Chloé Berthélémy, EDRi and Jesper Lund, IT-Pol Denmark
Photo: copyright Raimond Spekking / CC BY-SA 4.0 (via Wikimedia Commons)
Background of the Belgian case
On 3 September 2026, the Advocate General (AG) Szpunar of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) released his opinion in case C-661/24, Académie Fiscale and Others, which questions the compliance of the new Belgian data retention regime with EU privacy standards.
Belgium’s data retention history is a rocky one. Its two previous data laws were annulled following CJEU judgments, respectively in 2014 and 2020. The latest one, adopted in 2022, is currently facing a new legal challenge, brought by Belgian civil society organisations including EDRi member Liga voor Mensenrechten.
In 2024, the Belgian Constitutional Court validated most of the new data retention legal framework, including the legal provisions pertaining to targeted data retention based on geographical areas. However, the data retention net is only “targeted” in name because the criteria chosen by the government factually cover almost the entire country. Sadly, it is a missed opportunity for the CJEU to examine one of the first implementation attempts by a Member State of its jurisprudence prescribing targeted retention for traffic and location data.
The case in front of the CJEU therefore focuses only on the articles establishing retention obligations and permissions for internet companies to detect fraud or security breach on their networks or services. While the AG suggests to find the Belgian law incompatible with EU law for its lack of clarity, preciseness and safeguards, he also takes the chance to expand his vision for an “necessary development” of the case-law on data retention. It is not his first time doing this. In a previous landmark case, he had already successfully pushed for a change of jurisprudence, arguing it should be more “pragmatic” and “nuanced” since Member States refuse to apply it. Once again, the AG proposes to weaken the privacy standards established by the CJEU since 2014 in order to allow the mass retention of all traffic and location data for the purposes of law enforcement.
This blogpost analyses the AG’s argumentation and warns the CJEU against following his advice if it wants to remain true to its mission of safeguarding and upholding EU legal protections.
Recap of existing case-law
The CJEU annulled the EU’s Data Retention Directive in 2014 on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and since then has declared any legislation which mandates the general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data by communications service providers as a preventive measure for combatting crime to be against EU law.
In 2020, the Court started to cave in to certain Member States’ demands and accepted that general and indiscriminate retention of all metadata was allowed when a Member States is confronted with a genuine, present or foreseeable threats to national security. It further permitted retention of all source IP addresses for a period that is limited in time to what is strictly necessary for combating serious crime. Lastly, it confirmed that civil identity data can be retained in a generalised manner for all criminal offences, as this retention is not considered a serious interference. As a result, the Court created a hierarchy of purposes for which data retention is acceptable (i.e. from safeguarding national security to fighting ordinary crime), depending on the degree of seriousness of the interference with rights entailed. The way to determine how serious the interference is depends on the sensitivity of the data and the possibility to reconstruct a precise profile of individuals from those data.
In light of the new AG opinion, it is worth highlighting that the Court always held that retention of data and access to that data are separate interferences. Whether the retained data is actually accessed is irrelevant for the assessment of the interference that retention of data constitutes. Furthermore, it constantly reaffirmed the need to subject law enforcement access to retained data to strict safeguards.
In the more recent HADOPI case, an additional “nuance” was introduced: the mass retention of source IP addresses can be justified by the objective of fighting criminal offences in general – not just serious ones - if the national law requires watertight separation between source IP addresses and other data. By separating them from the rest, the CJEU argues that the interference with rights becomes non-serious. This case-law “adaptation” was justified by the alleged risk of failing to systematically identify suspects of online crime.
More concerns about implementation than fundamental rights
In his opinion, the AG shares his analysis of the pitfalls of the Court’s current jurisprudence. He notes that, as a result of the case law since 2020, service providers are forced to maintain multiple sets of retained data, one for each objective of the retention (i.e. national security, serious crime, non-serious crime), which comes with heightened risks of breach or misuse (points 68-76).
In France and Denmark, data retention for national security has become de facto permanent, even though the Court arguably intended this as an exceptional measure in the 2020 judgment. This practice exacerbates the problems with multiple partially overlapping datasets and the AG fears it is too burdensome for internet companies.
