Showing posts with label agencies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label agencies. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 November 2023

Europol’s Joint and Several Liability Regime: Revolutionizing EU Fundamental Rights Responsibility?

 


Dr Joyce de Coninck, University of Ghent

Photo credit: Oseveno 


Introduction

 

The Europol Regulation introduces a system of joint and several EU liability for unlawful data processing in violation of Article 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This nascent EU liability regime features at the heart of the dispute in the Marián Kočner v Europol saga, and much like the recent WS and others v Frontex case before the General Court, highlights the urgency for clarification on joint responsibility for human rights violations as a result of shared conduct between the EU’s operational agencies and the EU Member States.

 

One of the drivers prompting this need for clarification, relates to the increased cooperation between the EU’s operational agencies on the one hand, with EU Member States on the other hand, in achieving common objectives. While Frontex is increasingly endowed with (executive) powers in the EU’s Integrated Border Management (see here, here and here), Europol is endowed with increased powers regarding the processing of large datasets, the screening of foreign direct investment in security-related cases and the acquisition of data from private companies in dealing with terrorist or child abuse material. These enhanced powers result in a multiplicity of public and private actors working together in achieving common goals, where previously such tasks fell within the exclusive purview of the Member States.  

 

The ‘crowding of the operational field’, referred to by Gkliati and McAdam as the ‘many hands’ problem, reveals a significant disconnect between the EU’s contemporary liability regime on the one hand, and the application of this liability regime in practice to situations of joint conduct that give rise to human rights harms on the other hand. In other words, the EU’s liability regime was not legally designed to accommodate questions of joint responsibility for human rights harms flowing from concerted conduct by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the EU Member States. The incompatibility – or rather, unsuitability – of the EU’s human rights regime in dealing with joint conduct, features on two distinct levels, and on both levels, a driving force behind the unsuitability is one of legal design.

 

On the one hand, historical accounts of the constitutionalization of fundamental rights in the EU, giving rise to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in particular, explain that this process was by and large the result of constitutional concerns over EU fundamental rights protection by domestic courts. In other words, this exercise of constitutionalization came about in reaction to constitutional objections by Member States regarding the level of protection of fundamental rights provided under the EU’s chapeau. An unintended consequence of this development appears to be that the drafters of the Charter did not necessarily consider joint and inseparable operational conduct by EU entities and the EU Member States. In turn, and as predicted by Weiler, it did not bring the added clarity to how the state-centric Charter rights – many of which were inspired by and textually almost identical to state-centric international human rights treaties – would translate into enforceable negative and positive human rights obligations that give flesh to the bones of these human rights commitments. In other words, the mere fact that EU entities are bound by fundamental rights in the Charter, does not relay much on how the EU must conduct itself in order to comply with these rights, as I have discussed at length elsewhere (here, here and here).

 

On the other hand, the EU’s liability regime also was not legally designed to respond to questions of responsibility-allocation flowing from unlawful joint conduct giving rise to human rights harms. This is textually and historically supported, as the EU’s action for damages falls within the exclusive purview of the CJEU (Article 268 in juncto 340 TFEU) and case law has set out rules proclaiming that national courts shall be seized where damages are the result of the incorrect or correct implementation by Member States of EU legislative acts (for a general discussion, see here). In other words, the EU’s action for damages was not developed to consider joint non-contractual responsibility and the conditions for liability subsequently developed through the CJEU’s case law were also not developed with such liability in mind.

 

However, the increased reliance on inseparable and operational cooperation between EU entities and its Members giving rise to fundamental rights harms, brings to the fore a new dimension of liability that was not foreseen in either the normative human rights developments giving rise to the Charter, nor the liability regime that currently exists within the EU’s framework. Yet it is precisely this question of joint liability that sits at the heart of the case of Marián Kočner v Europol currently pending before the CJEU and the accompanying opinion by Advocate General Rantos as developed and discussed in what follows.

