Salvation outside the church? The ECJ rules on religious discrimination in employment

Dr Ronan McCrea, Senior Lecturer in Law, University College London

Background

The Court of Justice has issued its first major ruling on the reconciliation of the autonomy rights of religious organisations with the right of employees (or potential employees) of such organisations to be free of discrimination.

In 2012 Vera Egenberger applied for a fixed term post advertised by the Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung, which is a body associated with the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (a German Protestant church). The post advertised sought a person who could prepare a report on Germany’s compliance with the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Ms. Egenberger had significant experience in this area and applied for the post. However, there was a problem. Ms. Egenberger is a person who does not have a religious faith and the relevant advert included the following statement:

‘We require membership of a Protestant church, or of a church which is a member of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Christlicher Kirchen in Deutschland (Cooperative of Christian Churches in Germany), and identification with the welfare mission. Please state your membership in your curriculum vitae.’

Ms. Egenberger was not called for interview. She took a case in the German courts alleging discrimination on grounds of religion.

As discrimination in employment on grounds of religion is regulated by EU law, in the form of Directive 2000/78 (which also bans discrimination on grounds of disability, age or sexual orientation in employment), when the case came before the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) it decided to make a reference to the Court of Justice to clarify the interpretation of EU law. The key issue in the reference was whether the scope of the exemption from the duty not to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief granted by German law to religious organisations was compatible with Directive 2000/78.

The issue of exemptions from the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of religion for religious employers is addressed by Article 4(2) of the Directive which states:

‘…. in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment based on a person's religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person's religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation's ethos. This difference of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground.’ (emphasis added).

The relevant German law implementing the directive provided that:

‘….a difference in treatment based on religion or belief shall also be admitted in the case of employment by religious societies, by institutions affiliated therewith, regardless of legal form, or by associations whose purpose is to foster a religion or belief in the community, where a given religion or belief constitutes a justified occupational requirement, having regard to the employer’s own perception, in view of the employer’s right of autonomy or by reason of the nature of its activities.’ (paragraph 9(1) of the Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, emphasis added).

This legislation, has been interpreted in the light of the German constitutional guarantee that states:

‘Religious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently within the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer their offices without the involvement of central government or local authorities.’ (Grundgesetz Article 140).

This has meant that the consistent approach of the German courts has been that the decision as to whether a particular role within a religious organization needs to be limited to those of a particular faith was for the religious employer to take. The role of the courts has been limited to plausibility review, on the basis of a religion’s self-conception defined by belief.

The national court harboured doubts as to whether the approach of German law in allowing the religious employer to determine for itself, subject only to plausibility review by the courts, whether its beliefs required a particular role to be reserved to those of a particular faith, was compatible with the directive and therefore made a reference to the Court of Justice under Article 267.

The Ruling: A More Balanced Approach Needed

The Court of Justice’s ruling made it clear that German law had gone too far by allowing such a wide scope for religious employers to determine for themselves whether a particular job could be reserved to those of a particular faith.

It noted that Article 4(2) of the Directive allowed the discrimination on grounds of religion only if having regard to the nature of the activity concerned or the context in which it is carried out, ‘religion or belief constitute[s] a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos’ and concluded that:

‘if review of compliance with those criteria were, in the event of doubt as to that compliance, the task not of an independent authority such as a national court but of the church or organisation intending to practise a difference of treatment on grounds of religion or belief, [this provision of the Directive] would be deprived of effect.’

Interestingly, although the employer had cited both the guarantee of freedom of religion or belief (Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that the Union ‘The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States’, the Court also relied heavily on constitutional principles to bolster its conclusion that excessive leeway had been granted to religious employers by German law.

The Court noted that Directive 2000/78 was merely a ‘specific expression, in the field covered by it, of the general prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 21 of the Charter’ (which sets out a general ban on discrimination). It also noted that that when an individual establishes before a national court facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination then, under Article 10 of the Directive, it is for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of that principle. Thus, the need under Article 47 of the Charter to provide effective judicial protection of EU law rights meant that restricting the ability of the national courts to review the decision of an employer to impose a discriminatory requirement would be contrary to EU law.

