Showing posts with label Directive 2013/33. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Directive 2013/33. Show all posts

Monday, 1 January 2024

The New EU Asylum Laws, part 2: the Reception Conditions Directive




Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Rebecca Harms, via Wikimedia Commons

*sentences with an asterisk have been corrected or updated since the original publication of this post. Most recent update 18 June 2024. 

Just before Christmas, the European Parliament and the Council (the EU body consisting of Member States’ ministers) reached a deal on five key pieces of EU asylum legislation, concerning asylum procedures, the ‘Dublin’ system on responsibility for asylum applications, the ‘Eurodac’ database supporting the Dublin system, screening of migrants/asylum seekers, and derogations in the event of crises. I’ve looked at these agreements for new legislation on this blog, based on a forthcoming article.* These laws are a ‘package’ of new or revised EU asylum laws, which was formally adopted on 14 May 2024, and published in the EU Official Journal on 22 May 2024.* 

This is the second blog post in the series, on the revised reception conditions Directive.* For the first blog post, on the new qualification Regulation, see here.* Part 3 concerns the resettlement Regulation, part 4 concerns Eurodac, part 5 concerns the Screening Regulation, part 6 concerns the revised Dublin rules, part 7 concerns the asylum procedures Regulation, and part 8 concerns the crisis Regulation (plus general comments).* There’s also an earlier analysis of the revised reception conditions Directive on this blog, by Vasiliki Apatzidou.

The 2024 asylum package joins the Regulation revising the powers of the EU asylum agency, which was separated from the package and adopted already in 2021.* (Some of the description of the current Directive and its case law in this blog post is adapted from my asylum law chapter in the latest edition of EU Justice and Home Affairs Law).

The reception conditions Directive: background

There have been two previous ‘phases’ in development of the Common European Asylum System: a first phase of laws mainly adopted between 2003 and 2005, and a second phase of laws mainly adopted between 2011 and 2013. The 2024 package is in effect a third phase, although for some reason the EU avoids calling it that.*

One of the more controversial issues in the asylum debate is how asylum-seekers are treated before a decision is made on their asylum application, as regards issues like benefits, access to employment, housing and detention. In each phase of EU asylum law, the EU has addressed this issue by means of a law known as the reception conditions Directive. The first phase reception conditions Directive was adopted in 2003; the second phase Directive replaced it in 2013. The third phase includes a new version of the Directive.

There is CJEU case law on both the first phase Directive and the second phase Directive. It might be argued that the case law is still relevant to the new Directive, unless the relevant text has been amended.

The UK opted in to the first phase Directive, but not the second phase Directive; conversely Ireland opted out of the first phase Directive, but into the second phase Directive. Neither opted into the proposal for the 2024 Directive. Of course, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but Ireland is still bound by the second phase Directive. Denmark opted out of both.

None of the measures in the package can be fully understood without the context of all the others – which I discuss over the course of this series of blog posts.* For instance, it is possible that the effect of the other measures in the package will be to reduce the numbers of people who would otherwise apply for refugee or subsidiary protection status in the EU, or whose applications will be considered on the merits (the asylum procedures law provides that some applications can or must be considered inadmissible). Any reduction in the numbers applying for asylum will reduce the numbers who are covered by the Directive; any increase in the number of applications found inadmissible will in principle curtail the length of time that asylum seekers are covered by it – only ‘in principle’, because the Directive will still apply in the event of an appeal, if the asylum seeker is still on the territory. 

Reception conditions for asylum seekers should more broadly be situated in the context of the asylum system as a whole. While benefits etc for asylum seekers are provided under the reception conditions Directive, the process of dealing with their applications for asylum as such is subject to the rules in the EU law on asylum procedures, while the substance of the claims (if they are admissible) is considered on the basis of the EU law on qualifications (on which, see part 1 of this series). As we shall see, the Dublin rules – ie which Member State is responsible for considering their application – is relevant to reception conditions too. If the application is successful, the parts of the qualification law rules dealing with benefits etc for refugees and people with subsidiary protection then apply (again, see part 1 of this series).

If the application fails at first instance, the asylum seeker can appeal – an issue subject to the procedures law, although as noted already, the reception conditions Directive applies during the appeal, if the asylum seeker is allowed to stay on the territory. Whether they are allowed to stay during the appeal is an issue dealt with under the procedures law (spoiler: in principle appeals have suspensive effect, although there are wide exceptions to that rule). If an appeal is successful (and quite a few are), the qualification rules apply. But if an appeal fails, then in principle the failed asylum seeker must be expelled on the basis of the rules in the Returns Directive. However, the Returns Directive leaves Member States with discretion to allow irregular migrants to stay; and the case law on that Directive requires Member States to let them stay if they would be expelled to an unsafe country. Also, EU asylum law, as noted in part 1 of this series, leaves Member States with discretion to grant a form of national protection to people who do not qualify for refugee or subsidiary protection status. People with such national status will largely fall outside the scope of any EU law, although the equal treatment provisions in the recently agreed amendment of the EU single permit Directive (discussed here) will apply to them, if they are allowed to work.

The legislative process leading to the agreed text of the revised reception conditions Directive started with the Commission proposal in 2016, as a response to the perceived refugee crisis. EU governments (the Council) and the European Parliament then adopted their negotiating positions, and jointly agreed a text in principle. Member States were reluctant to accept that text, but then agreed to it eventually in 2022. But this blog post will compare the 2024 Directive only to the current Directive, leaving aside the politics of the negotiations.

Basic issues

The first key issue is the type of law used, which is linked with the degree of harmonisation which the EU seeks in this field. Like the first and second phase laws, the 2024 reception conditions law is a Directive, which means that Member States are still bound to achieve the outcome required but have a choice of form and method.* But since the qualification and procedures laws will be turned into Regulations (binding in and of themselves, without national transposition), the 2024 law is the only Directive applicable in the field of asylum law, other than the temporary protection Directive.

As for the level of harmonisation, the 2024 reception conditions Directive still sets a form of minimum standards:* Member States can have higher standards, as long as those standards are compatible with the Directive. So there will still be both a floor and a ceiling. Again, the reception conditions Directive has become unique in the field of asylum law (besides the temporary protection Directive), as the equivalent provisions in the laws on qualifications and procedures have been dropped, in favour of full harmonisation in principle – although note that some provisions in the qualification and procedures Regulations are still only options for Member States.* Exactly what the ceiling means in terms of reception conditions may be open to debate, because there’s no CJEU case law on the issue (for the case law on the ceiling applicable to the outgoing qualification Directive, see part 1; there’s also case law on the equivalent provision of the returns Directive, which is not technically an asylum measure)

The 2024 Directive provides that Member States will have to implement it two years after its adoption - namely 12 June 2026.* Unlike the other measures in the 2024 package, there is no transitional clause, so it is not clear if the 2024 Directive will apply also to applications still pending on 12 June 2026, or only to applications made after it; the point could be relevant particularly to grounds for detention, sanctions for not complying with Dublin rules, or earlier access to employment.* 

Turning to the details of the Directive, there are nine main elements to the law: its scope, general provisions, detention, education, employment, benefits, reduction or withdrawal of benefits, special cases, and appeals and final provisions. This blog post mostly does not discuss the preamble, but keep in mind that the preamble adds some important detail to many of the points in the main text analysed here.

