Flight from Ukraine: A Proposal for Transition out of the EU Temporary Protection Scheme

 

 

Professor Kees Groenendijk, Radboud University, Emeritus and Professor Elspeth Guild, University of Liverpool

 

Photo credit: Dietmar Rabich / Wikimedia Commons / “Münster, Stadtweinhaus, Beflaggung Ukraine und EU -- 2022 -- 0219” / CC BY-SA 4.0

 

On 3 March 2022 the EU legislator, for the first time, opened a temporary protection scheme under Directive 2001/55 for those fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While the Directive limits the duration of any scheme to three years maximum, the EU legislator has already extended the scheme to five years and is currently reflecting on where to go next. The validity of the extra extension has already been considered by Peers, Ineli-Ciger and others and for the moment the Court of Justice has yet to be asked. 

In the meantime, the war in Ukraine continues. Some have assessed that at the current rate of progress, it would take Russia centuries and tens of millions of deaths to succeed in occupying Ukraine. It seems that Ukrainian attacks in Russia are causing havoc and the Ukrainian military is holding up and diversifying its strategy. There is little or no news about any peace negotiations. Last year Eurostat advised that 4.31 million non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine had a temporary protection status in the EU. The number is unlikely to have diminished since then. Many of these people arrived in the EU soon after the opening of the scheme and will soon have been resident in the EU for five years.

In this blog, we examine the pressing need for a common EU approach to providing a durable status to those who are in the EU and address some of the issues which are being expressed by some Member States and EU institutions. In 2023, we examined the nature of the temporary protection scheme and the challenges for the Member States. In our contribution to Govaere and Graben The Impact of War (in Ukraine) on the EU Hart, 2025) we examined the options available to the EU legislator and Member States regarding the long term status of beneficiaries of the Temporary Protection scheme. At that time we strongly recommended that there would need to be an EU wide scheme to bring these persons into a stable and permanent status. We proposed a number of options, from the most liberal – a modified free movement of persons regime with Ukraine in the context of the EU-Ukraine enlargement procedures to the most limited a special scheme limited to those who are already reaching the end of the scheme’s life span. 

What we did not expect at the time of writing was that the EU legislator would simply continue to extend the scheme notwithstanding the express limit in the directive to three years. But this has been the policy option for the moment. 

In September 2025, a Council Recommendation proposed that there be a transition into national or EU legal statuses for those currently benefitting from temporary protection. Few, however, have managed to do so. problem is the numbers. In 2024, according to Eurostat  the Member States managed to issue 3.5 million first residence permits to non-EU citizens. Adding 4.31 million applications to change status or be issued a new permit in a different status would undoubtedly cause consternation to the officials charged with the task. Further, as we argued before, unless there is a common EU status for temporary protection beneficiaries any differences in treatment could result in them moving among the Member States in search of greater stability.

In one of the most important destination states for temporary protection beneficiaries the following information is available: according to the Central Alien’s Registration a total of 1,346,200 displaced persons from Ukraine were living in Germany on 30 April 2026, more than 96% having Ukrainian nationality. 88% received a residence permit for temporary protection under Directive 2001/5 and §24 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz, 7% applied for that residence permit but their applications are still pending, and 2% applied for international protection. The remaining 3% did not apply for either temporary or international protection. According to the same source, 467,100 displaced persons from Ukraine who came to Germany between February 2022 and 31 December 2025, were no longer living in Germany at that date (or have otherwise disappeared from the register). Thus, a quarter of the displaced persons who came to Germany after the Russian war of aggression no longer live in that member state. Apparently, few displaced persons received a national or an EU-residence permit instead or in addition to their temporary protection status.

In light of these pressing issues and the difficulty which the EU legislator is having with the question, we are now revisiting the subject with a view to providing a clear action plan to provide these people with security while assuaging concerns of some Member States.

When the EU legislator first addressed the issue of security of residence for third country nationals resident in the EU it adopted a directive in 2003. Having commissioned research on the normal period of residence Member States require for third country nationals to spend in a state before enjoying security of residence, the EU legislator alighted on the period of five years as the most appropriate to ensure genuine integration and fair treatment to resident third country nationals. The same time period should be applicable also to temporary protection beneficiaries on the basis of the same arguments.

In light of the difficulties of the EU legislator to adapt any existing measure to resolve the pressing need to provide certainty and security of residence of Ukraine temporary protection beneficiaries we now propose the following course of action.

