Professor Steve Peers, Royal
Holloway University of London
Photo credit: Pierre
Blaché, via Wikicommons
*This blog post draws upon and
updates research for the 5th edition of EU
Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP,
2023)
Late last year, the EU Member
States and the European Parliament agreed upon a Directive
to harmonise criminal law as regards EU foreign policy sanctions. (Update: the Directive was officially adopted in April 2024, and published in the EU Official Journal afterwards) This followed
barely a year after the EU Council adopted a decision to
extend EU criminal law competence to cover those sanctions. This blog post
updates a previous
post that discussed both the 2022 decision on competence and the initial Commission proposal
for a Directive that has now been agreed in principle.
The Decision extending
competence
As noted in the previous post –
and discussed in more detail there – the 2022 Decision extending EU competence
was the first use of the EU’s power to extend the list of crimes which it had
competence to harmonise, as set out in Article
83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The
previous list of crimes was: ‘terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment,
computer crime and organised crime’.
That competence involves not only
the ‘definition of criminal offences’ but also ‘sanctions’, ie the length of jail
terms and/or other sanctions that can be imposed as part of the criminal law.
However, these are ‘minimum rules’ – meaning that Member States can add to them
as part of their criminal law.
Since the Treaty of Lisbon
entered into force in 2009, the EU has adopted Directives regarding most of the
ten Eurocrimes, in most cases replacing older forms of EU law adopted before
the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. The exceptions are arms trafficking,
corruption, and organized crime – although there are pre-Lisbon EU laws
concerning the latter two crimes, a proposal from 2023 to update
the law regarding corruption, and other EU legislation concerning firearms
that falls short of adopting criminal sanctions for arms trafficking. In any
event, as we shall see, some arms trafficking will fall within the scope of the
newly agreed EU Directive on criminal law and EU foreign policy sanctions.
The legal context: EU foreign
policy sanctions
As discussed in more detail in
the previous blog post, there is a body of EU law already in this field, based
on the EU’s powers to adopt Decisions on foreign policy sanctions (along with
other foreign policy issues) on the basis of Article
29 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), alongside Article
215 TFEU, which provides for most of those foreign policy sanctions to be
paralleled in the form of ordinary EU law (in practice, Regulations).
Although Article 215 provides for
qualified majority voting of Member States in the Council, the effective rule
is actually unanimity, for that is the rule which applies in the foreign policy
provisions of the TEU (with marginal exceptions) to the adoption of the EU
foreign policy measures which the Article 215 legislation gives effect
to. The Commission proposed a
few years ago to drop unanimity here, but Member States didn’t bite. (They would
have to agree unanimously to change the voting rule).
Over the years, there have been a
lot of EU foreign policy sanctions and a lot of litigation – mostly direct
challenges to the validity of the sanctions measures by the persons or
companies (or even the States)
concerned by them in the EU General Court. That Court’s judgments can be
appealed to the CJEU; and national
courts have occasionally asked the CJEU about the interpretation or
validity of sanctions decisions too. (Although in general the CJEU has no
jurisdiction over EU foreign policy measures – an exception which the Court has
been slowly eroding for
awhile – as an exception to the exception, the CJEU has its normal
jurisdiction over foreign policy sanctions: see Article
275 TFEU).
The details of the Decision
A key point about the Decision extending
EU competence is that it applies only to the breach of EU foreign policy
sanctions. So the Decision does not give the EU power to harmonize criminal law
as regards the breach of purely national foreign policy
sanctions. The recently agreed Directive respects this distinction, applying
only to EU sanctions.
However, the competence – and the
recently agreed Directive – are not limited to breach of EU foreign policy
sanctions relating to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, even though that invasion
was the reason why the Decision and the Directive were adopted and agreed. In
fact, the Commission proposal for
the Decision noted that the EU has forty sanctions regimes, applying not only
to countries but also ‘targeting proliferation and use of chemical weapons,
cyberattacks, human rights violations and terrorism’. (For more details, see
the Council website,
especially its sanctions map).
The anti-terrorism sanctions have been around for awhile, attracting high
profile litigation such as cases involving Mr Kadi or Hamas;
the human
rights sanctions are fairly new, but will sometimes cross over with
other sanctions – see, for instance, the sanctions against Putin’s erstwhile allies, the
Wagner Group, for human rights breaches (along with links to other EU
sanction measures).
