The Council of the EU’s Position on the Return Proposal: Trump-Inspired Approaches Dominate

 

Dr. Izabella Majcher, Independent Consultant

Photo credit: Alamy stock photo

 

On 11 March 2025, the European Commission published a proposal for a Return Regulation intended to replace the 2008 Return Directive. The stated objective of the proposal is to increase the number of people returned, with the Commission regretting that only around 20% of persons issued with a return decision actually leave. As the proposal explains, it seeks to streamline and harmonise return procedures, attributing the perceived ineffectiveness of EU return policy to divergent national approaches. In this spirit, the Commission proposes replacing the directive with a regulation that would establish “modern, simplified and common” procedures. EU institutions have repeatedly asserted that the current return framework is complex and outdated. However, this claim is difficult to verify, as is the assumption that the proposed regulation would effectively increase return rates. This is largely due to the Commission’s failure to conduct a prior impact assessment, despite this being required under its own Better Regulation Guidelines.

On the side of the European Parliament, the draft report on the Commission’s proposal was presented to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on 11 November 2025, and the Parliament is currently working towards adopting its final position. The other co-legislator, the Council of the European Union, adopted its “general approach” on 8 December 2025, during the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, alongside its position on the safe third country concept and on a common EU list of safe countries of origin. This JHA Council was the final meeting under Denmark’s Presidency. Denmark—widely known for its restrictive asylum and migration policies—sought to secure Member States’ agreement on these files before the end of its term (for instance, the Council removes the future mandatory character of the mutual recognition of return decision proposed by the Commission, on which the agreement among Member States proved difficult).

While the Commission’s proposal already displays an overall coercive approach and restricts human rights safeguards—as highlighted in a joint statement by over 200 civil society organisations—the Council’s position further erodes existing protections. This non-exhaustive analysis examines ten key measures introduced or reinforced by the Council that are particularly problematic from a human rights perspective.

 

1) Return decision and the risk of refoulement: the Council explicitly allows disregard of the principle of non-refoulement. It provides that authorities should not be precluded from issuing a return decision where there is a risk of refoulement (Art. 7(4a)). In such cases, the return decision should state that removal to the country concerned is postponed under Art. 14(1)(a). Given that a return decision may be enforceable, issuing it despite an identified risk of refoulement engages the State’s responsibility under Article 3 ECHR. Issuing a return decision in such circumstances—irrespective of a possible postponement of removal—may lead to refoulement in practice, for example if the postponement decision is not adopted in time. Moreover, as the suspensive effect of appeals is significantly curtailed (see below (2)), a person may be removed before such a decision is taken. This approach is also questionable in terms of effectiveness: postponement procedures would still need to be carried out, while the person would remain in an irregular situation, thereby undermining the stated objective of increasing return rates.

In practice, this provision appears to facilitate transfers to third countries acting as “return hubs” (see below (9)) during the postponement of removal to the country designated in the return decision. However, the prohibition of refoulement also covers indirect (chain) refoulement. Transfer to an intermediary country does not absolve the sending State of its responsibility under Article 3 ECHR to ensure that the “return hub” offers sufficient guarantees against onward removal to a risk of refoulement.

2) Procedural safeguards and the right to an effective remedy: the proposal further increases the risk of refoulement by weakening procedural safeguards to challenge return decisions. As introduced by the Commission and reinforced by the Council, a return decision need not specify the country of return (Art. 7(4)), while a removal decision may identify more than one country (Art. 4(4b)). This undermines legal certainty and clarity and places an excessive burden on individuals, who may be required to challenge removal in relation to several potential destinations. The proposal foresees a non-refoulement assessment prior to removal, which is particularly important given that a return decision may be issued despite an identified risk of refoulement (see above (1)). Accordingly, where there are indicators that removal would breach the principle of non-refoulement, the person should be referred to an appropriate procedure, including the asylum procedure, or the risk should be assessed in accordance with national law. However, this assessment may be carried out by the same authorities that issued or enforce the return decision, and may be dispensed with entirely where a prior assessment exists or where the relevant information is deemed insufficiently substantiated (Art. 12(3)–(3a)).

Remedies are also weakened. The Council deletes the Commission’s proposal to suspend enforcement of a return decision where there is a risk of refoulement. Automatic suspensive effect is no longer guaranteed; instead, Member States may grant it only upon request (Art. 28(1)). Given the irreversible nature of the harm, Art. 13 ECHR requires automatic suspensive effect where return is challenged on non-refoulement grounds.

3) Grounds for non-return: under the current Return Directive, Member States may grant an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for humanitarian, compassionate or other reasons. In such cases, no return decision shall be issued, or an existing decision must be withdrawn or suspended for the duration of the authorisation (Art. 6(4), current Directive). While the Commission retains this possibility (Art. 7(9), Commission proposal)—albeit outside the exceptions to the obligation to issue a return decision in Art. 8—the Council removes it entirely. Its position contains no human-rights-based exception to the obligation to issue a return decision. Yet such exceptions are essential to ensure respect for rights that may prevent removal, including non-refoulement, the right to private and family life, or other circumstances rendering return unlawful or inappropriate, such as serious health conditions. Eliminating the possibility to grant a residence permit in such situations risks violations of international and EU human rights obligations and conflicts with Member States’ own legal frameworks, many of which provide for regularisation mechanisms. Not every person in an irregular situation can be removed. Issuing return decisions in cases where removal would violate human rights is likely to generate litigation and leave individuals in legal limbo—ultimately undermining, rather than enhancing, the effectiveness of return policy.

4) Detention: the Commission’s proposal significantly expands the legal basis for detention. In addition to the two grounds provided under the Return Directive—risk of absconding and hampering return—it introduces three new grounds: “security risks” (see below (8)), determination or verification of identity or nationality, and non-compliance with restrictive measures (see below (5)) (Art. 29(3)). As discussed elsewhere, these grounds are broadly framed and raise serious concerns as to their necessity and justification. The Council further extends this list by allowing detention on “other relevant, necessary and proportionate grounds” to ensure an effective return procedure, as defined in national law. This open-ended clause undermines legal certainty and permits unchecked and potentially arbitrary detention, in violation of the right to liberty.

The Commission also introduces extensive criteria for assessing the risk of absconding, including three criteria establishing a rebuttable presumption and eight criteria for an overall assessment (Art. 30, Commission proposal). The Council expands both lists further, adding undefined criteria under national law (Art. 21a, Council version). This disproportionate approach risks categorising nearly every person in an irregular situation as a potential absconder, thereby transforming immigration detention from an exceptional measure of last resort into a standard tool of migration control, contrary to international human rights standards.

Despite the requirement under international law that immigration detention be as short as possible, the Commission extends the maximum period of detention from 18 months (6 + 12) to 24 months (12 + 12) (Art. 32(3), Commission proposal). This detention period is exceptionally long and unnecessary, particularly given that immigration detention concerns persons who have not committed a criminal offence and who do not benefit from safeguards applicable under criminal law. The Council allows for repeated six-month extensions of the detention period where there is a risk of absconding and a reasonable prospect of removal arises from specific changes in circumstances (Article 32(3a), Council version). Such potentially indefinite detention amounts to arbitrary detention and violates the right to liberty. In addition, the Council clarifies that these detention limits apply per Member State, allowing a new period of detention to be imposed if the person moves to another EU country (Art. 32(3)).

Procedural safeguards are further weakened: the Council reduces the frequency of detention reviews from three to six months and removes the 15-day deadline for an initial judicial review (Art. 33).

5) Cooperation duties and restrictive measures: the Commission’s proposal imposes extensive cooperation obligations and restrictive measures on persons subject to return, which the Council substantially expands. The resulting web of detailed—and at times overlapping—obligations undermines legal clarity and proportionality. The obligation to cooperate (Art. 21) encompasses fifteen categories of obligations, including remaining available to authorities (such as appearing before third-country authorities for the issuance of travel documents or verification of identity or nationality), providing extensive information, and complying with third-country entry requirements, including health-related conditions. The list is open-ended, as it refers to national law. In practice, many of these obligations may be difficult or impossible for individuals to fulfil.

