Ulla Neergaard, Professor of EU Law, University of Copenhagen
Photo credit: Gordon Leggett, via Wikimedia Commons
*This contribution draws upon Ulla
Neergaard’s forthcoming work, “‘Eurarctic’: Colonialism and EU-Greenland
Relations” in Hanna Eklund's edited volume, “Colonialism and the EU Legal
Order,” to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025. For a more
comprehensive understanding and complete references, readers are encouraged to
consult that work, as well as e.g. Ulla Neergaard: “Shadows of Europe’s
Colonial Past as Interwoven in EU Law” in Catherine Barnard, Adam Łazowski
& Daniel Sarmiento (eds.): “The Pursuit of Legal Harmony in a Turbulent
Europe. Essays in Honour of Eleanor Sharpston”, Hart Publishing, 2024
.
The inauguration of President Trump in the beginning of 2025 and the events to follow have elevated Greenland’s position within the Danish Realm and the European Union (EU) to a prominent geo-political focus. These developments have included an interest in purchasing Greenland, accusations regarding Denmark’s ability to ensure Greenland’s security, and threats of military intervention and tariff war. In response, the EU and its Member States have expressed solidarity with Denmark, but the EU may now be forced to rethink its relationship with Greenland and, more broadly, with the Arctic in a much, much stronger strategic way than it has so far (see e.g. the analysis by André Gattolin).
This
renewed situation reflects a global shift in power dynamics amidst broader geo-political
disruptions, drawing increased attention to Arctic issues, including the forthcoming
elections in Greenland on 11 March 2025, where the independence movement is at
the center of attention in the election campaigns. Such unsolicited scrutiny
raises concerns for Greenland, Denmark, and the EU alike.
In
this context, it is particularly noteworthy that Denmark is a Member State of
the EU, whereas its two autonomous entities, Greenland and the Faroe Islands,
hold the status of an ‘overseas country and territory’ (OCT) and a ‘third
country’, respectively. Unlike the Faroe Islands, Greenland has been recognized
as a former colony of Denmark and has maintained formal relations with the EU
since 1973. The relationship between Greenland and the EU, primarily mediated
through Denmark, is thus rooted in a complex history that merges colonial
legacies with modern geo-political interests. Grasping this relationship is
essential in relation to the current challenges which however remains rather
under-researched. Thus, the following discussion will present this complex history and
will focus on the overall links between the EU and
Greenland highlighting how Greenland went from being part of a Member State
through Denmark to becoming an associated OCT and the main implications
thereof. It will finally offer a few reflections and some future prospects.
The
Overall Historical Links between Greenland and Denmark
Geographically, Greenland is classified as
part of North America; however, in many other aspects, its closest ties are
with Denmark, placing it within the European context. The evolution of this
relationship has been detailed in a report
by the Greenlandic Constitutional Commission from 2023, which proposes a
Constitution for Greenland. The report outlines several phases of colonialism:
1) ‘Initial Colonization’ (1721-1782); 2) ‘Parasitic Colonialism’ (1782-1830s)
and ‘Classic Colonialism’ (1830s to 1908); 3) ‘Intensive Colonialism’ (1908 to
1953); 4) ‘Hidden Colonialism’ (1953-1979); 5) ‘Early Decolonization’
(1979-2009); and 6) ‘Matured Decolonization’ (2009-present).
According
to prevailing Danish narratives, Greenland is viewed as having originally
belonged to the Danish Crown under the Kalmar Union since the fourteenth century
but regarded as ‘properly’ colonized by Denmark in 1721, following the arrival
of the Danish-Norwegian priest Egede. When the first Danish Constitution was
adopted in 1849, Greenland retained its status as a colony and was not
explicitly recognized as a separate entity within the Constitution.
Following
the conclusion of the Second World War and the establishment of the United
Nations (UN) in 1945, it became evident that significant changes were underway
regarding the colonial arrangements of European countries, which were
increasingly deemed unacceptable. This shift notably affected the relations
between Denmark and Greenland. In 1952, decisions were made that led to
Greenland’s formal decolonization in 1953 through its integration into the
Kingdom of Denmark. Unlike most other decolonization processes, this
integration involved a connection with the metropole rather than a pursuit of
independence. Crucially, although the idea of a constitutional right for
Greenlandic self-determination was proposed at some stage, it was ultimately
not included. Greenland’s status then
became, along with the Faroe Islands, what in Danish constitutional theory is
commonly viewed as part of ‘Rigsfællesskabet’, which might be translated as the
‘community of the realm’ or ‘the commonwealth of the Danish State’. Against
that background, Paragraph 1 of the Danish Constitution was (with effect from
1953) amended to read ‘This Constitutional Act shall apply to all parts of the
Kingdom of Denmark’.
The
report from the Greenlandic Constitutional Commission emphasizes that the
Greenlandic population was not invited to vote in the referendum concerning the
new Danish Constitution. The absence of a referendum in Greenland was not only
questioned but also criticized during UN negotiations; however, this criticism
ultimately had no impact (see the report of the Danish
Institute for International Studies). Consequently, on 9 September 1954,
the UN acknowledged the requested change of status by adopting a resolution
that removed Denmark from the list of colonial powers.
