Asylum Pact 2.0: the EU amends the rules on ‘safe third countries’ and ‘safe countries of origin’

 

Steve Peers, Professor of Law, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Paula Reister, via Wikimedia Commons

Introduction

The EU has finally adopted two amendments to the EU’s asylum pact, entailing significantly more stringent rules as regards ‘safe countries’ of origin’ (adopted text here) and particularly ‘safe third countries’ (adopted text here).

This blog post summarises the new laws in their context, and then examines how much they impact upon the ability to claim asylum in the EU in practice – in particular the introduction of a ‘Rwanda clause’ in EU law, mirroring the last UK government’s attempt to designate that country as ‘safe’ even for asylum-seekers who had not travelled through it.

Background

The history of the two ‘safe countries’ concepts in EU law goes back initially to 1992, in the form of the London Resolutions of Member States’ ministers (see here and here). The concepts then appeared in the initial 2005 asylum procedures Directive, since replaced by the current 2013 asylum procedures Directive. The 2013 law will be replaced, as from 12 June 2026, by a new Regulation on asylum procedures, adopted in 2024 (the ‘2024 Regulation’, which I previously discussed here), part of the EU’s asylum pact. While the 2024 Regulation already makes the rules more stringent than in the 2013 Directive, the 2026 amendments now make those rules more restrictive again.

(For earlier blog posts on the 2026 amendments, see my analysis of the Commission proposal here, and my analysis of the Council and Parliament positions).

‘Safe countries of origin’

2024 Regulation

The 2024 asylum pact Regulation retains the definition of ‘safe country of origin’ from the 2013 Directive, referring to a list of human rights standards. As in the 2013 Directive, the rule can only apply if an asylum-seeker is a national of the country concerned, or is a stateless person formerly habitually resident there; and the principle remains a presumption, which the applicant can rebut in individual cases.

However, there are several changes. First of all, the rule will become mandatory for Member States, instead of an option. Secondly, it will be possible to designate a non-EU country of origin as ‘safe’ in part, either geographically (exceptions for ‘specific parts of its territory’) or for some groups of people (‘clearly identifiable categories’). Recent Court of Justice judgments have confirmed that such designations are not possible under the 2013 Directive (see here and here).

Thirdly, the 2024 Regulation makes it possible for the EU to adopt a common list of ‘safe countries of origin’, alongside Member States’ designation of such countries. Countries can be taken off the common EU list in the event of ‘significant changes’ there, initially by means of a delegated act adopted by the Commission, then via legislation. Member States cannot put the country back on their national list of ‘safe countries of origin’ while a delegated act suspending it from the list applies; and for two years after the country is dropped from the common EU list via legislation, Member States need the Commission’s approval to reinstate it on their national lists.

Fourth, in place of a general reference to speeding up consideration of ‘accelerated’ cases (including ‘safe country of origin’ cases) in the 2013 Directive, there will be a three-month deadline to decide on such cases, although if an authority considers the asylum application to be too complex, it can default to the usual six-month deadline to decide on the merits. (This general deadline has not been amended, although the possibilities of extending it have been partly curtailed).

Fifth, a new ground for accelerated procedures, overlapping with the ‘safe third country’ ground, has been added: Member States must also fast-track cases where the most recent annual recognition rate for asylum claims for the asylum-seekers’ nationality is below 20% EU-wide at first instance (ie before appeals), ‘unless the determining authority assesses that a significant change has occurred in the third country concerned since the publication of the relevant Eurostat data or that the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom the proportion of 20 % or lower cannot be considered to be representative for their protection needs, taking into account, inter alia, the significant differences between first instance and final decisions.’ It is also mandatory, and subject to the same deadlines.

Sixth, while the ‘safe country of origin’ concept remains a ground for applying special border procedures, as under the 2013 Directive, those border procedures have been changed. They are now mandatory in principle (for a specific number of asylum-seekers per Member State) and can now last for up to twelve weeks (including both the administrative and judicial phase of the case), instead of four weeks. Presumably the Court of Justice case law, requiring that asylum-seekers be released from detention (if that was the only ground for it) and admitted on to the territory at the end of the border procedure deadline, still applies. Unaccompanied minors will be exempt from the revised border procedure, unless they are ‘national security’ or ‘public order’ risks.

Finally, it will be mandatory, instead of optional, for Member States to deny automatic suspensive effect to appeals in ‘safe country of origin’ cases, and several safeguards related to the lack of automatic suspensive effect are dropped. However, it will still be possible for asylum-seekers to ask a court for permission to stay during the appeal. On appeals, there is nothing to suggest that the case law of the Court of Justice on the 2013 Directive (Alace) has been overturned. In that case, the Court said that: a Member State’s designation of a ‘safe country of origin’ has to be subject to judicial review; the sources of information used for the designation must be provided to the applicant and to courts; and courts must be able to examine other sources of information.

2026 amendments

First of all, the new Regulation allows (as an option) the early application (ie before June 2026, from the day after publication of the new law in the EU Official Journal) of the possibility of partial designation of a country as a ‘safe country of origin’ (either geographically or for certain groups of asylum-seekers), as well as the new ‘20% recognition rate’ rule. In particular, this is intended to allow for the earlier application of the Italy/Albania arrangements on processing asylum-seekers on Albanian territory, which were in effect frustrated by the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the current Directive. Of course, other Member States might have a use for earlier application of the rules too.

Furthermore, the 2026 amendments similarly allow for early application of the partial designation of countries as ‘safe third countries’.

The early application of the 2024 version of these rules can also be applied at the borders, in the current version of the border procedure. This means that, among other things, the 2024 exclusion of most unaccompanied minors from the border procedure will not apply until the 2024 Regulation fully enters into force in June.

Secondly, the 2026 Regulation sets out a common EU list of ‘safe countries of origin’, as from the entry into force of the Pact: Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia, plus candidates for EU accession (Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia).

The accession candidates are, however, subject to special rules: they cannot be regarded as ‘safe’ if they have been subjected to EU foreign policy sanctions due to their actions ‘affecting fundamental rights and freedoms that are relevant to’ the definition of ‘safe country of origin’; or if their recognition rate is above 20% at first instance; or if there is a ‘serious threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence’ in that country (which is an amended version of one of the grounds for ‘subsidiary protection’ in EU law; the requirement that the threat also be ‘individual’ does not apply in this context). The preamble draws the obvious conclusion that ‘Member States should not apply the concept of safe country of origin to applicants from a candidate country during the period in which the circumstances provided for by this Regulation persist.’ 

It appears that in place of the usual rules on suspending a country from the list, the accession candidates will be removed following a notification from the Commission to the Council, European Parliament and Member States. However, to trigger the ‘serious threat’ ground for removal from the list, the Commission will need approval from the Council first. Presumably the default voting rule of qualified majority in the Council will apply. According to the preamble, the Council’s role is necessary ‘in view of the potential implications for the external relations of the Union and the Member States’ in this scenario.

Several of these points (dropping the ‘individual’ criterion, qualifying the sanctions point, and creating a role for the Council) were changes from the Commission’s original proposal, made at the Council’s behest. The European Parliament’s proposed amendment (removing a country from the list if the temporary protection Directive applied – obviously referring to Ukraine) was not agreed, although the final version of the preamble says that the application (or termination) of temporary protection under that Directive should be taken into account when assessing whether a ‘serious threat’ exists. Moreover, the Parliament’s proposal to use delegated acts (ie the usual process) to remove candidate countries from the common list was not agreed either.

