Can a Member State be expelled or suspended from the EU? Updated overview of Article 7 TEU

 

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

With the re-election of the Orban government in Hungary, some of its critics are calling for Hungary to be expelled from the EU. But is that even possible? And if not, what other sanctions can be imposed against a Member State by the EU?

Back in 2019, I wrote two blog posts on this theme: first, on the ‘Article 7’ process for sanctioning Member States for breach of the rule of law or other EU values; second, on the alternative processes (ie other than Article 7) for sanctioning Member States. This is an update of the first of those blog posts; I hope to update the second one at some point too.

The legal framework for sanctions

Although many people refer to Article 7 TEU, there are other Treaty provisions which are inextricably linked: Article 2 TEU sets out the values which Article 7 is used to enforce; Article 354 TFEU describes voting rules for the EU institutions; and Article 269 TFEU provides for limited jurisdiction for the CJEU over the sanctions procedure.  All of this must be distinguished from the normal rules of EU law, discussed in the second blog post.

First of all then, what are the values of the EU, legally speaking? Article 2 TEU states:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Article 7 then sets out the process of enforcing those values. It begins with Article 7(1), which provides for a kind of ‘yellow card’ – a warning if there is there is ‘a clear risk of a serious breach’ of those EU values:  

1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.

The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to apply.

Notice that the ‘yellow card’ process can be triggered by the European Parliament, or a group of Member States, or the Commission. There is no requirement of unanimity of Member States to approve a Council decision to issue a ‘yellow card’ (this is a common misunderstanding), but the threshold of four-fifths of Member States’ governments in the Council is nevertheless fairly high. 

In practice, this process has been triggered both against Poland (by the European Commission) and Hungary (by the European Parliament). So far neither has resulted in any action by the Council, despite holding a number of the hearings referred to in Article 7(1).. So obviously triggering the process does not, as some think, mean that the Council will agree to issue a ‘yellow card’, or has done so already. If the Council ever did issue a ‘yellow card’, note that this does not entail a sanction as such: it is only a finding of a risk to EU values, with possible recommendations. Nevertheless, the issue of a ‘yellow card’ is perceived as extremely politically serious.

This brings us to Article 7(2), which is the ‘red card’ of the process:

2. The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the Member State in question to submit its observations.

The procedure here is even tougher: unanimity of the Member States. The European Parliament cannot trigger the process, but could veto it if the Commission or a group of Member States trigger it. The threshold to be met is higher: not just the risk of a serious breach, but the ‘existence of a serious and persistent breach’ of those values. It’s likely that the EU would get to the ‘red card’ stage after issuing a ‘yellow card’, but that’s not a legal requirement: a ‘straight red’, for (say) a country which had suddenly undergone a military coup, is also conceivable.

What are the consequences of a ‘red card’? Article 7(3) sets them out:

…the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.

The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to be binding on that State.

Note that Member States don’t have to act unanimously in the Council when deciding exactly what sanctions to apply to the black sheep amongst them. The unanimity threshold only applies when taking the previous step of deciding whether there’s a serious and persistent breach of the EU values.  As for the specific sanctions which might be imposed, the Treaty mentions suspension of voting rights, but that’s just one example. The Council might instead (or additionally) impose other sanctions, such as suspension of MEPs’ voting rights (which raises the awkward question of whether they might also end up sanctioning any opposition MEPs from the Member State in question – whose voices would ideally need to be heard). However, there’s an obligation to consider the rights of individuals and businesses, which suggests that trade sanctions might be problematic. It might also be hard to justify restricting free movement rights, but in any event note that there are specific rules on asylum for EU citizens fleeing from a Member State subject to a ‘red card’. (see the second blog post).

Most significantly, there’s no provision to expel a Member State from the EU as such. Having said that, a Member State subject to suspension might be so outraged to be in that position that it triggers the process of leaving the EU under Article 50. The UK’s withdrawal process was complicated and controversial enough; now imagine the legal and political complexities of a Member State subject to an Article 7 ‘red card’ triggering Article 50. Should its political authorities’ actions be considered legally and morally valid? What if a group of exiles claim to be the legitimate government of that Member State (a la the USSR-era Baltic States), and that purported government does not wish to leave the EU?  What if a part of that Member State, at odds with the government in power over EU membership and its violation of EU values, attempts to secede?

Of course, the possibility of withdrawal (alongside concerns about sovereignty, and the workings of partisan politics) may also have influenced the pronounced reluctance of the EU to use the Article 7 process.

It’s sometimes suggested that the large bulk of Member States could just leave the EU, forming an “EU 2.0” copy of it among themselves, with only Poland and Hungary left in the original EU. Such a move would be risky for those who support EU membership in the departing Member States, as the critics of the EU would be given an opportunity to prevent their countries signing up to the new EU, or to demand renegotiation of the current terms of membership.

