €733 million for new student halls through public-private partnerships, along with 53,000 permanent teacher appointments made since 2019, which she said outnumber the retirements over the same period. She also conceded that more resources do not mean every need has been met.

The figure holds up. The Education Ministry's own Strategic Plan for Primary and Secondary Education 2025-2029 records 38,409 permanent appointments for 2019-2024 and a further 10,000 in 2025, and a later report from ERT puts the running total above 53,000. What the same plan shows, that the broadcast figure does not, is why a national total answers a different question. It separates organic vacancies, posts left empty, from functional gaps, which open when the teacher who holds a post is on leave, seconded elsewhere, or otherwise absent. Filling the first does nothing for the second. That is part of why the plan records 51,149 substitute hires in the single school year 2024-2025, alongside that year's permanent appointments, though not all of them replaced an absent teacher, since the total also covers programmes such as parallel support. A national hiring total, however large, cannot show whether a particular post, in a particular school, was filled when a particular class needed it. The ministry's planning document and the cases of Kythira and Tilos describe the same system from opposite ends, and only the second tells a pupil whether there will be a teacher in the room.

On 5 November the Commission presented the EU Teachers Agenda (COM(2026) 795), a proposal for a Council recommendation on teaching careers and working conditions. A July preparatory document for the wider package described such actions as "not legally binding". The October Council recommendation on Greece's expenditure path does something else: it permits specified energy-security spending to exceed that path. For the ordinary cost of teachers, no comparable exception exists.

The numbers

Greece spends less on education than almost anywhere in Europe. According to Eurostat, general government expenditure on education in 2024 stood at 3.9% of GDP in Greece, against 4.8% for the EU. As a share of total public spending, education took 8.2% in Greece, the second-lowest share in the Union after Italy. The OECD's Education at a Glance 2026 puts total expenditure on educational institutions, from public and private sources, at $8,600 per lower secondary pupil in Greece in 2023, in purchasing-power terms, against an OECD average of $15,305 (Table C3.1).

None of this proves that every vacancy comes down to money. It does describe a system that has run below the European average for a long time, and has grown used to families making up the difference.

An exception with a list

In July 2025 the Council of the EU activated the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for 15 member states, Greece among them. The clause runs for four years and allows a deviation of up to 1.5% of GDP from the agreed net expenditure path, provided the excess is due to higher defence spending. By February 2026 it had been activated for 17 states.

For Greece, the list has since grown. A Council recommendation, proposed by the Commission in September and agreed by finance ministers on 9 October, extends Greece's clause to eligible measures that strengthen energy security, capped at 0.3% of GDP a year and 0.6% in total, within the overall 1.5% ceiling. Among the envisaged measures, the recommendation mentions energy upgrades of public buildings.

Three things should be kept apart. The clause permits a deviation; it funds nothing, and whether a given measure qualifies is for the Commission to assess. The school upgrades are paid for from national resources and would be lawful spending with or without the clause. And nothing in the clause prevents Greece from paying for teachers out of its regular budget. What the clause decides is narrower, and for that reason easy to miss: which costs may push spending above the agreed path without consequences under the fiscal rules.

None of this is an argument against defence or energy spending. In a week of Turkish navigational warnings south of Rhodes and east of Crete, that argument would be naive. Nor is there evidence that the clause took teachers out of classrooms; Greece's budget is decided in Athens, not in Brussels.

Who decides what is exceptional

The legal basis is Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263. It allows a member state to deviate from its expenditure path where exceptional circumstances outside its control have a major impact on its public finances, provided fiscal sustainability over the medium term is not endangered. The Council decides, on a recommendation from the Commission, at the request of the member state itself.

The strongest objection to this argument follows directly from that text, and as far as it goes, it is correct. A war on the Union's border or an energy shock can be described as outside a state's control. A chronic shortage of teachers cannot. It is the kind of problem a government is expected to solve through ordinary budgeting, and the clause is designed to keep it there. Defence and a teacher shortage are not legally comparable circumstances.

Take the objection at its strongest, and the question still stands. Two legal texts now speak about the same school. The Greek Constitution, in Article 16, makes education a basic mission of the state and gives every Greek the right to free education at every level, in state institutions. The European fiscal framework recognises defence and, for Greece, energy security as needs that may lawfully exceed the ceiling. The two texts regulate different things. Treating one need differently from another under the fiscal rules does not, by itself, create a legal contradiction with the Constitution, and the Constitution does not entitle education to a fiscal exception.

The difference matters all the same, because three separate questions are in play, and each is answered in a different place. The first is legal obligation: whose duty is it to teach? The Constitution answers that it is the state's. The second is fiscal eligibility: which spending may exceed the agreed limits? Article 26 sets the general conditions, and the Council's individual recommendations apply them. Ordinary staffing falls outside. The third is actual access: what happens to a pupil when the lesson is not provided? No text answers that. It is settled in practice, by what families can afford and by what is available where they live, and for some, as on Tilos, private replacement is hardly available at all.

That is an institutional asymmetry, not a breach. The need the national constitution names as a basic mission has no fiscal standing comparable to the needs the Union has agreed to treat as exceptional, and every teacher hired has to fit under a ceiling that two other needs may lawfully exceed.

Nor is the list drawn by Brussels alone. The clause is activated at the request of the member state. Greece asked for flexibility for defence in April 2025 and for energy security in August 2026. Both requests were political choices about which needs to present as exceptional, made within the categories the Union was prepared to accept. An exception for teachers was never part of that conversation, and under Article 26 as it stands, it is doubtful that a request for one could succeed. The rules set no formal hierarchy of public needs. In practice, as Europe rearms for the rest of this decade, the needs allowed to exceed the spending limits are being named one decision at a time: defence in 17 member states, energy security in Greece. The classroom is not among them.

What the students refuse

What a right is worth depends not only on its wording but on how institutions classify its shortfalls: as exceptional or ordinary, as the state's failure or the user's misfortune. The pupils and students who camped in Syntagma refuse the second term of each pair. They are asking that a teacher's empty desk and a crumbling building be treated as gaps left by the state in meeting a constitutional obligation, not as the misfortune of families that could not cover them.

A state can hold a constitutional duty to educate and operate under a fiscal framework that grants exceptions to other needs without any contradiction appearing in the texts. The strain shows elsewhere: in a final-year class on an island with no economics teacher and no tutoring school, in a music school that has spent eighteen years in prefabricated classrooms, and in the household budgets of families who can buy what the school did not provide. On paper, the missing lesson remains the state's to provide. In practice it has become the family's to buy, where a family can buy it, and it is simply absent where it cannot. The classroom does not need a place on Europe's list of exceptions; it needs the ordinary budget to reach it. Until it does, Greek law will go on assigning the duty to the state while the cost settles somewhere else.