The Regulation also now provides for the possibility (again, at the Council’s behest) that a country on the common EU list can be de-listed in part, ie using the exceptions for parts of a country or groups of people which Member States can use.

Finally, at the behest of the Parliament, a clause in the preamble to the 2026 amendment appears to hint at limiting judicial review in individual cases:

[a ‘safe country of origin’] designation reflects the general situation in that country and is not affected by the individual circumstances, which may only be assessed for the purposes of determining whether the concept of safe country of origin should exceptionally not be applied in a specific case. Therefore, in the context of national judicial review, the detailed evidence regarding an applicant’s individual situation justifying the applicability of the concept of safe country of origin should be the main purpose of that assessment. In accordance with the Treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union is competent to rule on any doubts on the validity of a designation of a third country as a safe country of origin at Union level.

This is slightly more equivocal than the EP’s proposed amendment on this point, which had read:

…national judicial review should examine the detailed evidence regarding an applicant’s individual situation justifying, in his or her case, the inapplicability of the concept of safe country of origin and not the designation as such.

‘Safe third countries’

2024 Regulation

The 2024 Regulation (before the 2026 amendments) makes a number of changes to the rules on this issue as compared to the 2013 Directive. First of all, it will be simpler to designate a country as a ‘safe third country’ in one respect: there need not be an opportunity to request and receive Refugee Convention refugee status there. Instead, if a non-EU country ‘has ratified and respects’ the Convention, within the limits of any reservations and limitations, that country ‘shall be considered to ensure effective protection’; but if has not ratified the Convention, or applies a geographical limit to it (ie Turkey), that country ‘only’ offers effective protection for people where, ‘as a minimum’, that country allows people to remain, offers subsistence, health care and education, and ‘effective protection remains available until a durable solution can be found’.  

Secondly, as with ‘safe countries of origin’, it will now be possible to regard a country as a ‘safe third country’ only partly, ie ‘with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons’. A country can even be a ‘safe third country’ for an individual applicant.

Thirdly, there will be new safeguards for unaccompanied minors: a ‘best interests’ test and a prior assurance that the non-EU country will take them in charge and give them immediate access to effective protection.

Fourth, there will now be a two-month deadline for deciding ‘safe third country’ applications (and most other inadmissible applications), with a possible extension of up to two months in certain circumstances.

Fifth, there will also now be a new prospect of a common EU list, which works the same way as the possible common list of ‘safe countries of origin’ (and removals from it) described above.

Sixth, the revised border procedure in the Regulation (described above), will also apply to ‘safe third country’ cases.

Several elements have not changed, though. It is still necessary that, in the country concerned, there is: no threat to [life or liberty’ on any of the grounds set out in the Refugee Convention; ‘no risk of serious harm’ as defined in EU law as regards subsidiary protection; respect of the non-refoulement principle in the Refugee Convention (ie not sending the asylum seeker to an unsafe country); and respect for ‘the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law’.

Also, the principle will still only be optional for Member States; and the rule still cannot be applied unless the asylum-seeker will be admitted to the country concerned. Also, the rule can only apply if the asylum-seeker has a ‘connection’ with the other country, ‘on the basis of which it would be reasonable’ for the asylum-seeker to go there; it must still be possible for the asylum-seeker to challenge the alleged safety of the country concerned for them, as well as their supposed connection with it. Finally, as before, appeals in ‘safe third country’ cases will still have automatic suspensive effect.

2026 amendments

First and foremost, the new Regulation (which will apply from June, along with the rest of the asylum pact) has dropped the requirement that the ‘safe third country’ principle can only be applied in the event of a ‘connection’ to the supposedly ‘safe’ third country. There are further explanations of that principle in the preamble:  

Member States should, while fully respecting the parameters set out in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, be able to apply the concept of safe third country on the basis of a connection as defined in conformity with national law or practice, in so far as specifically defined therein. The connection between the applicant and the third country could be considered established in particular where members of the applicant’s family are present in that third country, where the applicant has settled or stayed in that third country, or where the applicant has linguistic, cultural or other similar ties with that third country.

It will now also be possible to apply the ‘safe third country’ principle in two other cases. First, it can be applied where the asylum seeker had transited through that country on the way to the EU, as further explained in the preamble:

…transit through a third country could include a situation where an applicant has passed through or stayed on the territory of a third country on the way to the Union, or where the applicant has been at the border or in a transit zone of a third country, where that applicant has had the possibility to request effective protection from the authorities of the third country concerned.

Secondly, the ‘safe third country’ principle can now apply to a Rwanda-type deal with a country that the asylum-seeker had neither a connection with nor transited through: ‘there is an agreement or an arrangement [with the non-EU country concerned]…requiring the examination of the merits of any requests for effective protection made in the third country concerned by applicants subject to that agreement or arrangement’.

Such an agreement or arrangement can either be negotiated by the EU or one or more Member States; the Member States might even negotiate it alongside non-EU countries (say the UK, or the US?). There are detailed rules on how any EU negotiations relate to Member State treaties on the issue.

However, the new ‘Rwanda’ criterion will not apply to unaccompanied minors, although the Parliament had argued that it should apply to children who were security threats. The new transit criterion will apply to unaccompanied minors though, although the current safeguards for them in ‘connection’ cases (best interests of the child, certain assurances from the country concerned) in the 2024 Regulation will apply to ‘transit’ cases too. The preamble also refers to considering the family unity principle.

Finally, the new Regulation has altered the rules on appeals, so that there will no longer be automatic suspensive effect in ‘safe third country’ appeals, except for unaccompanied minors subject to the border procedure. The amendments also (at the Council’s behest) drop automatic suspensive effect in cases where the asylum seeker has international protection from another Member State, even though Court of Justice case law provides for the possibility of applying for international protection in another Member State to avoid harsh conditions in the Member State which granted such protection, where the latter Member State treats the beneficiaries of international protection so badly that it amounts to a breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nevertheless, it will still be possible to request a court to grant suspensive effect.

Other features of the ‘safe third country’ principle have not changed: it will remain optional for Member States, and the rules will not change as regards criteria defining the ‘safety’ of a country as such, the applicable deadlines, the related rules on the border procedure, or the requirement that Member States must consider the merits if the third country concerned refuses to admit the asylum seeker. Nor does it use the power to adopt a common EU list of ‘safe third countries’.

 

Assessment

The ‘safe country of origin’ amendments in particular are partly aimed at overturning case law of the CJEU, not only as regards allowing geographical and group exceptions from the principle, but also (on a more lasting basis, given that those exceptions would be allowed from June anyway) as regards limiting national judicial review of the national lists of such countries.