The Proposal and Adoption of a new EU legal instrument

The Commission should propose a new legal instrument based on Article 79(2)(a) and (b) TFEU consisting of the following five essential elements:

1. Beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine who have resided legally in an EU Member State for five years retain the rights they acquired under Directive 2001/55/EC or under national law in that Member State. The transition should be fully automatic.

2. Member States may not introduce new restrictions on the right of residence, the access to (self-)employment, and access to general and vocational education applicable to the persons referred to in point 1.

3. Member States may withdraw a right of residence acquired under point 1 only on the exclusion grounds listed in Article 28 of Directive 2001/55/EC, the grounds relating to public policy, public security or public health listed in Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC, or in case the person has not been present in the territory of the European Union for a period of 12 consecutive months (cfr. Article 9(1)(c) of Directive 2003/109/EC).

After five years of lawful residence (and employment during part of those five years) termination of residence on economic grounds is no longer permitted. [cfr. for third-country nationals with an EU long-term residence permit, according to Article 12(2) of Directive 2003/109/EC, and for Union citizens, according to Article 16(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC.]

4. In case of the loss of the right of residence pursuant to point 3, the rights under Directive 2001/55/EC are reacquired. In case the temporary protection for beneficiaries from Ukraine has come to an end,  the national law of the Member State shall apply to the third country nationals mentioned in the first sentence.

5. Member States have the right to adopt or maintain more favorable provisions.

Three Main Aims

Establishing an almost uniform transitional residence status at EU level, as long as no other more stable and durable residence status is acquired under EU or national law, would serve three aims: (1) granting secure residence rights would on the one hand promote the integration of those wanting to remain in their Member State of residence and (2) on the other hand support the voluntary return of those considering return to Ukraine by explicitly allowing for absence from the EU up to twelve months. (3) The third aim is the reduction of administrative burden through the quasi-automatic acquisition of durable  residence rights after five years of temporary protection.

The majority of temporary protection beneficiaries from Ukraine entered their host Member States in 2022. By 2027, these individuals will have resided legally in that Member State for five years on the basis of Directive 2001/55/EC. From mid-2027, the abovementioned transitional EU residence status should will be acquired gradually and automatically on the basis of EU law without an application or a decision by an administrative authority. The likelihood of large numbers of asylum procedures and the associated burden on asylum authorities and, potentially, the courts will be reduced, whilst the continued protection needs remain guaranteed at the level provided in Directive 2001/55/EC. The second sentence of Article 8(1) of that directive, concerning documents to be issued, will continue to apply, pursuant to point 1. 

Further Explanation

The proposed regulation utilizes elements of the residence status of third-country nationals with an EU long-term residence permit under Directive 2003/109/EC and the status of EU citizens under Directive 2004/38/EC. The proposed scheme also serves Ukraine's interests regarding the voluntary return of Ukrainian citizens and represents a preferential treatment of Ukrainian citizens under EU migration law, compatible with Ukraine’s status of candidate member state, without requiring Ukraine's membership in the European Union or establishing EU citizenship for Ukrainian citizens. The scheme does not provide for more intra-EU mobility with this durable residence right than under the Temporary Protection Directive before acquisition of the EU-long term residents’ permit or Union citizenship.

The scheme clarifies that, after five years of lawful residence in a Member State, deportation to Ukraine is only possible in exceptional individual cases and that the war refugees and their families are part of Europe. Individual review by immigration authorities only in cases of loss of the durable residence right. Reunification with family members from Ukraine or family members living in other Member States would be governed by Article 15 of Directive 2001/55/EC, the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC, or, in case those the relevant provisions of those two instruments are not applicable, by national law. Pursuant to point 1 of the proposed new instrument, the right to apply for asylum, confirmed in Article 17 TPD will continue to apply to persons with the new EU status. This transitional scheme would also apply to third-country nationals without Ukraine’s citizenship who acquired temporary protection under Directive 2001/55/EC.

At present, war refugees granted temporary protection under Directive 2001/55/EC are excluded from the personal scope of the EU Long-Term Residence Directive 2003/109/EC, the Blue Card Directive 2021/1883/EU, the Single Permit Directive 2024/1233/EU, and the Students and Researchers Directive 2016/801/EU. The proposed new EU-status is not mentioned in Articles 2 or 3 of these four directives. The exclusion clause in those four directives no longer obstructs access to employment and social inclusion in Member States on the basis of those directives. The previous residence on the basis of Directive 2001/55 counts as lawful residence for the application of those four directives.

One final remark

As long as the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine continues, Directive 2001/55/EC should be extended for (a) new war refugees from Ukraine, and (b) war refugees from Ukraine who have resided in a Member State for less than five years and are, hence not yet covered by the transitional scheme.