While blaming the impracticability of the case-law and the resulting technical burden placed on companies, the AG fails to reconsider the origin of the problem: the slow but steady weakening of the building blocks of a jurisprudence designed to protect people’s rights and freedoms. Conditional retention rules, including some tailor-made to the functioning of specific surveillance systems like the French HADOPI, have created a lot of legal uncertainty both for law enforcement and people affected.
Things could be simpler. However there are radically diverging ways to solve these intricacies. The AG suggests to simplify the jurisprudence but he does so by dropping privacy standards, crucially forgetting the CJEU’s key role in giving direct effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Solution to the data retention implementation impasse?
In points 84-94, the AG takes the view that general and indiscriminate data retention should not be ruled out merely because it pursues the objective of combatting crime. The Commission and Member States have argued for this since the first data retention case in 2014, but the Court has consistently rejected their arguments that safeguards for access to retained data could make general and indiscriminate data retention a lawful measure for combatting crime.
The main justification presented by the AG is to extend the “watertight separation” principle in the HADOPI judgment to all traffic and location data. The AG hypothesises that if the data retention regime is subject to “arrangements governing the structuring of the retention of those data”, the resulting interference with fundamental rights remains proportionate (point 84).
By assuming that technology can always solve legal and societal problems when needed, the AG takes a classic technosolutionist approach. Typical for this approach is that the mere assumption often substitutes for concrete evidence that technology can actually do what is claimed. The purpose of watertight separation is to prevent the retained data from being linked with other data, whereby intrusive profiles of the individual’s behaviour can be established. Whilst it may be conceptually possible to prevent retained source IP addresses from being linked with the user’s complete clickstream (internet behaviour), extending the watertight separation principle to all traffic and location data seems to present insurmountable technical obstacles. Mostly because the retained traffic and location data is high-dimensional and contains in itself (without being linked with other data) a detailed profile about the social connections of the person, their places of residence and daily movements. Indeed, the Court has emphasised this deeply sensitive nature of traffic and location data in previous judgments (C-511/18, para 117).
In addition, the AG proposes strengthened conditions governing access to retained data, as well as shifting the focus to assessing the interference with fundamental rights resulting from access to the retained data (points 86-87). This is a different justification than limiting the retention interference through technical measures, but one that directly conflicts with the Court’s established case law of viewing data retention and access to retained data as separate interferences.
Flawed reasoning
The reasoning of the AG for a renewed interpretation of Article 15(1) of the ePrivacy Directive is flawed in several ways.
First, the AG argues that the Court already “implicitly” permitted general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data in specifically defined geographical areas. This is ontologically contradictory as, by definition, a targeted data retention regime, where some areas are subjected and others not, cannot be general and indiscriminate – otherwise it would cover the entire jurisdiction without differentiation.
Second, the ePrivacy Directive requires the retention of data to be the exception and not the rule (Tele2 Sverige, pt. 104). The AG’s new interpretation would fundamentally go against the Directive’s core principle and spirit.
Third, the necessity criterion is completely ignored by the AG. It is worth reminding the AG that there is still no reliable evidence that the mass data retention actually contributes to the reduction of crime in society. Relying on Europol and Eurojust reports and a European Police Chiefs political statement (AG opinion, footnotes 45 and 47) to justify necessity can under no circumstance amount to objective evidence. Moreover, there is actually more data available to law enforcement than ever before due to today’s surveillance capitalist business models.
Fourth, the impacts of general and indiscriminate data retention on fundamental rights the Court described more than ten years ago remain valid today. Data is retained about innocent people. Critically, persons under an obligation of professional secrecy such as lawyers and medical professionals are also affected by data retention. This breach of professional secrecy is detrimental for the right to a fair trial and may prevent people from seeking the medical assistance they need.
It is extremely worrying that the AG ignores these fundamental aspects in order to accommodate the security agenda of the Commission and other law enforcement actors. The AG’s opinions are not binding but usually influence the final judgments of the CJEU, which will be issued in the coming months. EDRi will be following the development of this case.

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