However, this apparent attempt to limit judicial review would, if the provision is interpreted as such, breach the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court of Justice’s Alace judgment refers several times to Article 47 of the Charter (the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial), when ruling that it must be possible to challenge the designation of countries as ‘safe countries of origin’ (underlining and bold text added):

…it should be noted that the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 to provide for a right to an effective judicial remedy for applicants for international protection, the scope of which is defined in Article 46(3) of that directive, corresponds to the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter… [para 53]

…although, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States and subject to the observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing remedies for ensuring that individual rights derived from the EU legal order are safeguarded, Member States nevertheless have the responsibility to ensure observance in every case of the right to effective judicial protection of those rights as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, the scope of that right being clarified, in the present case, by Article 46 of Directive 2013/32… [para 64]

…the choice, by a Member State, of the competent authority and the legal instrument effecting the designation, at national level, of safe countries of origin, in accordance with Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32, cannot affect its obligations under that directive. It is thus for each Member State, inter alia, to ensure respect for the right to an effective judicial remedy which Article 46(1) of that directive confers on applicants for international protection against decisions taken on their applications, the scope of which is defined by Article 46(3) of that directive. [para 65]

In that regard, the Court has held that, in accordance with Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, where an action is brought before a national court or tribunal against a decision taken on an application for international protection – examined in the context of the special scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants from third countries designated, in accordance with Article 37 of that directive, as safe countries of origin – that court or tribunal must, as part of the full and ex nunc examination required by Article 46(3) of that directive, raise, on the basis of the information in the file and the information brought to its attention during the proceedings before it, a failure to have regard to the material conditions for such designation, set out in Annex I to that directive… [para 66]

Consequently, and having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 62 and 63 above, the fact that a Member State has chosen to designate safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act cannot be such as to preclude the national court or tribunal seised in the circumstances set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment from reviewing, even if only indirectly, whether the designation of the third country in question as a safe country of origin complies with the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to Directive 2013/32. [para 67]

In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first questions is that Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from designating third countries as safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act, provided that that designation can be subject to judicial review as regards compliance with the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive, by any national court or tribunal hearing an action brought against a decision taken on an application for international protection, which had been examined under the special scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants who are from third countries designated as safe countries of origin. [para 68]

As the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU), any EU law adopted in breach of it would be invalid.

In any event, the litigation has not stood still. There are further cases referred from the Italian courts as regards aspects of the Italy/Albania arrangements, including Sedrata on detention issues, and Comeri (fast-tracked by the Court) on the external relations aspects of such arrangements. These pending cases may limit the possible application of the Italy/Albania agreement in the meantime, although it remains to be seen whether the changes to the law (including the 2024 version of the reception directive), might be relevant to the issues in these disputes post June. Of course, further legal challenges can be expected as the 2024 Regulation is partly rolled out early on the basis of the 2026 amendments, and applied fully from June.

The removal of automatic suspensive effect from ‘safe third country’ cases, while widening the scope of such cases in principle, may mean that it is harder to obtain an effective remedy in such cases – although the possibility of requesting suspensive effect from the national court will now become crucial. The same will be true of cases where a Member State is allegedly breaching the Charter rights of recognised refugees – an issue separate from ‘safe third (non-EU) countries’ where the legislators decided to carry out a ‘drive-by hit’ on appeal rights nonetheless.

As for the ‘Rwanda clause’ itself, at first sight it leaves open the possibility that (apart from unaccompanied minors) literally everyone who applies for asylum in the EU could be removed to such a country. In practice, though, this depends upon there being enough countries willing to admit the asylum-seekers. The EU’s current and planned leverage (via the visa code, recent visa waiver suspension rules, agreed amendments to trade policy laws, proposed changes to development aid and planned further changes to the visa code) relates to countries taking back their own citizens and those who transited through them. While the transit point is relevant to the widening of the ‘safe third country’ concept to include transit states, it does not cover the introduction of the Rwanda clause.

Even for those who are subject to the wider application of the ‘safe third country’ principle after the 2026 amendments, it will still be necessary to show that they will be admitted to the country concerned, and still possible to argue that the country is ‘unsafe’ in their particular situation. Moreover, it could be argued that – in parallel with the CJEU case law on challenging the listing of ‘safe countries of origin’, quoted from above – the EU Charter of Rights necessarily confers the possibility of challenging the listing of the country in question itself, comparable to the UK Supreme Court ruling that Rwanda was ‘unsafe’ as such. And since the EU Charter has a higher legal status than EU legislation, it would not be possible for the EU or its Member States to overturn such a ruling merely by passing legislation – unlike the ‘Safety’ of Rwanda Act passed under the previous UK government.

 

 

The right to perform secondary movements under international refugee law

 

Paolo Biondi

 

Photo credit: Mstyslav Chernov, via Wikimedia Commons

 

 

Introduction

 

The 1951 Refugee Convention is a pivotal document in international refugee protection, outlining the rights of asylum seekers and the responsibilities of states. Central to this convention is Article 31(1), which addresses the non-penalization of refugees for illegal entry or presence:

 

1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence

 

Traditionally viewed as a provision ensuring refugees are not penalised for illegal entry or presence if they present themselves promptly to authorities and have good cause for their illegal entry or presence, in my opinion Article 31(1) has broader implications. This blog post explores these implications, highlighting how Article 31(1) and related provisions within International Refugee Law (IRL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) should be interpreted to uphold human rights standards. By examining the negotiating history, authoritative interpretations and jurisprudential decisions, it suggests an unorthodox interpretation of Article 31 pointing to a wider interpretation of the right to perform secondary movements where effective compliance with human rights is essential for legitimately allocating of responsibility for asylum applications.

 

Understanding the Orthodox Interpretation of Article 31

 

Article 31(1) aims to address the practical realities of flight from persecution, acknowledging that refugees may have no choice but to enter or remain in a country illegally but, most importantly, implicitly regulates the right to perform secondary movements. During the drafting process, states, particularly France, expressed concerns about ensuring that refugees who had already found protection in one country would not move freely to others without adherence to border formalities. This debate underscored the tension between the humanitarian protection of refugees and states' sovereign rights to control their borders and regulate the distribution of refugees (responsibility sharing).

 

While Article 31(1) prohibits the imposition of penalties on refugees for their illegal entry or presence, it must be read alongside Article 32, which restricts protection from expulsion to refugees lawfully in the territory. This distinction highlights that the scope of penalties under Article 31(1) does not necessarily encompass removal to another country, as this could fall under the separate regime of expulsion under Article 32. Recent jurisprudence, such as rulings on the UK's Rwanda policy, suggests that removal to a third country may not always constitute a penalty under Article 31(1), provided the destination country is deemed capable of providing effective protection. However, international and regional jurisprudence also supports the view that measures resulting in effective penalties, such as removal without substantive guarantees of protection or the risk of refoulement, fall within the ambit of Article 31(1). The principle of non-penalization ensures that refugees are not disadvantaged due to the manner of their arrival, particularly when they lack viable alternatives to reach safety.

 

Two critical elements in the interpretation of Article 31(1) are the concepts of effective protection and meaningful connection. Effective protection refers to conditions in a country that ensure refugees' safety and access to basic human rights. Meaningful connection (e.g. family links) emphasize the importance of a reasonable connection with the transit or destination country. Effective protection is further elucidated in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits refoulement—returning refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened. This principle extends beyond the country of origin to any territory where such risks exist, underscoring the necessity of ensuring that refugees are not merely safe but can live free from fear of persecution or other serious harm.

 

During the 1951 Convention negotiations, while Norway’s proposed amendment of Article 31(1)—replacing "coming directly" from a country of persecution with "any territory" where life or freedom is threatened—was not accepted, this rejection does not negate the principle's evolution. Subsequent jurisprudence and interpretations, such as those from the ECtHR, CJEU and the UNHCR, have expanded the understanding of effective protection (e.g. Dublin jurisprudence further below). These developments in essence reflect an acknowledgment that threats in transit countries or deficiencies in protection standards can also justify secondary movements. Yet, already during the negotiations. UNHCR stressed that transit and secondary movements are sometimes unavoidable due to the challenges refugees face in initial asylum countries. Historical examples, such as the flight of refugees during World War II informed this perspective. The experience of UNHCR officials (including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Dr Van Heuven Goedhart) participating in the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, who themselves had to transit through multiple countries during their own escapes, highlighted the practical realities faced by refugees.