 

The Case

 

In 2018 Marián Kočner was being investigated by the Slovak criminal authorities within the context of a murder investigation. The investigation resulted in the domestic authorities taking possessing of two mobile phones and a USB drive belonging to the Applicant, which were subsequently handed over to Europol at the request of the domestic authorities in October 2018. Several months later, Europol returned the mobile phones and the USB-drive along with relevant scientific reports concerning its contents, as well as a hard-drive with encrypted data derived from the mobile phones to the Slovak authorities. The contents of the mobile phones and USB drive – transcripts of intimate conversations involving the applicant and his girlfriend, as well as the inclusion of his name on the ‘mafia lists’ – were subsequently leaked in large quantities and made public by the press. On the basis of these leaks the Applicant claimed compensation from Europol for non-material damage stemming from unlawful data processing, underscoring that the leaks by the press violated his right to a private and family life as protected under Article 7 CFR.

 

In the subsequent action for damages on the basis of Article 268 and Article 340 TFEU, the General Court dismissed the Applicant’s claims (Kočner v Europol T-528/20) holding that no causal link could be established between Europol’s conduct and the purported damages stemming from the data made public from the mobile phones, and that the Applicant had not provided any evidence demonstrating that the ‘mafia lists’ had been drawn up by Europol.

 

In his appeal, the Applicant asks the Court of Justice to set aside the General Court’s ruling on the basis of six points of law. For the purpose of the current contribution however, the focus will be on the argument raised by the Applicant concerning the nature of the EU’s liability. Specifically, the Applicant argues that the General Court erred in law for having disregarded Europol’s liability in light of recital 57 of the Europol Regulation related to joint and several liability. In other words, this claim by the Applicant juxtaposes the concept of ‘joint and several liability’ with the notion of joint responsibility more generally, contending that the implications of these different approaches to responsibility may have yielded a different outcome in the case. According to the Applicant, the fact that the General Court did not consider Europol’s liability through the standard of ‘joint and several liability’ constitutes an error depriving recital 57 of the Europol Regulation of any significance.

 

The arguments advanced by the Applicant provide the Court of Justice with the first-ever opportunity to rule on the scope and implications of the concept of joint and several liability of Europol, which – given the marginal case law on joint responsibility for human rights harms more generally – could prove very instructive in clarifying the conditions of joint responsibility and the manner in which such responsibility should be allocated between the EU and the Member States.

 

The Opinion

 

After dismissing an admissibility objection by Europol, Advocate General Rantos identifies six grounds of appeal, of which four relate to the question of whether unlawful data processing occurred by Europol. The remaining two points of appeal concern the nature of Europol’s liability and the concept of ‘joint and several liability’ specifically.

 

The question of the nature of Europol’s responsibility essentially revolves around recital 57 and Article 50 of the Europol Regulation. As aforementioned, recital 57 introduces the concept of joint and several liability where it may “…be unclear for the individual concerned whether damage suffered as a result of unlawful data processing is a consequence of action by Europol or by a Member State”. This provision covers only liability issues relating to unlawful data processing and only insofar it is unclear to which party the (unlawful) data processing should be attributed, whereas the preceding recital 56 recalls that for all other questions of non-contractual liability, the EU’s general liability rules – as articulated in the CJEU’s Bergaderm ruling – apply.

 

Chapter 7 of the Europol Regulation covers remedies and liability and Article 50 specifically, addresses liability stemming from unlawful data processing. This provision holds in its first paragraph that anyone having suffered damage from unlawful data processing will be entitled to receive compensation from either Europol in line with the general liability rules of article 340 TFEU, or from the Member State in which the unlawful data processing occurred in accordance with its domestic law. The second paragraph (Article 50(2)) holds that where a dispute arises concerning the ultimate responsibility for compensation, the Management Board of Europol shall decide by a two-thirds majority who bears the burden of ultimate responsibility for compensation. Grosso modo the relevant recitals appear to refer to modalities of responsibility allocation between Europol and the implicated Member States, whereas Article 50 is concerned with the ensuing obligation of compensation insofar responsibility has effectively been established.  

