Showing posts with label gender violence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gender violence. Show all posts

Friday, 21 June 2024

Advancing Gender Equality: The EU`s Landmark Directive 2024/1385 on Violence Against Women

 



 

Dr. Ceren Kasım, Postdoctoral Research and Teaching Fellow, University of Hildesheim, Germany

Photo credit: MesserWoland, via Wikimedia Commons

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The first-ever binding European Union (EU) legal instrument to combat violence against women and domestic violence was approved on the 14th of May 2024 by the EU and has already been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Directive, known as Directive 2024/1385 on combating violence against women and domestic violence (Directive), marks a historic moment for equality and equal opportunities in the European Union and is a significant symbol of the EU`s dedication to achieving not only de jure but also de facto equality.

 

Gender-based violence is prevalent in the European Union, with one in three women in the EU reporting experiences of physical and/or sexual violence. Each day, between 6 and 7 women in Europe are killed by their partner or ex-partner, resulting in an estimated total of 2300 women becoming victims of femicides every year. The structural nature of such violence is inherently connected to gender-based discrimination, serving as a central social mechanism that perpetuates women`s subordination in society. The Directive represents a step closer to gender equality in the European Union, not only through the criminalisation of many offenses but also by promising preventive, supportive, and prosecutorial measures linked with training and coordinated Europe-wide policies.

 

BACKGROUND

 

The Directive 2024/1385 is a groundbreaking legal document that aims to prevent and combat violence against women (VAW) and domestic violence. It highlights the European Union’s objectives to achieve equality between women and men, as outlined in the Treaties, including Art. 2, Art. (3)(2) TEU, Art. 8, 10, 19 TFEU, as well as Art. 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which represent the fundamental values of the EU. The Directive also aligns with the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, which includes the objective of eliminating gender-based violence.

 

European women`s organisations have advocated for a European legal instrument to empower women in Europe, aiming to create a safer environment for women and girls. In a parallel development, the Directive was launched on March 8, 2022, a significant symbolic date for women's rights – International Women`s Day. Subsequently, on June 9, 2023, the Council agreed on its position regarding the proposed Directive, leading to a deal being reached among EU legislators in February 2024. The EU Parliament then adopted the directive on April 24, 2024, with 522 in favor, 27 against, and 72 abstentions, which was later adopted by the council on May 7, 2024. Finally, on May 14, 2024, the act was signed.

 

Moreover, a significant advancement towards gender equality in the European Union was the accession of the EU to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) (IC) on October 1, 2023 – the sole binding European human rights document addressing gender-based violence. However, controversy surrounding the Istanbul Convention arose within the broader European context, with instances such as the Bulgarian Constitutional Court declaring it unconstitutional in 2018. Additionally, Polish government argued that the convention disregards religious beliefs and promotes what they term ‘gender ideology’. In 2019, the Slovakian parliament chose not to ratify the Convention, despite earlier signing it. Notably, an Opinion by the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) on October 6, 2021 (Opinion 1/19), paved the way for swift ratification of the Convention, allowing the Council to adopt it through a qualified majority vote. EU acceded to the Convention, handling matters falling under its exclusive competences as defined by agreed common rules related to judicial cooperation, asylum, non-refoulement, institutions, and public administration of the Union. So, it was crucial for the EU to have its own legal instrument, especially considering that some EU Member States have not ratified the Istanbul Convention.

 

The Directive stands as the sole European Union legal source addressing VAW and domestic violence directly. Member States now have three years to implement the provisions (Art. 49).

 

COMMON RESPONSIBILITY AND A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK

 

The Directive stands out in many aspects. Foremost, it acknowledges the shared responsibility of Member States in addressing and advocating for a comprehensive framework to effectively prevent and combat VAW and domestic violence.

 

This holistic approach within the Directive introduces detailed regulations and sets down rules to prevent and address VAW and domestic violence, with the aim of ensuring effectiveness and enforceability. The Directive's obligations cover four key pillars: prevention and early intervention, protection and access to justice, victim support, coordination and cooperation. In alignment with the four aims of the Istanbul Convention – prevention, protection, prosecution, and coordinated policies – the EU seeks to bolster the protection of all victims of VAW and domestic violence by establishing measures focusing on prevention, minimum guidelines for reporting, early intervention, victim protection, support, access to justice, perpetrator prosecution, training, enhanced data collection, coordinated mechanisms, and cooperation requirements.

 

The Directive establishes mechanisms for prevention and early intervention, as well as measures to protect and support victims, outlining the minimum rights of victims of all forms of VAW or domestic violence before, during, and for a period of time after criminal proceedings. It advocates for a comprehensive preventive approach and ensures the existence of early intervention mechanisms. It is convenient to emphasise the importance of these mechanisms going beyond basic preventive measures to include compulsory comprehensive sexuality education, consent education, and challenging negative gender norms.

 

The Directive mandates the provision of protection and support for victims, guaranteeing victims access to comprehensive medical care and sexual and reproductive health services. This marks the first instance where EU law imposes explicit obligations on Member States to ensure access to essential medical care for victims of sexual violence. Additionally, it ensures that victims have access to justice. Member States are required to provide training for professionals who are likely to interact with victims, including law enforcement, prosecutors, and judiciary. Moreover, the prosecution of perpetrators must be consistently ensured across all Member States. The training provided should be based on human rights, centered around the victim, and sensitive to gender, disability, and children (Art. 36).

 

In many respects, the Directive is determined, demanding that Member States adopt comprehensive and coordinated policies (Art. 38) and introduce national action plans (Art. 39) that should be implemented with union-level cooperation (Art. 43). These efforts should be bolstered by collaboration with non-governmental organisations (Chapter 6). Member States are urged to consider the expertise of women's organisations and women's specialist services, as crucial players in addressing all forms of VAW and offering assistance to survivors with a gender-sensitive and intersectional outlook.

