Testing the Applicability of EU Law Abroad: The Italy–Albania Protocol in the Comeri, Sidilli, and Sedrata Hearings

 

Eleonora Celoria, Post-doctoral researcher, FIERI

Andreina De Leo*, Post-doctoral researcher, Maastricht University

Marcella Ferri, Research Fellow, Florence University

* Funded by the European Union (ERC, SoftEn project, 101165167, PI: Lilian Tsourdi). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

Photo credit: Jorge Franganillo, via Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

On 23 and 24 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held two hearings in the ongoing proceedings addressing the compatibility of the Italy-Albania Protocol with EU law and the broader implications of conducting asylum and return procedures extraterritorially (Joined cases C-706/25 Comeri and C-707/25 Sidilli, and C-414/25 Sedrata).

This may appear as a déjà-vu. Less than a year ago, the extraterritorial processing of asylum under the Italy-Albania Protocol had already come before the Court in the well-known Alace and Canpelli cases (discussed on this blog by Zamboni and Favilli & Marin). The focus of those cases was, however, narrower, as it concerned the criteria to designate countries as “safe countries of origin” under the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) and their judicial review, a classification that directly enabled the use of accelerated offshore asylum procedures in Albania. Following those rulings, the Italian Government adjusted its strategy, implementing a policy based on the relocation to Albania of returnees already detained in Italian pre-removal detention centers under the Return Directive (RD). While awaiting removal, these individuals may lodge an asylum application which, according to the Government, can then be examined in Albania. Against this backdrop, the new preliminary references raise a distinct and more direct question: whether asylum and return procedures can, as such, be carried out in a third country without breaching EU law. In doing so, they place the legality of the Protocol as a whole squarely before the Court.

More specifically, the first preliminary ruling, submitted by the Court of Cassation on 20 June 2025, asks whether Articles 3, 6, 8, 15, and 16 of the Return Directive preclude transferring a migrant subject to a return order to an extraterritorial detention centre, even without a concrete prospect of removal. It also asks whether Article 9(1) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which requires applicants to remain on a Member State’s territory, precludes keeping asylum seekers who lodge an asylum application after being transferred to a third-country detention centre within that country (see De Leo).

The second preliminary ruling, submitted by the Rome Court of Appeal on 5 November 2025, directly questions Italy’s competence to conclude an international agreement  interfering with an area of exclusive EU competence, as laid down in Articles 4(3) TEU, 3(2) TFEU and 216(1) TFEU (see Montaldo and delli Carri). Alternatively, should the Court find that Italy has such competence, it asks whether the safeguards under the APD and the Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), as well as the Charter, particularly the rights to liberty, an effective remedy, and health, preclude transferring asylum seekers to, and detaining them in, centres outside EU territory.

It is worth recalling that the stated aim of the Protocol is to “reinforce bilateral cooperation in managing migration flows,” allowing Italy to transfer migrants to Albania solely to carry out asylum and return procedures under Italian and EU law (Art. 4(3) Protocol). These procedures remain under Italian jurisdiction and are conducted in accordance with national and EU law “to the extent compatible” (Art. 4(1), Ratification Law 14/2024).

Although raising different questions, both Italian courts focused on the same core issue: whether EU law safeguards can be effectively ensured for asylum seekers and returnees detained in a third country and whether those standards are compromised merely because detention occurs outside the territory of a Member State.

Outline of the post

While awaiting further developments, and notably the Advocate General’s opinions on 23 April (Sedrata) and 11 June (Comeri and Sidilli), this post examines the key issues raised during the hearings and outlines the main arguments on whether asylum and return procedures conducted in a third country, yet under a Member State’s jurisdiction, comply with EU law.

It first considers whether EU law applies to procedures carried out in Albania and whether such procedures may interfere with its application, summarising the positions of the Italian Government and the European Commission. Two aspects are examined: the Dublin system and its founding principle of mutual trust, and whether EU safeguards can be effectively guaranteed in detention centres abroad. Finally, the post clarifies the differences between the Albania model, the so-called “return hubs,” and the notion of a safe third country, as frequently referenced during hearings and in public debate.

EU Law Beyond Territory: Parties’ Arguments on Applicability, Compliance, and Competence in the Italy-Albania Scheme

The Italian government

To justify the compatibility of the Italy-Albania Protocol and its Ratification Law with EU law, the Italian Government advanced two alternative lines of argument. Both were aimed at demonstrating that: first, the Protocol does not risk adversely affecting the internal rules of the Union and therefore does not encroach upon an area of exclusive EU competence; secondly, that the extraterritorial application of the relevant directives in a third country does not undermine their effet utile.

First, the Government argued that the Albanian centres should be considered “representations of Member States” abroad under the APD and RCD, and that EU law applies indirectly through its incorporation via the Ratification Law. On this basis, the Government maintained that the Italy-Albania Protocol is purely technical and logistical: it does not alter the substance of the legal framework on pre-removal detention, asylum procedures or reception conditions, which remain fully applicable because the legislator has chosen to extend EU standards to the situations covered by the Protocol. By virtue of this legal extension, the Government maintained that third-country nationals detained in Albania receive treatment equivalent to that in Italy. It further argued that instruments such as the Dublin Regulation, though not explicitly mentioned in the Protocol, continue to apply because the individuals remain continuously under Italian jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Protocol would neither interfere with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) nor encroach upon the Union’s external competences.

With respect to the RD, the Government argued that the transfer to Albania does not qualify as a “return” within the meaning of Article 3, but it rather amounts to a temporary relocation to a different pre-removal detention facility, legally assimilated to ones located on Italian territory. Accordingly, it maintained that compliance with the Directive’s objectives and provisions, including Articles 15 and 16 on detention and conditions of detention, are not undermined, as the material conditions would be fully respected. Regarding the APD, the Government contended that Article 9 is not violated when returnees apply for asylum after being transferred to Albania, since they remain under Italian jurisdiction, and thus do not risk refoulement, and continue to benefit from the full application of both the APD and RCD.

Alternatively, the Government argued that EU law could apply directly through a functional interpretation of “territory.” In the absence of a clear EU definition of “border” or “transit zones,” the centres in Albania could be regarded as a fictio iuris, functionally equivalent to transit zones located on Italian soil. On this view, the legal equivalence of procedures in Albania and Italy would justify treating the Albanian centres as falling within the scope of EU law, in the same way as their territorial counterparts.