 

Thus, when refugees seek effective protection or a meaningful connection in a transit or destination country, such as family reunification among other compelling reasons, they may indeed have "good causes" for secondary movements under a modern interpretation of Article 31(1). This aligns with the broader human rights framework that underpins the Refugee Convention, ensuring that its protections remain relevant to contemporary challenges. While the effective protection and meaningful connection terms do not appear explicitly in the text of Article 31, they are crucial because they underpin the broader principles and objectives of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

 

 

 

Secondary Movements and Effective Protection: An Evolving Legal Framework

 

This section argues for a broader interpretation of "good cause" under Article 31(1) and the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. It emphasizes that secondary movements can be justified by systemic deficiencies in transit countries, a lack of effective protection, or strong connections, such as family ties, with a destination country. These interpretations align with the Convention's humanitarian purpose, which prioritizes refugees' fundamental rights over rigid procedural constraints.

 

The criterion of "good cause" for illegal entry under Article 31(1) has been a point of contention. Traditional interpretations often limit "good cause" to the manner of entry, focusing on immediate justifications such as the urgency of escape from persecution. However, scholars like Goodwin-Gill advocate for a broader understanding of this concept. According to Goodwin-Gill, "good cause" can extend to reasons such as the presence of family members in a specific country or other genuine links that justify secondary movements. His interpretation aligns with the principle that refugees should not be penalized for seeking effective protection or family reunification, even when this necessitates onward travel. This broader interpretation underscores the humanitarian objectives of the 1951 Refugee Convention, emphasizing that "good cause" should accommodate the complex realities refugees face when fleeing persecution and seeking protection.

 

UNHCR and recent international court rulings have reinforced this expansive view of "good cause" under Article 31(1). For instance, systemic deficiencies in asylum procedures in transit countries—such as those identified in Greece in 2009 during the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, and in Italy in 2011 with Tarakhel v. Switzerland — demonstrate how inadequate protection can justify secondary movements. These deficiencies are considered violations of human rights, as they fail to meet the minimum standards of effective protection, thereby necessitating the right to seek protection elsewhere. Additionally, the interpretation of non-refoulement has evolved to encompass broader threats beyond persecution as narrowly defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. This includes situations of generalized violence, systemic oppression, and serious human rights violations, as recognized in both international and regional jurisprudence. Such an expansive approach ensures that refugees are shielded from threats to their life or freedom, whether arising from persecution, armed conflict, or other severe risks, thereby reinforcing the principles of protection enshrined in the Convention.

 

A similar interpretation was upheld in 2014 by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC), which considered the interaction between safe third country practices and Article 31(1). In that context, the court, referencing M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, concluded that while Greece was designated as a "safe country" under German law, systemic deficiencies in its asylum procedures rendered it unsafe at the time of entry. These deficiencies exposed applicants to risks of inhumane and degrading treatment, justifying their secondary movements. This interpretation aligns with the reasoning in subsequent decisions by the CJEU, such as in Ibrahim, where the principle of effective protection under the Dublin Regulation was applied to recognize systemic deficiencies as undermining safety. These cases confirm that the right to perform secondary movements is not necessarily linked to "persecution" in a third country; instead, deficiencies in asylum procedures can represent "good cause" and a human rights violation, entitling the applicant to seek protection elsewhere.

 

The absence of protection in third countries fundamentally alters the nature of an asylum seekers journey. What may initially appear as an indirect flight can transform into a direct flight under Article 31(1) when inadequate protection in a transit country prolongs or exacerbates the risk of persecution or other serious harm. This interpretation reflects a broader understanding of the Convention’s purpose: either (a) "good cause" can trump the "coming directly" requirement, encompassing the need to avoid a lack of effective protection en route, or (b) "coming directly" must itself be understood in light of the Convention’s object and purpose, which would exclude transit through countries where effective protection is not available.

 

Such an interpretation aligns with universal rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which emphasize that the object and purpose of a treaty must guide its application. Moreno Lax has argued that unilateral designations of responsibility under the 1951 Refugee Convention or the Dublin system for the application of the Safe Third Country (STC) concept “must be rejected when they merely provide for a deflection mechanism incompatible with the realization of the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention.” While Moreno Lax's critique primarily addresses procedural responsibility mechanisms, the underlying principle she highlights—the necessity of ensuring mechanisms serve the Convention’s purpose rather than undermining it—is adapted here to support the argument against penalizing refugees for secondary movements where effective protection is absent.

 

Similarly, Lord Justice Simon Brown, in R. v. Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court, acknowledged that differing state responses to asylum requests create a rational basis for refugees to exercise some choice in where to seek asylum. While he rejected the idea of unconditional freedom to choose the country of asylum—a stance that might align with concerns over "forum shopping"—his judgment also recognized that there is no obligation under the Refugee Convention requiring refugees to apply for asylum in the first country they enter. This interpretation underscores that the Convention does not preclude secondary movements, especially when linked to legitimate causes such as seeking effective protection or family reunification.

 

Effective protection within the context of Articles 31(1) and 33(1) is crucial. The concept revolves around ensuring that a state can offer genuine safety and uphold the basic human rights of refugees. This includes protection from refoulement, access to fair asylum procedures, and the absence of persecution or inhumane treatment. The Safe Third Country (STC) and First Country of Asylum (FCA) concepts are often invoked in discussions about refugee movements. However, the distinction between these two is largely theoretical. Both concepts require that the third country or the first country of asylum offers effective protection. This means that in the third country concerned, refugees must not be subjected to refoulement or face threats to their life or freedom. The adequacy of protection in the third country must be assessed to ensure compliance with these core principles, ensuring that refugees are not transferred to situations where their fundamental rights may be at risk.

 

Commentator Paul Weis, analyzing the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 33(1), concluded that the words "in any manner whatsoever" indicate that Article 33(1) applies to non-admittance at the frontier. This interpretation underscores that an asylum seeker can claim protection under Article 33(1) if they fear persecution or if their physical safety or freedom is endangered in a country where they previously stayed, even before crossing the border. The non-refoulement applies universally, prohibiting rejection at the border in such cases.

 

This understanding is further supported by the absence in Article 33 of any requirement for lawful presence or explicit reference to illegal entry, distinguishing it from other provisions of the Convention, such as Article 31. The absence of such conditions highlights that the protection against refoulement applies broadly to all refugees, regardless of their mode of entry or presence. Other commentators such as Chetail agree with Weis, suggesting that protection against refoulement, grounded in positive obligations, may derive from the principle of non-refoulement itself. This principle obliges states to admit persons at immediate risk of fundamental rights violations, ensuring that non-admission does not have the same effect as refoulement.

 

While the 1951 Refugee Convention does not explicitly regulate access to asylum procedures or territory, the principle of non-refoulement inherently requires that refugees not be returned to situations where their life or freedom would be threatened. The refugee definition applies specifically to individuals outside their country of nationality. In contrast, IHRL imposes no such geographical limitation, and non-refoulement, from a human rights perspective, applies to any person under another state's effective control, regardless of location. While IRL and IHRL operate as distinct legal regimes, their objectives often intersect. For example, individuals may be protected from expulsion under human rights law without necessarily qualifying as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement principle, recognized in both IRL and IHRL, extends states' obligations to prevent the return of individuals to harm, even when they are not within the state’s territory. This principle has been extensively developed in case law, particularly by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases such as Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, where the Court confirmed that effective control triggers non-refoulement obligations.