Article 7(4) TEU then provides that the Council, again by qualified majority, may ‘vary or revoke’ its sanctions against a Member State ‘in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed’. Article 7(5) notes that the rules on voting within the institutions when Article 7 is being applied are set out in Article 354 TFEU. The latter provides that the Member State which is the subject of potential sanctions has no vote at any stage of Article 7, as otherwise this would obviously have made the adoption of any decision on breach of EU values impossible. Abstentions cannot prevent the adoption of a ‘red card’ decision. Where the Council votes to implement a ‘red card’ decision, a higher threshold for adopting EU laws applies (72% of participating Member States in favour, instead of the usual 55%). If a Member State’s voting rights are suspended, the usual rules on Council voting with only some Member States participating apply. For its part, the EP ‘shall act by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of its component Members’.

Finally, Article 269 TFEU significantly limits the role of the CJEU over the sanctions procedure:

The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to decide on the legality of an act adopted by the European Council or by the Council pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union solely at the request of the Member State concerned by a determination of the European Council or of the Council and in respect solely of the procedural stipulations contained in that Article.

 Such a request must be made within one month from the date of such determination. The Court shall rule within one month from the date of the request.

The legal issues

Given the limit on judicial control of the Article 7 process, it is almost entirely political. So the legal questions arising from it may be largely hypothetical in practice. However, they do exist.

The first important point is the wide scope of issues which can be the subject of the Article 7 process. It is sometimes claimed that the process can only be used to sanction Member States for breaches of EU law, but this is clearly false. There is no reference to EU law breaches in Articles 2 or 7. Indeed, such a limit on the scope of Article 7 would be odd, given that Article 269 TFEU limits the Court’s jurisdiction, yet other provisions of the Treaties (discussed further in the second blog post) give the Court extensive jurisdiction over the enforcement of ordinary EU law.

This claim about the limited scope of Article 7 is also absurd if you consider the broader context. Imagine, for instance, a Member State placing LGBT citizens in concentration camps. A narrow interpretation of Article 7 would mean that the EU could only complain about this to the extent that being locked up in camps would have a discriminatory effect on the detainees’ access to employment (ie, an issue definitely within the scope of EU law). Yes it would; but that would hardly be the most outrageous aspect of detaining LGBT people in camps because of their sexual orientation. (EU law is also relevant to LGBT refugees, but the Article 7 process would have to be triggered first for it to be relevant to refugees who are EU citizens).

So obviously Article 7 is not intended to be limited in this way. Indeed, its broad scope partly explains why the CJEU’s jurisdiction is limited – to avoid giving it jurisdiction to rule on issues which are not normally within the scope of EU law. (Another reason is the intention to keep the Article 7 process in the hands of politicians, not judges).

On the other hand, the Article 7 process and ordinary EU law can overlap. The Court can use its ordinary jurisdiction to rule on an issue being discussed in the Article 7 process, and vice versa – for example, in the string of rule of law judgments regarding the Polish courts.

Exactly how does the Court’s limited jurisdiction over Article 7 work? The wording of Article 269 TFEU definitely covers the decisions on the ‘yellow card’ or the ‘red card’. At first sight, it also applies to the implementation of sanctions, since the text refers to any Council actions pursuant to Article 7 TEU. But on this point, the use of the word ‘determination’ is confusing, as Article 7 doesn’t use that word to refer to the implementation of sanctions,  but only the decisions on whether EU values have been (or might be) breached.

Note also that the only possible challenger is the Member State sanctioned under Article 7 – not any other Member State, an EU institution, or an individual or business. If individuals are barred from challenging the validity of Article 7 implementation decisions, even indirectly via national courts to the CJEU, how else can the Council’s obligation to ‘take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons’ be enforced? At any rate, there’s no limit on the Court being asked by national courts to interpret the decisions implementing sanctions, which could be significant in working out the impact of sanctions on individuals. In particular, if Council decisions under Article 7 disapply ordinary EU law in some way, there should be no objection to the Court’s ordinary jurisdiction to interpret such ordinary EU law applying.

A Court judgment under Article 269 TFEU can only address procedural issues, not substance. In other words, the Court cannot be asked to rule on the question of whether the Member State concerned has actually breached EU values (or seriously risks breaching them). As we will see in the second blog post, however, the developing case law on the overlap between Article 7 and ‘ordinary’ EU law renders this firewall a little diffuse. Also, one can imagine that a Member State may make arguments about the fairness of the hearings, even where (as in the case of Poland and Hungary) some hearings have been held (note that the Council's internal rules on Article 7 hearings have been published). Finally, the time limits in Article 269 require significant fast-tracking: the challenge must be made one month after the determination (the usual deadline to bring an action to challenge an EU act is two months after publication) and (uniquely in EU law) one month for the Court to give its ruling.  

Even though Article 7 has not resulted in any sanctions decision yet, the CJEU did address some issues about its scope in 2021, when it ruled on a legal challenge by Hungary to the European Parliament’s decision merely to trigger Article 7. In the Court’s view, the special rules in Article 269 did not exclude a legal challenge to the decision to trigger the process, because those special rules only apply to acts of the Council or European Council. The European Parliament’s resolution had legal effect, because it also triggered the protocol on asylum for EU citizens; therefore it could be challenged (non-binding EU acts, ie with no legal effect, cannot be challenged). Nor did the Court agree with the European Parliament that its resolution was a purely intermediate step.