Non-compliance with cooperation duties triggers the mandatory imposition of restrictive measures, including residence requirements, reporting obligations, and other measures under national law (Art. 23(1)). It may also lead to further sanctions, such as refusal of allowances, extension of entry bans up to 20 years, criminal sanctions including imprisonment, or other penalties provided for under national law (Art. 23b(1)). Failure to cooperate also constitutes a criterion for establishing a risk of absconding (Art. 21a(2)(g)), which may in turn justify the imposition of so-called “alternatives to detention for preventing absconding”—including electronic monitoring and measures defined in national law (Art. 23c(1))—as well as detention itself (Art. 29(3)(a)). Moreover, failure to comply with specific cooperation duties is an independent ground for detention (Art. 29(3)(e)).

In practice, virtually any person subject to return may fail to comply with one or more of these extensive obligations and thus become exposed to a cascading set of restrictive measures and sanctions. The breadth of these measures fails to meet the principles of necessity and proportionality and leaves significant scope for arbitrary application.

6) “Investigative measures”: the Council introduces “investigative measures” (Art. 23a), allowing authorities—without the person’s consent—to search persons subject to return, their homes and other relevant premises, and to seize personal belongings, including electronic devices. Such measures may also be further defined under national law. While safeguards are foreseen, such as necessity, proportionality, respect for fundamental rights and access to remedies, the breadth of this provision raises serious concerns. In practice, it would permit police to raid homes, shelters and other premises that accommodate or support persons in an irregular situation, with significant implications for the right to privacy.

7) Entry ban: while the Commission already expands the use and duration of entry bans, the Council amplifies this approach further. The Commission introduces the possibility of imposing an entry ban without a prior return decision where an irregular stay is detected during exit border checks. The Council removes the Commission’s safeguards, namely the requirements that such a ban be justified by the individual circumstances of the case, respect the principle of proportionality, and safeguard the rights of defence. The Council’s position effectively eliminates the rights of defence by allowing an entry ban to be imposed and notified after the person has already left the territory (Art. 10(4)). It further allows the imposition of an entry ban without a prior return decision where a person departs before such a decision is issued (Art. 10(4a)). This raises serious concerns as to how authorities can assume, without any prior assessment, that a person in an irregular situation would not have a right to stay. Crucially, this deprives individuals of any effective remedy, in breach of Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

As regards duration, in cases not involving a threat to public order or security, the Commission extends the maximum length of an entry ban from five to ten years, while the Council further increases it to twenty years (Art. 10(6)). Such durations may severely interfere with the right to private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR, particularly for individuals who have established strong personal and social ties in the EU prior to removal. Although the Council retains the possibility to withdraw, suspend or shorten an entry ban in justified individual cases (Art. 11(2)), it significantly restricts individuals’ ability to request such measures (Art. 11(3)).

8) Persons posing “security risks”: the Commission introduces a distinct category of persons subject to return to whom heightened coercive measures may apply: those deemed to pose “security risks” (Art. 16). The Council further expands this already vaguely defined category. In particular, it includes within the notion of a threat to public policy or security and national security persons subject to an alert in the Schengen Information System (SIS), which itself encompasses situations as minor as attempts to circumvent rules on entry or residence. The Council also defers to national law for defining “other security threats,” further diluting legal certainty. Persons falling within this category may be subjected to additional coercive measures, including detention—which may be carried out in prisons and potentially be of indefinite duration—and entry bans exceeding twenty years. This approach blurs the distinction between criminal and migration law, reinforces harmful stereotypes linking migration and security risks, and circumvents the procedural safeguards that apply in criminal proceedings. While States have a legitimate interest in protecting public order and national security, criminal law should apply equally to all persons under a State’s jurisdiction. Using migration law as a substitute for criminal justice undermines fundamental legal principles and the rule of law.

9) “Return hubs”: among the Commission’s so-called “innovative solutions” to increase return rate is the establishment of “return hubs.” The proposal allows Member States to remove individuals to a third country with which they have concluded an agreement or arrangement (Art. 17). The person need not have any link to that country, nor must the country qualify as a safe third country, although certain conditions are envisaged. The Council’s position clarifies that such agreements or arrangements may regulate the modalities of onward return and that detention may result from their implementation (Art. 17(2a)). It also relaxes notification obligations vis-à-vis the Commission and other Member States (Art. 17(3)), reducing transparency and oversight.

While the externalisation of returns may appear attractive to Member States, recent migration arrangements show that such models often entail significant legal challenges, operational difficulties and high financial costs for the outsourcing State. More fundamentally, return hubs raise serious human rights concerns, in particular regarding detention and onward return. States cannot evade their international obligations by outsourcing migration control. Depending on the degree of involvement, responsibility for violations may be attributed to the externalising State, the third State, or both, including through complicity in internationally wrongful acts.

10) Children: the Council reduces child-specific safeguards throughout the proposal. It weakens protections relating to age assessment (Art. 19), the appointment and role of a guardian for unaccompanied children (Art. 20(2)), and legal assistance and representation (Art. 25). The Council also removes the provision in the current Directive (Art. 10(1)) that requires assistance for an unaccompanied child by bodies other than the authorities enforcing return to be granted before issuing a return decision. This safeguard is crucial to ensure that the best interests of the child are properly assessed prior to any return decision. Under international law, children may be returned only where this is in their best interests. The Council further removes schooling from the explicit grounds for extending the period for voluntary departure (Art. 7(1c)). It also deletes the Commission’s proposed exemption of families with children from return to “return hubs” (Art. 17(4)), leaving only unaccompanied children excluded from this measure. Moreover, children are not exempt from newly introduced coercive measures, including cooperation obligations and sanctions for non-compliance (see above (5)), as well as investigative measures (see above (6)).

As regards detention, both the Commission and the Council disregard international standards according to which children should not be placed in immigration detention at all. The expanded detention regime (see above (4)) applies equally to children. The Council further removes the mandatory ex officio review of detention of unaccompanied children (Art. 33(2)) and relaxes requirements concerning conditions and services in detention, including access to education (Art. 35(2)–(3)). These changes are incompatible with the best interests of the child and with children’s rights to liberty and education under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

 

Concluding thoughts

The Council: as this assessment demonstrates, the Council’s position lacks proportionality and opens the door to arbitrary measures. Human rights safeguards are systematically weakened. Even the fundamental, non-derogable prohibition of refoulement no longer prevents the issuance of a return decision. The accumulation of multiple—and at times overlapping—coercive measures, including far-reaching cooperation obligations and sanctions for non-compliance, runs counter to the stated objective of the reform, namely to streamline and simplify return procedures. Moreover, the Council’s frequent deferrals to national law—including on core issues such as grounds for detention, criteria for establishing a risk of absconding, and the definition of a security threat—undermine the very rationale for replacing a directive with a regulation and defeats the goal of harmonisation of return procedures.

Other players: the Council’s position was made possible by the Commission. The Commission has consistently relied on the narrative of a low return rate, while maintaining a taboo on non-return and regularisation, despite having funded multiple research projects that provided evidence on this matter. The Commission’s proposal itself already contained several measures raising serious concerns from a human rights perspective. By advancing this proposal in a context of political polarisation on migration—where centrist parties increasingly adopt right-wing and enforcement-driven approaches—the Commission has fallen short of its role as guardian of the Treaties and defender of the Union’s fundamental values. Attention now turns to the European Parliament, with the hope that its final report will offer a human-rights-compliant position to restore a measure of balance before inter-institutional negotiations begin.