 

 

Balancing 'Good Cause' and 'Coming Directly' Under Article 31(1)

 

This section expresses reservations about the 2017 UNHCR interpretation of "good cause" under Article 31(1) as narrowly focused on the nature of illegal entry, arguing that this view is inconsistent with the provision's negotiating history and broader judicial interpretations.

 

In 2017, UNHCR published a research paper that interprets the "good cause" criterion in Article 31(1) as primarily relating to the nature of illegal entry—specifically, the need to demonstrate a "good cause" for entering a country illegally. The publication argues that "the good cause requirement should not be used to rehearse arguments relating to safe third countries as these matters are examined under the ‘coming directly’ element." While this interpretation is plausible, it appears inconsistent with the negotiating history of Article 31(1) and with interpretations from international courts.

 

Authoritative figures, such as Goodwin-Gill, have challenged the conventional understanding of "good cause" in the context of irregular entry under Article 31(1). Goodwin-Gill argues that the "good causes" criterion should not be confined solely to the manner of illegal entry. Instead, it may encompass a broader range of reasons for seeking asylum in a particular country, including family reunification or systemic deficiencies in transit countries. These reasons reflect the Convention’s humanitarian purpose and recognize the complex realities refugees face during their flight to safety.

 

The relationship between "good cause" and "coming directly" has been a matter of debate. One interpretation is that these are separate, non-overlapping conditions, meaning "good cause" cannot override the "coming directly" requirement. However, according to me scholars like Goodwin-Gill argue that "good cause" should inform the application of "coming directly," allowing exceptions when transit countries fail to provide effective protection or there is no meaningful link. This perspective aligns with the Convention’s humanitarian objectives, ensuring that refugees are not penalized for seeking safety where protection was unavailable en route.

 

While Article 31(1) does not allocate responsibility for asylum applications, its principles shape the treatment of secondary movements. For example, family bonds or other relevant links in alternative destinations are recognized in regional frameworks, such as the EU’s Dublin Regulation, which prioritizes family links, and the "safe third country" concept, which requires a meaningful connection beyond mere transit. In 2020 in the FMS case the CJEU also clarified that mere transit cannot be intended as meaningful  connection for the purpose of STC concept application. These interpretations reinforce the need to assess secondary movements within a legal framework that respects refugees' rights. Most recently another key aspect was clarified in the CJEU judgment in Elliniko Symvoulio where it is established that if the third country designated as generally safe by a Member State does not in fact admit or readmit the applicants for international protection concerned, that Member State cannot reject their applications for international protection as inadmissible on the basis of Article 33(2)(c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD).

 

Judicial decisions, such as FMS, provide critical clarification on the application of "good cause" and "coming directly," supporting broader interpretations that prioritize refugee rights and systemic fairness. Such decisions are all the more important during a time EU Member States are exploring the possibility to remove the meaningful connection requirement from the newly adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation. In the same vein, Prof. Steve Peers critiques the revised Dublin rules for narrowing the scope and effectiveness of appeal rights, which, as he notes, marks a shift 'towards a purely intergovernmental framework' rather than one that individuals can effectively engage with to enforce their rights. This procedural limitation highlights the systemic barriers refugees face in seeking fair assessments, particularly in the context of systemic deficiencies in transit countries. His critique underscores the necessity of maintaining procedural safeguards to ensure fairness and uphold refugees' rights under Article 31(1). The FMS ruling aligns with the notion of "good cause" under Article 31(1), which advocates for flexibility and fairness in determining when secondary movements are justified. It supports the argument that a lack of substantive ties in a transit country may justify onward movement. The FMS case underscores the importance of individual assessments and procedural safeguards. This aligns with the broader goal of ensuring that Article 31(1) is applied in a way that prioritizes fairness and refugees' rights. While FMS primarily interprets EU law, it indirectly supports a broader understanding of "good cause" and "coming directly" by emphasizing meaningful connections and rejecting procedural shortcuts like reliance on mere transit.

 

 

 

Protecting Family Unity in the Context of APD and Dublin Regulation Interplay

 

Now, we turn to the interplay between EU asylum law and IRL, particularly how they address family unity, meaningful connections, and procedural safeguards in allocating responsibility for asylum seekers. The EU asylum system closely reflects the principles of IRL, especially those enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. This alignment provides a valuable framework for examining how EU rules incorporate and interpret these international standards, with a particular focus on family links and responsibility allocation.

 

Article 38(2)(a) of APD stipulates that the application of the safe third country concept must consider a connection between the asylum seeker and the third country. This connection, which could include family ties, must be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to that country. The directive itself explicitly states that the presumption of safety in a third country can be rebutted by the applicant, emphasizing the importance of individual assessments to ensure access to asylum procedures. Misapplication of admissibility rules could unjustly deny access to appropriate asylum procedures, thereby impacting the applicant's fundamental rights.

 

The Dublin Regulation, referenced by Article 38 of the APD, assigns responsibility for examining asylum applications through a comparative test. This test prioritizes family links and other meaningful connections to determine the most suitable EU Member State to handle the asylum claim. However, the regulation also considers other factors, such as the first EU state of entry, which can play a significant role in responsibility allocation. According to EU law, family unity remains a crucial factor, and decisions should aim to preserve these ties wherever possible.

 

The application of the APD procedure, particularly the "safe third country" rule under Article 33(1), has been interpreted differently in recent case law. On 17 March 2016, the CJEU in the Mirza case addressed the interplay between the STC rule under Article 33 of the recast APD and the Dublin Regulation. The Court ruled that a Member State may apply the STC rule to declare an application inadmissible, even if it is not the Member State responsible for examining the claim under the Dublin Regulation. This judgment reflects an interpretation of the Dublin Regulation’s explicit provisions regarding STC rather than a general approach to inadmissibility.

 

While the Mirza judgment interprets EU law as it stands, in my view concerns remain about its implications for procedural fairness and fundamental rights. For example, the judgment permits Member States to invoke the STC rule without fully determining responsibility under the Dublin Regulation, which could undermine the structured allocation of responsibility designed to safeguard family unity and other meaningful connections. EXCOM Conclusion 15 emphasizes that asylum should first be requested in a state where the applicant has a connection, such as family ties, and this requires a comparative test, not a non-contextual application of inadmissibility rules. Similarly, Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention recognizes family links as a "good cause" for onward movements, highlighting that strict and non-comparative procedures risk penalizing refugees contrary to international law.

 

In my opinion, the Mirza judgment illustrates a tension between procedural flexibility for Member States and the need for structured, rights-based responsibility allocation. While the judgment aligns with EU law’s textual framework, the absence of a comparative test in applying the STC rule risks decisions that fail to account for family unity or systemic deficiencies in protection. To strengthen procedural safeguards, inadmissibility decisions under Article 33(1) APD should ideally follow responsibility determinations under Article 3 of the Dublin Regulation. Although this sequencing is not explicitly required by the regulation, it reflects a normative approach that aligns better with the principles of family unity and effective protection embedded in both EU law (Fundamental Rights Charter) and IRL.