 

What is wrong with the proposal to exclude some Ukrainians from temporary protection?

 

 

Dr. Meltem İneli Ciğer, Associate Professor of International Law, Suleyman Demirel University Faculty of Law, Türkiye; Honorary Fellow, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool

With comments from Professor Steve Peers, Law School, Royal Holloway University of London

 

Photo credit: President of Ukraine, via Wikimedia Commons

 

 

Nearly every year since I started teaching temporary protection and the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (Temporary Protection Directive) at the Odysseus Summer School in 2022, a familiar pattern has emerged. Each year, while updating my PowerPoint slides, the European Commission adopts a proposal to extend the temporary protection regime implemented for Ukrainians fleeing the full-scale Russian invasion. I usually read and incorporate this new development, either the Commission Proposal or the adopted Council Implementing Decision, when I am flying to Brussels. This year is no exception.

 

This year’s Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision (COM(2026) 345 final) marks a departure from previous practice. Aside from proposing to extend temporary protection for an additional year, namely until 4 March 2028, the Commission is proposing, for the first time, to restrict the scope of temporary protection for a specific subset of newcomers. In particular, Article 2 of the Proposal targets newly arriving Ukrainian citizens who are subject to military service obligations under Ukrainian law and who lack explicit, official authorisation from the Ukrainian authorities to leave the country. By proposing this conditionality, the Commission is effectively linking eligibility for temporary protection to the enforcement of a home state’s conscription laws.

 

I have written here and here why I believe these yearly extensions run contrary to the Temporary Protection Directive itself and the risks they bring. This year, however, I will do something different. Since over the years, I have covered the legal problems with yearly extensions, I want to focus specifically on the legal questions brought by the new proposal, namely, those relating to the new restrictions it introduces.

 

Here, I will pose four main legal questions relating to these new restrictions and give my opinion on them. I should mention that the idea to write this post emerged from an exchange on LinkedIn, where I am a somewhat active user, and the comments I received from Steve Peers. I asked Steve to include his answers to these questions, to provide a ‘devil’s advocate’ perspective on some points. Finally, I should mention the sources that can help this analysis. You can watch the Commission’s official press conference video, where some similar questions were posed to the Commission. Additionally, a recent Council of Europe report explicitly warns about the human rights risks of the proposed restriction of scope. Of course, these legal questions will only arise if the proposal is adopted as it is. What are they?  

Question 1: Is restricting the scope of temporary protection and excluding newly arriving military-age men from Ukraine discriminatory?

Meltem: Yes, there is a very strong legal argument that this specific restriction is discriminatory under both EU and international human rights frameworks. First, let us look at who is excluded: Article 2 of the proposal explicitly targets newly arriving Ukrainian citizens who are subject to military service obligations under Ukrainian law and who lack official authorisation from the Ukrainian authorities to leave the country. Because martial law and mobilisation frameworks in Ukraine predominantly apply to adult males aged 18 to 60, this measure selectively excludes military-age men from receiving temporary protection in the EU in future.

Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights strictly prohibits any form of discrimination based on sex or nationality. By implementing a rule that disproportionately and systematically strips temporary protection eligibility away from mostly adult men, the proposal introduces a gender-discriminatory measure. Treating newly arriving men less favourably than women fleeing the same conflict zone creates direct friction with this principle of equal treatment. This is further reinforced by Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits sex-based discrimination when read alongside the protection of fundamental rights under Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR (cf para 30 here). Of course, although these excluded individuals will retain their absolute right to apply for asylum under Article 18 of the Charter, this route opens up further complex legal questions. Most notably, what happens if their international protection claim is rejected?

If a Member State examines an individual’s asylum (ie international protection) claim (which can still be made, according to the temporary protection Directive, even if temporary protection is refused), and concludes that evading conscription under these specific circumstances does not meet the high threshold for refugee status or subsidiary protection, the individual is left in a dangerous legal vacuum. Because they are barred from registering as temporary protection beneficiaries by this new proposal, this may expose them to the immediate risk of a return decision. 

Steve: A devil’s advocate view: the Charter also provides for possible restrictions of Charter rights in its Article 52, which allows limitations on rights to support ‘objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. The argument here is that the EU is seeking to support the Ukrainian defence effort, which could be described either as an objective of general interest, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The measure is arguably proportionate as long as the return of each Ukrainian citizen in the individual case would not amount to non-refoulement (and only provided that any application for international protection they have made has failed on the merits; the concerns raised about human rights and conscription in Ukraine can obviously be argued in this context). Having said that, the Commission’s proposal can fairly be criticised for failure to make any specific reference to the possibility of applying for international protection instead.