First they came for migrants: the Council’s position reflects the view, advanced by some States, that the European Court of Human Rights—or human rights more broadly—has become excessively protective of migrants in an irregular situation and unduly restrictive of States’ prerogatives to expel them. To be clear, any attempt to narrow the scope or application of human rights conventions in relation to migrants constitutes an attack not only on migrants’ rights, but on the rights of all persons. Once human rights are weakened for one group deemed politically expendable, derogations and qualifications can be expected to follow for others. What is presented as an exceptional response to migration thus risks becoming a broader erosion of the universality and indivisibility of human rights protection.

 

 

Return hubs – innovative lawmaking or a dangerous legal experiment?

 

 

By Jonas Bornemann, Assistant Professor of European Law at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen and re:constitution fellow 2024/2025 and Isabela Brockmann, Research intern at the Department of European and Economic Law, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.

 

Photo credit: Konstantin von Wedelstaedt, via Wikimedia commons

 

1.     Legislative creativity: thinking outside the (legal) box?

 

In lawmaking, creativity is an asset. The ability to devise innovative solutions can break deadlock and help align previously irreconcilable positions. But even the most innovative idea must stay within the limits of legality. This is particularly true for sensitive areas like migration law, where ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking has recently become fashionable among political leaders in Europe to signal their determination to pursue a more restrictive migration policy.

 

The most recent illustration of such an out-of-the-box mentality figured in the Commission’s reform of the Return Directive. Among the changes proposed, the Commission seeks to introduce an option for Member States to create so-called return hubs – centres established in third states to facilitate the return of persons who are not or no longer authorised to stay in the territory of EU Member States. The term ‘return’ is used here, following the terminology used by the Commission, although it should be borne in mind that persons send to return hubs are usually expelled to places they have never been to before. Speaking of ‘return’ in such a context may therefore already be a euphemism. Be that as it may, the Commission’s proposal has been presented and hailed as an innovative way to increase the effectiveness of returns, offering an avenue of deporting persons from the territory of EU Member States who cannot, for practical or legal reasons, be returned to their country of origin. However, the fate of this innovative instrument is far from certain. Even if it would ultimately be accepted by the co-legislatures, several important aspects regarding the implementation of the proposed policy remain unclear. This blog post discusses the potential limits in EU primary law that circumscribe the way that return hubs can be established and run, and proposes refinements to the legal design of the currently discussed reform of the Return Regulation.

 

The post will do so by, first, placing the idea of return hubs in the broader scheme of initiatives that seek to offshore migration administration (2.). It will subsequently present the legal basis for the establishment of return hubs as proposed by the Commission (3.), before zooming in on the options regarding the practical implementation of these hubs by the Member States. Specifically, it will discuss possible limits to the geographical location of these hubs (4.), the risk of systematised detention (5.) and the paramount importance of an effective remedy (6.). It concludes by drawing attention to aspects that should be addressed during the legislative process, to circumscribe, with greater clarity, the mandate of Member States to establish and use return hubs (7.).

2. Return hubs – a piece in the puzzle of offshoring migration administration

 

The idea of return hubs is closely linked to related attempts of offshoring migration administration. The Rwanda scheme, for instance, attempted to outsource asylum examinations through the adoption of a bilateral agreement between Rwanda and the UK that would have enabled the latter to send asylum-seekers to Rwanda to have their claims processed by Rwandan officials. However, following successful legal challenges before the UK Supreme Court and a new government which subsequently repealed the Safety of Rwanda Act, the Rwanda scheme was  abandoned and now largely serves as a cautionary tale for efforts to externalise migration administration. The (voluntary) return of four asylum-seekers pales in contrast to the extreme financial costs of the scheme, estimated to amount to £700m. Costs included upfront payments to Rwanda, asylum processing and operational costs and funding for an integration package covering five years if the individual decided to stay. The results, however, remained extremely meagre.

 

More recently, the Italy-Albania deal followed a similar but not identical template. The deal took the format of a protocol concluded between the two states to allow for the transfer of asylum seekers to Albanian asylum facilities. This measure applied exclusively to persons intercepted in international waters, and would have allowed Italian authorities to process claims under Italian law, although physical access to Italian territory is prevented. After transfer to these newly established facilities had been halted by Italian courts, and legal challenges are currently pending before the Court of Justice, the government decided to ‘reactivate’ the now moot asylum facilities, turning them into so-called ‘repatriation hubs’. A similar initiative was announced by the British Prime Minister during his visit in Albania: the UK would establish ‘return hubs’ in Albania to facilitate return of persons whose asylum application had been rejected.

 

All this suggests that there is a functional connection between the attempts to offshore asylum processing and the emergence of ‘return hubs’, even though the categories of persons targeted by these initiatives differ. Return hubs have no role to play in the context of asylum processing, but rather during the return of third country nationals that are not or no longer authorised to stay in the territory of the Member States. This may relate to third country nationals who are not or no longer allowed to stay and cannot be returned to their state of origin. Return hubs could therefore equally be used to return persons whose application for international protection had been rejected. With a view to this group of persons, however, it should be borne in mind that the Commission’s recently proposed changes to the Asylum Procedures Regulation could give rise to situations where the third state in which a return hub is established will be designated as ‘safe third county’ and that would-be beneficiaries of protection would be returned to that third state without their case being assessed on the merits in the EU.

 

3.     Return hubs as a Member State project

 

Despite the fact that several Member States are currently considering the use of return hubs, and the Commission’s proposal would adjust the legal framework in EU law accordingly, the design – both in law and fact – of these hubs remains far from clear. The Commission’s proposal indicates that persons may be returned to a third country with which an agreement has been concluded, thereby effectively creating a legal basis in EU law for such agreements (see here at 6). However, the proposal only vaguely predetermines the elements that such an agreement should satisfy, thereby backloading potential legal problems to Member States’ implementation of return hubs.

 

First of all, the proposal suggests that return hubs may be established on the basis of either an ‘agreement or arrangement’. The reference to ‘arrangements’ may be read as permitting Member States to resort to forms of cooperation other than formal international agreements. This wording may be inspired by the blueprint of the original UK-Rwanda deal, which took the form of an informal Memorandum of Understanding rather than an international agreement and was termed an ‘asylum partnership arrangement’. Informal arrangements, however, would likely fall short of the requirements outlined by the Commission’s proposal, specifically the obligation to ensure that the third state would be ready to accept the returnee (on this point, see here at 17). While an informal agreement may, in principle, likewise practically ensure that the third state accepts entry of returnees (here at 148), it is characterised by weaker normativity than formal international agreements and appears less suitable to ensure the willingness of third states to accept entry of returnees or ensure respect for safeguards of migrant protection. The importance of formal rules is acknowledged not just by the UNHCR (here, point 3. v), but likewise by the EU legislature, as Art. 59 (7) of the Asylum Procedures Regulation, seems to rest on the view that a formal international agreement adopted under the procedure of Article 218 TFEU would ensure full respect of the principle of non-refoulement.

 

The Commission’s proposal spells out several requirements that the international agreement adopted with third states should satisfy. An agreement establishing return hubs would have to outline the procedure for transfer, the conditions of stay in the third state, including the responsibilities of the Member State and third state respectively, modalities of onward return and the consequences if onward return would not be possible. In addition, the Commission’s proposal clarifies that unaccompanied minors and families with minors shall not be returned to a return hub and insists, moreover, that the agreement would include an independent monitoring mechanism to verify the effective application of the agreement. Last, the agreement must make provision for cases in which the arrangement would be violated or a significant change had occurred that would adversely impact the situation of the third country.