Two
significant events further stand out. The first occurred in 1979 when a ‘home
rule’ framework was established following a referendum in which the majority of
Greenlanders voted in favour of this governance model. The second pivotal event
took place on 21 June 2009, when a new arrangement known as ‘self-rule’ was
implemented. This change was also supported by a prior referendum, in which 75
percent of the population endorsed an enhanced version of home rule. Notably,
the Act on Greenland’s Self-Governance outlines the process by which the people
of Greenland can initiate a decision regarding their independence, although it
requires the consent of the Danish Parliament.
The
Accession in 1973
Regarding the bonds with the EU, it is
noteworthy that during the 1972 Danish referendum on membership in the European
Community (EC), Greenland was not afforded the chance to hold a separate
referendum. There was significant resistance in Greenland to EC accession, with
a majority of Greenlanders voting against it. The isolated votes from Greenland
were 4,062 in favor (‘Yes’) and 9,594 against (‘No’). However, unlike the Faroe
Islands, Greenland – which at the time did not yet have a home rule arrangement
– was required to accede as an integral part of Denmark in 1973.
The
referendum result has been seen as a significant
catalyst for subsequent political initiatives as several Greenlandic
politicians and commentators concluded that the unwanted foreign policy
situation affecting Greenland could not be overlooked and necessitated
political consequences. Consequently, the initial focus shifted to the future
relationship between Greenland and Denmark, which was deemed essential for any
further actions concerning the relationship with the EC.
The
Changed Status in 1985
A few years after the establishment of the home
rule arrangement in 1979, a consultative and non-binding referendum took place
in Greenland on 23 February 1982. The referendum sought to determine whether
the EC Treaties should continue to apply in Greenland. It did not address the
potential transition to an OCT status; rather, it focused solely on the
question: ‘Do you want Greenland to remain a part of the European Communities?’
Additionally, the title of the Greenlandic act regarding the referendum clearly
indicated that the primary concern was the continued application of the
treaties governing the European Communities in Greenland.
In
the referendum, 32,391 individuals were eligible to vote. Among them, 12,615
voters, representing 52 percent of the total turnout, cast their ballots for
‘No,’ while 11,180 voters, or 46.1 percent, voted ‘Yes’ on the referendum’s
question (and 470 votes were invalid). This resulted in a modest anti-EC
majority. Although the Danish Government supported Greenland’s continued
membership in the EC, it had previously stated that it would respect the
referendum’s outcome. Following the results, the Danish Government, which held
the authority in this matter, was asked to commence negotiations with the EC.
Ultimately, Greenland's departure from the EC was formalised on 1 February
1985, transitioning to an OCT status instead.
As
mentioned above, the referendum in Greenland was concerned with whether Greenland should
remain a part of the EC. However, it did not address
the potential for Greenland to attain the status of an OCT. This omission may raise
concerns that the decision ultimately reached may not fully align with the
intended theme of the referendum as the view may be that Greenland did not
withdraw from the EU as such but only changed status (see the thesis
of Wessel Guersen on the territorial scope of the EU).
Implications of the Current Status
The term OCT designates regions located
outside the European Union (EU) that maintain historical, social, cultural,
and/or political ties to an EU Member State. These territories do not possess
sovereign status and international legal personality, and are placed in a
unique position, as neither Member States nor third countries. Currently, OCTs
are outlined in Annex II of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).
The
overall implications of the OCT status became that Greenland to some degree
remained related to the EC and subject to the applicability of some EC law
(including some Treaty provisions). At that time, the legal framework of the
OCT formula was adjusted to accommodate Greenland’s future re-association. Consequently,
among others, a provision was added which is now Article 204 TFEU, affirming
that the provisions regarding the OCTs are applicable in Greenland. Article 198
TFEU highlights the basic purpose of association as being to promote the
economic and social development of the countries and territories, and to
establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole, as
well as to serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the
inhabitants of these countries and territories to lead them to the economic,
social and cultural development to which they aspire. Additionally, Article 200
TFEU specifies that customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods
originating in the OCTs shall be prohibited in conformity with the prohibition
of customs duties between Member States in accordance with the provisions of
the Treaties. It also states that customs duties on imports into each OCT from
Member States or other OCTs are prohibited, as outlined in Article 30 TFEU.
The
Council
Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland holds significant
importance, too. The essence of the interrelationship is articulated in its preamble,
stating: ‘The TFEU and the secondary legislation adopted on the basis of it do
not automatically apply to the OCTs, with the exception of a number of
provisions which explicitly provide for their application. Although not third
countries, the OCTs do not form part of the single market and must nevertheless
comply with the obligations imposed on third countries in respect of trade,
particularly rules of origin, health and plant health standards and safeguard
measures.’ The Decision includes several provisions that place Greenland (and
other OCTs) in a more advantageous position compared to third countries, and in
some respects, they are treated similarly to Member States. Specifically,
Article 44 of the Decision stipulates that products originating from Greenland (and
other OCTs) can be imported into the EU without incurring import duties.