Question 2: Does the Temporary Protection Directive give the Council the power to restrict its scope after four years of its activation?

Meltem: No, it does not. Neither Article 5 nor any other provision in the temporary protection Directive (TPD) grants any power to the Council to retroactively alter, narrow, or restrict the objective scope of who qualifies for that protection via a yearly implementing decision. Article 5 is invoked by the Commission in the Proposal to justify restricting the scope of the TPD’s application. However, if you look closely at the TPD, you will see Article 5 is intended to designate the specific categories of persons eligible for temporary protection at the very beginning, when there is a mass influx. It does not give the Council the power to dynamically designate or exclude different groups in subsequent yearly extensions. In my opinion, attempting to introduce new restrictions now is completely contrary to the TPD provisions. These new restrictions essentially introduce new exclusion grounds for temporary protection status. When looking at Article 28 of the Directive, which explicitly sets out the allowed exclusion grounds, it is clear that the new restrictions are also not permitted as additional exclusion grounds.

Steve: Again, a devil’s advocate might argue the opposite here – that this is not an issue of a new exclusion from temporary protection (which would definitely need an amendment to the parent Directive to be created), but rather a narrowing of those included by temporary protection. The scope of people included by the current iteration of temporary protection is defined not by the parent Directive, but by the 2022 decision to trigger it in response to the main Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been amended (to extend its duration) several times already. The parent Directive is silent on the issue of whether the scope of who is covered by temporary protection can be altered (either to narrow it or to widen it) after temporary protection is triggered, but perhaps the earlier CJEU judgment in Kaduna – which accepted that Member States could narrow the scope of any ‘optional’ temporary protection they initially offered on top of the EU minimum if they chose – applies by analogy to EU-wide temporary protection, ie the EU can narrow the scope of temporary protection it initially offered, as long as the parent Directive’s test for terminating temporary protection is met for the specific group of people being removed from the scope of that protection as regards future applications. That test is:

...the situation in the country of origin is such as to permit the safe and durable return of those granted temporary protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and Member States' obligations regarding non-refoulement.

It might, of course, be argued that this test is not met for men of military age. In any event, the parent Directive’s guarantee that they can apply for international protection at any time, and the Return Directive’s guarantee that they cannot be refouled, have to be satisfied too, on an individual basis.

It might also be argued that since the parent Directive only sets minimum standards, it must remain open to Member States to grant temporary protection to military age men as an option, as long as they are fleeing Ukraine for the same reason as others seeking temporary protection (see the Kaduna judgment by analogy, as regards those who left Ukraine shortly before the main Russian invasion). This might be relevant in particular to Hungary, which has reportedly objected to this aspect of the proposal.

Question 3: What will happen to the family members of those who fall within the scope of temporary protection in line with Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022?  

Meltem: This raises a very messy legal question regarding family unity. Under the initial Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, family members of Ukrainian nationals, as well as those of third-country nationals holding refugee or equivalent protection status in Ukraine prior to the full-scale invasion, are explicitly included as a core category entitled to temporary protection alongside the principal applicant.  Article 15 of the Temporary Protection Directive sets out mandatory duties for Member States to reunite family members who were separated due to the circumstances of the mass influx. (cf. Milios’s contribution here) The new proposal creates a direct clash between Article 15 of the TPD and the proposed exclusion grounds. If a newly arriving, military-age man leaves Ukraine to join family members who have held temporary protection in the EU since 2022, his exclusion would directly undermine the right to family life and the obligations in the 2022 Decision and the Directive. Conversely, admitting him while excluding single men in identical circumstances introduces severe issues of differential treatment and discrimination.

Steve: here I think the devil’s advocate has no good argument to make. Family members of those with temporary protection are entitled to temporary protection, according to the 2022 Decision, and family reunion, according to the parent Directive, unless the criteria for exclusion set out in that Directive (ie security risks and serious crimes, defined similarly to the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention) apply. This route to temporary protection is most likely to be relevant to men whose wives or partners have temporary protection in the EU (for partners, this is subject to the criteria of having a ‘stable relationship’, and that the host Member State treats partners in a ‘comparable’ way to married couples). As Jane Austen might have said, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man seeking temporary protection from a Russian platoon, must be in want of a wife.”

Question 4: Is Recital 5 of the Proposal a mistake or a new interpretation of the Krasiliva case (C-753/23) by the Commission?