 

While the Commission’s proposal therefore lists certain elements that agreements establishing return hubs should satisfy, it is safe to say that the Commission wishes to ensure that the establishment of return hubs is a Member State project. For EU lawmakers, the choice for national solutions may seem preferable for several reasons: first, it accepts a level of diversity, to the effect that Member States remain free to decide whether they wish to include return hubs as an element of their return efforts. In addition, a legal design that simply requires agreements to respect essential safeguards, such as respect for international law and human rights, may be viewed as a means to keep one's hands clean. Any violation of these safeguards would be attributable to Member State authorities rather than EU institutions. In this sense, the Commission can present its proposal as conforming with standards of EU and international law, whilst leaving the implementation of return hubs, and associated legal challenges, to national authorities.

 

 

4.     Does EU law accept arbitrary geographical choices?

 

The establishment of return hubs is legally operationalised through a broadening of the concept of the ‘country of return’. Pursuant to Article 4 (3) of the Commission proposal, a country of return includes not only the country of origin or transit of a third country national, but has been extended to any third state willing to host a return hub and has entered into an agreement to that end with one or several Member States. Leaving the issue of political feasibility at the side, this raises the question whether Member States’ choice for the location of return hubs would be subject to any standards of legality, or whether this would essentially allow national governments to make an entirely arbitrary geographical choice. Are Member States allowed to return persons to hubs in third states that are extremely remote from both the EU and the country to which the person should ultimately be returned?

 

Current legal standards limiting the geographic stretch of the deportation of asylum-seekers may not be applied by analogy when it comes to the return of third country nationals who are no longer authorised to legally stay in the EU Member States. Indeed, the ‘connection criterion’, a safeguard against arbitrary deportation which has aptly been referred to as the ‘anti-Rwanda’ rule, stipulates that asylum seekers may only be deported to a safe third state to which (s)he has a connection ‘on the basis of which it would be reasonable for him or her to go to that country’ (Article 59 (5) Asylum Procedures Regulation). While such a criterion may not be mandatory under international law and the Commission has recently proposed to allow Member States to derogate from it, one of the innovative aspects of the Commission’s proposal concerns the fact that this safeguard does not apply mutatis mutandis to persons who are not or no longer asylum seekers. More generally, the connection criterion does not apply outside refugee law, and is therefore a ground that cannot be relied upon to limit a Member State’s geographical choice for setting up return hubs.

 

In the absence of a legal standard such as the connection criterion, Member States appear, in principle, to be free to return third country nationals to hubs located in states to which the individual has no personal link whatsoever. However, it is not unreasonable to argue that this principled freedom should be limited by general principles of EU law, specifically the principle of proportionality. While the proposed Return Regulation would leave significant room for maneuver to Member States, it would nonetheless create a legal framework governing the use of return hubs, to the effect that Member States would act within the scope of EU law (for a discussion of the case law, see here at 141). If this is a correct reading of the proposed Regulation, return to a return hub in a region far removed from the country of origin of the person and to which that person has no connection may be viewed as violating this principle. While the principle of proportionality would not preclude Member States from establishing return hubs in third states, it may limit their geographical choice, nonetheless. As UNHCR rightly points out, return hubs would only further the effective return of a person if such hubs are geographically located in places from which individuals may actually be able to travel onwards, either by virtue of visa-free or other forms of mobility regimes. If this would not be the case, return hubs might not be suitable to attain the objective of effective return.

 

5.     Conditions in return hubs – towards systematised detention?

 

The Commission’s proposal suggests that an international agreement setting up return hubs must clarify the conditions of stay in the third state. However, it remains silent about the nature of these conditions. This has given rise to criticism by NGOs and scholars (see here, here, here as well as here, here and here), suggesting that return hubs may incentivise practices of arbitrary detention. On the one hand, it is not inconceivable to argue that an international agreement may allow third country nationals deported to a return hub in a third country to move freely in that country. However, existing practices suggest that cooperation with third states will most likely take the form of restricted mobility or ‘semi-carceral spaces’ (for this apt description, here at 34). This raises questions regarding the respect for fundamental rights in return hubs, specifically the right to liberty. Depending on the length and nature of stay, mobility restrictions in return hubs in third states may amount to detention. If it is presumed that return hubs will not magically resolve the obstacles of onward return to countries of origin, it is entirely reasonable to presume that these hubs will frequently amount to a restriction of liberty which would coincide with significant habeas corpus safeguards, particularly also the obligation to provide for periodic review of detention and to respect maximum detention periods.

 

The presumption that return hubs will frequently be designed as closed facilities follows from political preferences rather than legal necessity. Governments willing to host return hubs might accept that returnees are staying short-term before they are returned to their country of origin, but they might be much less enthusiastic about the prospect of returnees establishing themselves more permanently in that country. There is no obligation for Member States to ensure that third country nationals would remain at or in the proximity of return hubs. While Member State authorities (or the European Border and Coast Guard, as the case may be) may remain responsible for bringing the return of a third country national to her country of origin to a successful end (see here, point 14), there is no provision in EU law that would require Member States to limit the mobility of third country nationals in the country in which the return hub is located. Rather, with a view to persons who cannot be returned in the short- or medium-term to their country of origin, UNHCR advocates for arrangements that minimise restrictions to movement, and that allow for pathways to self-sufficiency in the host third country.

 

6.     Could return hubs increase the effectiveness of the EU’s return policy?

 

The creation of return hubs is driven by the ambition to increase the effectiveness of return. Although the Commission’s proposal does not explain how the establishment of such hubs would help attain this objective, there seems to be an implicit assumption that a person who is returned to a country in which (s)he does not like to reside would be more easily convinced to return. This assumption is problematic, not just because of the lack of empirical data supporting it. Such a conclusion equally fails to acknowledge the variety of reasons why persons leave their country of origin, and ignores the fact that return is often hampered by lack of cooperation on the side of the third state, not the individual.

 

In addition to these factual uncertainties, the political objective of increasing the effectiveness may be criticised for being based on fair-weather presumptions. It presupposes that Member States would be able to ensure that returnees will not be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment in the third state to which they have been transported. On the one hand, it can surely be welcomed that the Commission’s proposal explicitly reminds Member States of this obligation, requiring them to respect “international human rights standards and principles (…) including the principle of non-refoulement” (Article 17 (1) of the Commission proposal). On the other hand, NGOs, scholars and curiously, in a 2018 working paper, even the Commission itself, had warned against the significant risks of refoulement associated with the establishment of return hubs. For example, a third country may be declared prima facie safe, however, this may still fail to account for intolerance towards certain groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals or religious minorities. A de facto risk of violating non-refoulement therefore remains.

 

In this context, it is crucial that individuals have the possibility to challenge their deportation to a return hub. National courts may find deportations to return hubs to be unlawful if this would amount to a violation of migrants’ fundamental rights. One of the key questions for the future of the idea of establishing return hubs will therefore revolve around the availability and nature of judicial redress. While the Commission’s proposal clarifies that individuals would benefit from a right to an effective remedy with a possibility of suspensive effect, a document drafted by the Council Presidency before the publication of the Commission’s proposal indicated that ‘the prevailing position’ in the Council was that ‘judicial scrutiny [...] could put the implementation of this innovative solution at risk’ and should therefore be precluded. This proposition is highly problematic, as it seems to be at odds with EU primary law, specifically the right to an effective remedy, proposing to sacrifice this crucial constitutional safeguard in the name of innovative lawmaking, thereby exacerbating the risk of refoulement that is inherent in the idea of offshoring return.

 

7.     The uncertain future of return hubs

 

Return hubs are one of the key innovations proposed by the Commission. Hopes may be high that this will enable Member States to increase the effectiveness of return policies, thus marking what is presented as a significant change in EU migration policy. As this blog post has argued, however, the fate of return hubs is far from certain. It is unclear whether the co-legislatures may be able to find common ground on this element of reform or whether the proposed legal basis for return hubs in EU law will be kept as it is, amended or abandoned altogether. Specifically, it should be worth critically reflecting on some of the underlying presumptions of this policy instrument: would it really persuade third country nationals to move back to their country of origin? And could Member States in practice enter into a cooperation with third states that ensures that courts will accept, in a significant number of cases, deportation?