However, the Court ruled that some aspects of Article 269 did apply to legal actions against the triggering of an Article 7 procedure: only the Member State concerned could bring a challenge, and it could only raise the procedural issues referred to in Article 269, not the substance of whether the body which started the process had wrongly claimed that the Member State was breaching (or risked breaching) EU values to the thresholds set out in Article 7. However, that Member State was entitled to the usual two months to bring the legal action, not the one month referred to in Article 269. Ultimately the Court rejected the Hungarian government’s argument on the merits, finding that European Parliament correctly counted the votes cast (and abstentions) to trigger the Article 7 process.

One key legal and political question is the interpretation of the unanimity requirement to issue a ‘red card’ determination of a serious breach of EU values. Some have suggested that since two Member States are facing Article 7 procedures, and they would have a natural tendency to stick together and vote for each other, unanimity can never be reached. Therefore, for the ‘red card’ procedure to be effective, it must be interpreted to mean that any Member State facing an Article 7 procedure must lose its vote even as regards issuing a ‘red card’ against another Member State.

With respect, this interpretation is untenable. Article 354 TFEU refers to ‘the Member State in question’ not voting in its own case – clearly using the singular, as well as the definite article. There is no way to stretch the canons of interpretation for this to refer to multiple Member States. Such wild leaps of legal fancy are particularly inappropriate when a main point of the process is to ensure protection of the rule of law in the European Union.

Conclusions

Article 7 TEU was conceived as a political process par excellence, and it remains supremely political. Due to its impact on national sovereignty, and the web of transnational partisan politics in which the governments concerned are embedded, Article 7 has long been seen as a ‘nuclear weapon’ – only to be used as a last resort, in a political emergency such as a military coup. Although the attempt to nuance Article 7, by adding a ‘yellow card’ process, dates from 2003, in practice this version of the process is perceived as politically ‘nuclear’ too.

The obvious problem here – which the ‘yellow card’ reform sought but failed to address – is that democracy rarely collapses overnight. In the famous words of Michael Rosen, ‘people think that fascism arrives in fancy dress’, but in fact ‘it arrives as your friend’ – promising to:

…restore your honour, 

make you feel proud, 

protect your house, 

give you a job, 

clean up the neighbourhood, 

remind you of how great you once were, 

clear out the venal and the corrupt, 

remove anything you feel is unlike you...

And to that end, and for those reasons, it often gains a foothold through the democratic process. Yet the values of the EU to be protected also include democracy – and the Article 7 process is in the hands of the governments of fellow Member States. All have some skeletons in their own closet; and all have backs that might need some scratching by the governments of the States being criticised. While recent Hungarian elections have been criticised as undemocratic, Member States seem reluctant to pursue the route of defining what they consider to be acceptable democratic standards and sanctioning other Member States for breaching them.

So is the Article 7 process doomed? In fact, the expansion of EU law in areas with significant relevance to human rights, the willingness of the CJEU to rule on the judicial independence of national courts in general, and the creation of new means to address ‘rule of law’ concerns within the EU budget system means that recourse to the nuclear option may arguably not be necessary. In effect, the conflict over the protection of human rights and the rule of law in Member States can also be fought by conventional means: the ordinary EU law system, discussed in the second blog post.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 9

Photo credit: Steve Peers

How is Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement (citizens' rights) enforceable in the courts?

Professor Tamara Hervey, Natalia Miernik and James C Murphy (UG students), University of Sheffield

The support of the ESRC for Health Governance after Brexit and UK in a Changing Europe is gratefully acknowledged

1. Introduction

Some 3.6 million EU citizens, and their families, live in the UK. An estimated over 185,000 work in the health and social care sector, as highlighted in recent news reports. Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement, on ‘Citizens’ Rights’ gives these people continuity of many of the rights they enjoyed in EU law. This blog post builds on earlier posts on the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020; and the relevant parts of the Withdrawal Agreement itself. It considers what happens if those rights are not upheld. How can people affected enforce the Withdrawal Agreement? This is an important practical consideration: rights on paper without the means to enforce them are meaningless.

The ‘Citizens Rights’ provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement will continue to apply after the end of transition. They give residence rights and rights to access health care, pensions and other social security entitlements. Note, there are equivalent provisions in the EEA/EFTA Separation Agreement and the Swiss Citizens Rights Agreement (which the Withdrawal Agreement Act also gives domestic legal effect to in the UK).

Our focus here is the enforceability of the ‘Citizens Rights’ provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK. The question of their enforceability in EU Member States is a matter of EU law and of domestic constitutional law in each relevant Member State. However, because the Withdrawal Agreement is intended to impose reciprocal obligations (Article 4 (1) WA), where necessary, we also explain the enforceability of those provisions in the EU.

The starting point, which will be the relevant legal position for all instances where the UK brings into domestic law its relevant obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, is the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. This gives power to adopt regulations to implement the Citizens Rights parts of the Withdrawal Agreement. If the UK executive adopts regulations that fully implement the citizens’ rights contained in the Withdrawal Agreement, then enforcing those rights in UK courts or tribunals will be a matter solely of domestic law: a claimant will be relying on rights found in UK regulations.