Scope

As with the second phase Directive, the 2024 Directive will apply to applicants both for refugee and subsidiary protection status, although Member States can choose to apply it to applicants for other types of status. (The first phase Directive only applied to applicants for refugee status). The Directive still does not apply to applications at consulates. Otherwise, as before, it will apply to those ‘who make an application for international protection on the territory, including at the external border, in the territorial sea or in the transit zones of the Member States, as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory as applicants, as well as to family members, if they are covered by such application for international protection according to national law.’

The 2024 Directive deleted an exception in the 2013 law, which excluded the Directive from applying where the temporary protection Directive (which has been applied in practice to those fleeing the invasion of Ukraine) applies.* So in principle this means that anyone covered by temporary protection who decides to apply for asylum in light of temporary protection expiring in March 2025 (as the law now stands) will be covered by the reception conditions Directive – if Member States a) apply this aspect of the 2024 Directive before the deadline to apply it in 2026; and b) opt to apply the temporary protection directive and reception conditions directive simultaneously (the temporary protection directive gives Member States the option not to allow this).

As with the new Qualification Regulation, ‘family member’ will be defined slightly more broadly, to include relationships formed outside the country of refuge, not just those formed inside the country or origin. It will also include adult dependent children. But it will still be necessary for the family members to be present on the territory in connection with the asylum application. A minor must be considered unmarried if the marriage would not have been allowed under the Member State’s national law, especially on grounds of age.

General provisions

Under the 2013 Directive, asylum seekers have to be informed within fifteen days of lodging their application of the rights and benefits to which they are entitled and the obligations placed upon them by Member States.* The 2024 Directive provides that they must be given information on the basis of a standard template, within three days of the application, or the deadline to register it under the asylum procedures law. There are expanded provisions on making this information understandable.

As for documentation, under the current law asylum seekers have to be given, within three days of their application, a document certifying their status or the legality of their presence on the territory (subject to certain exceptions), and Member States ‘may’ supply asylum seekers with a travel document ‘when serious humanitarian reasons arise that require their presence in another State’. Member States cannot ‘impose unnecessary or disproportionate documentation or other administrative requirements’ before granting rights under the Directive, solely because the beneficiaries are asylum applicants.

Under the 2024 Directive, the main rules on documentation will be set out instead in the procedures law. The ban on unnecessary etc documentation remains, including now non-discrimination based on nationality. Also, the rules on travel documents are tightened: Member States may ‘only’ supply them in the event of ‘serious humanitarian reasons or other imperative reasons’ that require asylum-seekers’ presence in another State, and the document’s validity must be ‘limited to the purpose and duration needed for the reason for which it is issued’.

A number of changes will be made to the rules on movement within a Member State. Under the 2013 Directive,* asylum seekers are entitled to freedom of movement within a Member State, or at least within an assigned area, but Member States can decide on asylum seekers’ residence on grounds of public order, public interest, or the necessity to decide on applications quickly. Member States can also require asylum seekers to reside in a certain place in order to obtain benefits.

Under the 2024 Directive, there are more detailed rules on Member States’ requiring applicants to stay in a particular region, to ensure fair distribution of applicants or efficient processing of applications. There are also revised provisions on limiting free movement to a specific place, linked to the receipt of benefits, on different grounds: ‘for reasons of public order or to effectively prevent the applicant from absconding, where there is a risk of absconding, in particular’ in Dublin cases.

Detention

As before (rules on detention were only added in the second phase Directive), asylum seekers cannot be detailed solely for applying for asylum, and detention must be ‘necessary’ based on an individual assessment. The 2024 Directive will add that they cannot be detailed based solely on their nationality. Another new provision concerns detainees (or would-be detainees) who are special cases, who might be released from detention, or have their detention adjusted, in light of their personal circumstances. It will also now be specified that detention cannot be punitive.

The definition of ‘detention’ – confinement in a particular place, involving the deprivation (not merely the limitation) of free movement within a territory – will not change, so presumably the CJEU case law still applies: detention includes transit zones where the asylum-seekers’ movements are controlled by guards, they live in a small container, and are surrounded by high fences and barbed wire (FMS judgment; C-808/18 Commission v Hungary); the prospect of leaving for a non-Member State does not alter the conclusion that asylum-seekers are detained, because leaving would end the possibility of applying for asylum in a Member State and would not work on its own terms (as there was no effective possibility of applying for asylum there).

The possible grounds for detention have expanded from six to seven.* However, since the list of grounds will remain exhaustive (‘only’) – leaving aside criminal law outside the scope of the Directive – it will still not be possible to detain asylum seekers purely because housing capacity has been exhausted (VL judgment), because of their inability to cover their needs (FMS judgment), or because they entered illegally (Case C-72/22 PPU) – although the latter point must be qualified in light of the ground to detain pursuant to a border procedure.

First, detention can be justified ‘in order to determine or verify [an asylum seeker’s] identity or nationality’. Second, it can be justified:

(b)

in order to determine those elements on which the application for international protection is based which could not be obtained in the absence of detention, in particular when there is a risk of absconding of the applicant (on the first two grounds for detention, see the K judgment)


The 2024 Directive now adds a definition of ‘risk of absconding’.* (Note also that previous case law requires Member States to set out details in national law, concerning a similarly worded definition).

The third ground for detention is the new one. It will be possible to detain asylum seekers ‘in order to ensure compliance with legal obligations imposed on the applicant through an individual decision [requiring residence in a specific place] in cases where the applicant has not complied with such obligations and there is still a risk of absconding of the applicant’. This is linked to the revised rules on requiring residence in a specific place, summarised above.

The fourth ground for detention is amended.* The current text refers to detention ‘in order to decide, in the context of a procedure, on the applicant’s right to enter the territory’. The new version will refer instead to deciding that issue ‘in accordance with’ the border procedures rules in the new asylum procedures Regulation (which will alter the border procedures rules as compared to the current procedures Directive). Part 7 discusses whether the revised rules on border procedure detention might alter the Court’s rulings against Hungarian transit zone detention under the current rules (FMS judgment; C-808/18 Commission v Hungary).*

Fifth, an asylum seeker can be detained when subject to a return procedure under the Returns Directive, if ‘the Member State concerned can substantiate on the basis of objective criteria, including that he or she already had the opportunity to access the procedure for international protection, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is making the application for international protection merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision’. The Court of Justice has interpreted this ground narrowly (VL judgment; see also the JA ruling).

Sixth, detention can take place ‘when protection of national security or public order so requires’. The CJEU has already interpreted this provision under the current Directive, as discussed here and in Case C-72/22 PPU. Finally, asylum seekers can be detained on the basis of the specific rules in the Dublin Regulation (as replaced).

 

As before, Member States must lay down the grounds for detention in national law, along with the rules on alternatives to detention. There are still no time limits on detention of asylum seekers in general, although the case law on detention under the border procedure under the current asylum procedures law has set time limits, and for failed asylum seekers there are time limits to detention in the Returns Directive. There is already an obligation to give reasons for detention in writing; the new Directive adds a requirement to explain why coercive measures are not used instead.