 

Presuming there is a political majority for the idea of return hubs, based on the preceding analysis, the co-legislature may wish to consider some of the following aspects that may allow them to define, more clearly, the legal option of Member States to rely on these return hubs. First, the Return Regulation should clarify that such return hubs could only be established on the basis of formal international agreements. Second, return hubs would have to be established in a third state from which a person may, factually or legally, be able to move to her or his country of origin. Third, the EU legislature should oblige Member States to include, in their cooperation with third states, rules that clarify the legal position of third country nationals who cannot return to their country of origin. After a reasonable period of time, these individuals would have to be authorised to move freely within the territory of that third state, in order to avoid a practice of indefinite and systematic detention. Lastly, unlike views reportedly raised in the Council, ideas to drop or undermine the effectiveness of judicial review should be abolished. The right to an effective remedy is crucial in the context of deportation to a third state, and likewise a firmly enshrined constitutional guarantee. While judicial review may undermine the idea of effective return, this is surely a price worth paying. The fate and success of return hubs as an innovative policy instrument will depend on these safeguards. Should return hubs emerge as an innovative policy tool, its legal design needs to be waterproof.

 

 

The New EU “Common System for Returns” under the Return Regulation: Evidence-Lacking Lawmaking and Human Rights Concerns

 

Dr. Izabella Majcher, Independent Consultant

Photo credit: Alamy Stock Photo 

On 11 March 2025, the European Commission published a proposal for a Return Regulation to replace the 2008 Return Directive. This new proposal also supersedes the Commission 2018 proposal to recast the Directive (discussed here and here). Negotiations on the 2018 recast proposal spanned several years, incurring significant costs, yet they stalled at the European Parliament level before even reaching interinstitutional negotiations between the Parliament and the Council of the EU. This raises questions about the necessity of launching fresh negotiations, their financial implications, and ultimately whether a comprehensive revision is needed at all. Why will this proposal pass through the negotiations if the previous one got stalled? In addition, opting for a regulation rather than a directive could make negotiations even more complex, as Member States recognize that a regulation’s provisions would be directly applicable in their domestic legal systems.

The underlying aim of the proposal is to increase the number of people returned, as it regrets that only around 20% of those issued a return decision actually leave. The proposal links this objective to the effectiveness of return. This objective is to be achieved through two main contributions of the proposal.

First, the proposal aims to streamline and harmonise return procedures, attributing the inefficiency of returns at the EU level to divergent national approaches. To address this, the Commission proposes shifting from a directive to a regulation and restricting the ability of Member States to provide stronger safeguards at the domestic level. Notably, the proposal criticises “significant room” the Directive leaves for national courts to interpret EU rules and removes the option for “more favourable provisions” option under the Directive (Art. 4). In the effort to create “modern, simplified and common” procedures, there is a risk that essential human rights safeguards will be eroded. It is crucial to remember that return procedures must comply not only with the principle of effectiveness but also with human rights standards. Second, the proposal upgrades “common standards and procedures” of return to a “common system for returns.” Besides the return standards and procedures, the “common system for returns” includes mutual recognition of return decisions (see discussion below), necessary resources and personnel to be ensured by the Member States, cooperation between Member States, support from EU bodies and agencies, and digital management systems. These measures are neither groundbreaking nor novel enough to justify an entirely new legislative text—especially considering the costs of adopting a new law.

The lack of an ex-ante impact assessment makes these questions even more pressing. Citing urgency and existing studies and consultations (most of which have not been made public), the Commission chose not to conduct an impact assessment for this proposal. None of these explanations is convincing, especially in light of the importance of evidence-based law-making. Under its own Better Regulation Guidelines, for every initiative that is likely to have significant economic, environmental or social impacts, the Commission should conduct an impact assessment to demonstrate the added value of the proposed measures and their coherence with key criteria—including impact on fundamental rights.

The proposal introduces some stronger human rights protections compared to the Directive, including the judicial form of appeal (Art. 26(1)), expanded monitoring of forced returns (Art. 15), basic needs provision during removal postponement (Art. 14(6)), and age assessment for children (Art. 19). However, these safeguards are overshadowed by the proposal’s overall coercive approach and several provisions that weaken rights. This analysis examines five key measures that are particularly problematic from a human rights perspective, questioning not only their human rights compliance but also their effectiveness.

1) Mutual recognition of return decisions: Building upon the Commission Recommendation from March 2023, the proposal enshrines the mutual recognition of return decisions. Under this mechanism, a Member State that apprehended a person who has already received a return decision in another Member State may (and in the future shall) enforce that decision rather than issuing its own (Art. 9). This is made possible through a “European Return Order” (a form listing main elements of the return decision) made available among the states through the Schengen Information System (Regulation 2018/1860) or other information exchange channels. In theory, mutual recognition enhances efficiency, as only one state would conduct the return procedure. It is therefore unsurprising that the Commission presents it as a key element of the common system for return. However, this measure was already provided in a 2001 Council Directive, yet it does not appear to be regularly used.

Recognizing another state’s return decision comes with practical and legal challenges. Since grounds for legal stay are not harmonised at the EU level, a person may be in an irregular situation in one state but not in another. Although the proposal aims to harmonise procedures, Member States will still be allowed to grant residence permits on humanitarian, compassionate, or other grounds (Art. 7(9)). Since these residence permits are not harmonised, situations may arise where a state is required to remove a person who would otherwise qualify for a residence permit under its domestic law. Additionally, despite formal harmonisation, there will remain the scope for domestic interpretation of grounds for a legal stay (currently demonstrated by discrepancies between asylum recognition rates for the same nationality across the EU). So a state enforcing another’s return decision may face litigation, even though appeals against the decision would have to be lodged against the issuing Member State, according to the proposal. The enforcing state would also bear the costs of removal and potentially detention. Although the proposal provides for Frontex funding or compensation by the issuing state, accessing this financing may be cumbersome to organise. Mutual recognition is thus generally in the interest of the transit countries while disadvantageous for the destination countries.

Crucially, mutual recognition of return decisions and entry bans raises proportionality concerns as it effectively spreads across the EU the most restrictive approaches. As demonstrated above, despite the proposal's aim to harmonise procedures, there will still be room for domestic non-harmonised statuses (e.g., under Art. 7(9) of the proposal) as well as variations in the interpretation of harmonised statuses (e.g., refugee or subsidiary protection statuses). The Commission’s approach lacks coherence on this issue. It glorifies the mutual recognition of return decisions as a key efficiency measure, yet it makes no effort to introduce the mutual recognition of protection statuses—exposing a clear double standard in EU migration policy.  

2) Expansion of detention: the proposal significantly expands the legal basis for detention. Under the Directive, states may only apply detention unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case. The proposal removes this requirement (Art. 29(1)-(2)), making detention the first resort measure, which is at odds with the CJEU case-law and HRC jurisprudence. The proposal introduces three new grounds for detention (Art. 29(3)), which are also questionable under international human rights law. Among the new grounds for detention is the need to determine or verify the person’s identity or nationality, even where there is no risk of absconding. This ground could lead to unnecessary and prolonged detention of individuals whose nationality is disputed, not recognized, or who are stateless.

Detention would henceforth also be allowed if the person poses “security risks,” defined as a threat to public policy or public or national security, the existence of serious grounds for believing that the person has committed a serious offence, or a clear indication of their intention to commit one (Art. 16). The proposal further provides for derogations from the detention regime otherwise applicable. States will be able to detain those covered by this ground in prisons (albeit separated from “ordinary prisoners”) rather than in dedicated detention centres, and for a period longer than the maximum permissible length under the proposal—potentially indefinite. Detention based on “security risks” blurs the lines between (administrative) immigration detention and criminal detention. Because it offers fewer guarantees to detainees, immigration detention is an exceptional measure that should only be applied on narrowly defined grounds related to imminent removal. Immigration detention is by no means intended to address security risks; rather, criminal laws should apply equally to anyone under the state's jurisdiction. Criminal pre-trial and post-conviction detention provide stronger due process guarantees and clearer time-limits. The proposal thus intends to sideline the CJEU case-law, as the court was adamant in stressing that detention on public order or safety grounds cannot be based on the Directive.