In the Krasiliva case (C-753/23), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed that displaced persons from Ukraine have a right to choose the Member State where they want to apply for temporary protection. However, the Court ruled that national authorities cannot declare a newcomer’s temporary protection registration and resident permit request inadmissible simply because they already applied for a permit in another Member State but have not received it. Interestingly, the Court left open the question whether a person who has received temporary protection status and a resident permit attached to this status in one Member State can apply and be granted temporary protection in another MS.

Recital 5 of the Commission Proposal notes “Given that a person can benefit from the rights attached to temporary protection in only one Member State at a time, to ensure that this is the case, and to avoid multiple registrations for temporary protection, Member States should reject residence permit requests made on the basis of Article 8(1) of Directive 2001/55/EC when it is apparent that the person concerned has already obtained a residence permit on that basis in another Member State and therefore is enjoying the rights attached to temporary protection therein, including social assistance. This would be coherent with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in case C-753/23 and in particular paragraph 30 thereof.”

Steve: To my mind, the Krasiliva judgment is ambiguous. The key para in the judgment says that it is “open to the authorities of a Member State to verify, in the course of examining” a temporary protection application, “whether those persons have already obtained a residence permit in another Member State”. This is not explicitly definitive either way. The important point here is the addition of the words in the Commission proposal: “and therefore is enjoying the rights attached to temporary protection therein, including social assistance”, which do not appear in the previous Council decision extending temporary protection. This suggests that if another Member State has granted temporary protection but has not done so correctly, ie does not extend the substantive rights set out in the parent Directive to beneficiaries in practice, another Member State is obliged to consider a temporary protection application from those persons. This would be consistent with CJEU case law on international protection (Ibrahim).

Meltem: I believe the Commission adopts a very restrictive reading of the Judgment by noting Member States should reject residence permit requests made on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Directive when it is apparent that the person concerned has already obtained a residence permit in another MS. However, as Steve pointed out, what happens if a person holds TP status in a Member State but is not enjoying the rights attached to temporary protection therein, including social assistance? Then can they apply for temporary protection in another Member State? I think the recital somehow supports this reading. Is this on purpose or a mistake we do not know.

Conclusion

In conclusion, although the Commission's proposal to restrict the scope of temporary protection to help Ukrainian allies is understandable from a policy point of view, it raises many serious legal problems. For the reasons I have outlined, ranging from discrimination and ultra vires overreach to the risk of creating a dangerous legal gap for those whose asylum claims might be rejected, I argue that the Commission proposal should not be adopted as it is.

 

Misreading the Temporary Protection Directive? The CJEU sets the record straight on access to subsidiary protection in Framholm (C-195/25)

 

Dr Meltem Ineli Ciger, Associate Professor of International Law, Suleyman Demirel University

 

Photo credit: Dietmar Rabich, Münster, Stadtweinhaus, Beflaggung Ukraine und EU -- 2022 -- 0219, CC BY-SA 4.0

Framholm (C-195/25), delivered on 20 November 2025, is the Court of Justice’s third ruling interpreting the Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive 2001/55/EC, TPD) following Joined Cases C‑244/24 and C‑290/24 (Kaduna) (cf. analysis here), and Case C‑753/23 (Krasiliva) (cf. analysis here). The ruling provides further clarification of Articles 3, 17 and 19 of the TPD and, crucially, confirms that temporary protection does not exclude access to subsidiary protection, ie the type of international protection available for those who do not qualify for refugee status. It therefore marks an important step in aligning the TPD, an instrument drafted in 2001, with the contemporary Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

The reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice originated in Sweden, where several third-country nationals displaced from Ukraine were granted temporary protection and subsequently applied for subsidiary protection. For years, the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) had maintained a practice of automatically rejecting subsidiary protection applications lodged by temporary protection beneficiaries, without any examination on the merits. It interpreted Swedish law as allowing temporary protection beneficiaries to apply only for refugee status and treated all subsidiary protection applications as per se inadmissible. Faced with this restrictive and legally questionable approach, the Göteborg Administrative Court for Immigration Matters asked the CJEU whether EU law really permits a Member State to deny access to subsidiary protection solely because the applicant already enjoys temporary protection. The Court’s answer is unequivocal: No.