 

This cross-referencing aims not to override the Dublin responsibility criteria, principally to safeguard family unity (Art. 8 DRIII) criteria or the humanitarian clause (Art. 17 DRIII), which can and should be used to ensure family unity once a person gains access to the EU. The ECtHR has affirmed the proactive obligations under Article 8 ECHR in cases such as Senigo Longue and Tanda-Muzinga, which must be read in conjunction with the primacy of the Best Interests of the Child and the respect of family unity. This reiterates the positive duties of states to proactively and expeditiously comply with the procedural and substantive elements of Article 8 ECHR, both as an autonomous right and as part of an instrument of secondary legislation. Doing otherwise would undermine family unity (including for dependency reasons), with inadmissibility taking precedence over it.

 

Currently, it is possible for the principle of non-penalization under Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention to be undermined in the EU context. Article 38(1)(e) of the recast APD allows an applicant to be sent to a third country outside the EU where there is a "possibility" to request refugee status. However, the directive requires that a connection between the applicant and the third country be established, as outlined in Article 38(2)(a). Case law further clarifies that mere transit through a third country is insufficient to meet this requirement, emphasizing the need for a meaningful connection.

 

Additionally, the Dublin Regulation governs responsibility allocation for examining asylum claims among EU Member States and does not directly apply to transfers to third countries under the APD. While the Dublin Regulation does not explicitly mandate a "comparative test," its criteria prioritize factors such as family unity and the applicant’s meaningful links to a Member State. A rigorous application of these principles ensures that inadmissibility decisions under Article 33(1) of the APD do not override the safeguards enshrined in the Dublin Regulation and EU asylum law as a whole.

 

 

Conclusion: Balancing Control and Protection

 

Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention does not prohibit the diversion of asylum applications to third countries willing and able to provide effective protection, even in the absence of significant links to those countries. However, EXCOM Conclusion 15 and UNHCR guidelines emphasize that the principle of non-penalization under Article 31(1) limits such transfers when meaningful connections or effective protection are lacking. Justifications for secondary movements include insufficient protection in transit countries, refusal of protection, or strong family links in another state, which are recognized as "good cause" for onward movement.

 

A comparative test is necessary to evaluate the applicant’s connections to third countries versus their ties to other states, including within the EU under the Dublin Regulation. Effective protection, meaningful links, and family unity extend beyond non-refoulement, shaping a state's discretion in allocating responsibility for asylum claims. While Article 31(1) does not establish a positive obligation to admit or always justify secondary movements, it imposes constraints on measures that ignore these factors, as such restrictions may constitute penalties or harm integration prospects.

 

The interpretation of Article 31(1) requires a balance between state sovereignty and refugee protection. States have the right to control borders but must also honour international obligations, ensuring access to effective protection and family unity. Refugees should not face penalties for irregular entry or secondary movements driven by genuine humanitarian reasons. By applying Article 31(1) with sensitivity to these realities, states can uphold the 1951 Refugee Convention’s principles while maintaining humane and just asylum policies.

The New EU Asylum Laws, part 1: the Qualification Regulation

 

Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London*

Photo credit: Ggia, via Wikimedia Commons

*sentences with an asterisk have been corrected or updated since the original publication of this post. Most recently updated 18 June 2024.  

Just before Christmas, the European Parliament and the Council (the EU body consisting of Member States’ ministers) reached a deal on five key pieces of EU asylum legislation, concerning asylum procedures, the ‘Dublin’ system on responsibility for asylum applications, the ‘Eurodac’ database supporting the Dublin system, screening of migrants/asylum seekers, and derogations in the event of crises. I’ve looked at this new legislation in a series on this blog, based on a forthcoming article.* The other blog posts are: Part 2 (on reception conditions); Part 3 (on the resettlement Regulation); Part 4, (Eurodac); part 5 (on the screening Regulation); part 6 (on Dublin), part 7 (on the asylum procedures Regulation); and part 8 (on the crisis Regulation, plus general comments).* These laws are intended to be part of a ‘package’ of new or revised EU asylum laws. (Update: the European Parliament voted for the changes to EU asylum laws in April 2024, the Council formally adopted them on 14 May 2024, and they were published in the EU Official Journal on 22 May 2024)* 

The 2024 legislation joins the Regulation revising the powers of the EU asylum agency, which was separated from the package and adopted already in 2021.* 

The qualification Regulation: background

There have been two previous ‘phases’ in development of the Common European Asylum System: a first phase of laws mainly adopted between 2003 and 2005, and a second phase of laws mainly adopted between 2011 and 2013. The 2024 package is in effect a third phase,* although for some reason the EU avoids calling it that.

In each phase, the law on qualification is central: defining what is necessary to obtain refugee status or subsidiary protection status (ie protection other than as a refugee), and setting out what rights people have if they obtain either status. The first phase Qualification Directive was adopted in 2004; the ‘second phase’ Qualification Directive replaced it in 2011. (I analysed the negotiation of the latter Directive here; there’s also a lengthy analysis of it by Madeline Garlick and Violeta Moreno Lax in EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary, and see also my asylum chapter in the latest edition of EU Justice and Home Affairs Law). The third phase, adopted in 2024, now includes a qualification Regulation.*  

There is CJEU case law on both the first phase Directive and the second phase Directive. It might be argued that the case law is still relevant to the new Regulation, unless the relevant text has been amended; in some cases the Regulation (or the preamble to it) reflects some of that case law.

The UK and Ireland opted in to the first phase Directive, but not the second phase Directive or the proposal for the 2024 Regulation. Of course, the UK is no longer bound by EU law, but Ireland is still bound by the first phase Directive. Denmark opted out of both.

Of course, none of the measures in the package can be fully understood without the context of all the others – which I discuss over the course of this series of blog posts.* For instance, it is possible that the effect of the other measures in the package will be to reduce the numbers of people who would otherwise apply for refugee or subsidiary protection status in the EU, or whose applications will be considered on the merits (the asylum procedures law provides that some applications can or must be considered inadmissible). The qualification law is only relevant to those who get to that stage. And for those who do obtain refugee or subsidiary protection status, they can eventually obtain EU long-term resident status, which inter alia provides for a limited prospect of movement between Member States – and that law is in turn being renegotiated too, separately from the asylum package (my comments on that renegotiation here).

The legislative process leading to the 2024 qualification Regulation started with the Commission proposal in 2016,* as a response to the perceived refugee crisis, followed by EU governments agreeing their position on the proposal, which had to be negotiated with the European Parliament (its negotiating position was set out here). I compared the three institutions’ positions in a blog post here. But this blog post will compare the 2024 Regulation only to the 2011 Directive, although I have updated some of the discussion in my previous blog post where relevant.

Basic issues

The first key issue is the type of law used, which is linked with the degree of harmonisation which the EU seeks in this field. The first and second phase qualification laws were Directives, which mean that Member States were bound to achieve the outcome required but had a choice of form and method. The 2024 law is a Regulation,* which is binding in and of itself, without national transposition.