The proposal extends the maximum permitted length of detention in ordinary cases from 18 months to 24 months (Art. 32(3)). While states are not required to maintain detention for the maximum period, in practice, they often do. As a result, the proposal would lead to longer detention periods across the EU. This stands in stark contrast to the Commission’s previous stance, which claimed that the Directive had a beneficial effect on detention lengths in Member States by generally shortening them. Additionally, the proposal clarifies that these limits apply within a given Member State. So, if a person is transferred between states (for instance, under the mutual recognition mechanism), the detention period may start anew. The proposal also facilitates extended and unnecessary detention by removing the principle that detention shall only be maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence. However, this requirement stems from the ECtHR's well-established case-law, so the Member States remain bound by it in any case.

The expansion of detention thus conflicts with several safeguards flowing from the right to liberty. Additionally, as pointed out by the EPRS, detention is neither necessarily effective (since there is no evidence to suggest that more detention leads to higher return rates) nor efficient (due to the considerable costs involved).

3) Generalized restriction on freedom of movement: the proposal introduces five freedom-restricting measures (including reporting obligations, residing in a specific place and electronic monitoring), labelling them as “alternatives to detention” (Art. 31). However unlike genuine alternatives to detention, these measures are not to be imposed instead of detention (i.e., when detention would otherwise be lawful) but in addition to detention – when detention is not or no longer justified (Art. 32). Labelling such measures as “alternatives to detention” is therefore misleading and creates confusion. Under the framework of detention and its so-called alternatives, individuals risk being either detained or subjected to these restrictive measures depending on the perceived level of the risk of absconding. Given the expansive definition of the risk of absconding (Art. 30), personal freedom would effectively become the exception rather than the rule. Although the proposal includes some human rights safeguards flowing from the right to freedom of movement within a State—such as individual assessment and proportionality requirements—these may not be sufficient to counterbalance the broad scope of restrictions.

Another set of freedom-restricting measures introduced in the proposal relates to the new obligation to cooperate and remain available for the return process (Art. 23). To ensure a swift, efficient, and effective return, the proposal subjects individuals to geographical restrictions (such as confinement to a designated area or residence at a specific address) and/or reporting duties for the duration of the return procedure. Notably, the proposal does not establish any additional conditions for imposing these measures. Subjecting every person in the return procedure to geographical restrictions is an indiscriminate and disproportionate measure. It fails to meet the necessity requirement under the right to freedom of movement, which demands that any restriction be necessary in the individual case for achieving the legitimate objective.

4) The downgrading of “voluntary” departure/return: The proposal rebrands "voluntary departure" (currently used in the Directive) as "voluntary return," which reduces clarity. A return that follows a return decision is not truly voluntary, as it is not based on the person’s informed and free consent. Even "voluntary departure" under the Directive is misleading, with "mandatory" or "accepted" return previously suggested as more accurate. The shift to "voluntary return" only deepens the confusion, likely aligning the language with assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs run by the International Organization for Migration.

Additionally, the proposal removes the priority currently given to "voluntary" departure/return, making removal the default option. The minimum 7-day departure period has also been eliminated, further downgrading the role of “voluntary” departure/return (Art. 12–13). This shift contradicts key legal principles and the Commission’s own position. The CJEU in Zh. and O. confirmed that “voluntary” departure/return is rooted in the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, this form of return is in states’ interests—it is cheaper and easier to organize. As the Commission acknowledged in its 2021 strategy, “voluntary” departure/return helps ensure more effective and sustainable outcomes. The explanatory memorandum applauds the increase in the uptake of “voluntary” departures/returns and, due to the absence of an impact assessment, it remains unclear why this form of return is now being restricted. While the proposal limits “voluntary” departures/returns, it simultaneously promotes them by introducing a new provision dedicated to return and reintegration assistance (Art. 46(3)). This inconsistency ultimately undermines both legal principles and practical considerations.

5) Externalisation of return: The proposal allows Member States to remove individuals—except unaccompanied children and families with children—to a third country with which they have an agreement or arrangement for return (Art. 17). This “return hub” would then be responsible for the further removal. In effect, the proposal establishes a legal basis in EU law for the externalisation of return. On paper, outsourcing returns may seem attractive to Member States. However, as a recent migration deal has shown, such measures often face legal challenges, operational hurdles, and high costs for the outsourcing state. The Commission itself considered “externally-located return centres” in 2018 but identified serious legal and practical challenges, including the risk of violating non-refoulement and conflicts with EU values.

Return hubs raise human rights concerns, particularly regarding detention and onward return. While the proposal requires third countries to uphold international human rights standards, including non-refoulement, it fails to specify how and by whom compliance would be assessed. Similarly, although independent monitoring is mandated, its scope and mandate remain undefined. Member States may not be able to escape responsibility for human rights violations in return hubs. Under the proposed framework, their involvement may be substantial enough to establish jurisdiction, as seen in recent UN Human Rights Committee decisions.

Concluding thoughts

As this analysis has shown, several measures in the Commission’s proposal risk violating fundamental human rights, including the prohibition of refoulement, arbitrary detention, and torture or ill-treatment. The generalised restrictions on freedom of movement and the downgrading of “voluntary” departure/return are not in line with the EU law principle of proportionality. At the same time, these measures are unlikely to improve the effectiveness of return, even when effectiveness is reduced to the sheer number of persons returned—let alone efficiency, which considers the human and financial resources required. In fact, detention does not necessarily lead to higher return rates, while being costly. Similarly, forced removal is more expensive and complex to organize than “voluntary” departure/return. The so-called “innovative solutions”—such as mutual recognition of return decisions and return hubs—lack clarity and may prove far more difficult to implement than envisioned on paper.

Moreover, the proposal fails to meet other key criteria for EU policymaking as outlined in the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines. The de-prioritisation of “voluntary” departure/return contradicts the criterion of sustainability. The criterion of coherence is also put into question. Internally, the downgrading of “voluntary” departure/return is inconsistent with the promotion of “voluntary” assisted return and reintegration. Externally, the use of “alternatives to detention” as standalone restrictive measures distorts the concept, which is meant for people who would otherwise be lawfully detained. Ultimately, the proposal disregards several core criteria of EU lawmaking—shortcomings that could have been identified through an ex-ante impact assessment.

The proposal fails to acknowledge that, despite its arsenal of measures to increase return numbers, not everyone in an irregular situation can or will leave EU territory. The obligation to issue a return decision for every person in an irregular situation—without a mandatory prior assessment of refoulement risks or other legal bars to removal (such as family and private life or health conditions)—inevitably creates a group of unreturnable individuals. This issue already existed under the Directive and is further exacerbated by the proposal. Currently, Member States may issue a residence permit for humanitarian or other reasons instead of a return decision, or withdraw/suspend an existing return decision for such reasons (Art. 6(4)). However, as the EPRS observed, these considerations are not automatically assessed within the return procedure.

Rather than addressing this gap, the proposal eliminates this possibility from the list of exceptions. Member States will only be able to withdraw or suspend a return decision (Article 7(9)); abstaining from issuing a return decision on such considerations will not be an option anymore. Impediments to return will be assessed only at the appeal stage of the return procedure, which undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of return policies let alone human rights compliance. Instead, an automatic assessment should be conducted before issuing a return decision, and a regular status should be granted to those who cannot be returned. Regular pathways for stay are widely recognized as a viable alternative to return and a normal feature of migration governance. A genuine "Common System for Returns" should at least recognize regularisation measures for unreturnable persons.