While the Dublin Regulation was not explicitly mentioned by the referring judges, it emerged as a contentious issue. In particular, the risk of circumventing Dublin criteria for unaccompanied minors (Article 8) and family members (Articles 9–10) was debated during the Sedrata hearing. The Italian Government maintained that the Regulation remains applicable because the Albanian centres qualify as “transit zones” under Dublin III. This, however, raised a fundamental question from the bench: on what legal basis could another Member State be required to accept a Dublin transfer from a non-EU centre, and how would this not interfere with common EU rules? Questions which were left unresolved.

The European Commission

The Commission, by contrast, adopted a strict literal reading of the directives, distinguishing clearly between jurisdiction and territory. While acknowledging that the individuals remain under Italian jurisdiction, it stressed that asylum and reception rules are territorially anchored and do not apply automatically outside Member State territory. Nonetheless, the Commission did not view the Protocol as violating EU law or encroaching on exclusive EU competences, so long as the legislator’s choice to apply EU standards effectively preserves the effet utile of the acquis. Its reasoning followed two separate lines, depending on the instrument in question.

As for the RD, the Commission noted that it does not strictly define its scope in territorial terms but rather sets standards to ensure the effectiveness of returns from EU territory. Since Italy has committed to applying these standards in Albania, the Commission did not see any inherent incompatibility with the temporary transfer of returnees outside the territory pending repatriation. Yet, this conclusion was subject to strict conditions: the Commission emphasised that detention should have been previously judicially authorised, that all guarantees under Articles 15–18 of the Directive are fully respected, and that the transfer to Albania must not constitute the execution of the return decision. In essence, for the Commission the Directive does not require detention to occur on the territory of the Member State: what is rather decisive is that the Member State fully complies with its concrete obligations.

As for the APD and the RCD, the Commission rejected the qualification of the Albanian centres as “transit zones.” It stressed that the notion of territory is autonomous under EU law and cannot be extended to third countries, and that thus a “transit zone” must be located within the Union’s territory. When pressed by the bench on whether an international definition of “transit zone” exists, it indicated that this was ultimately irrelevant, as the notion must be understood as a matter of EU law. Accordingly, the Protocol cannot extend EU territory, and the direct applicability of the asylum acquis is thus excluded.

That said, the Commission did not view the mere extension, via national law, of EU standards to procedures in Albania as automatically undermining the directives’ objectives or interfering with internal EU competences under the ERTA doctrine. Such a violation would only arise if the arrangement risked affecting common EU rules: a risk the Commission considered unproven here. Article 9 APD illustrates this approach: if the asylum application is made in Italy, transfer to Albania is precluded. Conversely, if lodged only after transfer, while the Directive does not apply directly, its purpose, i.e. to prevent removal before assessing refoulement risks, is fulfilled because Italy retains jurisdiction and applies EU standards.

Regarding the Dublin system, the Commission held that the Regulation does not apply outside EU territory, revealing a potential paradox noted by Advocate General Emiliou during Sedrata: if EU law does not formally apply, can it still be circumvented?

More broadly, the question arises whether exclusion from the scope of the Regulation and Directives is merely a consequence of its incidental inapplicability in a third country, or the result of a deliberate choice by Italy, and namely, transferring individuals to Albania. In the latter scenario, how can it be argued that the Protocol and Ratification Law do not effectively allow Italy to evade its obligations under EU law?

As President Lenaerts highlighted, the key concern of the ERTA doctrine is preventing Member States from using external bilateral agreements to regulate matters that fall within EU law, in ways that could undermine its objectives. In other words, it is not enough to claim that EU law does not directly apply in a third country, but what matters is whether the external action could affect the effective internal functioning and uniformity of the EU legal framework. In this respect, the Commission’s position appeared unsatisfactory, as it failed to address the broader systemic implications for the CEAS and the structural risks of circumvention inherent in the scheme.

This brings us to our legal assessment, where we examine the unresolved issues in the approaches of the Italian Government and the Commission regarding the challenges of extraterritorialising asylum procedures and applying EU law in a third country.

Assessing the Potential Interference of Procedures Conducted in a third country with the EU Migration and Asylum Acquis

All in all, both the Italian Government and the European Commission ultimately arrive at a broadly similar conclusion: the Italy-Albania Protocol does not entail a violation of the Union’s exclusive competences, nor does it compromise the effet utile of the relevant directives, insofar as EU standards can be ensured, even in a third country. However, this conclusion leaves several key issues unresolved. First, it does not fully address the implications for the Dublin system. Indeed, the extension of Dublin obligations outside the Union could highly interfere with the CEAS and the principle of mutual trust. Second, the assumption that equivalent standards can be guaranteed extraterritorially remains highly problematic, as the territorial scope of EU asylum law reflects structural constraints necessary to ensure full compliance with procedural and substantive guarantees. These two issues will be addressed separately in the following sections.

The (application of the) Dublin system: a paradigmatic interference with the CEAS

The application of the Dublin system emerged as a highly sensitive issue during the Sedrata hearing. While EURODAC was not discussed, the reasoning for the Dublin Regulation can be extended to it, in light of recital 54 of EURODAC Regulation. The Italian Government and the Commission took sharply divergent positions: the Government qualifies the centres as “transit zones” under Dublin, a view opposed by the Commission, which raises several critical questions.

First, how can the Albanian centres be considered “representations of Member States” under the APD and the RCD, or “transit zones” under the Dublin Regulation? This argument is unpersuasive, as it would imply that the notion of “transit zone” differs across two CEAS instruments, risking to undermine the system’s internal coherence.

Secondly, if the Dublin system were applied to asylum requests lodged in the Albanian centers, other Member States would be obliged to accept transfers, as the Italian Government argued. From a theoretical perspective, this would directly interfere with the CEAS and undermine the principle of mutual trust on which it rests (Lenaerts, 2017). In fact, the presumption of compliance with EU law standards appears questionable in itself when it is applied to an asylum request lodged outside the territory of a Member State — albeit under its jurisdiction. Yet, save for specific exceptions, that principle prevents other States from verifying whether, in a given case, Italy has actually complied with EU law in processing an asylum application, notably that it has allocated responsibility in accordance with the procedural guarantees laid down in the Dublin Regulation and with the right to an effective remedy against the transfer decision. In short, extending the Regulation to applications lodged in the Italian centres in Albania would run counter to the principle of mutual trust underpinning the Dublin system and, ultimately, the CEAS.