 

AG Rantos begins his opinion on the nature of the EU’s liability by pointing out that while the relevant recitals do introduce a solidarity-based responsibility mechanism, this is not mentioned explicitly in its operative counterpart. In fact, the absence of any explicit reference to joint and several liability in Article 50 led the General Court to the conclusion that liability in accordance with the general rules on liability embedded in Article 340 TFEU, could not be causally established.

 

After recalling the conditions to establish EU liability generally (para 34 – 35), AG Rantos addresses the question of the nature of Europol’s liability in a threefold manner, recalling that a provision of EU law must be interpreted mindful of its wording (1), the context in which it was drafted (2), and its objective and purpose (3), which may be inferred from its legislative history and through comparative interpretation.

 

Contrary to Europol, AG Rantos concedes that the wording of the relevant recitals (which appear to introduce new modalities of joint responsibility under EU law), and the wording of the Article 50 (which neglects any reference to joint and several liability and refers only to compensation) is not unambiguous. To this end, he underscores that the reference to joint and several liability in recital 57 suggests concurrent liability for Europol and the Member States, whereas Article 50 literally suggests responsibility for compensation as being a responsibility of either the Member State or Europol. Similarly, the generic reference to non-contractual EU liability in Article 340 TFEU, which is to be considered in line with the general principles common in the laws of the Member States, leaves room for interpretation.

 

As concerns the context of the contested provisions, the AG notes that while recitals have no legally binding force as such, they nevertheless function as an indicator of the intent of the legislator. In casu, the intent of the legislator was to favor the aggrieved parties and eliminate any questions of attribution. The AG concludes that this is not in conflict with Article 50, following which the latter must be interpreted in light of recital 57 and the concept of joint and several liability.

 

Finally, the objectives of recital 57 of the Europol Regulation may be discerned through its legislative history and a comparative interpretation of its meaning in light of general principles common to the Member States. Here, the AG recalls that the concept of ‘joint and several liability’ had been introduced in the very first Commission proposal and had been included among others to limit the difficulties encountered by aggrieved parties in attributing unlawful processing to either the Member States or the EU. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of this concept reveals that Member States make use of this mode of liability in cases where attribution of unlawful conduct may be hard to establish. The Advocate General concludes that suspending the procedure before EU courts while the concomitant domestic procedure against the Member State is pending – as typically occurs for questions of joint responsibility – would deprive Article 50 interpreted through recital 57 of any significance. It flows from this that concurrent proceedings would thus be possible. 


Analysis

 

The case deals with a situation of ‘many hands’ cooperation involving a Member State which gives rise to a question of unlawful data processing, arguably falling within the ambit of Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection of personal data) of the Charter. Flowing from this, the Applicant argues that Europol should be held responsible under the rules of joint and several liability, whereas Europol contends that this should be assessed under the standard rules of joint responsibility which are derived from the Bergaderm ruling. In essence, this is a question of whether the lex generalis applies or instead, whether a lex specialis applies. As aforementioned, the Advocate General recommends that the case be re-examined by the General Court, in light of the (underdeveloped) rules on joint and several liability, whereby he concurs with the Applicant that it is unclear to which party the conduct should be attributed.

 

The Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur judgments, spell out the conditions for Member State liability under EU law, whereas the Bergaderm judgment spells out the conditions for non-contractual responsibility of the EU institutions. These conditions require that for responsibility to arise, there must be a (sufficiently serious) breach of EU law, that causally gives rise to damage. In certain cases, the CJEU will also demand that the conduct must be attributable to the EU actor under scrutiny.