A legislative proposal based on coercion and restrictive measures—without any supporting evidence due to a missing impact assessment—would never see the light of day in the EU if its addressees were not people whose voices are typically unheard. People fall into irregular situations in many different ways and many have lived in and contributed to European societies for decades. They remain invisible, and those who defend their rights face increasing criminalisation. In this context, responding to the demands of some Member States, the Commission has enjoyed wide flexibility to propose unrestricted coercive measures—with little accountability for their impact on those affected. However, law-making without evidence sets a dangerous precedent. In the future, such an untransparent approach could extend beyond undocumented migrants, affecting asylum seekers, migrants in a regular situation, and ultimately EU citizens. Now, it is up to the European Parliament and the Member States in the Council to reaffirm the EU’s founding principles: democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

The Council’s position on proposed EU law on migrant smuggling: cynical political theatre?

 

Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Ggia, via Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

Member States’ ministers (the EU Council) are likely to agree a negotiating position this week on replacement of existing EU law on smuggling of migrants – raising questions in particular about the compatibility of this law with human rights, including as regards humanitarian assistance for migrants. The following analysis first sets out the current law, comparing it to the Commission’s proposal for replacing that law last year, then comparing that proposal in turn to the likely text of the Council position, concluding with comments on the latest text. The proposal will still have to be negotiated with the European Parliament, which does not yet have a negotiation position of its own.

Current law

Because it was adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the current law is divided between two measures – a Directive setting out the prohibition on facilitating illegal entry or stay, and a Framework Decision providing for criminal offences based on the prohibition. (The proposed law is a Directive that will combine and replace the two).

According to the 2002 Directive, Member States must impose ‘appropriate sanctions’ on anyone who ‘intentionally assists a person who is not a national of a Member State to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit of aliens’ (illegal entry), and anyone ‘who, for financial gain, intentionally assists a person who is not a national of a Member State to reside within the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on the residence of aliens’ (illegal stay). Note that the prohibition on facilitating ‘illegal entry’ is not subject to a ‘financial gain’ motive; but the Directive goes on to say that any Member State ‘may decide not to impose sanctions’ in such cases, ‘by applying its national law and practice for cases where the aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned’. Member States must also apply sanctions where people are instigators of or accomplices in, or attempt, such actions.

The Framework Decision then specifies that the prohibitions in the Directive must be enforced by ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties which may entail extradition’, possibly accompanied by ‘confiscation of the means of transport used to commit the offence’, ‘a prohibition on practising directly or through an intermediary the occupational activity in the exercise of which the offence was committed’, or ‘deportation’. In the case of illegal entry for financial gain or instigation, the Framework Decision is more precise about sentencing: there should be a possible maximum penalty of at least eight years where the offence was committed as part of an organised crime group (as defined by a separate EU law), or ‘while endangering the lives of the persons who are the subject of the offence’. But that could be lowered to six years if that was ‘imperative to preserve the coherence of the national penalty system…provided that it is among the most severe maximum sentences available for crimes of comparable gravity.’

After standard provisions on liability of, and sanctions for, legal persons, the Framework Decision requires Member States to establish jurisdiction over an offence committed ‘in whole or part upon its territory’, by its nationals, or for the benefit of a legal person established there. But Member States may waive either of the latter two rules, or apply them only in ‘specific cases or circumstances’. There is also a specific rule on extradition and prosecution (no longer relevant in light of the European Arrest Warrant), and rules on communication between Member States, where one of them is informed about breaches of the law of another Member State, or requests another Member State to prosecute as regards breaches of its own law.

Finally, the Framework Decision includes a safeguard for asylum:

This framework Decision shall apply without prejudice to the protection afforded refugees and asylum seekers in accordance with international law on refugees or other international instruments relating to human rights, in particular Member States' compliance with their international obligations pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, as amended by the Protocol of New York of 1967.

There is limited case law on the current law, but the Advocate-General’s opinion in the pending case of Kinsa addresses its application to a family member being prosecuted for assisting her child to enter the territory. According to the opinion, this is covered by the obligation to criminalise assistance in the Directive (unless Member States opt out of that aspect), and the Directive is valid; but Member States are obliged to impose lower penalties in such cases.

 

Proposal

The Commission’s proposal starts with a merged criminal offence of assisting illegal entry or stay, either subject to a financial benefit test or a serious harm test:

a) the person who carries out the conduct requests, receives or accepts, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit, or a promise thereof, or carries out the conduct in order to obtain such a benefit; or

b) there is a high likelihood of causing serious harm to a person.

The preamble states that these elements of the offence:

…will usually not be fulfilled when it comes to assistance among family members or the provision of humanitarian assistance or the support of basic human needs. Third-country nationals should not become criminally liable for having been the subject to such criminal offences. Moreover, it is not the purpose of this Directive to criminalise, on the one hand, assistance provided to family members and, on the other hand, humanitarian assistance or the support of basic human needs provided to third-country nationals in compliance with legal obligations.

Although the asylum safeguard would be dropped from the main text, a version of it would still appear in the preamble:

Member States should apply this Directive in accordance and in full compliance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the Protocol of New York of 1967, obligations related to access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement, and fundamental rights.

The proposal also suggests a fleshed-out offence of ‘public instigation’ of illegal entry or stay, although the preamble states that providing ‘objective information’ about immigration and asylum law is not to be covered by this, and that the instigation would amount to ‘illegal content’ covered by the social media content regulation rules in the Digital Services Act.

The offence must be treated as ‘aggravated’ where it was committed within the framework of organised crime, ‘deliberately or by gross negligence caused serious harm to, or endangered the life of, the third-country nationals who were subject to the criminal offence’, was ‘committed by use of serious violence’, where those subject to the offence ‘were particularly vulnerable, including unaccompanied minors’, or where it caused the death of the migrant. Member States must also criminalise incitement, aiding and abetting and attempt – except as regards the ‘public instigation’ offence.

There would be more details on penalties: a maximum penalty possible of at least three years in general for the main offences; ten years (up from eight, or maybe six) for the (longer) list of aggravated cases, also now applying to illegal stay assistance, not only assistance for illegal entry; and fifteen years where a death was caused. (There would be no specific sentencing rule as regards the inchoate offences of incitement, aiding and abetting, or attempt).  

An expanded list of other penalties would include ‘withdrawal of permits or authorisations to pursue activities which have resulted in committing the criminal offence, or prohibition on practising directly or through an intermediary the occupational activity in the exercise of which the criminal offence was committed’ (the latter part reflecting the current law); return to a non-EU country either following sentence in the Member State concerned, or serving some or all of the sentence in the non-EU country, without prejudice to more favourable EU or national rules (building upon the current ‘deportation’); an entry ban for an appropriate period of a maximum ten years, again without prejudice to more favourable EU or national rules; exclusions from public funding etc; fines; and freezing and confiscation of proceeds and instrumentalities (building on the current confiscation of means of transport).

The current provisions on liability of legal persons would be supplemented by more detailed rules on levels of fines, resembling more the penalties in EU competition law (or the Digital Services Act): 3% of worldwide turnover as the general rule, 5% in the case of aggravated offences, 6% where a death is caused. There would also be a list of aggravated circumstances: an offence committed by a public official; a link to illegal employment offences; a prior conviction for the same offence; a link to ‘the exploitation or instrumentalisation of’ the migrant; dispossessing migrants of their ‘identity or travel documents’; or committing the offence while carrying a firearm. Conversely, helping the authorities to ‘find evidence’ or ‘identify or bring to justice other offenders’ would be a mitigating circumstance. But the consequences of either would not be further specified by the Directive.

Like several recent EU criminal law measures, there would be rules on minimum limitation periods: at least seven years after the commission of the offence as a general rule; ten years for aggravated offences; and fifteen years for deaths (including attempts). The same limitation periods would apply as regards enforcement of the sentence, from the date of conviction. As a derogation, these periods could be reduced to five, eight and ten years, ‘provided that the period may be interrupted or suspended in the event of specified acts’.