The provision on judicial review of detention is amended to provide a deadline (fifteen days, or exceptionally 21 days),* with a useful remedy: release from detention after 21 days if there is no ruling. (The current rule on release if detention is unlawful will be retained) The rules on further judicial reviews will now include a requirement of regular automatic reviews of detention of unaccompanied minors. There is no reason to doubt that the Hungarian criminalisation of advice to asylum-seekers (see Case C-821/19) would still breach EU law.

Finally, the guarantees on detention for special cases now include a requirement to give timely support for those who need it, and not to detain at all those whose health would be put at ‘serious risk’.* There is stronger language requiring that detention of minors is exceptional,* and some specific tightening of the circumstances and conditions of their detention: never in prison accommodation (at present this ban only applies to unaccompanied minors, not minors in general) or other law enforcement locations, and only on grounds of safeguarding (for unaccompanied minors) or because their caregivers are detained (for other minors). There are new references to ‘family unity’ and to detention adapted to minors.

Education

The 2013 directive requires access to education ‘under similar conditions’ to nationals, and the new Directive adds a requirement for ‘the same access’ – concepts that are potentially in tension.* Education must be ‘integrated’ with that for national children, and be of the ‘same quality’. The waiting period for access to education must be cut from three months to two, with a possible first month not provided within the ‘mainstream’ school system; although it will still be possible to provide education outside the mainstream education system indefinitely, if mainstream education is ‘not possible’ due to the ‘specific situation’ of the minor.

Employment

The second phase Directive cut the waiting period for access to employment, after lodging an asylum claim, from 12 months to 9 months; the 2024 Directive now cuts this to 6 months.* As before, this is only triggered if there is no decision on the application yet, and if the delay is not the fault of the applicant. According to the CJEU’s interpretation of the current Directive, a delay is not the fault of the applicant if they appealed against a transfer decision, or did not apply for asylum in the first Member State of entry. But a delay is their fault if they failed to cooperate with the authorities, as defined by the asylum procedures law.

However, there is a new exception, denying access to employment if a Member State has triggered some of the fast-track provisions in the procedures Regulation, discussed in part 7.* (Remember also that the Directive sets minimum standards, so in principle Member States can grant labour market access earlier).

Another new exception, discussed further below, provides that access to employment is lost when the asylum seeker is notified that they must be transferred to another Member State under the Dublin rules. As with the new Dublin exception for benefits, this overturns CJEU case law on the point, and raises the question of the effect of an appeal against the transfer (which was also expressly addressed in the case law, as noted above).

There are more detailed provisions on possible job-market preference, and new rules on equal treatment – although these are also subject to exceptions. It will remain the case that labour market access will be retained during appeals, if the appeals have suspensive effect.

Benefits

As for State assistance, the 2024 Directive maintains (with minor rewording) the current basic rule that Member States must ensure ‘material reception conditions’ that ‘provide an adequate standard of living for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health’, although assistance can be reduced or eliminated for asylum seekers with means or who have been working. (On the adequacy of financial support under the first phase Directive, see the Saciri judgment) A new provision will state that Member States cannot ask for contributions to health care costs if the health care in question is provided for free to their citizens.

For housing, a new provision emphasises that it must guarantee an ‘adequate standard of living’.* The 2013 Directive rule that Member States must aim to prevent sexual violence or harassment in reception centres is expanded to refer to ensuring ‘as far as possible, the prevention of assault and violence, including violence committed with a sexual, gender, racist or religious motive’* – which would seem to cover also violence against asylum seekers or reception centres committed by extremist far right groups. Other new provisions state that ‘Member States shall provide separate sanitary facilities for female applicants and a safe place in accommodation centres for them and their minor children’, and give Member States an option to permit asylum seekers to do voluntary work outside reception centres.

As under the 2013 Directive, the 2024 Directive specifies that Member States should change reception centres where asylum-seekers are living only where necessary.* The case law on the 2013 Directive says that this does not prevent Member States moving asylum-seekers to a new reception centre when they are preparing to transfer the applicants to another Member State under the Dublin rules (see VW and EV), even if the asylum seekers have appealed against the transfer decision; as we shall see below, the 2024 Directive takes an even stricter approach to those covered by the Dublin rules.

Finally, the 2013 Directive allows a temporary exception from the housing rules where the asylum seeker is a special case or housing provision is temporarily exhausted, provided that ‘basic needs’ are still met. The 2024 rules amend this, adding also the scenario where ‘due to a disproportionate number of persons to be accommodated or a man-made or natural disaster, housing capacities normally available are temporarily unavailable’.* In place of a reference to ‘basic needs’, it is now specified that in such cases Member States ‘shall in any circumstances ensure access to health care…and a standard of living for all applicants in accordance with Union law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and international obligations’.* This wording now matches the minimum standards required when reception conditions are reduced or withdrawn, discussed further below. The CJEU has ruled that detention cannot be considered in this context as a form of alternative housing provision (VL judgment); there is nothing in the 2024 Directive to suggest that interpretation should be changed.

Health care provided to asylum seekers has to include as a minimum essential treatment of illness, emergency care, and mental health; the 2024 Directive adds a reference to ‘necessary sexual and reproductive health care which is essential to address a serious physical condition’.* It is expressly specified that health care must be provided even where benefits are otherwise withdrawn due to the applicant being subject to a Dublin transfer.*

Reduction or withdrawal of benefits

In the 2013 law,* Member States are allowed to reduce or (exceptionally) withdraw reception conditions where rules on reporting or residence have been breached, or if the applicant makes a repeat application as defined in the asylum procedures directive. They can also reduce conditions where ‘an asylum seeker has failed to demonstrate that the asylum claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in that Member State’.  Furthermore, conditions can be withdrawn or reduced if the applicant concealed financial resources, and there can be ‘sanctions’ for ‘serious breaches’ of reception centre rules, or ‘seriously violent behaviour’.

The 2024 Directive provides that benefits can only be withdrawn for violent behaviour (as reworded).* But the daily expenses allowance, or other benefits, can also be reduced in the cases referred to in the 2013 law,* as well as failure to cooperate with the authorities or failure to comply with integration measures; although the prospect of punishment for late applications (which dates back to a UK demand during the negotiations of the first phase Directive) has been dropped.

Various procedural safeguards in the 2013 law are retained,* along with a substantive safeguard: Member States must always retain access to emergency health care and a ‘standard of living in accordance with Union law’ (referring to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and international law); this replaces the current minimum requirement of a ‘dignified standard of living’. As noted above, the same rule will apply when Member States temporarily apply an exception to normal benefits rules in special cases or due to overloaded reception capacity.