Third, from a practical perspective, applying the Dublin Regulation outside Italy would adversely affect the rights of asylum seekers lodging an application in another Member State and seeking reunification with a family member detained in Albania (Article 10 of the Dublin Regulation). Unless the applicants were also transferred to Albania — which would amount to their de facto detention — they would remain in Italy, thereby rendering effective reunification  impossible. This impossibility, which stems directly from the detention of the family member in Albania rather than in a detention facility on Italian territory, would breach their rights to family life and to the child’s best interests, as laid down in the Dublin Regulation and in Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter.

By contrast, if, as the Commission argues, the Dublin Regulation does not apply, Italy could evade its obligations under Articles 8— 10 of the Regulation and Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter. Once again, such circumvention would be achievable simply through the deliberate extraterritorialisation of asylum procedures. In a nutshell, whether applied or not, the Dublin Regulation illustrates the systemic and structural interference with the CEAS created by the Protocol and Ratification Law.

Ensuring Effective Application of  EU Standards and Rights in a Third Country: Mission Impossibile?

We concur with the Commission that the territorial nature of EU asylum law imposes inherent limits on extending its directives beyond the Union. However, we diverge from the view that voluntarily applying EU standards abroad via national law automatically resolves compatibility concerns. This divergence is anchored in the structural reality that the territorial scope of the directives is not merely formal: it reflects the impossibility of fully guaranteeing procedural and material standards outside the Union. Applying EU law where these guarantees cannot be secured risks undermining the directives’ objectives, the uniformity of EU law, and may raise concerns under the ERTA doctrine (see: De Leo & Celoria, and Montaldo).

As highlighted by the referring judges and the lawyers representing the migrants, a central issue is the gap between the guarantees afforded to migrants detained in Italy and those in the Albanian centres. The Government asserts that procedures in Albania are identical to those in Italy, yet legal equivalence on paper does not ensure effective protection in practice. In our view, the fiction that Albanian centres are legally treated as part of a Member State is insufficient to secure genuine compliance with EU standards on the ground.

The main concerns identified by the referring courts and discussed during the hearings include: the right to liberty under Article 6 of the Charter, notably the requirement for immediate release if detention is unlawful; guarantees related to detention conditions, including access for lawyers, family members, national, international, and non-governmental organisations, and access to healthcare; and the right to a fair trial and effective remedy under Article 47, particularly the right to be “advised, defended, and represented.” As emphasized by the rapporteur judge of Comeri and Sidilli case, these discrepancies risk creating a distinction between “two types of asylum seekers,” or even “two types of detainees,” solely based on where and when an application is lodged.

Both the RD and the RCD require that a person “shall be released immediately” if detention is found unlawful (Article 15(1) RD; Article 9(3) RCD). This requirement is inherently impossible to reconcile with the Italy–Albania scheme. Under Article 6(2) of the Protocol, Italian authorities must “take the necessary measures to ensure the permanence of migrants within the areas, preventing their unauthorised exit into the territory of the Republic of Albania, both during and after the completion of administrative procedures, irrespective of the final outcome.” In practice, release on Albanian territory is impossible: individuals can only be freed once transferred back to Italy. Therefore, even when detention is considered unlawful, the person remains under continuous coercive control throughout the transfer, i.e. from the detention center to the port, during maritime transport, and until release in Italy (typically in Bari or Brindisi): a process that may last from 24 hours to several days, depending on logistical conditions. In this respect, the Italian National Guarantor has recently noted that, if transfer cannot occur the same day, the person remains in a “separate area” of the same detention centre, a practice arguably failing short of the “immediate release” requirement. During this period, individuals are subject to a “coercive measure that deprives [them] of [their] freedom of movement and isolates [them] from the rest of the population” (CJEU, FMS, para. 223). Both the Albanian centres and the transport arrangements display the defining features of detention: a closed, restricted space where movements are limited and monitored and exit is not voluntary (CJEU, FMS, para. 231). The European Court of Human Rights similarly confirms that confinement on ships may constitute de facto detention, even if nominally for the person’s interest (Khlaifia and Others v Italy, paras. 70–71). In sum, the extraterritorial setting alters the legal consequences of detention, making immediate release practically unfeasible and raising serious questions about compliance with EU law.

Extraterritoriality also affects effective access to detention centres. Under national law implementing EU standards (Articles 16(2) and (4) RD; Article 10(4) RCD), a wide range of actors, e.g. parliamentarians, national monitoring bodies, UNHCR representatives, lawyers, family members, religious ministers, and civil society organisations, should be granted access (Articles 21 DPR 394/99; 7 D.Lgs. 142/2015; Ministerial Directive 19 May 2022). By contrast, Article 9(2) of the Protocol limits access to “lawyers, their assistants” and “international organisations and EU agencies,” raising questions about the interplay of the two regimes. Even if Italy seeks to apply its broader framework, as argued during the hearing, effective implementation depends on Albanian authorities’ consent. This is because access requires entry into Albanian territory, which remains under Albanian sovereignty. Article 9(2) subjects access to “applicable EU, national and Albanian law,” while Article 6(1) confirms Albanian responsibility for public order and security outside the centres and during transfers. Consequently, Albania may lawfully restrict access based on domestic entry, residence, or public order rules, limiting in practice the actors able to monitor detention conditions. While the Italian Government argued that this poses no practical concern, citing visa-free entry for holders of Italian passports or residence permits, the effectiveness of EU law guarantees cannot depend on conditions outside the Member State’s control. Making access contingent on the rules or discretion of a third country introduces uncertainty incompatible with the requirement to ensure EU rights in an effective and uniform manner. Moreover, denials imposed by Albanian authorities cannot be effectively challenged before an Italian court, which undermines the right to an effective remedy for those having the right to access the detention centres.

Similarly, under Article 10(4) of RCD, lawyers, family members, and civil society organisations have the right to communicate with and visit detainees, and any limitations must not make access impossible or excessively difficult. In the Albanian centres, however, restrictions appear structural and generalised rather than exceptional, making them difficult to reconcile with Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter and the proportionality requirement under Article 52(1). The Government’s argument that similar limitations exist in Italy is unpersuasive: in Albania, restrictions are the norm, access is more complex, time-consuming, and costly, and a recent monitoring report by the Italian National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty notes that some detainees were not informed of their transfer, further hindering visits. Crucially, as noted above, the ultimate decision rests with Albanian authorities, meaning that limitations stemming from a third State’s sovereignty cannot be effectively challenged or remedied in Italy, thereby weakening the effective enjoyment of EU-law-derived rights.