Furthermore, Article 45 mandates that the EU shall not apply to imports of
products originating in Greenland (and other OCTs) any quantitative
restrictions or measures having equivalent effect. Consequently, as an OCT,
Greenland enjoys direct access to the internal market without import
restrictions, while also retaining the ability to implement customs or
quantitative restrictions on imports from the EU, as outlined in Article 46 of
the Decision. In addition, fishing has all along also been of importance (see
the fisheries agreement
with Greenland).
Importantly,
Greenlanders may be regarded as Union citizens, already because they are Danish
citizens. Of interest in that regard is Article 20(1) TFEU stating that: ‘Citizenship
of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be
additional to and not replace national citizenship.’ Reference may at the same
time be made to the CJEU Eman and Sevinger judgment
from 2006 saying that: ‘...persons who possess the nationality of a Member
State and who reside or live in a territory which is one of the OCTs... may
rely on the rights conferred on citizens of the Union...’ In a related context,
the Charter of Fundamental Rights may be applicable when EU law is applied
and/or implemented (see Kochenov and
Geursens, ‘EU Law and the Overseas: General Principles’).
Notably, in 2021, the EU introduced its new
Arctic policy, committing to enhanced engagement in the Arctic region to address
various geo-political, environmental, economic, security, and social
challenges, while also collaborating with others to seize emerging
opportunities. Additionally, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the
European Commission, visited both the Faroe Islands and Greenland last year.
During her visit to Greenland, she inaugurated the EU Office in Nuuk, which
aims to establish a tangible European presence in Greenland and the broader
Arctic region. At the same time, President von der Leyen signed agreements with
Greenlandic Prime Minister Múte Bourup Egede and Danish Prime Minister Mette
Frederiksen, focusing on the EU-Greenland partnership, which amounts to nearly
€94 million under the EU Global Gateway investment plan. This plan allocates
€71.25 million for education and skills development and €22.5 million for green
growth initiatives, including renewable energy, critical raw materials, and
biodiversity conservation. The EU’s new Arctic policy also briefly addresses
Greenland’s OCT status, highlighting that under the Overseas Association
Decision, Greenland engages in extensive political and policy dialogue with the
EU, benefits from preferential trade arrangements for accessing the EU market,
and is one of the largest OCT recipients of EU support per capita, with €225
million allocated between 2021 and 2027.
As
a final consideration, reference may be made to the mutual assistance clause of
Article 42(7) TEU. This clause stipulates that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory,
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter. Consequently, it raises the question of whether
Greenland, as an OCT, in this context should be considered part of a Member
State’s ‘territory’. This is likely to be the case (see, e.g., Geursen).
Reflections
and Possible Future Prospects
The
preceding discussion illustrates the connections between the EU and Greenland,
primarily rooted in the relationship between the OCT, Greenland, and the Member
State, Denmark. However, the bond between Denmark and Greenland is heavily
influenced by a legacy of colonialism. Consequently, this may be central to the
EU’s engagement with the Arctic and more specifically, Greenland. Thus,
Greenland’s relationship with the EU - mediated through Denmark - is
fundamentally linked to its OCT status, which pertains to former colonies.
These connections can be seen as precarious, and the overall framework may be
susceptible to potential backlash, as also indicated by recent events, even
though it must also be taken into consideration that the general framework and
thinking of today, after all, has changed.
The current implications of OCT status remain ambiguous, and
the above discussions highlight that the existing
relations between the EU and Greenland are marked by significant legal
uncertainty and complexity. Looking ahead, the future of this relationship
remains open to debate. Notably, a survey
conducted in December 2024 indicated that 60% of Greenlandic citizens would
support rejoining the EU, an increase from 40% in 2021. In this context, Danish
MEP Morten Løkkegaard has recently
proposed that Greenland should reconsider its EU membership.
Consequently,
it may be pertinent for Greenland (and possibly the EU, too) to explore various
possibilities in light of current geopolitical events in the coming years,
including especially the following three: 1) whether Greenland rather than
keeping its OCT status would prefer to transition to an ‘Outermost Region’ (OR)
status, which would entail a closer association with the EU (as the EU acquis applies
in full unless the contrary is stated – see Kochenov
and Geursen; 2) whether Greenland would wish to reattain its former full membership
status alongside with Denmark; or 3) whether Greenland – if it were fully
severing ties with Denmark to become a sovereign state, no longer bound by the
Danish Constitution, which again would end its current relationship with the EU
– would wish to seek a different relationship with the EU, potentially aspiring
to become a Member State rather than being classified as a third country, which
would otherwise be its EU-legal status.
While
intentionally abstaining from providing any kind of direct advice to Greenland (and
eventually the EU) on the matter, it is important to acknowledge that the
inter-relational platform, despite its current volatility as evidenced by the
current tensions, may also possess positive aspects. Under all circumstances, ultimately,
the difficult decisions to be made in the coming years will be more crucial than
ever for the future of EU-Greenland relations.
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