 

CRIMINALISING FORMS OF VIOLENCE

 

In addition, the Directive establishes minimum rules specifying criminal offences and penalties related to the sexual exploitation of women and children, as well as cybercrime. In doing so, it criminalises and categorises forms of gender-based violence that were previously only acknowledged by a limited number of Member States. By taking this step, the Directive aims to standardise criminal legislation across the European Union concerning certain forms of VAW.

 

One key aspect is the requirement for EU countries to criminalise female genital mutilation (Art. 3) and forced marriage (Art. 4). This demonstrates the Directive`s firm stance that these issues are not merely products of cultural distinctions but are rather gender-related crimes.

 

Moreover, the Directive places a significant emphasis on addressing cyber-related violence. It considers the non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material as a criminal offence (Art. 5), providing a safety measure to protect women, which also encompasses instances like deepfakes. Additionally, cyber stalking (Art. 6), cyber harassment (Art. 7), and cyber-incitement (Art. 8) are recognised as punishable criminal offences. The Directive also addresses issues such as cyber stalking that have previously not been adequately covered in EU legal regulations, thereby filling a legal gap and for the first time criminalising various forms of cyber violence that predominantly target and impact women due to their gender.

 

Furthermore, the Directive outlines a list of aggravating circumstances (Art. 11), which include offences driven by motives related to the victim`s sexual orientation, gender, colour, religion, social origin, or political beliefs, as well as actions intended to uphold or restore “honour”. It also covers crimes against public figures, journalists, or human rights defenders.

 

INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

 

One of the most visionary aspects of the Directive is its consistent reference and emphasis on intersectional discrimination. The term ‘intersectional discrimination’, coined by Kimberle Crenshaw in the early 1990s, highlights the nature of discriminatory practices by showing how different discriminatory grounds interact with each other in a multifaceted way. The intersectional aspect of discrimination makes women more vulnerable and at a heightened risk of experiencing gender-based violence.

 

The Directive refers to intersectional discrimination in connection with Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the referenced grounds of discrimination (Articles 16, 21, 33). With advancing technologies, Art. 21 of the Charter becomes more significant as it includes genetic features as a ground for discrimination. By acknowledging intersectional discrimination, the Directive extends its protection to the most vulnerable groups who are at risk of all forms of gender-based violence and domestic violence – including women from racial minorities, women with disabilities, individuals with different sexual orientations, gender identities, and expressions, such as transgender and non-binary individuals, sex workers, individuals with lower socio-economic status, those who are homeless, with unstable immigration status – to access improved support services. These groups are the least protected and supported in society.

 

THE ABSENCE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GBV AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

 

However, there is a missing human rights perspective in the Directive. Neither in the Preamble nor anywhere else does the Directive acknowledge that gender-based violence is a human rights violation. This recognition is a core element of the Istanbul Convention. However, the Directive refers to VAW and domestic violence as a violation of fundamental rights and, thereby losing its connection to the most significant human rights document on VAW and domestic violence in Europe. (Compare Art. 3(a) IC to Art. 2(a) Directive 2024/1385) The Directive missed an opportunity to align closely with the Istanbul Convention's human rights approach, which would have been a groundbreaking step in addressing gender-based violence and domestic violence at the EU level.

 

A CLEAR GENDER PERSPECTIVE MISSING

 

In the Directive, a clear reference to gender and a distinction between ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ are also lacking. The Directive has an ambiguous relationship with the concept of gender. It uses the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ interchangeably in most cases, leading to significant uncertainty and undermining all the progress that has been made thus far. It lacks a genuine gender perspective. Which would have allowed for an understanding of the root causes, socially structured and historically ingrained nature of violence in relation to structural inequalities, moving away from a binary understanding of sex and stereotyping.

 

Unlike the Istanbul Convention, the Directive does not provide a definition of gender. CEDAW has also amended its General Recommendation No. 35 by explicitly choosing the phrase ‘gender-based violence against women’, a new and more inclusive approach to addressing the issue. Gender is socially constructed, whereas sex is genetically determined. The concept of gender enables us to comprehend violence within its societal context rather than viewing it as an individual problem. Considering that the European Court of Justice also does not clearly differentiate between ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ and regrettably uses the two terms interchangeably, it would have been appropriate for the European legislative body to rectify this and bring clarity.[1] The Directive could have simply followed the footsteps of the Istanbul Convention and provided clear definitions of the term gender and distungish betwenn gender and sex.

 

Furthermore, the Directive uses the term ‘violence against women’ instead of gender-based violence. However, it defines ‘violence against women’ as “gender-based violence directed against a woman or a girl because she is a woman or a girl or that affect women or girls disproportionately”. (Art. 2(a)) ‘Victim’ refers to “any person, regardless of their gender, who has suffered harm directly caused by violence against women or domestic violence”. (Art. 2(c) ) Throughout the text, the directive does not clearly differentiate between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Although some use ‘violence against women’ and ‘gender-based violence against women’ interchangeably, there is a distinction in understanding. Gender-based violence, including violence against women, encompasses all forms of violence that disproportionately affect women and marginalised communities. Using ‘violence against women’ as an umbrella term excludes also individuals who do not fit into the category of ‘women’, such as sexual minorities and non-binary people.