But what if the UK does not do so adequately? Can a claimant who believes this is the case bring a claim based on an infringement of their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement in UK courts or tribunals?

2. Enforceability of the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK

In EU law, two legal doctrines interact so as to have the effect that certain parts of EU law are enforceable by citizens using their national courts. These doctrines are known as ‘supremacy’ and ‘direct effect’. They are currently (pre the end of transition) recognised by UK courts, and applied accordingly, as required by the European Communities Act 1972.

In order for the Withdrawal Agreement to be enforceable in the UK, that effect must be created by an Act of Parliament. This is necessary because the UK is a ‘dualist’ country, where international treaties are not enforceable in the domestic legal system, unless there is domestic legislation which gives effect to them.

The EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, section 5(1), which inserts a new section 7A into the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, gives domestic legal effect to the Withdrawal Agreement, after the transition period:

‘all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the withdrawal agreement… are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the UK.’

This provision uses very similar wording to the European Communities Act 1972, section 2 (1), which is the part of UK law which gave EU law supremacy and direct effect in the UK legal order.

The supremacy, or primacy, of EU law means that it must be applied in preference to contradictory national law, even if the contradictory national law has been enacted later than the relevant EU law.

2.1 Supremacy

The UK House of Lords case of Factortame confirmed that the 1972 Act gave EU law supremacy in the UK. The House of Lords found that it was required to ‘disapply’ or disregard any domestic legislation that was contrary to European Community law. Lord Bridge’s judgment expressed it thus:

“under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a UK court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law”.

In the same sense, it is possible that section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 will have the same effect in that any domestic provision that contradicts the Withdrawal Agreement will be disregarded. In other words, Parliament may have given the Withdrawal Agreement supremacy in the same way the European Communities Act 1972 gave EU law supremacy.

This seems to be the intention of the Withdrawal Agreement. Its Article 4 (1) provides that the Withdrawal Agreement’s provisions “shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects” as they produce in the EU. Article 4 (2) of the Withdrawal Agreement imposes an explicit obligation on the United Kingdom to secure compliance with this agreement, ‘including as regards the required powers of its judicial and administrative authorities to disapply inconsistent or incompatible domestic provisions, through domestic primary legislation.’ (italics added).

But whether the supremacy of the Withdrawal Agreement, in the sense that contradictory domestic legislation must be ‘disapplied’ is secured by the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, and its amendments to the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 remains moot. It might be argued, for example, that the provisions of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the 2020 Act, represent a Parliamentary intention to free UK courts from the constraints implicit in the supremacy doctrine. The UK would then be in breach of the Withdrawal Agreement, because the Withdrawal Agreement would not have ‘the same legal effect’ in the UK as in the EU. But the remedy for that breach would lie elsewhere than in a claim brought by a citizen relying on a provision of the Withdrawal Agreement as disapplying contradictory national law.

2.2 Direct Effect

Whether the Withdrawal Agreement has the quality of ‘disapplying’ contradictory UK legislation or not, a further crucial question is whether the Withdrawal Agreement contains rights which can be enforced by individuals in UK courts and tribunals, such as the Social Security and Child Support Appeal Tribunals. This quality of EU law is known as ‘direct effect’.

There are two questions to be decided: first, whether the Withdrawal Agreement’s provisions on citizens’ rights have direct effect; and second whether that direct effect is effectively enacted as a matter of domestic law in the UK. The two are inter-related, because, as noted above, the Withdrawal Agreement itself provides that the agreement is to produce ‘the same legal effect’ in the UK as it does in the EU. If the Withdrawal Agreement did not provide for direct effect of the Citizens Rights provisions, then the UK need not effectively enact such direct effect into its domestic legal system.

2.2.1 Direct effect of the citizens’ rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement as a matter of EU law

The Withdrawal Agreement provides in Article 4 (1) that

‘... legal or natural persons shall in particular be able to rely directly on the provisions contained or referred to in this Agreement which meet the conditions for direct effect under Union law’. (italics added)

The term ‘the conditions for direct effect under Union law’ could be interpreted in two ways. Either it means the conditions for direct effect of EU law itself; or it means the conditions for direct effect in EU law of international agreements to which the EU is a party. The wording of Article 4, taken literally, might suggest the latter. Article 4 WA provides for ‘the conditions for direct effect under Union law’, not ‘the conditions for direct effect of Union law’.

EU law itself is directly effective where provisions meet a set of criteria developed by the European Court of Justice in the 1970s and 80s. They are relatively generous: the provision must set out entitlements for the benefit of individuals, and impose direct duties on a Member State authority to protect those entitlements. There is a (controversial, but accepted) presumption that the nature of the EU legal order is such that individuals enjoy enforceable rights within that novel legal order.