Interpreting the 2013 rules on withdrawal or reduction of benefits,* the CJEU has ruled that ‘sanctions’ for breaches of the rules of an accommodation centre can include reduction or withdrawal of benefits; but a complete withdrawal, making the asylum seeker homeless and giving him only a list of homelessness charities to contact, was a breach of the obligation to ensure a decent standard of living, in accordance with the EU Charter (Haqbin; see also the later TO judgment). The reworded minimum in the 2024 Directive, which adds a reference to the Charter in this context, appears to integrate this case law (although the case law post-dates the 2018 agreement on the text of the Directive), rather than overturn it. EU law requires as an absolute minimum, according to the case law, that the State refrain from imposing ‘extreme material poverty that does not allow that person to meet his or her most basic needs such as a place to live, food, clothing and personal hygiene, and that undermines his or her physical or mental health or puts that person in a state of degradation incompatible with human dignity’.

The biggest change in this area in the 2024 Directive is the overturning of the Court of Justice case law on the position of asylum seekers subject to a Dublin transfer (CIMADE and GISTI). In that case, the Court found that there were no express exceptions in the first phase Directive for Dublin cases, and that transfers might take months to take place or never happen at all. Member States were responsible for ensuring application of the Directive until a transfer was carried out, considering inter alia the right to dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Separately, as noted above, the CJEU has ruled that access to employment is not lost because the asylum seeker did not apply in the first Member State of entry, or is subject to the Dublin rules, or appeals against a Dublin transfer decision with suspensive effect.

In the 2024 Directive, a new clause specifies that access to benefits and employment is ended from the point at which the asylum seeker is notified of a transfer decision under the Dublin rules. However, this does not apply to healthcare, and is ‘without prejudice to the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with Union law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and international obligations.’ As noted above, this test, which also applies to the ‘traditional’ grounds for withdrawing or reducing benefits, appears to be consistent with the case law on those traditional grounds, which rules out a complete removal of support for housing, food, clothing and hygiene.

Special cases

The list of special cases will be expanded to add mentions of LGBTI applicants, PTSD (as an example of mental illness), and victims of ‘gender-based violence’, ‘child or forced marriage, or violence committed with a sexual, gender, racist or religious motive’. There will be a new deadline of 30 days after the asylum claim to complete an assessment (or a separate deadline in the procedures law), and new rules on the obligations for those assessing asylum-seekers. As before, the assessment process is separate from the determination of whether some qualifies as a refugee or needs subsidiary protection.

For specific groups of special cases, as regards minors the 2024 Directive will add references to ‘the need for stability and continuity in care’ and the risk that the minor is ‘a victim of any form of violence or exploitation’, along with references to access to school materials and a safeguarding requirement for anyone working with minors. In the case of unaccompanied minors, there will be deadlines to appoint a representative, as well as a number of other changes to the rules, including the prospect of the minor complaining about the representative. (For a breach of the current version of the obligation to consider the vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, see again the Haqbin judgment – which is also a practical demonstration of the importance of having a representative to litigate in the interests of the unaccompanied minor).

Finally, the provision on victims of torture et al will add specific references to victims of trafficking in human beings, expand on the forms of violence concerned and the motivation for it (‘including sexual-, gender-, racist- or religious-motivated violence), and refer specifically to rehabilitation, counselling and translation needs.

Appeals and final provisions

The 2013 rules on appeals against decisions under the Directive, which include the legal aid aspects of judicial review, are amended to include an appeal against a decision to refuse legal aid because there is ‘no tangible prospect of success’.*

The final provisions are amended to require Member States to take account of the EU Asylum Agency’s guidelines for their monitoring and control systems, and to place those systems into the monitoring mechanism set out in the Regulation establishing the Agency.  There is also a new provision requiring Member States to set out contingency planning measures.

The provisions on staff and resources also refer now to the use of training materials developed by the Agency, as well as the tools on identifying special cases. Finally, the provisions on resources now refer specifically to ‘translators and interpreters’, ‘taking into account seasonal fluctuations’ in asylum numbers, and allocating resources for ‘local, regional, civil society or international organisations’ which play a role in applying the law in practice.

Comments

According to the Commission’s proposal, the main objectives of the new Directive are to deter movement between Member States, harmonise the law further, and increase self-reliance of asylum-seekers. The former two objectives are shared with the qualification Regulation, as discussed in part 1 of this series, and they are linked: it is often presumed that one reason for movement of asylum seekers between Member States is the differences in their asylum laws (although this assumption is also contested).

Will the Directive deter movement between Member States? For the reasons explained above, Member States cannot enforce the Dublin rules by means of a complete removal of support for food and housing; and since the level of support may be quite low already, the threat may be less effective than Member States hope: asylum seekers might not even hear such threats over the sounds of their rumbling tummies. But it is bound to have some effect – including the removal of access to the labour market, where it is being exercised – and some key questions are left unclear. Since the access cannot be withdrawn until a transfer decision is notified (in CIMADE and GISTI, the Court ruled that the grounds for removal of benefits in the Directive were exhaustive), it cannot be withdrawn at an earlier stage in the Dublin process, so arguably not purely because the applicant did not apply in the first Member State of entry, but only after that fact leads to a transfer decision being made. (It should be recalled that the Dublin rules, even in the 2024 version, are more complex than a simple allocation of responsibility for the asylum claim to the first State of entry in all cases).

What if the asylum seeker appeals the transfer decision, with suspensive effect? Here, the new Directive is silent, and the case law points in both directions: the access to employment case law says that such access remains in light of the appeal, while the benefits case law says that the asylum seeker can be transferred to different housing, in light of the planned transfer, despite an appeal. In my view, it can be inferred from the absence of a provision on the point, and the need to interpret exceptions narrowly in light of Charter rights (both the right to dignity and the right to effective remedies), that appeals against transfer decisions will suspend the removal of benefits and access to employment, as long as those appeals are suspensive as regards the transfer itself. But undoubtedly the counter-argument will be made that this would undermine the attempts to make the Dublin system work efficiently – or, put bluntly, the intention to starve asylum seekers out of resisting its application.

Surely if the appeal against transfer is successful, or the transfer is not carried out by the deadline, then access to benefits and employment must be restored, on any interpretation. All of this will depend in practice on how the revised Dublin system applies in practice, and in particular the wording of the revised rules on transfers and appeals against them (the Dublin rules on detention may be relevant too, as that remains a detention ground under the Directive).   

How much further harmonisation will result from the Directive? There is certainly a degree more harmonisation on a number of points, such as information and documentation, limits on movement, time limits for judicial review of detention, detention guarantees, the details of access to employment, the definition of reception conditions, and special cases. In some cases the harmonisation results from cross-references to other new EU asylum laws, so it is hard to assess the changes in isolation. And in any event, the assumption that harmonisation of standards is closely linked to movement between Member States is in any event contested, as noted above. As regards education, the shorter time limits and expanded use of mainstream education are undercut by the possibility of still providing education outside the mainstream. Finally, the changes to the law on family unity and detention conditions adapted to minors imply that neither US-style family separation nor UK-style painting over Disney murals would be allowed under EU law.

Finally, as for the self-reliance of asylum seekers, the earlier access to the employment market and the clarification of related equal treatment and labour market tests should in principle increase the numbers of asylum seekers able to support themselves via work. But the exceptions for accelerated procedures and the Dublin cut off raise the question of whether the labour market access given with one hand will be in practice taken away with the other. 