Next, the Court held that the objective of Article 4(2) of the Directive was to ensure “a fair balance” between the autonomy rights of religious organisations and the right of workers to be free from discrimination. The Directive “sets out the criteria to be taken into account in the balancing exercise” and in the event of a dispute it must be possible for the balancing exercise to be reviewed by a national court. For the Court, the commitment to respecting the status of religious organisations in Article 17 of the Treaty could not change this conclusion.

That article’s function was:

‘to express the neutrality of the European Union towards the organization by the Member States of their relations with churches and religious associations and communities […] [and] is not such as to exempt compliance with the criteria set out in Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78 from effective judicial review.’

Guidance on the Test to Be Applied

Having found that the German legislation was not compatible with the Directive the Court then had to address two further interesting issues. First, it had to give guidance to the national court on the question of how the ‘fair balancing’ ought to be carried out and then it had to advise on how to implement the consequences of its finding in the case.

In relation to how to carry out the ‘fair balancing’ the Court had to walk a tightrope. It acknowledged that under ECHR case law, states are precluded from assessing the legitimacy of the beliefs of a religious organization. However, it also had to ensure that the imposition of an occupational requirement relating to religion or belief was, in the words of the Directive ‘genuine, legitimate and justified, having regard to [the] ethos [of the religious employer]’. Thus it had to decide how to recognize the necessarily subjective requirements of the ethos of the employer, with the seemingly objective requirements of the ‘genuine, legitimate and justified’ test.

The Court adopted an approach that is significantly more objective than the approach taken in German law. It set out a test under which religious organisations must show an ’objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned.’ Thus, in order to meet Article 4(2)’s requirements that the difference in treatment on grounds of religion be ‘genuine, legitimate and justified’ the Court held that:

‘To be considered ‘genuine’: ‘professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded must appear necessary because of the importance of the occupational activity in question for the manifestation of that ethos or the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.’

To be considered ‘legitimate’ it found that the national court must ‘ensure that the requirement of professing the religion or belief on which the ethos of the church or organisation is founded is not used to pursue an aim that has no connection with that ethos or with the exercise by the church or organisation of its right of autonomy.’

And to be considered justified the CJEU set down that ‘the church or organisation imposing the requirement is obliged to show, in the light of the factual circumstances of the case, that the supposed risk of causing harm to its ethos or to its right of autonomy is probable and substantial, so that imposing such a requirement is indeed necessary.’

Finally, although a proportionality requirement is not included in the text of Article 4(2) (and is included in other Articles of the Directive), the Court held that as proportionality is a general principle of EU law, the exemption given by Article 4(2) is to be read as being subject to a proportionality requirement.

Applying the Ruling

Given the possibility of a clash between German law and the requirements of the Directive the German court asked for guidance on how it should proceed if it proved impossible to interpret domestic law so as to comply with the Directive (bearing in mind the contra legem exception in the Marleasing line of case-law on the indirect effect of Directives; ie a national court cannot be required to interpret national law consistently with a Directive to the extent of ignoring the express wording of national law).

The Court seemed to doubt that an interpretation consistent with EU law was impossible, noting that the duty to interpret national law consistently with EU law included a duty for national courts ‘to change their established case-law where necessary’ (referring to the DI judgment on age discrimination, discussed here). However, it went on to say that should consistent interpretation prove impossible then the Court should disapply national law and give effect to the relevant EU law rights itself.

It justified this position on the basis that Directive 2000/78 did not establish the right to equal treatment. Rather it sets out a framework for combatting discrimination on various grounds. The right to equal treatment is, the Court held, a general principle of law and is enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter. Given that Article 47 of the Charter requires that adequate judicial protection be given to such rights, national courts have to ensure ‘the judicial protection deriving for individuals from Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter and to guarantee the full effectiveness of those articles by disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national law.’ This develops earlier case law on the issue of when the Charter itself does (and does not) have direct effect, in particular the AMS case discussed here; and it confirms the UK case law on the direct effect of Article 47 (Vidal-Hall and Benkharbouche, discussed here and here).

Conclusion

The Court of Justice has given a notably constitutionalized interpretation of the Directive in this case. It has relied on the Charter and general principles of law to read a proportionality test into Article 4(2) that did not appear in the text. It has insisted on proportionality as the framework within which the ‘fair balancing’ of the autonomy rights of religious employers and equal treatment rights of employees must take place.