 

NOT CRIMINALISED FORMS OF VIOLENCE

 

In addition, other forms of violence, such as intersex genital mutilation and forced sterilisation, were ultimately not criminalised in the Directive. Intersex genital mutilation affects intersex individuals, who are one of the most discriminated groups among the LGBTI population. On the other hand, forced sterilisation is a surgical procedure that removes a person`s ability to have children without consent or under undue pressure. Women with disabilities are disproportionately subjected to forced and involuntary sterilisation. United Nations human rights instruments, mechanisms, and agencies have acknowledged that the forced sterilisation of persons with disabilities constitutes discrimination, a form of violence, torture, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities stated in 2017 that protecting the rights of persons with disabilities to make decisions about their own bodies and sexuality is crucial in the global effort to end violence, exploitation, and abuse against women. Forced sterilisation is still either permissible by law or not expressly banned in 12 out of the 27 EU Member States –Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the Czech Republic– as reported by the European Disability Forum.

 

ABSENCE OF A DEFINITION OF RAPE

 

One of the continuous criticisms and demands preceding the adoption of the Directive was a common European consent-based definition of the crime of ‘rape’. Article 5 of the initial Proposal, focusing on the definition of ‘rape’ – a definition similar to the Spanish law from 2022, known as the “yes means yes” approach – was deliberated for nearly two years and was ultimately removed from the draft. This sets the Directive apart from the Istanbul Convention, which already includes a definition of rape based on the absence of consent (Art. 36 IC). Member States held varying opinions on this matter, with Italy and Greece supporting the inclusion of such a definition, while Germany and France opposed it, arguing that the EU lacked the authority to address this issue. Despite persistent demands from women's and human rights organisations, as well as many academics, the approved Directive does not provide a definition.

 

UNDOCUMENTED WOMEN AND WOMEN WITH AN INSECURE RESIDENCE STATUS

 

The Directive lacks a dedicated chapter addressing migrant women. The absence of an independent residence status, a secure status, or any status poses challenges for women, increasing their vulnerability to violence or exploitation in a variety of contexts by employers, intimate partners, or other individuals. As a result, they are less likely to report violence and abuse., limiting their access to justice and their ability to escape abusive situations, rendering them vulnerable to further abuse. Recently, the European Court of Justice in two landmark cases WS v Bulgaria (C621/21)[2] and K, L v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (C-646/21) reaffrimed the status of women as a whole, including minors, and women facing domestic violence in their country of origin in particular, and women who identify themselves with the fundamental value of equality between women and men qualify as a protected ‘social group’ in reference to Istanbul Convention. While the initial proposal included provisions to ensure that no personal data about victims of abuse, including residence status, would be shared by police with immigration authorities, the final text omits these safeguards (Art. 16(5) Propsal) As stated by many human rights organisations, this approach would run counter to the EU's rules on victims' rights (Victims' Rights Directive) and data protection (General Data Protection Regulation), which mandate rights and safeguards for all individuals without discrimination. This discrepancy with the Istanbul Convention contradicts the Convention`s requirement that all women be treated equally, irrespective of their residence status.

 

THE WORLD OF WORK AND THE NEW DIRECTIVE

 

In its preamble, the Directive highlights that VAW and domestic violence pose a threat to the fundamental values and rights of the European Union, particularly equality between women and men and non-discrimination. These forms of violence undermine women and girls' rights to equality across all aspects of life, including the world of work. The European Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as well outlines key objectives, such as ending gender-based violence, challenging gender stereotypes, closing gender gaps in the labour market, achieving equal participation in various sectors of the economy, addressing gender pay and pension disparities, bridging the gender care gap, and attaining gender balance in decision-making and politics.

 

However, the Directive falls short in thoroughly regulating gender-based violence in the world of work. The initial Proposal in Article 4 defines ‘sexual harassment at work’ as any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature that violates the victim`s dignity, particularly when creating a hostile or offensive environment. Despite efforts to include work-related violence, such provisions were rejected and are absent from the final text.

 

The Preamble of the Directive refers to sexual harassment at work in connection to EU non-discrimination Directives (No. 65 Preamble) and also in relation to support and protection mechanisms (No. 77 Preamble). Only Article 28 mandates that Member States ensure counselling services are accessible for victims and employers in cases of sexual harassment at work that constitute a criminal offence under national law. Article 36 states that individuals with supervisory in the workplace should receive training on recognising, preventing, and addressing sexual harassment at work. Additionally, Article 19 briefly mentions that restraining orders should prevent the perpetrator from entering the victim`s workplace but does not delve into specific scenarios. By 14 June 2032, the Commission is required to assess the need for further Union-level measures to effectively address sexual harassment and violence in the workplace (Article 45).

 

Given that individuals spend a significant part of their lives in the workplace and the relationship of work to socio-economic rights, an inclusive and comprehensive approach to addressing violence at work will have an emancipatory and empowering impact on women`s rights in the European Union. This approach should involve third-party violence and harassment at work, encompassing gender-based violence as well as domestic violence, whether in employment, occupation, or self-employment. However, the Directive falls short in this regard.

 

CONCLUSION

 

In conclusion, the Directive represents a significant advancement in promoting gender equality within the European Union. It recognises the shared responsibility of Member States in addressing violence against women and domestic violence, advocating for a comprehensive framework to effectively prevent and combat such issues. By criminalising offences that were previously overlooked in EU Member States and establishing minimum standards that Member States can exceed, the Directive serves as a robust legal instrument. It takes a holistic approach, providing detailed regulations and guidelines spanning from prevention and early intervention to protection, access to justice, victim support, and coordination and cooperation.

 

While the Directive is a positive step forward, it falls short of the initial Proposal's ambition, lacking a clear gender perspective and specific regulations on certain forms of violence, particularly in the context of the world of work. Nevertheless, the Directive is poised to bring about significant changes in the legal norms of Member States and pave the way for a cultural shift in understanding and addressing gender inequality that persists in EU countries. This milestone should be celebrated, while also acknowledging that there is still much work to be done to enhance legal safeguards in preventing and eradicating gender-based violence and domestic violence.