Tuesday, 19 January 2021

Asylum Seekers subject to ‘Dublin procedures’ have a right to work under EU Law

 



Liam Thornton, Associate Professor, UCD Law School*

 *Reblogged with permission from Liam Thornton’s blog.


The Court of Justice of the European Union last week held in the K.S decision that Ireland’s 2018 Reception Regulations  do not comply with the 2013 EU Reception Conditions Directive. Persons subject to a potential transfer under the Dublin system have a right to enter the labour market in Ireland where:

-          No decision on their substantive protection claim (not the Dublin transfer issue) has issued within nine months. As the person is subject to a Dublin transfer process, and a substantive protection claim is not being progressed, this iu essence provides a right to enter the labour market within nine months. This right only ceases when the transfer to the EU member state responsible for determining the protection application occurs.

-          The person is not responsible for the delay in progressing the Dublin procedures/transfer.

-          Taking legal action to challenge a Dublin transfer decision is not a delay attributable to the person challenging the Dublin transfer decision; this is simply an exercise of legal rights explicitly provided to protection applicants under the Dublin III Regulation.

Background

Irish law on right to enter the labour market for protection seekers, the 2018 Reception Regulations, sought to create two categories of protection seeker. First, a person for whom a substantive decision on their protection claim would be issued, and who was entitled to enter the labour market (after 9 months if no decision was issued by then). Second, a person who is potentially subject to transfer to another EU Member State under the Dublin Regulation. This person would be entitled to all reception rights, excluding the right to seek to enter the labour market.

The Irish High Court was of the view that the denial of right to enter the labour market for protection applicants subject to a potential Dublin removal was permitted under the 2013 Directive. Mr Justice Humphreys also stated that the applicants were the ones responsible for delay in processing their Dublin transfer, as they had taken court action to prevent transfer to another EU Member State. However, the judge did make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union to seek clarification as to whether his interpretation of law was correct. In the meantime, Judge Humphreys invited the International Protection Appeals Tribunal to follow his interpretation.

Tribunal Member Cindy Carroll in the International Protection Appeals Tribunal declined to follow the approach of Mr Justice Humphreys and stated that EU law was relatively clear on the issue: those subject to a potential Dublin transfer had an entitlement to enter the labour market, once meeting all other conditions. The context to both cases and my analysis of how the Court of Justice would rule can be found in my May 2020 article in European Public Law here (open access version here).

The 2013 Reception Conditions Directive provides that a protection seeker can seek to enter employment, where a first instance decision on their protection claim has not been rendered within nine months. In 2018, Ireland opted in to this Directive, providing (in essence) the first time that protection seekers could seek and enter employment in Ireland. However, the Irish transposition Regulations, purporting to give effect to the Reception Directive, did not grant persons subject to a potential Dublin transfer an entitlement to seek and enter employment.

Advocate General de la Tour, who issued his opinion on the case in September 2020, stated that protection seekers subject to a potential Dublin transfer are entitled to access the labour market, and Ireland could not argue that a protection seeker was ‘frustrating’ their removal to another EU Member State by legally challenging the transfer decision. This is essence was the same approach adopted by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal.

The Court of Justice Decision

The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that there is only one type of protection applicant in European Union law, who is entitled to all reception rights and to access the labour market under the Reception Directive 2013. This is clear from long standing case law of the Court (see Cimade). This interpretation is bolstered by the recitals to the Reception Conditions Directive which emphasise the importance of dignity and self-sufficiency to all requesting international protection, regardless of whether it is in the Dublin process or the substantive determination of the protection claim process.  While the access to the labour market is not included within the 2013 Reception Directive definition of ‘material reception conditions’, access to the labour market is a broad ‘reception right’ referred to elsewhere in the Directive.

The Court of Justice rejected the attempt by the Irish High Court to interpret the Reception Directive as permitting the denial of freedom to enter the labour market to protection applicants who did not lodge their protection claim in the first EU Member State of entry, as

…[N]o provision of the Dublin III Regulation requires an applicant for international protection to lodge his or her application with the Member State of first entry

A protection applicant who appeals a first instance decision that s/he be removed from say Ireland is not responsible for delays in courts determining the matter. The High Court had sought to fix all persons challenging a Dublin transfer decision as ‘abusing rights’ and should not be entitled to access the labour market. As the Court of Justice noted, the Dublin III Regulation explicitly provides a right for such an applicant to challenge a Dublin Transfer decision. The Court of Justice states:

….the EU legislature did not intend that judicial protection enjoyment by applicants…should be sacrificed to the requirement of expedition.

The Court of Justice has made clear that where a protection applicant subject to a Dublin transfer decision is appealing such a decision, s/he continues to have an entitlement to work.

In essence, the Court of Justice has upheld the well thought out and expert approach that the International Protection Appeals Tribunal would have adopted, but for the decision of the Irish High Court in K. S. This Court of Justice decision is in no way surprising, and even the most cursory engagement with past Court of Justice case law on reception conditions and the Dublin Regulation would have led a decision maker/judge to the same conclusion provided by the Court. Another feature of note in this case (not solely applicable to access to the labour market issues), is the decision of the Court of Justice, that when interpreting Irish asylum and protection law that is based on Ireland’s opt-in to EU asylum and protection directives, decision makers and judges, where appropriate, may seek legal clarification by reference to Directives that Ireland has not opted into.

What happens now?

The 2018 Regulations clearly need to be amended so as to confirm with Ireland’s freely accepted obligations under European Union law. However, the decision of the CJEU is so clear, that in processing permissions to enter the labour market by protection applicants (subject to Dublin procedures), decision makers in INIS, Department of Justice must ignore the 2018 Regulations and apply EU law directly. (The labour market access permission system remains with Justice, rather than with Children, Disability, Integration and Equality). Rather than waiting for proceedings to conclude in the High Court or the International Protection Appeals Tribunal, this right is effective immediately. It therefore may be appropriate for a fresh labour market access permission to be requested by protection applicants whose rights are now recognized by this ruling, alerting decision makers to their obligations under EU law due to this decision.

More broadly, this decision may have impacts well beyond Ireland, as it clarifies (yet again!) that all protection applicants enjoy all reception rights under the Reception Conditions Directive 2013.

**Note: I am not a legal practitioner and am unable to offer individual advice to people who may be impacted by this decision, please ensure you contact your legal representative.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:5

Photo credit: RTE.ie

Wednesday, 9 March 2016

Detention of asylum-seekers: the first CJEU judgment



Steve Peers

One of the most controversial aspects of immigration and asylum law is the detention of migrants: people who have broken no criminal law (other than, possibly a criminal law about migration control) but who are detained during their asylum application, or pending their removal from the country. The EU has had rules on detention of irregular migrants for some time, in the Returns Directive (on the CJEU’s interpretation of those rules, see my journal article here).  But it has only recently had rules on the detention of asylum-seekers, in the second-phase Directive on the reception conditions for asylum-seekers. (The UK and Ireland have opted out of both Directives).

Recently, in the JN judgment, the CJEU ruled for the first time on the interpretation of these new rules. In fact, this was the Court’s very first judgment on any aspect of the second-phase legislation, although it soon gave another judgment (on the rights of people with subsidiary protection, discussed here), and other cases are pending. The Court’s ruling addresses a number of key questions of interpretation of the detention rules, but left a number of issues open.