1.    What is the case about?

 On 11 March 2025, the Göteborg Administrative Court for Immigration Matters referred questions to the CJEU concerning whether beneficiaries of temporary protection may apply for subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive (or QD – which defines refugee and subsidiary protection status in the EU) and have that application examined on the merits. All applicants (a Nigerian national holding a permanent residence permit in Ukraine and his Ukrainian family members) had been displaced from Ukraine following the Russian invasion and were granted temporary protection in Sweden. When they applied for international protection, the Migration Agency rejected their refugee status applications but declared their subsidiary protection claims inadmissible solely because they already held temporary protection. No assessment of eligibility under Article 15 of the QD (ie the definition of subsidiary protection) was undertaken. The referring court rightly doubted whether such a blanket exclusion could be reconciled with the development of EU asylum law since 2001, which clearly conceptualises “international protection” as including both refugee status and subsidiary protection. (cf. The Judgment paras 28-37)

2.     The questions referred to and the Court’s short answers

The Göteborg Court referred four questions to the CJEU (OJ C/2025/2651, 19 May 2025), all centred on how temporary protection interacts with the CEAS:

1.    Do the QD and the Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU (APD) apply to international protection applications lodged by persons already benefiting from temporary protection under the TPD? Yes.

2.    a) Does the term “application for asylum” in Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD cover applications for both refugee status and subsidiary protection, and must such applications be examined under the QD and APD? Yes.
b) Does Article 3(1) of the TPD prevent Member States from recognising subsidiary protection for persons who are eligible for, or already enjoying, temporary protection? No.

3.    If Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD also cover the right to apply for subsidiary protection status under the QD, are those articles, in conjunction with Article 10(2) of APD, sufficiently clear and precise to have direct effect?  Yes, and kind of yes (the Court said the QD and APD provisions have direct effect, but did not say that the TPD provisions alone have direct effect)

4.    Is Swedish law, which allows temporary protection beneficiaries to apply only for refugee status (but not subsidiary protection), compatible with EU law? No.

3.    What are Articles 3, 17 and 19 of the TPD about?

Article 3(1) of the TPD makes clear that temporary protection does not prejudge refugee status under the Refugee Convention. It is not a derogation from the Refugee Convention, nor does the grant or expiry of temporary protection affect the substantive assessment of whether an applicant meets the refugee definition.  

Article 17 of the TPD guarantees that beneficiaries of temporary protection may lodge an asylum application at any time and provides that any applications still pending when temporary protection ends must be assessed and decided hereafter.

Article 19 of the TPD regulates the interaction between temporary protection and the asylum procedure: Article 19(1) allows Member States to decide that a person cannot simultaneously hold the status of “asylum seeker” and benefit from temporary protection while their asylum application is being examined. Whereas Article 19(2) ensures continuity of protection: if, after examining an asylum application, the authorities do not grant refugee status or another form of protection, the person must still be allowed to enjoy temporary protection for the rest of the designated duration. (Cf. for a detailed commentary on these articles Skordas’ chapter; Peers’ post; Ch. 5 of my book)

4.    The AG Opinion (which I fully agree with)

The Advocate General’s analysis is worth examining closely, not least because it is carefully constructed and has clear implications for how the TPD must be read today. His reasoning develops along five points.

First, AG interprets Article 17(1) TPD’s reference to an “application for asylum” as an application for international protection, encompassing both refugee status and subsidiary protection. Although the TPD predates the CEAS, it must now be read in light of Article 78(2) TFEU, which is a Treaty provision on asylum (AG Opinion, paras 49-58). He adds “A restrictive understanding of the term ‘asylum’ in Article 17(1) of Directive 2001/55 would fail to take into account the context in which that directive applies following the entry into force of the FEU Treaty, as well as the objectives and scope of the legislation concerning ‘international protection’ which has been adopted in the intervening period.”  (para 50)  

Secondly, the AG stresses that temporary protection does not suspend or exclude access to subsidiary protection. Beneficiaries of temporary protection may lodge applications for refugee or subsidiary protection “at any time,” and the TPD operates as a complement, not an alternative, to the individual assessment required under the Qualification Directive (AG Opinion, paras 43-45, 51-52, 59-61, 66).

Thirdly, he confirms that being a temporary protection beneficiary is not a lawful ground of inadmissibility or exclusion. The exhaustive lists in Articles 12 and 17 of the QD (on grounds for excluding people from refugee or subsidiary protection status) and Article 33(2) APD (grounds for inadmissibility of asylum applications) do not include temporary protection, and national authorities cannot refuse subsidiary protection applications on that basis (AG Opinion, paras 70-72, 78-81).