[1] Endres de Oliveira, Pauline / Kasım, Ceren, „Die Relevanz der Istanbul-Konvention für den flüchtlingsrechtlichen Schutz von Frauen in der EU. Das EuGH-Urteil in der Rechtssache WS gegen Bulgarien“, NVwZ 7/2024, 1.4.2024, p. 486-490.

[2] Endres de Oliveira, Pauline / Kasım, Ceren, „Die Relevanz der Istanbul-Konvention für den flüchtlingsrechtlichen Schutz von Frauen in der EU. Das EuGH-Urteil in der Rechtssache WS gegen Bulgarien“, NVwZ 7/2024, 1.4.2024, p. 486-490.





Saturday, 3 April 2021

Some Complex Legal Questions Examined from a Legal Perspective in a Partial and Passionate Manner Or, The EU’s Ratification of the Istanbul Convention: Competence, Bases and Common Accord

 


 


Catherine Briddick, Martin James Departmental Lecturer in Gender and Forced Migration at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford - @CateBriddick*

 

On the 11th March 2021 Advocate General Hogan of the CJEU delivered his Opinion (Opinion Procedure 1/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:198) on the European Parliament’s request for an advisory opinion on the accession of the EU to the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.

To prepare the reader concerned by the EU’s attempt to assume just a small selection of the legal obligations the Istanbul Convention imposes on its parties, the Advocate General cautions that:

“While that [the Istanbul] convention seeks to advance the noble and desirable goal of combating violence against women and children, the question of whether the conclusion of that particular convention would be compatible with the EU Treaties presents complex legal questions of some novelty which must naturally be examined from a legal perspective in a detached and dispassionate manner.” (para 2)

In this blog, I present my initial thoughts on the Advocate General’s Opinion and the implications that a CJEU judgment along the same lines could have for women in Europe. Detached and dispassionate I am not.

So, “complex legal questions” and their answers first.

The Istanbul Convention is only the second international legal instrument to focus on violence against women, such violence being, per the Convention’s preamble:

“a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between women and men, which have led to domination over, and discrimination against, women by men.”

Both the EU and its Member States can accede to or ratify the Istanbul Convention. Accession involves the Council, with the consent of the European Parliament, adopting a decision to do so. The decision must identify the legal bases of the EU’s accession, bases which must be derived from the EU’s legal competence (its ability or power) to act in a particular field. Once ratified, the agreement is binding on the institutions of the EU and EU Member States, within the relevant competences and to the extent that the EU has concluded the treaty. Further information about the EU’s accession to the Istanbul Convention can be found here. Some previous thoughts of mine on this topic are available here.

On 11 May 2017 the Council adopted two separate decisions relating to the signing of the Istanbul Convention. The first decision (2017/865) refers to arts 82(2) and 83(1) TFEU and limits accession only to those parts of the Convention concerned with “judicial cooperation in criminal matters.” The second decision (2017/866) identifies art 78(2) TFEU on the establishment of a common European asylum system as its legal base, this time referring only to “asylum and non-refoulement.”

These two Council decisions departed from that proposed by the Commission in two, interconnected ways.

First, the decisions rely on different legal bases to those the Commission identified. Second, the identified bases differ because the decisions limit, or attempt to limit, the legal obligations the EU will accept in relation to the Istanbul Convention only to those that concern judicial cooperation in criminal matters and to asylum and non-refoulement. Such a limited accession would insulate swathes of EU law, including free movement law, from the purview of the Convention and its monitoring body, GREVIO.

The European Parliament was quick to express its “regret” and to recommend a “broad EU accession to the Convention without any limitations”. On 9 July 2019, it requested an Advisory Opinion from the CJEU on the following questions:

(a) Do Articles 82(2) and 84 TFEU (the bases proposed by the Commission) constitute the appropriate legal bases for the Council act concluding the Istanbul Convention on behalf of the Union, or should that act be based on Articles 78(2), 82(2) and 83(1) TFEU (the bases selected by the Council)?

(b) Is it necessary or possible to split each of the two decisions on the signing and on the conclusion of the convention as a result of this choice of legal basis?

 

Is the conclusion by the Union of the Istanbul Convention in accordance with Article 218(6) TFEU compatible with the Treaties in the absence of a common agreement of all the Member States giving their consent to being bound by the convention?’

On 1(a), the Advocate General opines that the decision(s) authorising the EU to conclude the Convention must be based on Articles 78(2), 82(2), 84 and 336 TFEU (para 166). These bases concern the common European asylum system, judicial co-operation in criminal matters, non-harmonising measures for crime prevention and EU officials’ conditions of employment. The Advocate General selects these bases because they correspond to those which, whilst not covering the entirety of the Istanbul Convention, correspond to those competences the Council has chosen to exercise (paras 136, 148).

Reaching this decision required the Advocate General to accept the Council’s “limited adhesion” to the Istanbul Convention, even though such an “adhesion” involved “renouncing its [the EU’s] competence in the area of combating discrimination based on gender” (para 165). Notably, the Advocate General rejects as a base for accession the key objective of the Istanbul Convention - the elimination of sex discrimination (para 129) notwithstanding the EU’s competence and legal obligation to do so (arts 8 & 10 TFEU).

Having already accepted the Council’s/EU’s “limited adhesion” to the Convention, the Advocate General proceeds to answer question 1(b) in the affirmative, noting as he does the potential impact of the Convention’s protections for asylum-seeking and refugee women on the relevant EU rules (more on which later).

The Istanbul Convention takes an intersectional approach to violence and discrimination against women, art 4(3) prohibiting discrimination on a range of grounds, including sexual orientation, marital status, migrant or refugee status. A number of States have objected to and sought to undermine this approach, even after they have signed the Convention and are, therefore, obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat its objects and purposes (per art 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969).

