Tom Serby, Senior Lecturer in
Law, Anglia Law School, Anglia Ruskin University
There is a growing epidemic of
betting related match fixing in sport. To address it, the Council of Europe recently
opened for signature a Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.
However, Malta has asked the CJEU to rule on whether this treaty offends
against the rules of the internal market, specifically freedom to provide
services. This legal challenge highlights the difficulty in obtaining
international agreement on how best to fight the match fixing.
The first 15 countries,
including Russia and Germany, as well as six other EU Member States (Bulgaria,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Lithuania and Netherlands) signed up to the
Convention as soon as it was open for signature, on September 18th
2014; Malta’s is a lone voice in opposition. UEFA and the IOC (the Olympic
movement) back the Convention but the associations of regulated European
bookmakers are more guarded, sharing some of Malta’s concerns.
Match fixing, which the
Convention addresses, has moved up the agenda for sports governing bodies,
national governments and the the European Commission (which has funded various
studies into it), in the wake of the scandals over the last decade which have
affected in particular, but not only, the sports of football and cricket.
The growth in betting related
match fixing, (or “spot fixing” where an event within a match is fixed rather
than the overall result), is well known to anyone with only a passing interest
in sport. The rise in this corrupt “manipulation” of sport, where athletes take
bribes to underperform in order to facilitate winning on betting, has been
fuelled by the huge rise in both licensed and unlicensed online gambling.
INTERPOL investigations have proved that much of the fixing is at the behest of
international (particularly from Asia where betting is often illegal) criminal
gangs and is used for Money laundering purposes. The infamous Calcioscommesse football scandal for instance, was financed out of
Singapore, the corruptors acted in Italy, bets were placed all over Asia, and money
proceeds were laundered through Panama.
Manipulation or fixing is very
difficult to detect, and thus to prevent, as it crosses jurisdictions and is
largely the result of online activity. Sports governing bodies have
acknowledged that, while they have a role to play by tightening up their Codes
of Ethics and Disciplinary procedures and introducing Integrity Units to
investigate any suspected malpractice by athletes, they cannot on their own eradicate
the problem without governmental support.
Under the Lisbon Treaty and
TFEU Art 165 the EU has a role in promoting sport which specifically falls
short of law harmonization. Under what has become known as the doctrine of the
“specificity” of sport the CJEU will only interfere in the internal rules and
regulations laid down by sporting federations in so much as they have an
economic impact. So famously, in the Bosman
ruling, the Court ruled as unlawful (under the internal market freedom of
movement provisions) UEFA’s then transfer rules which restricted, on the basis
of a player’s nationality, football clubs signing players from other EU Member States.
Malta’s complaint in regard of
the Convention is brought under Article 218 TFEU, which is a special
jurisdiction allowing the CJEU to rule if an envisaged treaty (ie not in force
for the EU yet) is compatible with EU law or not. The object of the Convention
is to establish international cooperation in terms of defining unlawful
manipulation of sports competitions (ie corrupt betting related fixing) and in
the investigation and prevention of fixing.
A key provision of the Convention is
at Article 3 (5)(a) which defines "illegal
sports betting" as "all
sports betting activity whose type or operator is not allowed under the applicable
law of the jurisdiction where the consumer is located". The Convention prescribes at Article 11 website
blocking and a ban on advertising to enforce the restriction on illegal betting.
In other words, a betting operator licensed in say Malta, could be prohibited
from going about its business in another EU state, say Poland, if Polish law
proscribes some of the betting methods which in Malta are perfectly legal;
thereby constituting a classic impediment to an internal market.
In Poland gambling is legal,
and indeed is a source of important public revenue being relatively highly
taxed; however, unusually for the EU, online gambling is illegal. In practice blocking of foreign websites is
not enforced and many Poles therefore work round this restriction on online
gambling.
In Malta, on the other hand,
betting operators are highly prized as economic entities and both regulation
and tax are very light on betting companies in order to stimulate an important
part of the economy for this, the smallest EU member state. Not unreasonably
the Maltese argue that the Convention exceeds the ambit of EU competence by
introducing regulations on gambling which is not a settled matter in the EU. Moreover,
Malta will argue that any unduly restrictive provisions which drive gamblers
into the unregulated market are counter-productive, since it is widely
acknowledged that it is the unregulated betting market that is the source of
much of the match fixing problem.
Malta’s case is that the
definition of “illegal betting” is discriminatory under TFEU Art 18, and
unlawful under articles 49 (freedom of establishment) and article 56 (freedom
to provide services); and it is expected that Malta will argue before the Court
that while they accept that the regulation on illegal gambling is in pursuit of
a justifiable public policy aim (the eradication of match fixing), attacking
gambling which is licensed in one EU State but not another, is not a
proportionate means of achieving the aim given the evidence that unlicensed as
opposed to licensed gambling is primarily the source of match fixing.
The complex and voluminous case
law on the Court of Justice on this issue (most recently reiterated in Pfleger) makes clear that Member States
have a great deal of discretion to regulate gambling. However, that discretion
is not unlimited, and there are circumstances in which gambling regulation can
constitute a disproportionate restriction of internal market rights.
There are two possible
outcomes of this litigation. First of all, if the CJEU rules that the relevant
rules in the Convention are incompatible with EU internal market law, neither
the EU nor the Member States will be able to ratify it. Secondly, if the Court
rules that there is no breach of internal market law, it will probably indicate
in detail how to interpret the relevant provisions of the Convention in order
to ensure compatibility with EU law. In that case, the opinion of the CJEU will
of course inform the manner in which the Convention is implemented in Member States.
As the Convention is the first
multinational treaty aimed at harmonizing different states’ fight against
betting related sports corruption, the Court’s ruling is eagerly
anticipated. Watch this space……
Barnard & Peers: chapter
14, chapter 16, chapter 24
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