By contrast, provisions of international agreements to which the EU is a party are directly effective in a narrower range of circumstances. First, the agreement itself, taken as a whole, in terms of its overall nature and logic, must be capable of granting enforceable rights. Second, the specific provision at issue must contain a sufficiently precise legal obligation. Both conditions must be met. The CJEU’s approach makes a distinction between the novel legal order of EU law, and ‘ordinary’ international law. There is no presumption that provisions of international agreements to which the EU is a party, even if identically worded to provisions of EU law, have direct effect. The CJEU takes account of the political context as a whole: it is not simply a decision based on legal criteria alone.

Which interpretation of Article 4 WA is correct is a moot point, and could be the subject of litigation.

Adopting the former approach would lead to the conclusion that the Citizens’ Rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement have direct effect. The provisions set out entitlements for the benefit of individuals, and impose direct duties on a Member State authority to protect those entitlements. They are worded almost identically to directly effective provisions of EU law.

Adopting the latter approach would, in our view, lead to the same conclusion. But the steps of legal reasoning to reach that conclusion are more complex.

First, taking into account the nature and logic of the Withdrawal Agreement as a whole, is the Agreement such an agreement as capable of creating enforceable rights? It might be argued that the Withdrawal Agreement aims to provide for as smooth an exit from the EU as possible for the UK, but at the same time taking account of what is possible given the nature of the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement must be interpreted taking into account the UK’s position that it seeks to be outside of the control of EU law. The consequent effect of that position is that citizens in an EU-UK cross border situation will cease to enjoy the many benefits of EU membership. In other words, it is in the nature of the Withdrawal Agreement that citizens in a cross-border situation will find themselves worse off after Brexit. An aspect of that consequence could be the lack of enforceability of the Withdrawal Agreement.

But the better argument is that the whole point of the Withdrawal Agreement in this context is to secure the acquired rights of citizens who are in a cross-border position, who have relied in good faith on the ‘safety net’ of EU law, and on the benefits that EU membership had hitherto given those citizens. It is not possible to secure all such rights, as the UK is no longer an EU Member State. But the aim of the Withdrawal Agreement should be understood to be to secure as many such rights and benefits as possible. Therefore, the Withdrawal Agreement should be interpreted to be the type of agreement capable of direct effect. To this argument, we might add that where the EU has intended an agreement not to have direct effect, it has more recently been explicit on the matter, excluding direct effect in the text of the agreement itself, or in the Council Decision which concludes the agreement on behalf of the EU. The EU has emphatically not done so in the case of the Withdrawal Agreement, suggesting an intention that the Agreement taken as a whole is of a type which is capable of direct effect.

Second, what of the requirement that the specific provision at issue must contain a sufficiently precise legal obligation? This is an extraordinarily technical and complex area of EU law, where the CJEU’s approach has been criticized. It is difficult to draw general principles from the CJEU’s case law. Some authors have distinguished between association, cooperation and trade agreements, where the CJEU is more likely to find provisions directly effective, and other types of international agreements to which the EU is a party, where it is less likely to do so. This observation does not help with the Withdrawal Agreement: are we to consider it more similar to an association, cooperation or trade agreement, which all aim to bring closer integration between the parties (whereas the effect of the Withdrawal Agreement is to create divergence) or another type of international agreement?

Turning to the specific measures at issue, the relevant part of the Withdrawal Agreement contains many provisions which provide precise legal obligations, imposing specific duties on national authorities and granting rights to individuals: for instance, Articles 13-28, 31-35, 39 WA all have this quality, especially when combined with the definitional/scope provisions in Articles 9, 10 and 30 WA.

We conclude that, whichever approach is taken, many of the Citizens Rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are directly effective as a matter of EU law.

2.2.2 Direct effect of the citizens’ rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement in UK law

What about the position in UK law?

The starting point here is the interpretative presumption that Parliament intends to implement the obligations on the UK found in the Withdrawal Agreement. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 inserts section 7C into the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which makes this presumption explicit.

7C Interpretation of relevant separation agreement law

(1) Any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any relevant separation agreement law is to be decided, so far as they are applicable—

(a) in accordance with the withdrawal agreement, ... and ...

(2) See (among other things)—

(a) Article 4 of the withdrawal agreement (methods and principles relating to the effect, the implementation and the application of the agreement),

Any question as to, inter alia, the effect of any relevant law is to be decided in accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement. Section 7C refers explicitly to Article 4 WA in this regard.

The national implementation of the obligation to secure the direct effect of relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement is found in section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended. It reads:

7A General implementation of remainder of withdrawal agreement

(1) Subsection (2) applies to—

(a) all such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the withdrawal agreement, and

(b) all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the withdrawal agreement, as in accordance with the withdrawal agreement are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom.

(2) The rights, powers, liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures concerned are to be—

(a) recognised and available in domestic law, and

(b) enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.

(3) Every enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act) is to be read and has effect subject to subsection (2).

This provision, as already noted, is similar to section 2, on ‘General implementation of Treaties’ of the European Communities Act 1972:

(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression “enforceable EU right” and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this subsection applies.

...

(4) The provision that may be made under subsection (2) above includes … any such provision (of any such extent) as might be made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section; ...

Just as section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 secures direct effect of EU law in the UK’s legal system until the end of transition, so sections 7C and 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 secure direct effect of the Withdrawal Agreement after transition.