The European Parliament has condemned what it describes as a “backlash” against women’s rights, expressing its support for the rights and protections the Convention provides to all women. Notwithstanding the concerted efforts of the Council of Europe and others to respond to ‘concerns’ about the Convention’s aims and impacts, a number of EU States have failed to ratify it. Poland and Turkey (the latter a member of the Council of Europe but not the EU) have announced their intention to withdraw from the Convention altogether (see Professor Başak Çali’s analysis of Turkey’s decision).

Should and can the EU accede to an international instrument when a significant and vocal proportion of its Member States have chosen not to do so? The Advocate General opines that while there are “strong practical reasons” (para 218) to wait for its Member States to ratify the Convention, the Council is under no obligation to do so (para 223).

And now to the partial and passionate bit.

The Advocate General accepts, from the outset of his opinion, that the Council can proceed to a partial conclusion of the Istanbul Convention. When discussing this, however, he shifts from a discussion of the legal powers and choices of the EU itself (“where the Union chooses not to exercise the competence…” para 84) to that of the Council (“…it is clear that the Council intends...para 85).

In this linguistic and legal shift, the Advocate General substitutes the Council’s intentions for those of the Union as a whole, a move that is surprising given the lack of agreement on the necessity of ratifying the Istanbul Convention within the EU’s institutions, or between its Member States. The Advocate General does acknowledge the possibility that the Council’s decisions could be the subject of further challenge, once the competences exercised are known (paras 86, 164). He fails, however, to subject to adequate scrutiny the Council’s decision not to draw on its competence in relation to sex discrimination to accept all the obligations the Convention imposes. This failure seems particularly stark given that this is almost precisely the course of action that arts 8 & 10 TFEU seem to demand, (“the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex…”), in addition to being called for by the European Parliament. 

Second and linked to the above, the Advocate General’s acceptance of a partial accession of the Istanbul Convention could, as explained, exempt key areas of EU law from having to meet the standards it imposes. One could be forgiven for speculating that this is precisely the point, or one of the points, of the proposed accession. It is extremely troubling, however, that the Advocate General takes this approach without understanding exactly which parts of EU law his Opinion, if followed by the Court, would effect and protect in this way.

Having side-stepped the question of whether or not the EU’s free movement rules meet the standards set by the Istanbul Convention for the protection of migrant victims of violence against women (para 106, spoiler alert – they really don’t), the Advocate General erroneously assumes (paras 104-112, 160) that the second Council decision is concerned with them. This is simply incorrect. As set out in para 9 and art 1, the second decision only concerns asylum and non-refoulement, Istanbul Convention arts 60 and 61. It specifically does not cover the Istanbul Convention’s art 59, which takes a protective four-fold approach to migrant victims’ residence rights. It is of real concern that the Advocate General is so mistaken on this point, particularly given the CJEU’s “shameful” decision in NA to deny residence rights to migrant victims of domestic violence who are abandoned by their EU Citizen spouses before they can start divorce proceedings. Space precludes me from discussing this point any further, or for railing at the Advocate General’s comment to the effect that EU law does not “generally”  require violence against women to be taken into account as a form of persecution that could give rise to refugee status (para 161).

All of which brings me to my third and final point which concerns detachment and power in legal decision-making.

This case is, as the Advocate General acknowledges, about violence and discrimination against women. It is about the fact that, in another State that has failed to ratify the Convention, the UK, a woman is killed by a man, on average, every three days. Violence, and the fear of it, determines the course of, and shapes, many women’s lives. It has shaped my own. I’ve been assaulted by men who followed me home from a late night at work. I’ve been sworn at on the street for refusing an “offer” of sex, and harassed and threatened when cycling back from drinks with colleagues. In the first of these incidents I was 8 months pregnant with my first child. In the second, I had my second child, then a 6-week-old baby, with me. I can’t be detached from, or dispassionate about, State and EU responses to violence and discrimination against women. Nor can the women whose migration statuses are currently determined by EU rules which offer them significantly less protection that that provided by the Istanbul Convention.

Violence against women is discriminatory violence that breaches women’s human rights, including the right to be equally protected by the law (per the ECtHR case of Opuz v Turkey and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU). Opinions and decisions that give insufficient weight to legal prohibitions of sex discrimination, and attempts to circumvent them, sustain and amplify such discrimination. Combating violence against women and children is not a “noble and desirable goal” (para 2 of the Advocate General’s Opinion). It is a legal obligation. Exhortations of and to detachment, when offered in lieu of a principled vindication of women and children’s rights, serve only to reveal the position and power held by those who write them.

To be completely clear - I am not comparing, or in any way equating, my experiences of violence with the experiences of migrant women, like NA. We are all differently situated within co-constituting and mutually reinforcing networks of power and oppression. The Istanbul Convention’s prohibition of intra-sex discrimination recognises this, and seeks to ensure that those who are at the intersection of more than one axis of discrimination, including migrant women, and women who face violence because of their race and sex, receive the specialist support and services they need to overcome it. This is just one part of a Convention the whole of which is worth fighting for. I look forward to reading a CJEU judgment that sees and understands this.


*I would like to thank Professor Shazia Choudhury for reading this piece; all errors remain my own 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20

Photo credit, Cedric Puisney, via Wikicommons Media

Friday, 4 March 2016

Violence against women: what will be the impact of the EU signing the Istanbul Convention?

Steve Peers

The scourge of violence against women is a serious human rights abuse and the worst form of sex discrimination. Several years ago, the Council of Europe (a body different from the EU) drew up the Istanbul Convention on this issue. It came into force in 2014, and currently applies to 20 countries, including 12 EU Member States (for ratification details, see here). Today, the EU Commission proposed that the EU sign and then conclude the Convention. What practical impact will that have on violence against women?