 

These rules apply to responsibility and joint responsibility between the EU and its Member States generally, but importantly do not prejudice more tailored, specific or alternative rules on (joint) liability. An alternative, bifurcated approach to liability exists in the realm of EU data processing. On the one hand, there are the data-processing specific rules for Member State liability embedded in the GDPR. On the other hand, there are specific liability rules for data processing applicable to EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as embedded in the Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive, as well as the Data Processing by the EU Institutions and Bodies Regulation. These data processing-specific rules apply, unless there are more specific rules that have been developed, which is the case for processing of operational data by Europol (Article 2(3) Data Processing by the EU Institutions and Bodies Regulation). In other words, more specific rules have been developed for situations involving processing of data for Europol. Accordingly, when it is clear to which actor (the Member State or Europol) unlawful data processing should be attributed, the regular rules on liability apply, in accordance with the domestic regime for Member State liability and in accordance with the action for damages concerning Europol’s liability (Article 50(1) Europol Regulation). However, when attribution is not clear, joint and several liability applies (recital 57 in juncto Article 50(2) Europol Regulation), leaving it to the Management Board to decide in case of conflict who bears the ultimate responsibility to provide compensation for the inflicted harm (Article 50(2) Europol Regulation).

 

Juxtaposing Joint Liability and Joint and Several Liability

 

This approach appears to give rise to procedural efficiency from the perspective of the Applicant and appears to relax the Bergaderm conditions for EU responsibility to arise. 

 

Choosing the Judicial Forum

 

The objective of the joint and several liability mechanism is to ensure that the Applicant’s rights are safeguarded. This means that unlike the system of joint EU-Member State responsibility, the domestic court will not necessarily be the primary forum to establish responsibility and the ensuing burden of reparations. Instead, the aggrieved individual could go through either the domestic legal system or the EU’s action for damages to have responsibility established. Upon conclusion of the legal procedures and once the Applicant has been awarded damages, these actors could subsequently settle any dispute on the duty to provide reparations in a subsequent procedure within the Management Board of Europol, the decision of which could also be subject to legal scrutiny under the annulment procedure. Under this mechanism, the Applicant enjoys a much lesser of a burden in choosing the appropriate judicial venue and is not constrained by which actor will be able to provide reparations. Instead, reparations (in case of responsibility) will be the default from the perspective of the Applicant.

 

Attribution and Causation Revisited

 

The system of joint and several liability suggests that as soon as a situation implicates both Europol and a Member State, and the questionable conduct cannot be definitely attributed to either entity, the requirement of attribution becomes obsolete, as the conduct will be considered attributable to both in full. Interestingly, by relaxing the requirement to establish attribution, the condition of causation will arguably also be relaxed. It is important to recall that while attribution links a particular line of conduct to an actor, causality links that actor to the damage. Relaxing the rules of attribution under the joint and several liability regime and doing away with the requirement to definitively attribute conduct to one or the other, ipso facto entails that the requirement of causality as it currently is being applied, can never be met. Causation under general EU liability law demands that there is an uninterrupted relationship between the unlawful conduct by a certain actor, giving rise to damage. Yet, in the absence of an obligation to attribute to either the Member State or the EU, the unlawful data processing will be considered attributable to both. If the unlawful conduct is considered attributable to both, it is then unclear how this impacts the causality requirement, which demands that the chain of causation linking the damage to the unlawful conduct by a particular actor, be uninterrupted by intervening acts.

 

Lingering Questions for the EU Courts

 

In light of the limited case law on EU (joint) responsibility generally, a number of questions remain unaddressed including by Advocate General Rantos either.

 

Attribution

 

A first small but pervasive question that demands further clarification concerns when Article 50 read in light of recital 57 of the Europol Regulation is triggered. The presumption appears to be that it is straightforward to distinguish between scenarios in which attribution can be definitively established, and situations in which it is unclear to which entity the unlawful data processing should be attributed. Yet, to date no clear standard of attribution can be definitely discerned under the general system of EU liability. In fact, practice by the EU institutions internally, in international relations, and across different EU policy fields, suggests that the rule of attribution differs significantly in a rather haphazard manner. This is complicated by the absence of a common legal forum to settle responsibility questions implicating the EU and Member States in unlawful data processing. The applied attribution rules under domestic regimes may very well differ from attribution rules under the EU’s liability regime for example, and to date, it is not clear which attribution rules should prevail, much less how this impacts whether Europol’s joint and several liability mechanism is triggered. Arguably, the absence of a coherent and clarified approach to attribution under EU law means that it will be easier for Applicants to trigger joint and several liability under the Europol Regulation. However, this remains to be seen, and is as always, dependent on the applicable burden, standard and method of proof required to show that it’s unclear to which actor the unlawful data processing should be attributed.