This approach is in tension with recent trends in the caselaw of the Strasbourg Court. In cases such as Fernandez Martinez v Spain, the Court of Human Rights had moved away somewhat from the balancing of rights seen in its earlier caselaw and had moved closer to the ‘ministerial exemption’ model used in the United States, under which religious organisations have an absolute exemption from non-discrimination laws in respect of roles that include religious functions. Given the strong emphasis placed on proportionality by the EU legal order, unsurprisingly, in Egenberger, the Court of Justice has clearly come down in favour of the balancing approach (see R. McCrea “Singing from the Same Hymn Sheet? What the Differences between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts Tell Us about Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination and the Secular State” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2016) 5(2) 183-210, 198-99).

The Court’s insistence that EU non-discrimination law merely codifies a self-executing (and horizontally directly effective) constitutional general principle of non-discrimination law represents a continuation of the controversial line of cases beginning in Mangold which has attracted significant criticism, including from national courts given the potential for legal uncertainty that such an approach involves. Here, the Court of Justice has made it clear that the EU’s constitutional commitment to proportionality means that religious bodies may only impose discriminatory conditions on employees when it is proportionate to do so and national courts must be empowered to ensure religious employers do not exercise their right to discriminate in a disproportionate way.

This is in tension with the approach adopted by the German legislature which, in the light of German constitutional guarantees of religious autonomy, gave very restricted powers to the courts to second guess the decisions of religious bodies in this way. Given that EU and German constitutional norms appear to be in tension with each other in this way it will be interesting to see how this ruling is applied by the national court. The German constitutional provisions on religious autonomy go all the way back to the Weimar constitution and are taken very seriously, though it may be an exaggeration to view them as constituting the kind of core ‘constitutional identity’ that might trigger a refusal by the German courts to give primacy to EU law.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 9, chapter 20

Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons

Civil liability for Internet publishing: the CJEU clarifies the law

Professor Lorna Woods, co-author of Steiner & Woods, EU Law

Introduction

Yesterday’s CJEU judgment in Papasavvas is the most recent in a line of cases seeking to trace the edges of the concept of ‘intermediary’ for the purposes of EU information technology law, a question that has become rather more problematic than when the eCommerce Directive was first drafted in 2000. Then, the role of intermediaries was much more technical and related to transmission and technical access. Since then the market has moved on with the development of many services that are now viewed as important for the access and use of content on the Internet. Many of these services blur the boundaries between transmission services and content services. To what extent are those services neutral intermediaries? While in many respects this case could be seen as quite straightforward, it hints at still yet unresolved questions and highlights difficulties about reliance on EU law in national courts.

Facts

Mr Papasavvas (‘P’) brought an action for defamation in respect of articles published in the daily national newspaper O Fileleftheros, on 7 November 2010, which were published online on two websites. He sought damages and an injunction. The national court referred the following questions:

(1)      Bearing in mind that the laws of the Member States on defamation affect the capacity to provide information services by electronic means both at national level and within the European Union, might those laws be regarded as restrictions on the provision of information services for the purposes of applying Directive 2000/31 …?

(2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, do the provisions of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31 …, on the question of liability, apply to private civil matters, such as civil liability for defamation, or are they limited to civil liability in matters concerning business to consumer transactions?

(3)      Bearing in mind the purpose of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31 … relating to the liability of information society service providers and the fact that, in many Member States, an action must exist in order for a prohibitory injunction to be granted which will remain in force pending full completion of the proceedings, do those articles create individual rights which may be pleaded as defences in law in a civil action for defamation, or must they operate as an obstacle in law to the bringing of such actions?

(4)      Do the definitions of “information society service” and “service provider” in Article 2 of Directive 2000/31 … and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 … cover online information services the remuneration for which is provided not directly by the recipient, but indirectly by means of commercial advertisements posted on the website?

(5)      Bearing in mind the definition of “information service provider”, laid down in Article 2 of Directive 2000/31/EC and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34 … could the following, or any of them, be regarded as a “mere conduit” or “caching” or “hosting” for the purposes of Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Directive 2000/31:

(a)      a newspaper that operates a free website on which the online version of the printed newspaper, with all its articles and advertisements, is posted in pdf format or another similar electronic format;

(b)      an online newspaper which is freely accessible but the provider obtains money from commercial advertisements posted on the website, where the information contained in the online newspaper comes from the newspaper’s staff and/or freelance journalists;

(c)      a website which provides (a) or (b) above for a subscription?’