During the negotiations of the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK government published an (undated) Technical Note which stated that direct effect is a principle specific to EU law and that it will cease to apply in the UK once the UK is no longer a Member State. Moreover, the note contends (para 3) that direct effect is not necessary for individuals to be able to enforce their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement:

‘The same substantive result can be achieved if the Withdrawal Agreement requires the UK to give citizens specified rights, and the UK enacts domestic legislation whose effect is to bestow those rights … EU citizens [will] be able to enforce those rights through the UK’s domestic legal system...’.

We do not agree with the analysis here. A ‘Technical Note’ as part of negotiations can only have a persuasive effect in terms of interpreting the legislative text. As explained above, the better interpretation of the legislation is that it expresses Parliamentary intention to comply with the obligations in the Withdrawal Agreement by granting relevant provisions of that agreement the legal quality of direct effect in UK law.

We note that several influential commentators, for instance, Richard Eccles, of the international law firm Bird & Bird; Emily McKenzie of Brick Court Chambers; and Steve Peers on this blog share our view that relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement have direct effect in the UK post-transition.

2.3 Independent Monitoring Authority

Section 15 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 establishes an Independent Monitoring Authority. Its general duties, laid down by statute, are to ‘promote the adequate and effective implementation and application in the United Kingdom of Part 2 of the withdrawal agreement …’ (schedule 2, section 23 (1)). Further details about the IMA are in schedule 2 of the Act. They include the independence of the authority from government; provisions on membership, including expertise on relevant matters in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; provisions for payment of non-executive members; provisions for staffing; powers to delegate functions.

The IMA is to have powers to carry out inquiries, bring judicial review claims or intervene in judicial proceedings. But it is not obliged to do any of these things. The IMA is to be obliged only to carry out a preliminary review of a complaint brought by a person claiming to have a relevant right, to the effect that the UK has failed to comply with its duties in Part 2 of the Withdrawal Agreement, or a UK public authority has acted in a way which prevents that person from exercising the relevant right.  The preliminary review is so that the IMA may decide whether to carry out an inquiry. In reaching that decision, the IMA is obliged to ‘consider whether it would be more appropriate for the person who made the complaint to deal with its subject matter by other means (for example, court proceedings) than for the IMA to carry out an inquiry’.

The provisions in the 2020 Act conform with the UK’s obligations under Article 159(1) WA. This provision gives such an independent authority the power to: conduct inquiries concerning breaches of Part Two by administrative authorities; receive complaints from Union citizens and their family members for the purposes of conducting inquiries; and bring legal action before UK courts or tribunals following such complaints.

The IMA is to be appointed before the end of the transition period.

According to the government’s information, the Independent Monitoring Authority will report annually to Parliament, and will be sponsored by the Ministry of Justice.

The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 provides that the IMA’s role may be transferred to another authority, by executive act, if this meets the requirements of ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’, taking into account the need for continued operational independence, impartiality and appropriate resourcing to carry out its functions. The government also has the power to abolish the IMA altogether (schedule 2, section 40),

‘if it appears to the Secretary of State that, in accordance with Article 159(3) of the withdrawal agreement ..., it is no longer necessary for the IMA to continue to exist’.

While the IMA, or a successor authority, is operating, those who feel that their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement have not been adequately implemented or upheld by the UK authorities may make a complaint to the independent monitoring authority (IMA). The IMA will then be able to launch an inquiry into how the UK authority has implemented the citizen’s rights under the agreement. If the IMA believes that the UK authority has failed to implement or apply the relevant rights, it has the power to bring legal proceedings against the authority. The IMA will act as the equivalent to the European Commission, which will monitor the implementation and application of citizens’ rights under the Withdrawal Agreement in the EU. This implementation process falls far short of ‘direct effect’.

The independent legal charity, the Public Law Project, has pointed out:

‘The IMA will have a key role in monitoring and protecting EU citizens’ rights after Brexit. As such, the Secretary of State should not be able to make fundamental changes, or even abolish it, by secondary legislation. Any amendments to the IMA must be by primary legislation and in accordance with the WA.’

Reliance by the UK only on this method of enforcement, especially given the executive powers to remove it without external scrutiny, would comply with the UK’s obligations under Article 4 WA, if, and only if, the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement did not have the quality of direct effect, under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement. Given that they do have that quality (see above), we conclude, therefore, that the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 expresses parliamentary intention that the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement are directly effective.

2.4 Joint Committee

The IMA is not the only body that implements the Withdrawal Agreement into UK law. Article 164(1) WA establishes a UK-EU Joint Committee which ‘shall be responsible for the implementation and application of this Agreement’. Moreover, Article 166(1) WA gives the Joint Committee the power to adopt decisions with regards to any matter within this agreement. The effect of such decisions shall be binding on the UK and the Union; they must implement such decisions under international law. While the Joint Committee does not receive complaints about breach of the provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement, it is obliged to assess, no earlier than 8 years after the end of the transition period (31st December 2028) the functioning of the IMA. The Joint Committee even has the power to decide that the UK may abolish the IMA.