Additionally, discrepancies in safeguards for lawyers are particularly pronounced. In Italy, appointed lawyers can access detention centres without prior authorisation and often be appointed in person after initial telephone contact. In Albania, this is not possible, nor foreseen by the Protocol or the Ratification Law, which allows travel at public expense only “when remote connection is not feasible” during the detention validation hearing (Article 4(5), Law 14/2024). This effectively precludes in-person meetings before or after the hearing to prepare a defence or appeal a negative decision. Given the current five-day deadline to challenge a validation decision, detainees without immediate lawyer access face heightened risk of ineffective representation. In-person meetings are often essential to identify vulnerabilities or health conditions that may render detention unlawful, tasks difficult to perform remotely, particularly when access depends on the private centre manager’s discretion and mobile phone use is restricted. Physical distance, limited contacts, and communication restrictions materially weaken lawyer-client interaction, undermining the right to effective assistance and representation under Article 47 of the Charter. Remote hearings further exacerbate these issues. By analogy with the Court’s reasoning in FP and Others (C‑760/22), videoconference participation is not inherently incompatible with a fair and public hearing, but its appropriateness depends on the individual being able to follow proceedings, be heard without technical obstacles, and communicate effectively and confidentially with their lawyer. In Italy, lawyers attending remote validation hearings can choose to be in the courtroom with the judge or at the centre with their client: a flexibility that is simply unavailable for detainees in Albania, further undermining effective representation.

Finally, significant disparities exist regarding the right to health, guaranteed under Article 16(3) RD and Article 17(2) RCD. Detainees in Albania face substantial limitations in medical services, particularly psychiatric and addiction care. Unlike in Italy, where detainees are integrated into the National Health System, no equivalent framework operates in Albania, and on-site medical teams cannot provide comparable treatment. These deficiencies have already led to serious consequences, including self-harm and suicide attempts (see, report, here). A recent report by the National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of their Liberty found that, of 26 detainees for whom updated medical assessments were requested, 25 were deemed unfit for detention and released, highlighting the centres’ inadequacy to ensure proper care. While Article 4(8) of the Protocol obliges Albanian authorities to provide treatment in emergencies beyond Italian capacity on site, healthcare in a third country is by definition different from that provided by a Member State’s National Health System.

Taken together, the disparities analysed above make detention in centres located in a third country significantly more burdensome than detention in Italy, casting doubts as for its compliance with the principle of proportionality. There is no justification for imposing a harsher coercive measure than would be applied in Italy, particularly as the transfer to Albania does not demonstrably enhance the effectiveness of return procedures under the RD. On the contrary, a report by the Italian National Guarantor for the Rights of Persons Deprived of their Liberty shows that only 56 of 192 individuals transferred to Albania were ultimately returned to their country of origin, representing a return rate of approximately 29%, which is lower than the general return rate.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the Italian Government frames the issue in terms of formal equivalence between procedures carried out in Albania and those in Italy, and the European Commission emphasizes that the voluntary application of EU standards suffices to ensure compliance, our assessment shows that this approach does not adequately address the structural limitations inherent in the de facto extraterritorial application of EU migration and asylum law.

While awaiting the Court’s decision, we maintain that the strict territorial scope of EU law in this area is not merely formal but reflects a substantive requirement: it is meant to operate within the territory of Member States, where its guarantees can be fully implemented and monitored. Remaining under the jurisdiction of a Member State alone is insufficient to ensure compliance, as EU law cannot be effectively applied outside the Union without undermining its purpose, coherence, and the procedural and material protections that are inherently tied to the territorial context in which they are guaranteed.

Two key issues arise. First, if the Dublin Regulation applies to applications lodged in Albania, the Protocol and Ratification Law would undermine mutual trust and the functioning of the Dublin system, since other Member States cannot verify compliance with EU law outside the Union. Even if it does not apply, the deliberate delocalization of asylum procedures to a third country allows circumvention of EU obligations. Second, procedural and material safeguards ensured in Italy cannot be fully replicated in a third country.

Thus, in our view, relocating individuals to Albania undermines the effet utile of the CEAS, creating tangible discrepancies in treatment that formal equivalence cannot remedy. This, in turn, risks breaching the principle of loyal cooperation and jeopardizes both the uniform application of EU law and the trust-based cooperation that underpins the EU legal order.

A Final Note: Why Albania Is Different from Other Externalisation Models

Throughout the hearings, “return hubs” were frequently cited as a possible analogy to justify the legality of the Albania model. However, as repeatedly emphasized by all parties, the two schemes are fundamentally different from a legal perspective. The Commission’s proposed reform of the notion of a ‘return decision,’ which provides the legal basis for return hubs, presupposes a formal removal decision to a country other than the state of origin with which an agreement exists. In that context, the transfer constitutes an actual return under EU law (discussed, in this blog, here). By contrast, the Albania model does not involve a removal but a temporary relocation of the detention stage of the return procedure under the full jurisdiction of the Member State, prior to any formal removal to the individual’s country of origin or habitual residence. Consequently, it cannot be assimilated to the return hub framework.

Similarly, the Albania model cannot be framed within the reformed notion of a safe third country without a connection requirement (discussed, in this blog, here), as no inadmissibility decision is taken in Italy based on Albania’s acceptance of the asylum application. Instead, the procedure merely relocates the processing of the asylum claim to Albania while keeping the substantive application under Italian jurisdiction.

This distinction highlights that equating the Albania model with return hubs or safe third country schemes overlook its unique legal and procedural features. It underscores the complexity of assessing its compliance with EU law and why the pending preliminary rulings are essential to clarify the boundaries and practical limits of this peculiar migration management scheme.

The CJEU rules on multiple temporary protection applications but leaves key questions unanswered in Case C‑753/23 (Krasiliva)

 

 

Dr Meltem Ineli Ciger, Associate Professor, Suleyman Demirel University

Photo credit: Odessa Opera and Ballet Theatre, by Konstantin Brizhnichenko, via Wikimedia Commons

 

On 27 February 2025, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Case C‑753/23 (Krasiliva). This is the second ruling on the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (Temporary Protection Directive) following the Kaduna decision (Case C‑244/24, joined with C‑290/24), which interpreted Article 7 of the Directive, which concerned the termination of the temporary protection granted to persons benefitting from temporary protection at the option of a Member State, ie who do not fall within the scope of the mandatory obligations for Member States set out in Article 2(1) and 2(2) of the Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 (which applied the Directive to those fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine) and the lawfulness of the return decisions adopted in their regard.