Judgment

The Court dealt first with queries raised regarding admissibility.  P raised questions about timing: the proceedings at national level are at an early stage, to the point that the defendants in the national action have not yet filed a defence.  On this basis, P argued that the questions referred must be hypothetical as the nature of the dispute had not yet been defined. The Court did not address this argument directly but instead stated that ‘the description of the legal and factual framework of the proceedings in the order for reference seems to suffice so as to permit the Court to make a ruling’. 

P had also argued that the defendants did not fall within the scope of the e-Commerce directive and therefore questions relating to its interpretation were unnecessary. This is of course a little circular and the Court rejected the argument, pointing out that the scope of the Directive and the applicability to the defendants was one of the main issues that needed to be resolved. Having determined that, the Court re-ordered the questions referred and started with question 4 on the application of the Directive.

The Court reformulated the question, asking whether ‘information society services’ (ISS) as defined in the directive ‘covers the provision of online information services for which the service provider is remunerated not by the recipient, but by income generated by advertisements posted on a website (para 26).’ The Court re-iterated that the definition of ISS has four elements:

·         ‘normally provided for remuneration’;

·         at a distance;

·         by electronic means; and

·         at the individual request of a recipient of services.

The final three seemed non-contentious, but what concerned the national court was the issue of remuneration, as the user did not pay to access the website.  The Court then referred to recital 18 of the Directive, which expressly excludes the possibility that a service will fall outside the directive merely because payment is indirect.  In this there is a similarity to the CJEU’s reasoning in Bond van Adverteerders and Others (paragraph 16).

Having determined that the directive could apply to information services such as those in issue here, the Court then considered question 1 in which the referring court is effectively asking whether the directive precludes the application of rules of civil liability for defamation to ISS providers.  The directive applies the principle of home country rule to service providers, with the corollary that Member States should not impose additional rules on services coming from other Member States.  Given that the defendants in the domestic proceedings were based in the same Member State as P, the issue of whether the civil defamation rules constituted a restriction did not apply, though the Court noted that such rules fall within the scope of the directive (at Article 2(h)).

The Court then went on to consider whether the defendants could benefit from the intermediary immunity provisions in Articles 12-14 of the Directive. The Court considered the role of these provisions, and relying on its reasoning in Google France and Google  (paragraph 113) and L’Oréal and Others (paragraph 113) stated that they applied to intermediaries and activities which are of ‘a merely technical, automatic and passive nature’, that the ISS provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored and takes a neutral approach to content. The Court highlighted factors such as assisting clients in drafting commercial messages, or in optimising presentation of content.  It concluded:

Consequently, since a newspaper publishing company which posts an online version of a newspaper on its website has, in principle, knowledge about the information which it posts and exercises control over that information, it cannot be considered to be an ‘intermediary service provider’ within the meaning of Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31, whether or not access to that website is free of charge. [45]

So, in such a circumstance, a newspaper cannot claim exemption from civil liability.  Given this answer, it was not apparent that the Court needed to address question (2). Nonetheless, it confirmed that it made no difference whether the case involved business to consumer or consumer to consumer cases. [50]

The final issues dealt with were those raised by question (3), though again the Court noted that answers to this question might not be necessary given that Articles 12-14 did not apply.  The Court summarised this question as asking whether Articles 12-14 preclude the adoption of interim measures (such as the injunction prohibiting publication) or whether those articles create individual rights which the ISS provider may plead as defences in law in the context of legal proceedings such as those in the main proceedings. As regards the first element, the Court noted that – subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, matters as to conditions under which remedies might be available were matters for national law. [53]

The second element effectively concerns the direct effect of the immunity provisions: can they be relied on in the context of a dispute between private parties. The Court returned to the general case law on horizontal direct effect of directives, arguing that ‘with regard to proceedings between individuals, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the Court has consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual’ [54] but that indirect effect/doctrine of consistent interpretation from Von Colson would apply. [56]

Comment

While this case at the headline level came to the right answer - people who write or (first) publish content on the Internet are not intermediaries - the case raises a couple of issues worth pondering further.