If the EU does sign and conclude (ie ratify) the Treaty, it will be the second human rights treaty binding the Union. The first is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. While most attention has been focussed on the EU’s attempt to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was essentially thwarted by the EU’s Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2014 (as discussed here), the EU’s capacity to sign up to other human rights treaties is also relevant. While the EU cannot sign up to older international human rights treaties, like the UN Covenants, because they are only open to States, newer treaties (like the Istanbul Convention) expressly provide for the EU to sign up to them – if it wishes.

Impact of EU ratification

Like many international treaties, the Istanbul Convention is a ‘mixed agreement’, meaning that (if the EU ratifies it), the treaty will bind both the Union and its Member States. EU ratification should have six main effects (I’ve updated this list from the previous post on the reasons why the EU should ratify).

First of all, the EU’s ratification of the Convention could provide encouragement to its Member States, as well as non-Member States of the EU, to ratify the Convention. It would increase the prominence of the Convention worldwide, perhaps inspiring changes to national law and regional treaty-making outside Europe. It should be noted that the treaty is open for signature to non-EU countries: the 19 Council of Europe countries not in the EU (8 of them have ratified it already), as well as the 4 non-European countries (plus the Holy See) which took part in drawing it up.

Do you live in a country which hasn’t ratified the Convention? You can sign up to a campaign for the UK to ratify the Convention here. Please let me know of any other campaigns in the UK or any other country, and I’ll list them with a link in an Annex to this post.

Secondly, ratification could, as regards this Convention at least, address the argument that the EU has ‘double standards’ as regards human rights, insisting that Member States, would-be EU Member States and associated countries should uphold human rights standards that the EU does not apply itself. If the EU is perfectly able to ratify the Istanbul Convention, but chooses not to, what moral authority does it have to urge any countries to do so?

Thirdly, ratification of the Convention should enhance its role in EU law, because it could more easily be used as a parameter for the interpretation and validity of EU legislation. While there’s no general EU criminal law on violence against women (on the case for such a law, see here), there are other relevant EU rules. In particular, the Commission proposal refers to EU free movement law, substantive EU criminal law relevant to violence against women, EU immigration and asylum law, and the EU law on crime victims’ rights, applicable from last autumn (on the content of the crime victims’ law, see discussion here). It should also mean that the Convention will already bind those EU Member States which had not yet ratified it, as regards those provisions within EU competence. The proposal is based on EU competence over victims’ rights, and would apply (if agreed) to every Member State covered by the crime victims’ law – meaning every EU country except Denmark.

In practical terms, that should mean that (for instance), EU law must be interpreted to mean victims receive a residence permit based on their personal situation, if the authorities consider it necessary (Article 59(3) of the Convention). That would apply to citizens of other Member States and their (EU or non-EU) family members, in all 27 Member States covered by the proposal. It would also apply to non-EU citizens in general, in the Member States which apply EU law on non-EU migration (ie the 25 Member States other than the UK, Ireland and Denmark, which have mostly opted out of such laws).  

For asylum cases, Article 60 of the Convention makes clear that gender-based violence is a ground of persecution. This is more explicit than the EU’s qualification Directive, which says that ‘gender-related aspects shall be given due consideration’, with further reference in its preamble to specific practices like genital mutilation. (Note that the UK and Ireland are covered by the first-phase qualification Directive, which has less precise wording on this issue; so the EU’s ratification of the Convention might have more influence in these countries).

As regards victims of domestic violence crimes (of any nationality and residence status), Chapter IV of the Convention, concerning support and protection, could in particular have an impact on the interpretation of the crime victims’ Directive in each Member State.

Fourth, since the CJEU will have jurisdiction to interpret those provisions of the Convention which fall within the scope of EU competence, this could promote a uniform interpretation of those provisions within the EU.  

Next, the relevant provisions of the Convention will be more enforceable if the EU ratifies it. While the CJEU ruled in the Z case that the UN Disabilities Convention did not have direct effect, and might rule the same as regards the Istanbul Convention, at least that Convention would have ‘indirect effect’ (ie the obligation to interpret EU law consistently with it), and the Commission could bring infringement actions against Member States which had not applied the Convention correctly, as regards issues within the scope of EU competence. Ensuring the enforceability of the Convention is all the more important since it does not provide for an individual complaint system.

Finally, ratification would subject the EU to outside monitoring as regards this issue, and avoid the awkward scenario of its Member States being monitored as regards issues within EU competence – meaning that the Convention’s monitoring body would in effect to some extent be monitoring whether EU Member States were complying with EU law.

Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the EU’s planned ratification can only be welcomed. It may not, by itself, prevent any act of violence from being committed, but it may accelerate a broader process of ratification (and corresponding national law reform) on this issue. And it may have the important practical impact of helping victims receive support or protection, particularly in the context of the law on crime victims, immigration or asylum.


Barnard & Peers: chapter 25, chapter 26
JHA4: chapter II:4, chapter I:5

Wednesday, 23 April 2014

Should the EU ratify the Istanbul Convention on violence against women?



Steve Peers

For many years, discussion as regards the EU and human rights has focussed on the growing role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU’s planned accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. This is understandable, given the importance of these developments. However, the EU’s relationship with other international human rights instruments is also worthy of further examination.

The EU is not able to sign up to older UN human rights treaties – such as the two Covenants and the Conventions relating to sex discrimination, race discrimination and migrant workers – because ratification of these instruments is only open to States. Similarly, only States can ratify ILO Conventions, although the EU sometimes coordinates its Member States’ position as regards ILO measures (see the discussion of the proposal to coordinate positions regarding new ILO forced labour measures).