In contrast, the Krasiliva judgment concerns Article 8(1) of the Temporary Protection Directive, which requires Member States to provide temporary protection beneficiaries with residence permits. The Court held that a person eligible for temporary protection who has applied for temporary protection and a residence permit in one Member State but has not yet received it, cannot be denied a residence permit attached to a temporary protection status in another Member State solely on that basis. Moreover, the Court reaffirmed in this case the right to appeal a decision on the inadmissibility of an application for a residence permit linked to temporary protection status.

In my previous analysis here, I noted that the Court’s approach in Kaduna was largely predictable. Similarly, this judgment from the Tenth Chamber is unsurprising, and its reaffirmation of the right to challenge a negative residence permit decision is welcome. However, the ruling is particularly significant in how the CJEU addressed the first question concerning multiple temporary protection and residence applications—while notably failing to engage with the second half of that question. The judgment is unfortunately narrowly confined to the issue of denying a permit solely due to a pending residence permit application in another Member State, leaving broader and arguably more pressing issues unaddressed, such as the status of individuals who have already been granted temporary protection in one Member State but later apply elsewhere. Given these omissions and the Court’s handling of the first question, I find the judgment neither sufficiently clear nor well-reasoned.

 

Background of the case

A Ukrainian national entered the EU on 15 July 2022 and applied for temporary protection in Germany on 19 July 2022 before filing a similar request in the Czech Republic on 20 September 2022. The Czech authorities rejected her application on the grounds that she had already sought protection in another Member State. Under Czech law, a temporary protection application rejected because the applicant has previously sought protection in another Member State is not subject to judicial appeal. However, the Prague City Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to review such decisions citing Article 29 of the Temporary Protection Directive (which provides that individuals excluded from temporary protection or family reunification by a Member State have the right to challenge the decision through legal proceedings in that state) and Article 47 of the Charter and determined that the Directive does not support rejecting an application merely because of a previous application for temporary protection in another Member State, since the grounds for exclusion are strictly limited to those listed in Article 28 (namely serious crimes, security threats, or actions contrary to UN principles).

The Prague City Court annulled the Ministry of the Interior’s decision and sent the case back for reconsideration. In response, the Ministry of the Interior appealed, arguing that it is up to the Member State where the application is made to grant protection and that multiple applications should not be allowed. Consequently, the Supreme Administrative Court suspended the proceedings and referred these two questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling (para 21):

(1)      Does Article 8(1) of [Directive 2001/55], having regard also to the Member States’ agreement not to apply Article 11 of that directive, preclude national legislation under which an application for a residence permit to give temporary protection is inadmissible if the foreign national has applied for a residence permit in another Member State or has already been granted a [residence] permit in another Member State?

(2)      Does a person enjoying temporary protection under [Directive 2001/55] have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal under Article 47 of the [Charter] against the failure of a Member State to grant a residence permit within the meaning of Article 8(1) of [that directive]?’

 

Can a Member State deny a residence permit to a person eligible for temporary protection only because he/she applied for or granted a residence permit in another Member State?

What the CJEU said: Article 8(1) of the Temporary Protection Directive requires Member States to ensure that beneficiaries of temporary protection receive residence permits for the duration of their protection, along with the necessary documentation or equivalent evidence. The Court first confirmed the right of persons falling within the categories referred to in Article 2 of Implementing Decision 2022/382 to apply to the Member State of their choice for a residence permit (para 28). As one might remember, Article 2 of the Council Implementing Decision 2022/382 defines who is eligible for temporary protection in the EU.

Article 11 of the Temporary Protection Directive provides that a Member State must take back a temporary protection beneficiary who ‘without authorisation’ stays in or attempts to enter another Member State unless a bilateral agreement between Member States provides otherwise. The Court also confirmed Article 11 of the Directive does not apply when addressing the abovementioned question, as the Member States chose not to implement it when adopting the Implementing Decision (para 32-33). In view of this, the Court ruled that Article 8(1) must be interpreted to prevent national legislation from denying a residence permit to someone eligible for temporary protection under Article 2 of the Council Implementing Decision 2022/382 solely because they have already applied for, but not yet received, a permit in another Member State (para 33). Furthermore, the Court noted that for such multiple applications, the Member States can (the Court used the term ‘it is open to the authorities of a Member State’) examine and verify whether the person applying for a residence permit falls within the scope of the Council Implementing Decision 2022/382 i.e. eligible for temporary protection and enjoy the status and whether he/she obtained a residence permit in another Member State (para 30).

My analysis: Although in my opinion the Court’s reasoning is not clearly explained at all, its judgment appears to reaffirm the following point: if a person eligible for temporary protection applies for a residence permit in one Member State and then submits a similar application in another, the second Member State cannot reject the application solely because of the earlier submission. Instead, the second Member State should assess the merits of the new application. The authorities in the second Member State may verify whether the applicant qualifies under the relevant temporary protection categories and if they have already obtained a residence permit in another Member State. But the question remains unanswered: if, following an examination on the merits, national authorities determine that the person already holds temporary protection status or has a residence permit in another Member State, can this serve as an automatic ground for rejection?

The Court’s interpretation of Member States’ decision not to apply Article 11 of the Temporary Protection Directive confirms that the Implementing Decision allows Ukrainians, their family members, and a specific subgroup of third-country nationals identified in the Implementing Decision who have fled the Russian invasion to apply for temporary protection in any Member State of their choice. It is also notable that the Court made a particular reference to recital 16 in the Preamble of the Council Implementing Decision, which notes,

Ukrainian nationals, as visa-free travellers, have the right to move freely within the Union after being admitted into the territory for a 90-day period. On this basis, they are able to choose the Member State in which they want to enjoy the rights attached to temporary protection and to join their family and friends across the significant diaspora networks that currently exist across the Union. This will in practice facilitate a balance of efforts between Member States, thereby reducing the pressure on national reception systems. Once a Member State has issued a residence permit in accordance with Directive 2001/55/EC, the person enjoying temporary protection, whilst having the right to travel within the Union for 90 days within a 180-day period, should be able to avail of the rights derived from temporary protection only in the Member State that issued the residence permit.