First off, there was no Advocate-General’s opinion.  Querying this might seem churlish, given that I’ve just said the Court got to the right answer, and on the facts the judgment is a straightforward application of the Court’s existing law on Articles 12-14 in Google and L’Oreal.  It is, however, a sensitive area: currently a case, Delphi, concerning a news site and the self-same provisions is awaiting a judgment from the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on whether there was a breach of freedom of expression in finding the journalists liable for defamation (see the Chamber judgment here).  While there is a crucial factual difference between the two cases (Delphi concerns liability for user generated content, not journalism), it is noteworthy that although Recital 9 recognises the significance of ISS for freedom of expression, Papsavvas did not even consider whether there was a freedom of expression argument in issue.

To some extent most of the questions referred by the national court seem to reflect a lack of familiarity with the internal market system generally. So, the application of the rules in this case might seem straightforward, but they might not always be so.  While it should come as no surprise that national rules imposing civil liability on a service ‘import’ could be a restriction, nor that ‘home’ regulation should not be circumvented by reliance on provisions aimed at cross-border services, the determination of the place of establishment may in itself be problematic, as cases on cross-border television services have shown.  The eCommerce Directive seems to refer to the Court’s general case law on this point (Article 2(c), Recital 19): the Court accept the establishment point as proven here in Papasavvas. 

There is a risk of forum shopping and, by contrast to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (which deals with television), the eCommerce Directive has no ‘anti-abuse’ clause, although Member States may derogate on limited grounds (article 3(4), Recital 24). In this case, the Court did not address the question of whether rules relating to defamation could be seen as being justified under the protection of human dignity in Article 3(4)(a)(i).  Of course, a system which allows or even encourages delocalisation to another Member State has the consequence of adversely affecting would be plaintiffs under the national rules, especially private persons and small businesses. Even in rules of conflicts allow action in the injured party’s home state, there may be questions as to applicable law in the light of the home country regulatory principle (see eDate and Martinez). So, while the eCommerce Directive claimed not to affect rules on conflicts of law (Article 1(4)), there is an interrelationship there and one which may affect the effectiveness of remedies for users. 

Similarly, and as the Court itself noted, remuneration has typically been widely interpreted.  The Court referred to Bond van Adverteerders, a case concerning free-to-air commercial television – a set-up which has clear parallels with free to user internet services.  In its case law on Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services), the Court has gone further, even suggesting (in Deliege) that an amateur judoka was remunerated because she took part in competitions which carried advertising and which were televised.  Essentially the Court seemed to be saying, ‘there’s money there somewhere….’. Of course, there will be hard questions in some cases- ‘amateur’ content available freely: is that an ISS, and does the answer to the question change if the platform carries advertising entirely separately? In Delphi, it was the user generated content that was problematic. This question did not arise, however, as it was the underlying website that was sued, and it clearly was a commercial entity for the same reason that the newspaper in Papasavvas was.

Perhaps the interesting questions are those which deal with the interface between the immunity provisions and national law.  The purpose of these provisions is to encourage the development of the digital environment, particularly cross border services (recital 40). It should therefore make no difference if the service the intermediary carries is between businesses, or business to consumer, as indeed the Court ruled. The national court also questioned whether injunctions were permissible. The Court handed this one off to national procedural autonomy, but it is arguable that the terms of the directive suggest that injunctions are in principle permissible: each of the intermediary exceptions state that the exemption from liability does not affect the possibility of the Member State’s legal system requiring the intermediary to terminate the offending activity.

Finally, we come to the question of whether intermediaries can rely on the exemption directly before national courts: in effect, do these provisions have horizontal direct effect? The Court dealt with this by returning to basic principles precluding such an effect, but in doing so it argued that Union law precludes the imposition of an obligation on an individual. Of course, in this case the directive is not imposing an obligation on an individual but rather removing it. In this sense, although for different reasons, the position is closer to that in cases such as CIA Security International or even Wells, where a national obligation is disapplied. This area of law is problematic generally. Suffice it to note here that this approach knocks a potentially large hole in the protection of intermediaries if the Member State has not implemented, or not implemented correctly, indirect effect notwithstanding.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 6, chapter 14