In general, the Court has limited the prospect of detaining asylum-seekers on grounds of ‘national security or public order’, and its ruling implicitly somewhat constrains the possibilities of detaining asylum-seekers on other grounds too. But in parallel to that, the judgment strengthens the rules in the Returns Directive on the detention and expulsion of irregular migrants. And the Court’s ruling is surprisingly open to the application of human rights ‘soft law’ as a means of interpreting EU law. Overall, while not mentioning the current ‘refugee crisis’, the judgment is an implied rebuff to those who would like to resort to extensive detention of asylum-seekers as a means to address that crisis.

Background

The first phase reception conditions Directive (adopted in 2003, applicable from 2005) said little about detention of asylum-seekers. While the subsequent Returns Directive did regulate detention of irregular migrants, the CJEU made clear in Kadzoev and Arslan that those rules did not apply to asylum-seekers, because EU asylum legislation gives asylum-seekers the right to stay on the territory until a decision is made at first instance on their application, whereas the Returns Directive says that irregular migrants should be booted out as soon as possible. In Arslan, the Court clarified the relationship between the two sets of rules: an irregular migrant detained under the Returns Directive could not simply escape from detention by applying for asylum. Essentially the JN judgment returns to the same issue, and asks the Court to reconsider its position in light of the more detailed rules on detaining asylum-seekers which now apply.

So what are those rules? In the second-phase reception conditions Directive, the previous ban on detaining people solely because they have applied for asylum is retained. The Directive then provides generally for detention of asylum-seekers if ‘necessary’ after ‘an individual assessment of each case…if other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively’. Detention is permitted ‘only’ on six grounds: (a) ‘in order to determine or verify [an asylum-seeker’s] identity or nationality’; (b) to ‘determine the elements on which’ the application is based ‘which could not be obtained in the absence of detention, in particular where there is a risk of absconding’; (c) in order to decide on entry onto the territory; (d) when the asylum-seeker is detained pursuant to a planned expulsion under the Returns Directive, and there are objective grounds to show that he or she applied for asylum only to ‘delay or frustrate’ expulsion, despite having had an opportunity to access the asylum procedure; (e) ‘when protection of national security or public order so requires’; or (f) in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation on allocation of asylum-seekers between Member States, which provides for detention if there is a ‘significant risk of absconding’ before a Dublin transfer is carried out.

The grounds for detention must be ‘laid down in national law’, which must also lay down rules on alternatives to detention. There are detailed rules on procedural guarantees as regards detention, and on the conditions of detention. Those procedural guarantees and detention condition rules also apply to Dublin cases, and the Dublin Regulation moreover sets out precise rules on the length of detention. The CJEU has been asked to interpret the ground for detention in the Dublin III Regulation, in the pending Al Chodor case.


The judgment

Mr JN had made three prior applications for asylum. They were all unsuccessful, but nevertheless he was not removed from Dutch territory. Over a period of 20 years, he accrued more than twenty convictions for criminal offences. The case did not concern detention for those criminal convictions, as such detention falls outside the scope of the Directive (unless, arguably, the criminal conviction is related to immigration offences: more on that point below). Rather it concerned detention on grounds of ‘public order and national security’, which the Dutch government imposed in light of his criminal offences – but not as a penalty for them.

Obviously such detention is compatible in principle with the Directive, which expressly provides for detention on such grounds. So Mr. JN instead argued that the relevant provision in the Directive itself was invalid. It should be noted that another pending case asks the CJEU whether two other grounds for detention in the Directive are invalid: verification of identity or nationality, and determining the elements on which the application is based.

The Court began its analysis by reiterating its prior case law that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which includes rules on detention, does not bind the EU as such. Instead, it assessed the validity of the clause in the Directive in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – although this did entail some assessment of the validity of that clause in light of the ECHR as referred to in the Charter, as discussed below.

According to the Court, detention undoubtedly affects the liberty of the individual, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter. So the question is whether this particular ground for detention was justified, in light of the general test for limiting Charter rights set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter. This test requires that limitations on Charter rights must: (a) be prescribed by law; (b) not infringe the essence of the right; (c) be aimed at protecting an objective of general interest, or the rights and freedoms of others; and (d) be proportionate – meaning that they are appropriate and necessary to achieve their objective.

Applying these tests, the Court first found that the possibility of detention on grounds of public policy or national security was prescribed by law, since it was set out in the Directive. It did not infringe the essence of the right to liberty, since it was based on individual conduct and applied in ‘exceptional circumstances’, circumscribed by the various general limits and guarantees relating to detention set out in the Directive. Detention on grounds of public order and national security meets a public interest, and moreover protects the right to ‘security’ of others.

The Court’s most detailed reasoning therefore concerned proportionality. Detention on public order or national security grounds was inherently ‘appropriate’ to the objective of ensuring public protection. It was ‘necessary’ for a number of reasons, which the Court elaborated in some detail. All restrictions on liberty have to be ‘strictly necessary’ and this particular ground to detain was ‘strictly circumscribed’ by the overall legal framework: detention on such grounds had to be ‘require[d]’; detention must be provided for in national law; the general limits and safeguards on detention in the Directive apply; the exception is limited by international human rights ‘soft law’; and the concepts of ‘public policy’ and ‘national security’ had to be narrowly interpreted.

The Court explored the latter two points further. As regards international human rights ‘soft law’, it noted that in the Commission’s original proposal for the Directive, it referred to a Council of Europe Recommendation on detention of asylum-seekers, as well as UNHCR guidelines on detention. It then applied some of the text of the latter guidelines: in particular detention of asylum-seekers must occur ‘only exceptionally’ in an ‘individual case’ as a ‘last resort’, where ‘necessary, reasonable and proportionate to a legitimate purpose’.

As for the detention grounds of ‘public policy’ and ‘national security’, the Court applied last year’s judgments in T and Zh and O (discussed here and here), in which it had ruled that ‘public policy’ exceptions in other EU immigration and asylum legislation had to be narrowly interpreted, consistently with the narrow definition of that exception in EU free movement law. In JN it said the same for the national security exception as regards detaining asylum-seekers, and furthermore as regards the grounds for entry bans longer than five years, as set out in the Returns Directive. So the exceptions apply only where there is a genuine criminal or security threat, not where there the authorities simply deem it expedient to detain people.

Next, the Court applied its interpretation of the Directive to the facts of this case. He was detained due to his prior offences and pending expulsion order, which was attached to a ten-year entry ban. Since entry bans for longer than five years can only be issued on grounds of a ‘serious threat to public policy…public security or national security’ it followed that detention could be ordered in the same circumstances – as long as proportionality was ‘strictly observed’ and those reasons are still valid.

The Court also made clear that the pending expulsion order could not lapse during consideration of JN’s asylum application. The national case law which provided for it to lapse had to be disapplied by the national court, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Returns Directive (ie the expulsion of irregular migrants). So Mr JN was a sort of ‘Schrodinger’s migrant’: allowed to stay on the territory while his asylum application was considered (and so subject to the detention rules in the reception conditions Directive); but also simultaneously subject to an expulsion order under the Returns Directive, which was only temporarily suspended – and which continued to justify (in part) his detention under the formally distinct set of asylum rules.