As previously noted, this approach—granting individuals the right to choose the Member State where they seek protection and reside—stands in stark contrast to the Dublin rules, which do not offer such a possibility for asylum seekers.

Notably, a significant issue, in my opinion, in the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive concerns Ukrainian nationals who, after being granted temporary protection in one Member State, move to another Member State to apply for temporary protection and residence permits attached to the status. I have personally received many questions about multiple applications in several seminars and judge trainings. However, the Court limited its ruling to a very specific scenario described and did not address this broader question. In a sense, while the Court left open the possibility for Member States to deny a residence permit to individuals who have already been granted temporary protection in another Member State, it did not provide a definitive answer on the issue.

 

Can a person eligible for temporary protection appeal against the failure of a Member State to grant a residence permit?

What the Court said: The Court answered this question as follows:

Article 8(1) of Directive 2001/55, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a person enjoying temporary protection under that directive has a right to an effective remedy before a tribunal against a decision to reject as inadmissible an application for a residence permit, within the meaning of Article 8 thereof. (para 40)

My analysis: Given that the Temporary Protection Directive was drafted over two decades ago, it is particularly intriguing to define the precise scope of the right to an effective remedy in the context of temporary protection. The CJEU’s straightforward answer to the said question affirms the right of persons who are eligible for temporary protection to a residence permit and clarifies that Article 47 of the Charter read together with Article 8(1) of the Directive secures the right to challenge such an inadmissibility decision. With this, the Court confirmed that the right to appeal under the Temporary Protection Directive is not limited to Article 29, which covers appeals against exclusion decisions under Article 28 and family reunification rejections. Instead, Article 47 of the CFR should apply to ensure a right of appeal against an inadmissibility decision, as the Directive establishes a clear right to a residence permit. 

The judgment raises further questions for which I do not have definitive answers, making it a worthwhile topic for discussion in the comments section. Does this judgment imply that all individuals whose temporary protection applications are rejected or deemed inadmissible now have the right to appeal such decisions before a tribunal? Can the denial of rights granted to temporary protection beneficiaries under Chapter III of the Directive now be challenged before a tribunal?

 

Analysis

The Temporary Protection Directive typically addresses multiple temporary protection applications through Article 11, which establishes a take-back mechanism. However, given the Member States’ decision not to apply Article 11 or to use the quota system outlined in Article 25 of the Directive, the Directive remains silent on how to manage multiple temporary protection applications. 

In response to concerns over double registrations and access to benefits, the Commission launched the Temporary Protection Registration Platform (TPP) on 31 May 2022. Most Member States now participate in data exchange through this system to prevent duplicate temporary protection registrations and benefits. Member States have developed different approaches to handling multiple temporary protection applications and secondary movements of Ukrainians. For instance, according to the Finnish Immigration Service, “You cannot be granted temporary protection in more than one EU country at a time. If you are granted a residence permit in Finland based on temporary protection, your temporary protection residence permit in another EU country will be cancelled.” In Germany for instance, Ukrainians who already have a residence permit in another Member State can still receive a residence permit. In contrast, Swiss courts (not applying the Directive as such as Switzerland is a non-EU country, but Swiss law is modelled on the Directive) found that the validity of temporary protection or the possibility of renewing it in an EU country precludes the granting of temporary protection (so-called S protection) status in Switzerland. The same approach was followed by the Czech authorities as well.

Given these inconsistencies, the CJEU in Krasiliva upheld the right of individuals eligible for temporary protection under Article 2 of Council Implementing Decision 2022/382 to choose the Member State in which they wish to apply for temporary protection and the associated residence permit. The judgment also clarified that a Member State cannot deem multiple residence permit applications automatically inadmissible but must assess their merits. However, by failing to explicitly address the second part of the first question namely, whether an individual who has already been granted temporary protection and a corresponding residence permit in one Member State can subsequently obtain temporary protection and a residence permit in another Member State, the Krasiliva ruling represents a missed opportunity to harmonise Member State approaches to multiple applications for temporary protection and residence permits.

 

Conclusion

While the Krasiliva judgment provides clarity on the specific application of Article 8(1) of the Temporary Protection Directive, it leaves broader issues unresolved, particularly regarding multiple applications for temporary protection and the associated residence permits. The Court confirmed that a Member State cannot reject a residence permit application solely because the applicant has previously applied for, but not yet received, protection in another Member State. It also reaffirmed that Member States cannot deny the right to appeal against such inadmissibility decisions. These aspects of the ruling are significant in affirming procedural rights within the scope of the Temporary Protection Directive. However, the judgment notably fails to address whether an individual who has already been granted temporary protection and a corresponding residence permit in one Member State may subsequently obtain temporary protection and a residence permit in another Member State. The absence of guidance on this issue creates legal uncertainty, leaving Member States without clear direction on how to handle such multiple applications consistently.

The Future of Temporary Protection in Türkiye: Return of Syrians after the Fall of Assad

 

Dr. Ayşe Dicle Ergin, Assistant Professor, Bilkent University Faculty of Law

 

Photo credit: Henry Ridgwell, Voice of America news, via Wikimedia Commons

 

As of today, the vast majority of approximately 2.8 million Syrians in Türkiye, having fled the conflict and civil war, are under temporary protection. This figure does not include the 73,331 Syrians with residence permits. The regime applicable to the temporary protection beneficiaries is set out in the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) and the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR).

 

Following the fall of the Assad regime, there has been an expectation that Syrians will soon return to their home country. However, a realistic assessment of the current situation is essential to avoid fostering misguided expectations. This blogpost will examine the meaning and scope of temporary protection, the conditions for its termination, voluntary return, and the circumstances under which Syrians may be able to return.

 

Temporary Protection

 

Temporary protection is a regime that enables states facing a mass influx of refugees to provide emergency intervention without conducting individual refugee status determination procedures. It addresses protection gaps by ensuring the fundamental rights of individuals fleeing armed conflict and guarantees protection against refoulement. This regime was originally conceived as a return-oriented protection mechanism.

 

Under the temporary protection regime, both refugees covered by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and individuals eligible for complementary protection within the broader context of forced migration are provided with legal protection. This regime aims to use the host country’s resources efficiently while avoiding the perception that beneficiaries will remain in the host country permanently. In this context, the general expectation and the most commonly preferred solution is the return of beneficiaries to their home countries.