The first meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee under the Withdrawal Agreement took place on Monday 30 March 2020 by means of teleconference. The agenda for this meeting included UK / EU updates on implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement on Citizens’ Rights. During this meeting, the vice-president of the European Commission, both ‘welcomed the UK’s commitment to continue to ensure that EU citizens can register as lawful residents in the UK, so that they can enjoy their rights granted by the Withdrawal Agreement’ as well as confirming ‘that the Commission will support Member States in making sure that UK nationals in the EU will be in a position to exercise their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement, and will continue to monitor that this is done correctly.’ Both the UK and the EU agreed to ‘launch the work of the six Specialised Committees on the key areas for the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement.’ The establishment of such Specialised Committees, most importantly the Committee on Citizen’s Rights, can be found in Article 165(1)(a) WA.

2.5 Preliminary Reference Procedure

Another element of the enforcement the Citizens Rights provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement in the UK post-transition is through a preliminary reference procedure. Article 158(1) WA provides that UK courts may refer questions of interpretation of Part 2 to the CJEU where a case commenced within 8 years from the end of the transition period before a UK court or tribunal. The legal effect of this on the UK is to be the same as the legal effect of the preliminary reference procedure governed by Article 267 TFEU (binding on the national court that submitted the question).

This aspect of the Withdrawal Agreement is brought into UK law by section 7C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. This provides that questions about the interpretation, validity or effect of relevant law concerning the Withdrawal Agreement are to be decided in accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement. Section 7C (2)(b) refers explicitly to Article 158 WA and the jurisdiction of the CJEU under Part 2 of the Withdrawal Agreement.

3. Conclusion and summary

Until December 2020, (unless the EU and the UK agree, before July 2020, to extend the period for up to two years) EU law remains applicable. When the transition period ends, the UK’s obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement will take effect in UK law via the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. These measures include the Citizens Rights provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement.

Post-transition, at least five bodies will have a role to play in the enforceability of those rights:

-       The UK executive will implement the UK’s obligations in UK law using statutory instruments, relying on powers given in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020.

-       Also reliant upon these powers, an Independent Monitoring Authority will be set up in the UK to ensure the application and implementation of Part 2 of the Withdrawal Agreement. It will receive complaints from individuals and will have the power to conduct reviews.

-       This part of the Agreement is directly effective, and can be relied upon by individuals before domestic courts and tribunals in the UK.

-       Questions relating to interpretation of these parts of the Withdrawal Agreement may also be determined by the CJEU through a preliminary reference procedure, whereby domestic courts and tribunals refer such questions to the CJEU. 

-       General enforcement of the Withdrawal Agreement will be ensured by the Joint Committee, who will discuss and oversee implementation methods.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Photo credit: Michael Reeve, via Wikimedia Commons

Life’s a ditch – and then you lie: the third extension of EU membership

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

This was the extension that was never meant to happen. Despite the Benn Act (discussed here), requiring the Prime Minister to request a three-month extension of EU membership if a withdrawal agreement was not approved by Parliament by October 19, the Prime Minister said he would “die in a ditch” before he did so. Spurred on by mysterious Downing Street sources, there was endless talk that the Benn Act was unconstitutional, full of loopholes, would be overridden by emergency powers, or violated EU law. Flexing his Hulky legal biceps, Boris Johnson would slay the puny Benn Act with one titanic sunlit spaff. 

Legal commentators queried these claims, but many political journalists (with honourable exceptions) ignored them: what did mere legal commentators know, compared to huge-brained political advisors without any legal background, fresh from an 11-0 Supreme Court defeat? Failing that, some seemed certain that an extension (needing unanimous consent of EU Member States) would be vetoed: the Poles would drown it in vodka; Orban would poison it with goulash; Macron would guillotine it with a single arrogant Gallic shrug.

And yet we have an extension. As Johnson’s hero might say: never in the course of British political history have so many political journalists swallowed so much rancid legal bullshit fed to them by so few dodgy political advisors.

EU law issues

The starting point for discussing extensions of membership is Article 50(3) TEU, which provides, as regards a Member State withdrawing from the EU:

The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

Unanimity can still apply despite abstentions (Article 235 TFEU), and the European Council can, if necessary, act by written procedure (see its Rules of Procedure), as it did in this case. The Member State concerned has to agree to the text of the relevant European Council decision, which was regulated by UK law (see below). There’s no formal role for the European Parliament or national parliaments. Article 50(3) is silent on whether or not there can be multiple extensions, but obviously the EU assumes that this is legally possible.

The first extension decision (discussed here) provided for two variations for extending membership beyond the original Brexit Day of 29 March 2019, depending on whether the House of Commons approved the first version of the withdrawal agreement by that date. Since it did not do so, the first extension lasted until 12 April 2019. The second extension decision (discussed here) lasted until 31 October, provided that the UK held European Parliament elections in May (which it did), although it would have ended earlier if the UK had approved a withdrawal agreement (which it didn’t).

The third extension decision simply provides for what Parliament asked for: a three month extension. The only further detail in the main text is that it mentions earlier Brexit dates, in the event that the withdrawal agreement is ratified earlier.