Jurisdiction would be expanded, to include not only acts committed on the territory in whole or part, but also by nationals and non-EU habitual residents, for the benefit of a legal person also where it does business in the territory, on board its ships or aircraft (registered or flying its flag), or resulting in the entry, transit or stay of the migrants concerned. Unlike the current law, Member States could not opt out of any of these jurisdiction rules. Where an offence was committed outside its territory, Member States would have to drop any requirement that the act was a criminal offence in the other country, or that prosecution required information from the other country first.  

There are some vague new provisions on prevention, resources, training, investigative tools, and data collection, and finally a requirement to apply the new law within one year – shorter than the normal two years for Directives.

 

Council position

First of all, the Council version simplifies the main criminal offence by dropping the provision about causing serious harm as well as the ‘public instigation’ offence. The offence remains assistance to illegal entry or stay, with a financial benefit element. A further safeguard clause has been added to the preamble:

In particular, nothing in this Directive should affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities of Member States and individuals to provide assistance to third-country nationals, for humanitarian reasons or aimed at meeting their basic human needs, under applicable international law - including international human rights law and in particular, where applicable, the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees as amended by the Protocol of New York of 1967, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in compliance with legal obligations. This assistance can also include legal, linguistic or social advice or support.

However, the preamble also expressly reserves the possibility for Member States to criminalise support not motivated by financial benefits (new text underlined):

Assistance of unauthorised entry, transit or stay in the Union should constitute a criminal offence at least when there is a link with an actual or a promised financial or material benefit. This is without prejudice to the way in which Member States deal in their national law with facilitation conducts for which an actual or a promised financial or material benefit is not a constituent element of the offence.

A wholly new recital in the preamble makes the point even more clearly:

This Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonisation. As a consequence, Member States are free to adopt or maintain legislation providing for a broader incrimination than what is set out in this Directive, in the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the fight against migrant smugglers. Member States should ensure that intentionally assisting a third-country national to enter, or transit across, or stay within the territory of any Member State in breach of relevant Union law or the laws of the Member State concerned on the entry, transit and stay of third-country nationals constitutes a criminal offence at least where the person who carries out the conduct requests, receives or accepts, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit, or a promise thereof, or carries out the conduct in order to obtain such a benefit. However, since this Directive is an instrument of minimum harmonisation, Member States are free to criminalise such conduct when no financial or another material benefit has been provided.

And the Commission’s proposed recital stating that family members, and migrants subject to the offence, should not themselves be criminalised, is replaced by two recitals giving Member States leeway to do just that:

Nothing in this Directive should be understood as requiring the criminalisation, on the one hand, of assistance provided to close family members and, on the other hand, of humanitarian assistance or the support of basic human needs provided to third-country nationals in compliance with the applicable national and international legal framework.

Without prejudice to rules of national law relating to unauthorised entry in the territory of the Member State concerned, third-country nationals should not become criminally liable for the sole fact of having been the subject to the criminal offence of facilitating the unauthorised entry, transit across, or stay within the territory of any Member State.

In this context, it should be noted that the case law on the Returns Directive, beginning with El Dridi, places limits on Member States enforcing criminal law against migrants for irregular entry or stay by means of custodial sentences – although this is subject to exceptions, and the rationale for it is to speed up expulsion.  

The penalty would follow the Commission proposal for at least a three year possible maximum sentence for the offences. But it would revert to eight years (as at present, although without the option to lower that to six years) for (a longer list of) aggravated offences. It would also revert to an option to apply these sentences to illegal stay cases, and refer to serious endangerment of life – a higher threshold than the current law – as regards one of the grounds of aggravated offences (and the proposed extension to include serious harm would be dropped). The possible maximum sentence would be at least ten (not fifteen) years where a death is caused (subject to the added requirement that the death was caused by seriously endangering the migrant’s life; a new recital in the preamble refers to ‘intention’ being defined by national law, and the avoidance of strict liability). As for additional penalties, the Council would drop the reference to return (thus being less stringent on this point than the current law) as well as the specific reference to a 10-year entry ban (the length of the ban would not be specified).

The penalties for legal persons would be simplified by adding a possibility of a lump sum (€24 million for basic cases, €40 million for aggravated cases); deaths of migrants would be subsumed within the rules on other aggravated cases. A new provision would allow for different penalties than these, if necessary to be consistent with national penalty systems. Aggravating circumstances would no longer include a link to illegal employment, exploitation of migrants (although ‘instrumentalisation’ would now be defined in the preamble), or carrying a firearm, but would now include cases where ‘the criminal offence was committed involving cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of a third-country national who was subject to the criminal offence.’

Limitation periods for prosecution would be reduced compared to the proposal, matching the sentencing rules – ie a limitation period of three years where the maximum penalty must be at least three years, eight years for aggravated offences, and ten where death was caused via serious endangerment. A separate set of limitation periods would apply to enforcement after a sentence – three, five, eight or ten years from the conviction, depending on the length of the sentence. Member States could reduce either set of limitation periods to five years (where they were longer than that).

Next, Member States would only be obliged to assert jurisdiction where the offence was committed in whole or part on its territory, or by their nationals, or on board their ships or aircraft. Unlike the proposal, it would be optional to assert jurisdiction as regards non-EU habitual residents, where the act was for the benefit of a legal person established or doing business in the territory, or where the act aimed at the entry, transit or stay of the migrants concerned. Where an offence was committed outside its territory, Member States could retain a requirement that the act was a criminal offence in the other country. Finally, Member States would have two years to give effect to the Directive – probably bringing us to the second half of 2027.

 

Comments

If the European Parliament accepts the Council’s position – and we have no idea what the Parliament (now less liberal than it was before on immigration issues) will argue for – then the main changes from the current law would be:

-          criminalising assistance to illegal entry without financial benefit would no longer be the rule under EU law, with an opt out for Member States, but rather outside the scope of the law, leaving Member States free to criminalise it if they wish;  

-          a three year possible maximum criminal sentence for the main offences, and ten years where a death was caused by seriously endangering a migrant’s life;

-          returns would no longer be explicitly referred to as a penalty, although entry bans now would be;

-          there would be more specific possible penalties for legal persons;

-          there would be new rules on aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and limitation periods; and

-          jurisdiction would have to be asserted also as regards ships, aircraft and nationals.

The most controversial element here is likely to be exactly how to treat offences not committed for financial gain. (On this point, see also the Belgian Presidency redraft six months ago) Although nominally removing the default obligation under EU law to criminalise all cases of assisting illegal entry, unless Member States choose to opt out, Member States will still be left to criminalise such cases if they wished to, outside the scope of EU law.

In fact, if the Advocate-General’s opinion in the pending Kinsa case is followed, the position of anyone criminalised in this situation will arguably be worse: if EU law no longer applies to them, then even the obligation to reduce the possible penalties applicable to them, recommended by the Advocate-General, will no longer apply. Only a fully-fledged humanitarian defence to criminal liability would suffice. But on that point, it might be argued that since the EU can only set minimum rules on criminal offences (according to the Treaties), EU law is unable to provide fully for defences, because Member States are always free to insist upon greater criminal obligations than EU law provides for.

As for the other changes to the law, the provisions on sentencing, entry bans, limitation periods, special circumstances and jurisdiction may already reflect what many Member States do in practice. It’s hard to be sure because the Commission did not produce an impact assessment on its proposal, although the explanatory memorandum to that proposal did give some examples of potential maximum sentences of less than three years in some Member States. Taken as a whole, this exercise looks like another example of ‘migration theatre’ – an activity intending to signal some effort to control migration flows, but which does not change things much in practice, either as regards criminal liability for those profiting from smuggling, or exemption from liability for humanitarians and desperate family members who do not.