 

The international protection regime is founded on specific principles and criteria established under international law, and it is accepted that these principles largely apply to temporary protection, with the principle of non-refoulement serving as a key criterion in this context. As outlined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, this principle prohibits the expulsion or return of refugees to territories where they would face a risk of persecution. While this provision specifically applies to refugees, the second paragraph of the article allows for two exceptions based on public order and public safety considerations.

 

However, with the growing influence of human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement has been interpreted more broadly over time. As reflected in key international legal instruments, this broader interpretation extends to ‘everyone’ without exception. The case law of regional human rights courts has significantly contributed to this expansive understanding, solidifying non-refoulement as a fundamental principle of human rights law and international customary law.

 

The ECtHR interprets the principle of non-refoulement within the framework of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits torture and ill-treatment in an absolute manner. In this regard the ECtHR has adjudicated cases involving both generalized violence and national security concerns. These rulings affirm that the principle of non-refoulement constitutes a non-derogable obligation under the regional law of the Council of Europe, of which Türkiye is a member.

 

The principle of non-refoulement is a fundamental and binding principle of the international protection regime, ensuring that no one is returned to a territory where they would face a risk of persecution, torture, inhuman treatment, or punishment. Türkiye upholds this principle through legal guarantees enshrined in Article 17 of its Constitution, Articles 4 and 55 of the LFIP, and Article 6 of the TPR.

 

End of Temporary Protection

 

As reflected in its name, temporary protection is granted for a limited period; however, determining the exact duration is not always possible. In the 1990s, it was widely accepted that temporary protection should not extend beyond five years, whereas the current upper limit is generally set at three years. The EU Temporary Protection Directive (EU TPD) also stipulates a maximum protection period of three years, provided that the reasons for temporary protection persist (EU TPD Art. 4). However, following the Ukraine crisis, EU practice has shifted towards extending this duration despite ongoing legal debates.

 

In contrast, Turkish national legislation does not specify a maximum time limit for the temporary protection regime (TPR, Art. 10). Temporary protection may cease either individually or collectively. In cases of collective cessation, the President may terminate temporary protection upon the proposal of the Ministry of Interior (TPR, Art. 11). Following such a decision, the President also determines the durable solution for beneficiaries of temporary protection, which may include: full cessation to facilitate return to the country of origin, collective granting of status, individual assessment of applications for international protection, or the provision of a legal right to stay under the conditions outlined in the LFIP). According to the Temporary Protection Regulation, the primary expectation after cessation is the return of beneficiaries to their home countries (TPR, Art. 14). The TPR further mandates that authorities provide the necessary facilitation and assistance for those opting for voluntary repatriation (TPR, Art. 42). The grounds for individual termination of temporary protection include voluntarily leaving Türkiye, availing protection of a third country, being admitted to a third country for humanitarian reasons or resettlement, passing away, or acquiring a legal right to stay or Turkish citizenship as stipulated in the law (TPR, Art. 12).

 

Voluntary Repatriation and Return

 

Voluntary repatriation is a key concept in situations where the conditions that initially necessitated protection in the host country no longer exist in the country of origin. In the context of international protection, the international community, particularly the UNHCR, recognizes three durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. While the Global Compact on Refugees expands these solutions with the inclusion of ‘complementary pathways’, voluntary repatriation remains the most widely favoured durable solution by the states. This preference is reaffirmed not only in UNHCR Executive Committee conclusions but also promoted by the international community in the Global Compact on Refugees, which emphasizes facilitating the sustainability of returns.

 

The 1951 Convention does not explicitly address voluntary repatriation. However, international human rights law establishes the fundamental principle that no individual shall be deprived of the right to return to their own country (UDHR, Art. 13/2; ICCPR, Art. 12/4; CERD, Art. 5/d; ECHR, Protocol No. 4, Art. 3/2; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 12/2; American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 22/5). The key element of this process is its ‘voluntary’ nature - meaning the return must be based on the free will of the individual. Consequently, as highlighted by UNHCR, voluntary repatriation can only be considered a viable solution under international law if conditions in the country of return ensure the safety, dignity, and rights of returnees.

 

Although voluntary repatriation and cessation are distinct legal procedures related to refugee returns, they are closely interconnected. Article 1(C) of the 1951 Convention specifically regulates cessation in cases where international protection is no longer necessary or justified. In the Turkish legal framework the conditions necessitating the cessation of international protection are stipulated for refugee, conditional refugee and subsidiary protection statuses in Article 85 of the LFIP in line with the 1951 Convention. Return to the country of origin after the termination of temporary protection, which is regulated in Article 14 of the TPR, can also be considered as a form of cessation. This is because when the circumstances that necessitated international protection no longer exist, protection ceases, making return to the country of origin a natural outcome.

 

On the other hand, there are no uniform rules regarding the modality of voluntary repatriation. Relevant material and procedural conditions may vary depending on government policies. While return is always possible, ‘repatriation’ refers specifically to the facilitation of return. According to its Statute, UNHCR is tasked with promoting voluntary repatriation (UNHCR Statute, Art. 8/c).  Yet UNHCR verifies the following essential conditions before engaging in the voluntary repatriation of refugees: (i) changes of a profound nature in the country of origin, (ii) voluntary nature of the decision to return, (iii) timely dialogue between the host country, the country of origin and UNHCR and clear allocation of responsibilities through a tripartite agreement, and (iv) ensuring that the safety and dignity of returnees are respected.

 

UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation emphasises the importance of ensuring that return is voluntary, safe, dignified, sustainable, and durable. These standards are also underlined in relevant literature (see: here, here, here and here). Moreover the voluntary nature of return means that it must be an informed choice rather than a result of reduced assistance and unbearable conditions in the host country. This requires the transparent provision of detailed information about security and living conditions in the country of origin to potential returnees. Dignified return necessitates guarantees against potential violations of the individual’s rights, whereas, according to UNHCR, safe return is only possible when three elements are met: legal, physical, and material safety. Physical safety requires a secure environment that ensures freedom of movement and access to territory. Legal safety entails equal treatment upon return. Material safety is established through access to humanitarian assistance. These factors are directly proportional to progress in improving security and living conditions in the country of origin. Regarding the threshold for improvement in conditions, UNHCR Discussion Note considers a “general improvement in the situation of the country of origin so that return in safety is both possible and desired” sufficient (UNHCR Discussion Note, para. 8.A.i). However, this threshold is open to criticism for being lower than the one expected for cessation while it is argued that repatriation should not take place before the circumstances have changed.  On the other hand, sustainable return could be achieved through facilitating and monitoring the reintegration of returnees.