However, more recent international human rights treaties do provide for possible accession by the EU, and indeed the Union has signed up to the UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons (see the recent Z judgment of the CJEU). With the imminent entry into force of the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on violence against women (which will come into force on 1 August 2014, after the deposit of the tenth ratification on April 22nd), the question now arises whether the EU should sign up to another human rights treaty. This post sets out the reasons why the EU should ratify the Convention at the earliest opportunity.


EU competence to ratify the Istanbul Convention


The EU is certainty competent to ratify the Istanbul Convention, if it wishes to do so. First of all, the Convention expressly provides (in Article 75(1)) for ratification by the EU, without setting any special condition in this respect.

Secondly, as a matter of internal EU law, the EU can sign up to any treaties which are (inter alia) ‘likely to affect common rules or alter their scope’ (Article 216 TFEU). Although EU law has not regulated the key substantive criminal law issues dealt with in the Istanbul Convention, the Convention does not limit itself to establishing rules concerning criminal liability, but also addresses a number of other issues. In particular, there are EU law measures concerning the Convention’s rules on: crime victims’ rights, cross-border application of protection orders (both civil and criminal), other forms of cross-border cooperation, and immigration and asylum issues (see the detailed list in the Annex).

It must be pointed out that if the EU ratifies the Istanbul Convention, it would not be replacing its Member States, but ratifying the Convention alongside them. In other words, the Convention would be another ‘mixed agreement’ which both the EU and its Member States have ratified, like the UN Disabilities Convention, (in future) the ECHR and many other treaties. The EU would not be legally obliged to adopt any more legislation affecting the issue of violence against women than it already has done. While I have argued before that there are good reasons (and legal powers) for the EU to adopt legislation establishing substantive criminal law rules in this field, this is a separate question from whether the EU ought to ratify the Convention.

Reasons why the EU should ratify the Istanbul Convention

First of all, the EU’s ratification of the Convention would provide encouragement to its Member States, as well as non-Member States of the EU, to ratify the Convention. It would increase the prominence of the Convention worldwide, perhaps inspiring changes to national law and regional treaty-making outside Europe.

Secondly, ratification would, as regards this Convention at least, address the argument that the EU has ‘double standards’ as regards human rights, insisting that would-be EU Member States and associated countries should uphold human rights standards that the EU does not apply itself. While the double standards argument can be answered as regards human rights treaties which the EU cannot ratify, it cannot so easily be rebutted as regards treaties which it can. If the EU is perfectly able to ratify the Istanbul Convention, but chooses not to, what moral authority does it have to ask non-Member States to do so?

Ratification of the Convention would enhance its role in EU law, because it could more easily be used as a parameter for the interpretation and validity of EU legislation (such as the legislation listed in the Annex, plus any future relevant measures). It would also mean that the Convention would already bind those EU Member States which had not yet ratified it, as regards those provisions within EU competence.

Furthermore, since the CJEU would have jurisdiction to interpret those provisions of the Convention which fall within the scope of EU competence, this would promote a uniform interpretation of those provisions within the EU. 

Next, the relevant provisions of the Convention would be more enforceable if they were enshrined in to EU law. While the CJEU ruled in the Z case that the UN Disabilities Convention did not have direct effect, and might rule the same as regards the Istanbul Convention, at least that Convention would have ‘indirect effect’ (ie the obligation to interpret EU law consistently with it), and the Commission could bring infringement actions against Member States which had not applied the Convention correctly, as regards issues within the scope of EU competence. Ensuring the enforceability of the Convention is all the more important since it does not provide for an individual complaint system.

Finally, ratification would subject the EU to outside monitoring as regards this issue, and avoid the awkward scenario of its Member States being monitored as regards issues within EU competence – meaning that the Convention’s monitoring body would in effect to some extent be monitoring whether EU Member States were complying with EU law.

[Update: the Commission proposed that the EU should sign and conclude the Convention in March 2016. See discussion here.]

Annex

EU competence regarding the Istanbul Convention

Articles 18-22, 25-28, 30(1), 50(1), 56, 57: crime victims Directive

Article 47: Framework Decision on recognition of criminal sentences

Article 59(1): family reunion Directive, citizenship directive

Article 59(2): Returns Directive, citizenship Directive

Article 60(1) and (2): Qualification directive

Article 60(3): Reception conditions directive; asylum procedures directive

Article 61: Qualification directive, Returns Directive

Article 62(1)(b) and (3): Crime victims Directive

Article 62(1)(d): protection orders legislation 

Article 62(1)(a) and (c) and (2): legislation on mutual recognition, et al in criminal and civil matters

Article 65: Data protection Directive; Framework Decision on data protection


Barnard & Peers: chapter 20, chapter 24, chapter 25, chapter 26

Monday, 24 March 2014

Reverse discrimination against rape victims: a disappointing ruling of the CJEU



Steve Peers

While national criminal justice systems are often criticised for ignoring the role of crime victims, the EU has shown great interest in this issue from an early stage of the development of EU criminal law. One of the first EU 'Framework Decisions' concerned crime victims' rights, and this measure has since been replaced by a comprehensive Directive on this issue, which Member States must apply by October 2015.

Yet this Directive is not the only measure dealing with crime victims, as the topic of state compensation for crime victims is the subject of an earlier Directive, dating from 2004. The primary aim of the compensation Directive is to establish a framework for compensation in cross-border cases, where a 'violent intentional crime' is committed in a Member State other than the Member State where the person concerned is habitually resident. However, the Directive does provide that 'All Member States shall ensure that their national rules provide for the existence of a scheme on compensation to victims of violent intentional crimes committed in their respective territories, which guarantees fair and appropriate compensation to victims.'