Finally, the Court concluded by looking at the position under the ECHR, in the context of the Charter. The former was relevant to the latter because Article 52(3) of the Charter says that the ‘meaning and scope’ of Charter rights which ‘correspond’ to ECHR rights is the same as those ECHR rights.  However, the Court easily dismissed the ECHR argument by pointing out that in the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Nabil v Hungary, an asylum seeker could still be detained pursuant to Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention (which allows detention ‘where action is being taken with a view to deportation’) because rejection of an asylum application would entail enforcement of an expulsion order. But the Court did refer to the safeguards in other ECtHR case law: there can be ‘no element of bad faith or deception by the authorities’, and detention must be proportionate.

Comments

As the CJEU’s first proper judgment on detention of asylum-seekers, the JN ruling may become seminal. That’s not because of the facts of this particular case: with three failed asylum applications and over twenty criminal convictions to his name, the grounds to detain Mr JN are stronger than they are for many other asylum-seekers. But much of what the Court said in its judgment has potentially wider impact.

I will analyse that possible impact from five angles: (a) the ‘public policy and national security’ ground of detention; (b) the application of other grounds for detention; (c) the Court’s use of ‘soft’ human rights law; (d) the interpretation of the Returns Directive; and (e) the role of law in the development of the EU’s asylum regime more generally.

The ‘public policy and national security’ ground of detention

The Court made clear that the public policy and national security grounds for detention must be narrowly interpreted, and interpreted consistently with EU free movement law. Mr JN’s detention was justified because of his prior criminal offences in conjunction with the underlying expulsion order. But are these tests cumulative or alternative? And are they exhaustive?

The Court does not address these questions. However, the requirement to interpret these grounds consistently with EU free movement law suggests that the two tests are exhaustive. Arguably criminal offences alone could justify detention, in light of the nature of this ground for detention. But the principle of proportionality must mean that detention would be harder to justify in the absence of an expulsion decision, and that the seriousness and number of the offences are also highly relevant. (Remember that detention under the Directive is distinct from detention ordered as a result of a criminal conviction, or pre-trial detention linked to the criminal proceedings).

Conversely, it seems unlikely that an expulsion decision alone could justify detention on this ground. If that were permitted, it would be too easy for Member States to justify the detention of almost all asylum-seekers, by issuing irregular migrants with expulsion orders as soon as they are apprehended, before they can apply for asylum. This would undercut the Court’s emphasis on the exceptional nature of detention of asylum-seekers. Furthermore, the Directive has a lex specialis on detaining asylum-seekers who had been subject to expulsion orders: the ‘last-minute application’ clause. If the drafters of the Directive had intended a broader possibility to detain asylum-seekers merely because they were subject to expulsion orders, they would have drafted that clause differently.

Other grounds for detention

While most of the JN judgment focusses on the particular ‘public policy and national security’ ground for detention of asylum-seekers, some of the Court’s reasoning casts light by analogy on the validity and interpretation of the other five detention grounds.

First of all, each of the other five grounds for detention of asylum-seekers restricts their liberty, so must be also justified under Article 52(1) of the Charter. Applying the Court’s analysis in the JN judgment by analogy, each of those other five grounds is ‘prescribed by law’, at least according to the CJEU’s approach to that concept. However, the other grounds are not so closely linked to individual conduct of the person concerned, although arguably the ‘last-minute application’ and Dublin III ‘serious risk of absconding’ ground have a closer link than the others (the Dublin III Regulation refers to ‘reasons in an individual case’ to suggest that an asylum-seeker may abscond). Nor is it clear how the ‘exceptional circumstances’ concept applies to the other grounds, although they are all also subject to the general limits and guarantees relating to detention set out in the Directive.

The public interest arguments for the other grounds of detention are less obvious, although the Court could probably find them: the efficiency of the asylum system, and (as regards the entry control and ‘last-minute application’ grounds) immigration control (see the Schwarz judgment by analogy). But the restrictions on liberty are not so obviously appropriate as is the case for public policy and national security (except as regards the ‘last-minute application’ clause, provided that there was an effective opportunity to apply for asylum).

As for necessity, the Court applied the ‘strictly necessary’ rule to all deprivations of liberty. Furthermore, the other grounds for detention are also subject to the general limits and safeguards set in the Directive, and the rule that detention must be provided for in national law. However, not all of the specific features which the Court discussed in JN apply to the other grounds for detention: there is no obligation that detention on the other grounds be ‘required’, and the interpretation of those other grounds under EU law and international human rights soft law will necessarily be different. That brings us neatly to the Court’s innovative use of that soft law.

The Court’s use of ‘soft’ human rights law

First of all, the Court’s use of international human rights ‘soft law’ is remarkable in itself. It’s only taken account of such rules once before in the immigration and asylum context: the El Dridl case, where the preamble to the Returns Directive referred to a Council of Europe Recommendation on detention of irregular migrants. But in JN, the explanatory memorandum to the original proposal is enough to trigger incorporation of the soft law into the Court’s interpretation of the Directive.

It’s not clear if this may have broader implications beyond the reception conditions Directive. I’ve checked the original proposals for the other second-phase asylum laws, and none of them refer to international soft law as far as I can see. (But note that the preambles to the legislation do refer to the Geneva Convention on refugee status, as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).

However, it does have a number of implications for the interpretation of the reception conditions Directive. I have read through both ‘soft law’ measures invoked by the Court, and noted some key points where they could be useful in interpreting the Directive. For the sake of readability, I have put some of the detail in an Annex to this blog post. But here are the highlights.

The soft law gives more precise explanations for detention on grounds of determining nationality or identity, or to determine elements of the claim. A crucial point here is a detailed interpretation of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention, which states that refugees ‘coming directly’ from persecution cannot be penalised for irregular entry if they breach immigration law for ‘good cause’ and contact the host State’s authorities ‘without delay’. This is a big issue in practice.  

Two years ago, in its judgment in Qurbani (discussed here), the CJEU said it would not interpret Article 31 of the Convention, unless EU legislation referred to it. Well, the preamble to the second-phase reception conditions Directive does refer to it, in the context of detention (so does the Dublin III Regulation, and EU anti-smuggling law). Since criminal penalties for irregular entry are affected by the Returns Directive (according to the CJEU’s case law), it must follow that they are also affected by EU asylum law, a fortiori because the EU legislators expressly refer to Article 31 of the Convention. 

What does this mean on the ground? While the JN judgment did not concern Article 31, the CJEU's willingness to apply the UNHCR guidelines on detention means that those guidelines could be relevant to its interpretation. First of all, those guidelines say that asylum-seekers are covered by Article 31, even if their refugee status has not yet been established. Next, the 1999 version of the guidelines say that ‘coming directly’ also covers cases where asylum-seekers travelled through other countries. The ‘good cause’ rule must be interpreted in context, and there is no strict time limit for contacting the authorities. Between them, these interpretations of Article 31 should limit asylum-seekers’ criminal convictions for irregular entry considerably. In any event, EU legislation and case law says that asylum-seekers are entitled to stay on the territory and are outside the scope of the Returns Directive since they cannot be considered irregular; subjecting them to a criminal prosecution for irregular entry would directly contradict this.