In terms of the type of
sanctions covered, the preamble to the Decision, as well as the recently agreed
Directive, also makes clear that this is broad, applying not only to economic
sanctions such as restrictions on trade or financial relations, but to bans on
entry into the territory (which are also already given effect to by listing the
sanctioned people in the Schengen Information System) and to arms
embargoes.
The agreed Directive
Basic rules
The recently agreed Directive has
similarities to other Directives in this area – see, for instance, the
Directive on harmonization of criminal law as regards terrorism.
But there are also some new elements compared to other Directives; and in any
event, it is the EU’s first foray into adopting criminal law relating to EU
foreign policy sanctions.
It should be stressed that (as
the preamble to the Decision confirms) the Directive will not make
breaches of EU foreign policy sanctions criminal for the first time in
most Member States. Just as with issues like terrorism and drug trafficking,
these were already crimes in most national laws before EU law came along. But
the details of the national laws probably differed more before the EU got
involved; the point of the EU’s involvement is to harmonize the
national laws somewhat.
Member States will have to apply
the Directive one year after its formal adoption (update: the deadline in the published Directive is 20 May 2025). This is longer than the six months proposed by the Commission, but
less than the two year deadline usually applicable to Member States applying
Directives.
As noted already, just like the
Decision on competence, the Directive will not be limited just to sanctions
against Russia, but will apply to EU foreign policy sanctions across the board.
Denmark has an opt out of EU
criminal law adopted after the Treaty of Lisbon, while Ireland opted
in.
Definition of crimes
The agreed Directive will require
Member States to criminalize nine types of breach of EU sanctions, which can be
summarised as: making funds available to sanctioned persons; failing to freeze
funds of sanctioned persons; enabling the entry or transit of a person covered
by an entry ban deriving from EU sanctions (in effect, an immigration law
offence that might overlap with the pre-existing EU law on facilitation
of illegal entry and residence – itself subject to a recent proposed
replacement); entering into transactions with sanctioned entities; trading
in goods or services covered by EU sanctions; providing financial services
despite an EU law sanction; providing other services banned by sanctions law;
circumvention of sanctions; or abusing exceptions to the sanctions laws.
Member States will have an option
(not in the Commission proposal) to exempt from criminalisation breaches
involving sums less than €10k, although where multiple such minor breaches are
linked, Member States must accumulate them so that they might reach the €10k
threshold that way. (This threshold does not apply to entry bans, presumably
because a financial threshold is irrelevant)
In every case, an intentional
breach will have to be criminalized; and in one case (trade in arms or dual use
goods subject to sanctions), ‘serious negligence’ resulting in the breach will have
to be criminalized too. The Commission had proposed that ‘serious negligence’
should be criminalised in most cases.
There is a novel clause on the
position of lawyers advising those accused of sanctions breaches, which differs
somewhat from the Commission’s proposal:
Nothing in
paragraph 1 shall be understood as imposing an obligation on legal
professionals to report information that they receive from, or obtain on, one
of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their
client, or performing the task of defending or representing that client in, or
concerning, judicial proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or
avoiding such proceedings
There is also an exemption for goods
or services provided for persons in need or humanitarian aid, although usually
EU sanctions law has
its own exceptions for those cases anyway.
Inchoate offences of incitement
and (in most cases) attempts are also criminalized, as is aiding and abetting.
Penalties
Member States will have to provide
for a maximum possible penalty of at least five years for most of the main offences
(not the inchoate offences), and one year for most of the rest of the main
offences – subject to a threshold of €100,000 being involved (which can again be
satisfied by a linked series of offences). No financial threshold will apply in
two cases: breaches of entry bans and trade in sanctioned arms or dual use
goods. Furthermore, a three year maximum possible penalty applies to breaches
of entry bans.
More generally, as regards the
commission of any of the offences defined by the Directive, Member States will
be obliged to provide for additional penalties, such as fines, withdrawal of
permits, and even (a novelty for EU criminal law) a temporary ban on running
for office.
Legal persons are subject to
liability, too, and must be subject to penalties such as shutting down the
business or withdrawal of its licences. This is a longer list than usually
provided for in EU criminal law Directives. The Directive will go further than
usual in specifying the amount of possible fines, including basing them on
annual turnover (a method previously applied in non-criminal areas of EU law,
such as competition law and the GDPR).