Fourthly, he accepts that Member States may postpone examination of international protection applications in mass influx situations but makes clear that this administrative flexibility cannot justify a blanket inadmissibility rule for all subsidiary protection applications lodged by temporary protection beneficiaries (AG Opinion, paras 73-80, especially 7-78, 86).

Finally, he concludes that Article 17(1) TPD (not Article 19), read together with the overall CEAS architecture, confers a sufficiently clear and directly effective right to lodge an application for international protection.  

5.    What did the Court say?

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three clear steps.

First, the Court explains that nothing in Articles 3, 17 or 19 TPD authorises Member States to refuse to examine a subsidiary protection claim simply because the applicant enjoys temporary protection (paras 45-46). Article 19(2) even anticipates the existence of “other kinds of protection,” which must be read today as encompassing subsidiary protection (para 46). The omission of subsidiary protection in the TPD text reflects only the fact that this status did not yet exist in EU law, a point that AG raised. (paras 46-47).

Secondly, the Court turns to the purpose and logic of the TPD. Temporary protection is designed to ensure immediate, time-limited protection while preserving the “effective possibility” of receiving international protection (paras 47–49). Here the Court explicitly follows its reasoning in Joined Cases C‑244/24 and C‑290/24 (Kaduna), where it held that “the purpose of the temporary protection mechanism is, inter alia, to maintain the efficient operation of the international protection system in the Member States” and that the TPD “safeguards, in particular, the effective possibility for third-country nationals and stateless persons benefiting from temporary protection" of obtaining international protection following an appropriate examination of their individual situation” (Kaduna, paras 125 and 127). A national rule excluding subsidiary protection applications as such would therefore contradict the very objective of the TPD (paras 49–50).

Thirdly, and most decisively, the Court relies on the architecture of the CEAS. It emphasises that the QD establishes two forms of international protection – namely, refugee status and subsidiary protection – and that Member States must grant whichever status an applicant qualifies for (paras 51–54). Member States have no discretion to refuse subsidiary protection except on the exclusion grounds exhaustively listed in the Qualification Directive (para 54). The Asylum Procedures Directive reinforces this: an application may be declared inadmissible only on the five grounds set out in Article 33(2) APD, which must be interpreted strictly (paras 58–60). Temporary protection is not among these grounds; national authorities, therefore, cannot reject a subsidiary protection application solely because the applicant enjoys temporary protection (para 61).

Finally, the Court addresses the direct-effect question. The Swedish court had essentially asked whether Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD, if interpreted as including the right to apply for subsidiary protection, are sufficiently clear and precise, read together with Article 10(2) of the APD, to have direct effect. The CJEU reformulates the issue. Rather than grounding the direct effect in the TPD itself, the Court bases it on two CEAS provisions: Article 18 of the QD, which imposes an unconditional duty to grant subsidiary protection when criteria are met, and Article 33 of the APD, which exhaustively lists the admissibility grounds (paras 71-72). These provisions are both unconditional and sufficiently precise, and thus confer directly effective rights. The consequence is clear: if a national rule conflicts with these obligations and cannot be interpreted in conformity with EU law, domestic courts must disapply the national provision (para 73).

That said, the Court’s approach leaves an important ambiguity unresolved. The referring court had explicitly asked whether Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD, read together with Article 10(2) APD (which governs the relationship between refugee and subsidiary protection status applications), were sufficiently clear and precise to have direct effect. Instead of answering that question squarely, the Court effectively sidesteps it by grounding direct effect not in the TPD at all, but in Article 18 QD and Article 33 APD. Put simply, the judgment does not tell us whether Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD are capable of producing direct effect. 

6.    My analysis

The AG’s Opinion and the Court’s judgment reach the same legal outcome, but they do so through markedly different interpretative routes. The Advocate General adopts a more TPD-centred approach, grounding his analysis in Articles 3, 17 and 19 of the TPD and then interpreting these provisions in light of later CEAS instruments. He reads “asylum application” in Article 17 as an application for international protection covering both refugee status and subsidiary protection, emphasises that temporary protection cannot suspend or exclude access to subsidiary protection, and rejects temporary protection as a lawful ground of inadmissibility because it does not appear in the exhaustive list in Article 33(2) of the APD. Although he accepts that Member States may postpone international protection application examinations in mass influx situations, he stresses that a blanket ban on subsidiary protection applications is incompatible with the TPD and the CEAS.