The preamble to this decision also refers (recital 11) to the regular functioning of the EU, including an obligation of the UK to appoint a Commissioner. This recital also notes that EU law continues to apply more generally to the UK during an extension, and observes that the UK can withdraw its notice of intention to leave the EU. There’s also a general reminder of the EU law principle of ‘sincere cooperation’, and a specific version of that for a withdrawing Member State:

The European Council recalls the commitment by the United Kingdom to act in a constructive and responsible manner throughout the extension period in accordance with the duty of sincere cooperation, and expects the United Kingdom to fulfil this commitment and Treaty obligation in a manner that reflects its situation as a withdrawing Member State.  

All of this also appeared in the preamble to the second extension decision, except the reference to appointment of a Commissioner, which was not an imminent issue at that time.

Recital 9 in the preamble refers to facilitating ratification of the withdrawal agreement, but other extension decisions referred to this too. Recital 12 notes that appointments made by the UK cease on Brexit day, but this simply restates the consequences of withdrawal (as the second extension decision noted already). Recital 13 states that the withdrawal agreement cannot be reopened – but then the second extension decision said the same thing, and the EU nevertheless agreed to renegotiate. This recital also says, like the second extension decision, that this is not an opportunity to start negotiating the future relationship. It also provides, as with the previous extension, that ‘[a]ny unilateral commitment, statement or other act by the United Kingdom should be compatible with the letter and the spirit of the Withdrawal Agreement, and must not hamper its implementation.’ One novel point, though: recital 8 notes that there’s discussion of a possible election in the UK.

There’s also a parallel declaration by the European Council, but it simply rehashes the preamble of the extension decision.

UK law

As noted above, the Benn Act required the Prime Minister to apply for an extension of three months if no withdrawal agreement was approved by October 19. He duly did so (albeit without signature, and in conjunction with other letters: the EU ignored this), after parliament voted to defer consideration of the revised withdrawal agreement (discussed here) in order to spend more time considering the proposed withdrawal agreement bill (discussed here). Although the Benn Act permits the Prime Minister to withdraw or amend the request if a withdrawal agreement is approved after October 19, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled that a fresh attempt to vote on the withdrawal agreement was inadmissible, and Parliament later voted not to consider the bill over only a handful of days, making the October 31 deadline unfeasible – although the bill itself has passed second reading).

The Benn Act also required the Prime Minister to accept an extension decision once the EU adopted it, although if the date differed from three months then it was possible that Parliament could vote down the decision. To this end, the Prime Minister has accepted the EU decision. UK law is automatically updated to change the definition of ‘exit day’, according to another provision of the Act. (Update, October 30: the relevant secondary legislation to change 'exit day' has now been adopted.)

Due to doubts about the Prime Minister’s willingness to give effect to his obligations under the Act, two separate legal challenges were brought seeking its enforcement. In Scotland, the first instance court ruled that the challenge was premature, although on appeal the judges decided to hold the challenge in limbo to see if the Prime Minister would send an extension request if required, and subsequently to keep the challenge in limbo to see if he accepted an extension decision. In England, the High Court decided that the action was premature, and the Court of Appeal agreed. In separate proceedings, a challenge to bringing the revised withdrawal agreement before Parliament (on the grounds that the customs arrangements in the revised agreements breached previous legislation) was unsuccessful.

Comments

The reference to early termination dates if the withdrawal agreement is ratified simply states the law. As noted in the preamble to this extension decision (recital 10), this is inherent in the text of Article 50(3), as set out above, given that the agreement itself comes into force either on the first day of the month after both sides ratify it, or another date as specified in an extension decision. But there’s no other date set in this extension decision.

As for unilateral revocation of the notification of the intention to leave the EU unilaterally, this simply follows CJEU case law (see the Wightman judgment). Similarly, the point about the UK retaining obligations as a Member State reiterates a principle established in two earlier CJEU rulings (discussed here and here), and also noted in Wightman as regards extensions.

As for the appointment of a Commissioner, this is less urgent than it would have been since the new Commission is delayed taking office on the usual date (November 1) for unrelated reasons. I discussed the legal issues further in an earlier blog post on the Benn Act, but it’s striking that the third extension decision does not make appointment of a Commissioner a condition of granting the extension – unlike the second extension decision, which was dependent on the UK holding elections to the European Parliament.  Equally, while the preamble to the latest decision mentions the possibility of elections in the UK, the extension is not dependent upon them (although that prospect may have tipped the balance in convincing the French government to support a longer extension).

Ultimately it seems likely at time of writing that the UK’s relationship with the EU will be decided by a December election: a choice between the withdrawal agreement (the Conservative party), a no deal outcome (Brexit party), revocation of the notification (the Liberal Democrats), renegotiation followed by a referendum with an option to remain (Labour), or rejection of Brexit plus support for Scottish independence (the SNP), among other parties. A renegotiation and referendum would necessarily require a further extension; the other scenarios would not. So the next word falls to the public. We’ll see if this is decisive one way or the other.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 27

Photo credit: Indiana Watershed Initiative, via Wikicommons