 

In short, voluntary repatriation is a solution that can be implemented when, based on an objective assessment, the circumstances that led to displacement no longer exist, return is deemed feasible and in line with the principle of non-refoulement, and the process takes place in a safe and dignified manner. Accordingly, individuals’ return decisions will be shaped by these conditions.

 

Expectations for Return of Syrians to Their Country in the Short Term After the Fall of the Assad Regime and Relevant Obligations

 

As a country that has suffered extensive damage from conflicts, Syria remains unstable, with significant uncertainty about its future. Currently it is impossible to predict when voluntary repatriation will become a viable option for the beneficiaries of temporary protection. Several factors must be considered as a priority, including the uncertainty over which actor/s will control different parts of the county, the accommodation and housing needs of returnees, existing infrastructural deficiencies, and the limited availability of employment and livelihoods opportunities.

 

UNHCR reported the return of 270,000 Syrians from the neighbouring countries to Syria as of 5 February 2025 including 81,576 returnees from Türkiye. However, it remains unclear whether these returns are permanent. Many Syrians may have travelled back their home country to assess conditions, visiting their homes while waiting for the summer holiday to bring their children and other family members along. Despite these numbers, it is too early to draw optimistic conclusions in the short term.

 

Accordingly, certain factors need to be considered for a realistic plan:

 

Respect for legal obligations and the principle of non-refoulement:

 

As outlined above, the principle of non-refoulement, governed by Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, is reinforced by fundamental human rights principles. This protection is embodied in the Turkish legislation and the ECHR. Legal provisions safeguarding the right to life and prohibiting torture impose a duty on states to protect individuals from potential violations of these rights. In line with this, both the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) and the ECtHR have issued recent rulings assessing whether national authorities have adequately reviewed and corroborated applicants’ claims regarding the violation of their right to life or the risk of torture or ill-treatment upon return to conflict areas. (See A.A. ve A.A.; Abdulkerim Hammud; Hüsam İbrahim; Ali Elhüseyin cases by the TCC and L.M. and others v. Russia; M.D. and others v. Russia; Akkad v. Turkey cases by the ECtHR)

 

Therefore, regardless of whether temporary protection terminates collectively or individually, the State’s obligations under international law remain in effect. In all cases, states are required to uphold their legal commitments and respect the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, returnees should be provided with comprehensive information and guidance to ensure their informed consent for safe and dignified return, thereby mitigating the risk of human rights violations.

 

States can facilitate “go-and-see” visits after conflicts end, allowing potential returnees to assess security conditions, find accommodation, seek employment or check the general situation in their home countries. Some of the visits facilitated by the Turkish Ministry of Interior after the fall of the Assad regime can be considered within this scope. The conditions of such exploratory visits are also included in the EU temporary protection framework.

 

Planning for processing of individual applications of those in need of protection:

 

Under the TPR the beneficiaries of temporary protection are not permitted to file individual asylum applications, and applications submitted before the TPR came into force cannot be processed (TPR, Art. 16 and Provisional Art. 1). In the event of collective termination of temporary protection, it should be a priority to plan how to process individual applications of those in need of international protection and what steps to take for those who no longer have a legal right to stay in the country. Since circumstances will vary on a case-by-case basis, status determination procedures must be initiated for those who claiming to be unable to return return due to their ongoing need for international protection. Assessments may be conducted on an individual or family basis to determine the place of origin (in this case, in Syria) and to establish whether it is safe for return, whether such individuals qualify for international protection, and if eligible, what status will be granted to them. These procedures will be essential in ensuring that protection needs are met while maintaining compliance with legal obligations.

 

Adoption of realistic approaches and transparent provision of information both to Syrians and the society:

 

Historical examples demonstrate that the return of Syrians is likely to be a realistic option only in the medium to long term. Past mass influx experiences have shown that states often hold overly optimistic expectations regarding safe and rapid returns. For instance, it took more than a decade for approximately 2 million temporarily protected Bosnians to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Yugoslav crisis. Similarly, the return of those forcibly displaced due to conflicts in Burundi, Cambodia, Liberia, and South Sudan was also a prolonged process.  These examples suggest that adopting a cautious approach rather than an overly optimistic one would provide a more realistic perspective.

 

The UNHCR’s Position on Returns to Syria, published in December 2024, highlights that Syria is not yet safe for large-scale voluntary repatriation, emphasizing that returns should only begin once security, societal, and humanitarian issues are adequately addressed (para. 3). That said, it would also be inaccurate to portray the return of Syrians as an impossible prospect as repatriation to safe areas remains a possibility when based on informed consent. However, states, UNHCR, and relevant stakeholders must work together to facilitate returns through a multi-stage plan with a realistic timeline.

 

Ensuring sustainable reintegration of voluntarily returning returnees:

 

Furthermore, the sustainability of returns to Syria depends on development support for Syria and increased assistance and support to Türkiye, rather than the symbolic funding allocated in recent years. Even as of 2019, Turkish authorities reported having spent $40 billion on supporting Syrians in Türkiye. Meanwhile, following the destruction caused by internal conflicts and international sanctions, the estimated cost of reconstruction in Syria ranges between $250 billion and $400 billion.

 

Significant infrastructure development, well-equipped human resources, and targeted development assistance will be essential for any new government in Syria to create conditions conducive to return and stabilize the country. To secure such assistance from the international community, the new government must establish an inclusive and democratic regime.

 

Conclusion

 

There is a perception that large-scale returns to Syria will take place soon. However, given the situation on the ground, this is dependent on political, economic and legal realities. Voluntary repatriation is not only a political matter but also a legal one, as it must adhere to international standards that ensure safety, dignity and sustainability. Various challenges could facilitate or hinder this process including political fragmentation, economic instability and security concerns. Above all a well-managed and inclusive reconstruction process will be essential. This process would demonstrate how a nation composed of diverse ethnic and sectarian groups, with weak sense of nationhood and limited resources, can transform into a stable and secure country within a relatively short period. Ultimately, time will determine whether large-scale voluntary repatriation to Syria will be possible. While a democratic and stable government is the ideal scenario for the future of Syria, the opposite also remains a possibility in the near future.