Furthermore, the soft law is relevant not only to the grounds for detention, but also alternatives to detention, judicial review of and the conditions for detention. On that latter point, it mentions the practice of religion in detention, as well as a broader measure of contact with the outside world. Asylum-seekers should have a complaints procedure concerning detention conditions. There are more details on detention of vulnerable persons.

On that point, I can never pass on an opportunity to comment on the quite obnoxious derogations permitted in the Directive, allowing Member States to waive the requirements for separate accommodation for detained families and detaining women separately from unrelated men, in ‘duly justified’ cases at the border. In light of the Charter rights to privacy, the rights of the child and the EU’s imminent signature of the Council of Europe Convention on violence against women (on which, see here), these derogations are surely either invalid or can only apply in cases of force majeure.

Interpretation of the Returns Directive

The Returns Directive says nothing explicitly on the lapse of return decisions. This judgment is the first time the CJEU has ruled on the issue. While the Court only addresses the specific point of return decisions lapsing due to an asylum application, it might be argued by analogy that the lapse of return decisions in other circumstances is also incompatible with the Returns Directive. Although Member States are allowed to set higher standards than the Returns Directive, that only applies if those standards are still ‘compatible’ with the Directive. As we saw in the Zaizoune judgment (discussed here), such higher standards cannot amount to a waiver of the obligation to return people. It’s implicit in the JN ruling that equally it’s not compatible with the Directive for return decisions to lapse as soon as an asylum application is made.

The role of law in the development of the EU’s asylum regime

The JN ruling came as the EU took further measures to reduce the numbers coming to or staying on the territory – most notably by reaching a controversial arrangement with Turkey (on which, see here). Overall, the judgment sends a clear signal that the CJEU is going to assert its legal authority to ensure that measures taken to deal with the refugee and migration crisis are compatible with human rights, in particular as regards asylum-seekers – although conversely the Court is keen to strengthen the obligation to expel those who have not established any need to stay.

More broadly, the EU’s refugee policies are obviously in a state of deep crisis. Rather than leave the issue entirely to populists at the EU or national level, it would be better for the EU ask a panel of respected international experts to recommend (quickly) how the EU, in the wider international context, should deal with the crisis. I would nominate (say) Mary Robinson, David Miliband, Madeline Albright and Carl Bildt for this task. In any event, we cannot go on as we are: the EU needs an asylum policy that is simultaneously fair, humane, realistic and coherent; but it is falling far short of that at the moment.  


Barnard & Peers: chapter 26
JHA4: chapter I:5
Photo credit: UNHCR, B. Szandelszky

Annex

Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation

Point 1 – the definition of ‘detention’ is taken implicitly from ECHR case law, and is more precise than in the Directive

Point 3 – a general provision says ‘the aim [of detention] is not to penalise asylum-seekers’. The ground of detention to determine nationality or identity is explained in more detail than under the Directive. It applies ‘in particular when asylum seekers have destroyed their travel or identity documents or used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the host state’. The ground of detention to determine elements of the asylum claim is less detailed than under the Directive, which contains the following additional words: ‘in particular where there is a risk of absconding of the applicant’.

There is no parallel to two of the grounds for detention under the Directive: under the Dublin process (ie where there is a ‘significant risk of absconding’ during that process); and where there is an asylum application purely to forestall an expulsion decision, if the asylum-seeker had previously had an opportunity to apply for asylum. 

Point 4 – says there must be a ‘careful’ examination of the grounds for detention in individual cases, and detention shall be ‘non-arbitrary’.

Point 5 – discusses grounds for judicial review, which are not expressly mentioned in the Directive. If a maximum detention duration has not been provided for by law, the duration of the detention should form part of the review by the above-mentioned court (see the Mahdi judgment on the Returns Directive by analogy).

Point 6 – ‘Alternative and non-custodial measures…should be considered before resorting to measures of detention’. The Directive does not state this expressly.

Point 7 - Measures of detention should not constitute an obstacle to asylum seekers being able to submit and pursue their application for asylum.
Point 8 - Asylum applications from persons in detention should be prioritized for the purposes of processing. This is especially the case where a person is held in detention because of reasons resulting from the law pertaining to foreigners.
Conditions of detention
Point 15 - Detained asylum seekers should be allowed to practice their religion and to observe any special diet in accordance with their religion.
18. Asylum seekers should be allowed to contact and, wherever possible, receive visits from relatives, friends, social and religious counsellors, non-governmental organisations active in the field of human rights or in the protection of refugees or asylum seekers, and to establish communication with the outside world. Note that this is wider than Article 10(4) of the Directive.
19. Asylum seekers should be guaranteed access to a complaints mechanism concerning the conditions of detention. This issue is not mentioned in the Directive.
22. If minors are detained, they must not be held under prison-like conditions…If [placing outside detention] proves impossible, special arrangements must be made.
UNHCR guidelines
Guideline 2 - Interprets Article 31 of Geneva Convention – also referred to in preamble to the Directive. Refers also to UNHCR Executive Committee conclusions for more on when detention is ‘necessary’ under Article 31 of the Convention
Article 31 applies also to asylum-seekers, not just recognised refugees; 1999 version of conclusions: (point 4) ‘coming directly’ clause also covers cases where the asylum seeker transited through other States on way to State where they are now present. No strict time limit to the phrase ‘without delay’. ‘Good cause’ – must look at all the circumstances
Guideline 3 – must consider alternatives to detention first – same as in CoE recommendation.
Grounds for detention (i) to prevent absconding (matches Dublin III Regulation to some extent); (ii) manifestly unfounded or abusive claims (no match with Directive); (iii) to verify identity or security; no reference to nationality (so not as complete a correspondence as CJEU suggests); (iv) elements of the claim – explained in detail ‘within the context of a preliminary interview' (with further clarification); (v) public health (no match in the Directive); (vi) national security; or (vii) a 'last minute' application to frustrate expulsion (no match in the Directive) 
Point (d) of Article 8(3) of the Directive doesn’t appear here; ‘procedure to enter the territory’ does not apply.
General rule – cannot use detention as a deterrent, or to dissuade continuing with claims; not punitive or disciplinary, or for breach of rules at reception centres or camps.
Guideline 4.3 – more detailed rules on alternatives to detention than in Article 8(4) of the Directive.
Guideline 5 - detention cannot be discriminatory
Guideline 6 - there must be time limits on detention
Guideline 7(iv) – right of asylum-seeker or lawyer to attend hearing re review of detention; 7(v) – authorities have burden of proof re detention; 7(vi) not an obstacle to pursue the asylum application (as in CoE recommendation).  
Guideline 8 – like CoE Recommendation: religious diet, wider access to outside world; more details on basic necessities than in Directive (ie ‘dignity’); no prison uniforms or shackling; also refers to complaints procedure (like CoE Recommendation) but goes into further detail than that Recommendation
Guideline 9 – more details on vulnerable persons than in Art 11(1) of the Directive