Criminal liability must be
aggravated in certain cases (such as organized crime, breach of duty by a
public official or a professional, obstruction of justice, or prior convictions
in this field), and mitigated in others (where the offender ‘flips’ on his or
her criminal associates).
Other provisions
Criminal jurisdiction would apply,
as usual under EU criminal law Directives, to acts committed on the territory,
on a ship or aircraft with a national flag, or by nationals. Member States will
have an option to apply liability to habitual residents.
Unusually, there will be rules on
limitation periods, ie when Member States would be out of time to bring a
prosecution or enforce a sentence. In most cases the limitation period would be
five years, with a possibility for derogation to at least three years where the
period can be interrupted by specified acts. Previously Member States have only
agreed to regulate this issue via EU law as regards fraud
against the EU budget (although the agreed
Directive on environmental crime contains limitation rules, and the proposal
on violence
against women would also address this point).
Finally, there would be links to
other EU law (besides, obviously, the sanctions laws themselves). The proposal
would link up with EU criminal law on money laundering and confiscation (the
latter now also being
amended), plus there is a novel link to the EU legislation on whistleblowers:
that law must also apply to protect those in a company or organization who tip
off the authorities about breaches of sanctions. Conversely, there is no
proposed amendment of the law on the European Arrest Warrant – even though
breach of EU foreign policy sanctions is not on the list of crimes
where the dual criminality condition for extradition must be waived. However,
prosecution or sentences for sanctions breaches will sometimes fall within
areas where dual criminality has to be waived (like terrorism or organized
crime); and the dual criminality condition is more likely to be met as a result
of the harmonization Directive anyway (it may even be met already, simply by
virtue of the foreign policy sanctions measures themselves).
Comments
It is hard to assess the likely
impact of the Directive, for several reasons.
First of all, it is difficult to
see what impact the Directive will have in practice without more detail on what
changes would be made to national law as a consequence of its adoption. As
noted already, while the Directive will bring about some harmonisation, Member States
already have some criminal laws on the books in this field.
Secondly, a key issue with
criminal law – just as with non-criminal forms of regulation of conduct – is that
its effectiveness depends upon the resources and expertise necessary to
investigate and bring prosecutions. On this point, the prospect of extending
competence to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to include
breaches of EU foreign policy sanctions was raised
by the German and French justice ministers. This would be important but has
not been raised again since the Directive was proposed. (Extensions of EPPO
competence need unanimous agreement of Member States, although some Member
States have opted out of the EPPO; the Commission’s proposal to extend
its competence to terrorism has not been agreed so far).
An extension of EU competence might
be seen as an EU power-grab, but it is notable that it is an exception: over
fourteen years after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, it is the only such extension
of competence to date. By contrast, as noted above, Member States have not yet
agreed an earlier proposal to extend the list of Eurocrimes to cover hate
speech and hate crimes, or agreed the proposal to drop unanimous voting for
some foreign policy measures; nor have they agreed to drop unanimity in a
number of other areas which the Commission proposed years
ago.
It is striking to see some novel
points (for EU criminal law) in this Directive: the specific rule on lawyers; the penalty of a ban on running for office (obviously relevant because politicians might be tempted to, and be in a position to, breach the sanctions); the more detailed regulation of financial penalties a la other areas of (non-criminal)
EU law; the obstruction of justice point; and the link with the whistleblowers
law. It is only the second time that the EU has agreed to regulate limitation
periods (although the revised environmental crime directive, also including
similar provisions, was agreed essentially simultaneously).
It is also significant to see the
singling out of arms trade in breach of sanctions for stricter treatment in several
respects, given the EU’s reluctance to regulate this issue as a Eurocrime to
date. In the context of foreign policy sanctions, it makes sense to treat the arms
trade more seriously, given its more direct contribution to the death and injury
which the EU sanctions aim to end.
The extension of competence is
also best understood as part of the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine – which has also prompted developments as regards the start (in
principle) of accession negotiations, the use of EU defence powers, and the first-ever
use of the long-dormant temporary
protection Directive. By itself, the extension of EU competence and the use
of those criminal law powers will not end the invasion – and, as noted already,
the agreed Directive applies to other EU sanctions too. Nor does it address the
criticism that that those sanctions are too little and too late. But it may
make some contribution to the effective implementation of those sanctions which
have been established to oppose the invasion, and in any event it sends a
political message that the EU is stepping up their enforcement.
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