By contrast, the Court relies primarily on the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive, using the CEAS instruments themselves as the main foundation for each key step. It interprets “asylum application” in light of the QD and APD definitions of international protection, derives the duty to grant protection from Article 18 of the QD and the obligation to examine claims (and the limits on inadmissibility) from Articles 10(2) and 33 APD, and treats Article 33(2) of the APD as an exhaustive rule that excludes any TP-based inadmissibility ground (paras 58-60). On the direct effect, the Court bases its analysis on Article 18 of the QD and Article 33 of the APD (paras 70-73), whereas the AG reaches the same conclusion via a combined reading of Article 17 of the TPD with the CEAS provisions.

Compared to the AG’s Opinion, which engages more directly with the wording, structure and logic of the TPD, the Court reaches essentially the same conclusions but grounds its reasoning far more firmly in the QD and APD. Put differently, while the AG reads the TPD through the lens of the CEAS, the Court treats the CEAS instruments themselves as the primary legal basis for explaining why Member States cannot refuse to examine (and, where appropriate, must grant) subsidiary protection to temporary protection beneficiaries.

I must admit that I prefer the AG’s TPD-centred approach: it is more faithful to the architecture of the TPD, and does not treat the TPD as a second-rate asylum instrument because it has never been updated to reflect two decades of CEAS development.

The outcome of the judgment is fully in line with what many of us working on the TPD have long expected. The TPD was never intended to operate as an obstacle to accessing international protection, whether refugee status or subsidiary protection. For over a decade, “international protection” in EU law has included both statuses, and nothing in the Directive suggested a closed or self-standing regime intended to override the CEAS.

The central logic of the TPD has always been pragmatic: to give Member States facing a mass influx breathing space by allowing them to suspend the processing (not lodging) of asylum claims where their systems would otherwise be overwhelmed. It was and never has been designed to bar access to subsidiary protection altogether. Member States with fewer temporary protection beneficiaries, or with sufficiently strong asylum systems, remain entirely free to process claims during temporary protection and examine the merits of their international protection applications.

Interpreting the TPD in the restrictive and literal manner adopted by the Swedish administration, treating “asylum” in the TPD as excluding subsidiary protection and ignoring the subsequent development of EU asylum law, was therefore misguided. It runs counter to the TPD’s objectives, its underlying logic, and the entire evolution of the CEAS. Most importantly, it results in a clear violation of the rights of temporary protection beneficiaries to access international protection.

This judgment matters well beyond Sweden. Even if Sweden appears to be the only Member State to have openly applied such a blanket rule, Framholm makes clear that no Member State may treat temporary protection alone as a ground for declaring subsidiary protection applications inadmissible. Across the EU, temporary protection can never justify a blanket refusal to examine the merits of a subsidiary protection claim.

7.    Conclusion

Framholm matters because it definitively closes the door on any national attempt to use temporary protection as a barrier to subsidiary protection. The judgment also exposes a broader structural problem: the Temporary Protection Directive, drafted in 2001, simply do not reflect the legal architecture of the CEAS in 2025. This is visible not only in Sweden’s misinterpretation but also in the Court’s need to rely so heavily on the QD and APD to reach a decision rather than the TPD’s own articles.

This brings me to a point that, as far as I am aware, no one else has explicitly raised: we know that the TPD remains useful and conceptually sound as a framework for managing mass influx situations, contrary to the Commission’s initial 2020 proposal to repeal it. Temporary protection works. It has proven its value during the Ukrainian displacement and remains a necessary instrument in the EU’s protection toolbox. Even today, 4.3 million non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine have temporary protection status in the EU. Moreover, the adoption of the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation does not render the TPD unnecessary or obsolete: the two instruments, although they can be invoked in exceptional mass influx situations, operate on different logics. In my opinion, the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation, which is based on derogations more than anything, cannot fully substitute for the protection mechanism established by the TPD.

Despite the usefulness of the ongoing relevance of the TPD, the judgment also implicitly makes clear that the TPD urgently requires updating. Many of the problematic national practices stem precisely from the fact, highlighted by the AG, that the TPD is an old instrument, never recast and never aligned with two decades of CEAS development. The result is predictable: legal ambiguities that should no longer exist, and litigation over issues that should be obvious.

I wish to conclude with a call to the EU institutions, above all, to the Commission. Once the current temporary protection regime for Ukrainians comes to an end, the Commission should initiate a targeted revision of the TPD, drawing directly on the lessons of its implementation during the mass displacement from Ukraine and the emerging body of CJEU case law, including Kaduna, Krasiliva and Framholm. An updated TPD can significantly narrow the scope for misinterpretation, perhaps introduce a new and clear time limit, align the instrument with the contemporary CEAS architecture, and prevent further unnecessary litigation on matters that ought already to be legally settled.