As for the level of harmonisation, the Directives set a form of minimum standards: Member States could have higher standards, as long as those standards were compatible with the Directives. So they set not only a floor, but also a ceiling: the CJEU judgments in B and D, M’Bodj (discussed here), Ahmedbekova and LW discussed the limits of the power to set higher standards. But this will soon be history: the 2024 Regulation removes the power to set higher standards even with a ceiling, providing instead for uniform standards in principle, although some national options will remain in the text.* (The same two basic changes were also made to the 2013 asylum procedures Directive).*

The new Regulation, reflecting that case law, notes that Member States are however free to retain or establish a separate status of humanitarian protection,* as long as there is no confusion with the (EU harmonised) notions of refugee or subsidiary protection status. People with such national status will largely fall outside the scope of any EU law, although the equal treatment provisions in the recent amendment of the EU single permit Directive (discussed here) will apply to them, and the resettlement Regulation applies aspects of the qualification Regulation to those admitted on a humanitarian basis under the EU resettlement law (see Part 3 of this series).*

In practice the shift toward harmonisation may lead to some lowering of standards overall, due to the absence of the possibility to have higher standards generally (even subject to a ceiling) and the removal of some options, to the extent that Member States are now obliged to (for instance) provide for an ‘internal flight alternative’ in their law,* and to require two criteria (not just one criterion) to be satisfied to apply the ‘particular social group’ ground of refugee protection. But the effect of such changes is qualified: for example, the requirement to apply the ‘internal flight alternative’ rule comes with additional safeguards attached to that rule, and Member States may have had less enthusiasm to apply higher standards for refugees, as compared to the options in EU law to have higher standards for (say) employment and environmental law.

The 2024 qualification Regulation provides that the previous Directive ceases to apply from 12 June 2026, while the new Regulation will apply from 1 July 2026.* There is no explanation of what happens between those two dates, and no transitional rule for applications pending, or status granted, before either of those dates.*  

The refugee parts of the Regulation (like the prior Directives) aim to implement the UN Refugee Convention (which the EU refers to as the ‘Geneva Convention’) in more detail, as regards both the definition of ‘refugee’ and the rights which refugees receive. The case law of the CJEU has often interpreted the Directive in light of the Convention, which seems likely to continue because the Regulation still makes many references to the Convention.

Turning to the details of the Regulation, there are five main elements to the law: common rules (applying to both refugee and subsidiary protection status); the definition of ‘refugee’; cessation, exclusion from and withdrawal of refugee status; the definition and cessation etc of subsidiary protection; and the content of status (ie the benefits people with status receive). This blog post mostly does not discuss the preamble, but keep in mind that the preamble adds some important detail to many of the points in the main text analysed here.

Common rules

Family members of refugees and people with subsidiary protection will be defined slightly more broadly. A ‘family member’ will now include relationships formed outside the country of refuge, not just those formed inside the country or origin. This means, for instance, that the spouse of a Syrian refugee who married him while in Turkey or Lebanon, and the children of that couple born in such countries, would now be defined as ‘family members’. It is still necessary for the family members to be present on the territory in connection with the asylum application, though (as confirmed by the recent CJEU judgment in Afrin – although note that in such cases, the separate EU law on family reunion applies for refugees). 'Family members' will now include dependent adult children.* A minor must be considered unmarried if the marriage would not have been allowed under the Member State’s national law, especially on grounds of age.

The Regulation ‘should’ apply to those covered by the planned new EU law on resettlement of refugees from non-EU countries (according to the preamble); the rules on assessment of asylum applications will expressly apply to them. (In fact, as discussed in Part 3 of this series, the resettlement Regulation will be clearer on this point).* As with the previous Directives – and unlike other EU asylum law measures – there is no provision on the territorial scope of the Regulation.

It will now be mandatory, not optional, for the main burden of proof to rest upon the applicant to show why the claim for refugee or subsidiary protection status is justified; and a new clause in the preamble will reflect the ECJ’s 2014 case law (discussed here) which limits the intrusiveness of Member States’ questioning of the credibility of LGBTI asylum-seekers.  The importance of the asylum seeker applying at the ‘earliest possible time’ will be de-emphasised.

As before, the Regulation will retain the possibility of becoming a refugee or needing subsidiary protection ‘sur place’ – ie because of events which took place after the asylum seeker left his or her country of origin, or due to activities of the applicant since leaving that country. But the exception to this rule will remain optional (‘may’): where the applicant has created the circumstances for use of this provision, Member States may refuse protection. This exception will be widened in two ways (extending it to include subsidiary protection claims, and applying it to initial applications, not just repeat applications), but also subject to a new safeguard (the circumstances created by the applicant must be for the for the ‘sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection’). (For the position under the 2011 Directive, see the recent judgment in Case C-222/22).*

On the other hand, the option to refuse claims because the asylum seeker had an ‘internal flight alternative’ – ie he could have fled to a safe part of the country of origin, like a supposed ‘safe zone’ in Syria – will become mandatory. (The possibility of rejecting a claim because an asylum seeker would arguably have been safe in a different country is the subject of the asylum procedures Regulation). However, there are new safeguards: a strong presumption that the concept cannot apply where the source of persecution is the State; applying the main rules on qualification first; shifting the burden of proof to the authorities, and obliging them to consider contrary arguments submitted by the applicant; more on the personal circumstances of the applicant; a requirement to consider whether the applicant could meet their basic needs; and a specific protection for unaccompanied minors. There is also a new requirement to consider the country of origin information supplied by the EU Asylum Agency. Note that although the CJEU has not yet interpreted the rules on the ‘internal flight alternative’ as such, it has recently ruled that differences in interpretation of the rule between Member States are not a good enough reason to refuse to transfer an asylum seeker to another Member State under the Dublin rules. In that context, it is possible that the additional provisions in the Regulation will lead to a more harmonised interpretation of the rule between Member States.

As for the sources of persecution or protection, the Regulation will retain the current rules in the Directive, replacing a reference to considering whether EU acts define a country as providing effective protection from persecution with a reference to considering country of origin information, including from the EU asylum agency where available.

Definition of ‘refugee’

The Regulation retains the basic idea from the previous Directives – and the UN Refugee Convention – that a ‘refugee’ is someone persecuted because of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality or particular social group, elaborating upon each of these concepts. The definition of ‘persecution’ will not change, but there are some changes to the text on ‘particular social group’: adding a reference to how the group is perceived, dropping a reference to criminal law, and adding a reference to ‘gender expression’. Furthermore, there are some new elaborations of the concept in the preamble, including a reference to the possibility of persecution on grounds of disability. As noted above, all Member States will also now have to require that asylum-seekers show that they both perceive themselves as part of a distinct group and are perceived as different by the rest of society, due to the loss of the capacity to set higher standards. (In the meantime, the CJEU has ruled for the first time on the position of women as part of a particular social group, with a judgment in January on domestic violence – see earlier discussion here – and also a pending case on Afghan women, discussed here).*

More generally, a new clause will provide that asylum seekers cannot be expected to hide their identity or beliefs, confirming case law as regards sexuality and religion.

Exclusion, cessation and withdrawal of status

The 2011 Directive elaborates on the Refugee Convention on exclusion, but the Regulation elaborates further.* First, the preamble to the new Regulation enshrines the basic elements of CJEU case law on the special status of some Palestinians (case law starting with Bolbol and El Kott; note also the recent Advocate-General’s opinion relating specifically to Gaza).* Secondly, a new provision on exclusion on grounds of terrorism states that no proportionality test is required in such cases, confirming the judgment in B and D; the preamble also takes account of the judgment in Lounani on the exclusion of foreign fighters, discussed here). Finally, another new provision will require consideration of whether a minor would be considered criminally responsible for acts under the law of a Member State, when considering if a minor would be excluded on grounds of war crimes, terrorism et al.