In the recent order in C, a woman in Italy brought a claim for state compensation on the basis of this provision, following the conviction of her attacker for sexual violence. The national court had ordered the offender to pay compensation (an issue addressed by the general Framework Decision, now the Directive, on victims' rights), but there was no prospect of enforcing this order, since he did not have the money to pay that compensation. So she tried to obtain compensation from the Italian state instead, pursuant to the Directive. However, according to the CJEU, the Directive did not apply to purely domestic cases like this one, but only to cases where there was a cross-border element.

With great respect, this is just not convincing. While the main focus of the Directive is certainly compensation in cross-border cases, Article 12(1) of the Directive makes clear that this takes place on the basis of each national system for compensation. Therefore Article 12(2) - quoted above - requires each Member State to set up a national system covering crimes like this one. So a failure by Italy to provide for state compensation for its residents who are victims of such crimes will complicate any attempt by visitors from other Member States to collect compensation from the state in such cases.

Since such cross-border disputes will undoubtedly fall within the scope of the Directive, the CJEU might be prepared to rule that crime victims in such case would nonetheless have a directly effective right to compensation against the Italian government, regardless of its failure to implement the Directive fully. While protection of some victims is of course welcome, all of them ought to be protected. EU lawyers have long become accustomed to 'reverse discrimination' as regards family reunion, where EU citizens who move between Member States can rely on decent standards, while those who do not leave their Member State can in some countries (like the UK) be subject to a far more restrictive national law. It hardly helps the legitimacy of EU law to accept that the same double standards apply to compensation of victims of violent crime, especially when the better interpretation of the legislation concerned is that they shouldn't.

[update: see analysis of the main crime victims' Directive, which has applied since autumn 2015, here].

Barnard & Peers, chapter 25

Wednesday, 5 March 2014

Violence against women: Can EU law play a bigger role in combatting it?

Steve Peers

Today's report from the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) on the scale of violence against women within the European Union is simultaneously an enormously impressive attempt to collect standardised data on this important issue, and a very upsetting indication at how prevalent such forms of violence are. The FRA report makes a large number of detailed and useful recommendations to Member States and the EU about how to address this issue, as regards changes to national law, the interpretation of existing EU laws, and the role of education and awareness-raising. Yet it does not suggest that the EU adopt legislation on the specific subject. In my view, the EU could - and should- do so. So despite the great value of the FRA's report, it is, in my view, unfortunate that it did not take this opportunity to advocate EU legislation.


The EU's ability to act


No matter how desirable a particular law might be, the EU can only act when powers have been conferred upon it. To what extent can it act to deal with violence against women? First of all, Article 83(1) TFEU gives the EU power to adopt criminal law measures on specific offences which were deemed by the Treaty drafters to have a EU-wide impact. This includes legislation concerning 'trafficking in human beings and the sexual exploitation of women and children'. Indeed, as the FRA report points out, the EU has adopted Directives on trafficking in persons and sexual offences against children.

The EU has also used its power to adopt a Directive on the protection of crime victims generally, which, as the report points out, contains specific provisions on protection against gender-related violence. However, this Directive does not address issues of substantive criminal law. Neither does the EU legislation on cross-border enforcement of criminal law protection orders or civil law protection orders.

Could the EU adopt a substantive criminal law measure on other aspects of violence against women? It does have power to adopt criminal law measures on offences not listed in Article 83(1), if (according to Article 83(2)) this is 'essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures'. As regards gender equality, there is (inter alia) EU law on sex equality in employment and sex equality as regards goods and services. It seems obvious that violence against women could impact in practice upon their equal access to employment or goods and services. The FRA report mentions in particular the fear of crime that deters women from moving freely. Of course, violence against women shouldn't normally be examined in such utilitarian terms, but it is necessary to do in the particular context of proving the EU's competence to act. And this analysis would apply equally as regards EU legislation concerning racial hatred, which I discussed in a previous blog post.


Should the EU use its powers?


The FRA report makes many references to the Council of Europe's recent Convention on violence against women, and encourages Member States and the EU to ratify it. Of course, this would be desirable, since the Convention is a comprehensive recent instrument which is moreover open to non-EU Member States.  But is it enough? Certainly the EU did not simply rely on the Council of Europe Conventions on trafficking in persons or the exploitation of children when it adopted its own legislation on the issue, or upon the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women when it adopted its sex equality laws.

The fact is, while ratification of the Convention should be encouraged, most Member States have not yet ratified it. Moreover, EU law has an inherent advantage over international treaties in terms of its enforceability, given that the Commission can bring proceedings against Member States for non-application or incorrect application of the law, and individuals can rely on it before the national courts.

What specific issues could EU legislation address? Here, the FRA report points to some failings in national law which could be addressed by an EU measure, ensuring that the EU measure would add value compared to the existing legal position. In particular: some national laws have a restrictive definition of sexual violence; one Member State does not criminalise rape of married women; some Member States do not address repeat victimisation; some national laws do not address psychological violence, stalking or cyber-harassment; and current EU anti-discrimination law only concerns sexual harassment at the workplace, not in other contexts. This represents a significant catalogue of issues which EU law could usefully address.


Conclusion


The FRA's suggestion that the EU ratify the Council of Europe Convention presents an opportunity to bring the two issues (can the EU act, and should it act) together. According to EU external relations law, the EU can ratify treaties not just as regards its competence which it has already exercised (as regards crime victims' rights, for instance), but also in respect of competences which it has not exercised. Furthermore, a treaty which the EU has not yet ratified can be sent to the Court of Justice of the European Union, in order to examine its compatibility with EU law, including as regards EU competences. So the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State could use this process to ask the Court to clarify the exact extent of the EU's powers to conclude the Convention as regards substantive criminal law.


[Update: in March 2016, the Commission proposed that the EU sign the Council of Europe Convention. See further discussion here.]

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20, chapter 25