On cessation – loss of refugee status because, inter alia, the situation has improved significantly in the country of origin – the Regulation will provide again that account must be taken of country of origin information supplied by the EU asylum agency, or other sources.

As for the withdrawal of refugee status, withdrawal will be mandatory in more cases, now including where ‘there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present’ and where ‘he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the Member State in which he or she is present’. Previously withdrawal of refugee status was only optional in some cases. The CJEU has recently interpreted the latter of the two newly mandatory exceptions (see the trilogy of judgments here, here and here). Also, the Court has more broadly ruled that even if refugee status is withdrawn, the person concerned remains a refugee, still benefiting from non-refoulement and the rights which the Refugee Convention sets out for refugees who are unlawfully resident.

Subsidiary protection

The core definition of subsidiary protection (a threat of serious harm deriving from the death penalty, torture or similar treatment, or facing a specified threat from armed conflict) will not be affected by the Regulation – although the preamble will entrench some of the relevant CJEU case law on how much violence against civilians, and what types of conflict, trigger the ‘armed conflict’ ground of subsidiary protection (Elgafaji and Diakité). The provision on cessation of subsidiary protection will refer to country of origin information, including from the EU Asylum Agency.

There will be some changes to the rules on exclusion from subsidiary protection (it will be necessary to show that there was a conviction for a ‘serious crime’, if committed after admission to the territory; the person concerned must be a danger to national security, not security generally); and the prospect of exclusion from subsidiary protection due to commission of less serious crimes will remain optional. As with refugee status, the rules on exclusion will now specify that no proportionality test is required, along with special provision for minors.

Rights of refugees and persons with subsidiary protection

The Regulation will change the provisions on the rights of those with refugee status or subsidiary protection in several ways. First, if a Member State has not issued a residence permit within 15 days, it must at least issue some provisional documentation so that access to rights is more effective. Secondly, the list of vulnerable people now includes parents of adult dependent children. Thirdly, there will be a common template for information to be given to people with refugee status or subsidiary protection, which will emphasise the limits on their movement to other Member States.

Fourthly, due to the abolition of the right for Member States to set higher standards where compatible with the qualification law, it will no longer be possible for them to give refugee or subsidiary protection status automatically to family members who do not qualify separately for refugee or subsidiary protection status in their own right (see Ahmedbekova). On the other hand, there is still an obligation to extend the same rights in the law to family members covered by it, even if they will not have refugee or subsidiary protection status as such. This will include having a residence permit with the same date of expiry as the person with refugee or subsidiary protection status, which is an improvement on the current Directive. But the Regulation precludes a residence permit being issued to a spouse or unmarried partner ‘where there are strong indications that the marriage or partnership was contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to enter or reside in the Member State’.

Fifthly, there will be more harmonisation of the rules on residence permits, as regards fees, an explicit requirement to use the EU uniform format, an obligation to issue a permit within 90 days, and a requirement not to leave people with gaps between permits when they are renewed. The prospect for non-renewal of permits will now be linked to withdrawal of status (compare with the T judgment on the current law, discussed here).

Sixthly, there will be parallel harmonisation of the rules related to travel documents, which are issued by Member States to beneficiaries of international protection in place of passports, given that it would probably be unsafe for them to contact officials from their country of origin. (In the case of refugees, this supplements the rules already set out in the Refugee Convention). They will be valid for more than one year and will be expressly subject to the EU’s passport security rules.

Seventh, the provisions on movement within the territory will be redrafted to add the proviso that equal treatment with other non-EU citizens applies where they are ‘generally in the same circumstances’. This may be an attempt to confirm the case law in Alo and Osso (discussed here), which permits a link between limiting movements and the grant of benefits in some cases.

Eighth, there will be a new rule emphasising that refugees and people with subsidiary protection do not have the right to move between Member States – unless they are allowed to stay on the basis of national or other EU law, and subject to the right to make short-term visits under the Schengen rules. As noted already, the EU rules in question include a limited right to move between Member States under the EU long-term residence Directive, which is also being renegotiated. Any unauthorised movement between Member States can be punished by ‘resetting the clock’ on acquisition of long-term residence status under that law. However, Member States will have to fully count the time spent as an asylum-seeker when determining if a refugee or person with subsidiary protection has spent five years’ legal residence in order to qualify as an EU long-term resident under that Directive.

Ninth, the rules on integration will be amended by an obligation to ensure equal treatment as regards work-related matters, including taking account of experience in an occupation obtained outside the country of refuge. The rules on education will provide for equal treatment for adults (subject to an optional exception for loans and grants) and an express right to finish secondary school after the age of majority. Social assistance benefits can be linked to compulsory integration courses, and it will still be possible for Member States to limit beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to ‘core benefits’, which will now be listed in the main text instead of the preamble (adding housing benefits, which takes account of analogous case law). It will also now be explicit that Member States may make integration measures compulsory, subject to provisions on fees and accessibility. Finally, there will be new provisions on the guardians of unaccompanied minors.

Assessment

To what extent will the Regulation achieve the objectives which it sets out in its preamble?

To ensure harmonisation and more convergence in asylum decisions and as regards the content of international protection in order to reduce incentives to move within the […] Union, encourage beneficiaries of international protection to remain in the Member State that granted them protection and ensure an equality of treatment of beneficiaries of international protection

The assumption that harmonisation of refugee decisions deters movements within the EU is often questioned, but in any event the Regulation should in principle increase harmonisation of decision-making somewhat. This stems not only from converting a Directive into a Regulation and removing the qualified option to have higher standards, but also from removing some of the options in the main part of the law, and providing more details of how the common rules must be interpreted – for instance, as regards sur place applications, the internal protection alternative, and the definition of ‘particular social group’.* Note that in some cases this takes the form of integrating the case law into the main text or preamble, thereby making it more visible – and this blog post only mentions some of the new details which will be added to the preamble.

On discouraging movements between Member States, the sanction of restarting the clock on EU long-term residence status for those who move without authorisation, plus allowing easier access to that status for those who stay put, aims to provide a simultaneous carrot and stick. Awkwardly the Regulation does not provide for the situation, recognised by the case law (albeit subject to a very high threshold), when it is legitimate for a refugee or person with subsidiary protection to move to another Member State because the conditions in the Member State which extended them protection have deteriorated to the point where they breach the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

As for equality of treatment of those with international protection, the changes in the rules on the rights after obtaining refugee or subsidiary protection status appear liable to reduce differences between Member States – if that is the issue of equal treatment being referred to. On the other hand, some differences between refugees and people with subsidiary protection (as regards social assistance, and being covered or not by the family reunion Directive, which will be particularly relevant where family members are not already present) will remain.  

More fundamentally, as noted already this Regulation will form part of a broader package aiming at the same objectives; in particular the new Regulation on asylum procedures will in parallel harmonise the law on the procedural side, and changes to the law on reception conditions will also aim to discourage movements between Member States. And going beyond this, the bigger impact of the asylum package may come not from this Regulation, but from the new constraints planned on asylum seekers’ applications being considered on the merits in the first place – potentially leaving the EU law on qualification for refugee and subsidiary protection status, whatever its form or legal content, as a form of Potemkin village less frequently accessible in practice. Some of the other blog posts in this series will examine the extent to which the new asylum package could lead to this result.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA5: chapter I:5

**Disclaimer: I was an independent adviser for a consultancy advising the European Commission on the implementation of and possible amendment of the current Directive.