 

Joint and Several Liability Beyond Data Processing

 

The question of human rights liability for violations occurring at the hands of operational EU agencies has gained much traction in recent years. The current pending actions for damages against Frontex prompt the question whether a – CJEU clarified – system of joint and several liability may be a way forward. Anyone who has attended a conference or workshop involving Frontex representatives, has undoubtedly been confronted with the scripted answer to questions of human rights responsibility: ‘Frontex is not responsible for such actions – Frontex merely coordinates Member State actions’. Leaving aside the veracity of this response, it is undisputed the current regime of liability allocation has resulted in much blame shifting at the expense of individual rights. Conversely, the system of joint and several liability introduced by the Europol Regulation may very well be a way to circumvent this type of blame-shifting, safeguard the rights of the individual while ensuring that the burden of reparation is not circumvented by one at the expense of the other. A well-developed system of joint and several liability could thus fulfill both a remedial function – namely to protect the Applicants’ fundamental rights, as well as a deterrence function. By increasing the likelihood of legal responsibility through more relaxed rules on attribution and causation, EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies may be disincentivized to resort to ‘many hands’ to circumvent responsibility claims in implementing their policies, or at least be incentivized to clarify their own rules on (human rights) responsibility allocation. Of course, I write this knowing full well that it is precisely these institutions that prefer to continue operating in the ‘many hands’ murkiness and that clarified rules on responsibility will receive political push-back and may disincentivize operational agencies from providing support in tackling transnational issues. Yet, once every so often, a unicorn-like development surfaces in the field of EU human rights responsibility, as evidenced by the joint and several liability mechanism in this case. Who knows – maybe this same unicorn will resurface in the EU’s responsibility acquis more generally? In any event, I await the CJEU’s perspective on this matter eagerly.  

Sunday, 12 February 2023

Of Third ‘States’, ‘Countries’ and Other Demons - The CJEU’s Judgment in Case C-632/20 P Spain v Commission (Kosovo)

 



Eva Kassoti, Senior Researcher, CLEER academic co-ordinator, T.M.C. Asser Institute. E-mail: E.Kassoti@asser.nl

Photo credit: Aljabakphoto, via Wikimedia commons - Šar Mountains National Park in Dragaš, Kosovo

On 17th January 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C-632/20 P Spain v Commission (Kosovo) ruling that notwithstanding the EU’s non-recognition of Kosovo as a State, Kosovo may participate in an EU agency, namely the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). The judgment is significant since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of ‘third country’ - as including territorial entities which have not been recognized by the EU as sovereign States - and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies. The judgment may also have more far-reaching consequences in the light of Kosovo’s 2022 bid for EU membership.

The case is an appeal against the GC’s judgment of 23 September 2020 (T-370/19, for comment see here and here). At first instance, the GC rejected Spain’s complaint to the effect that participation of Kosovo’s National Regulatory Authority (NRA) in BEREC is precluded since the EU has not recognised Kosovo as an independent State and thus, it does not constitute a ‘third country’ within the meaning of Article 35 of the BEREC Regulation. The GC argued that the fact that the TFEU makes reference both to ‘third States’ and ‘third countries’ implies that the latter concept is broader and thus, that it is “clearly intended to pave the way for the conclusion of international agreements with entities ‘other than States’” (T-370/19, para. 30). Spain appealed the GC’s judgment and AG Kokott delivered her Opinion on 16 June 2022 (for comment see here).

This blogpost will focus on what is - arguably - the most important aspect of the judgment, namely how the CJEU treated the question of Kosovo’s participation in an EU agency as a ‘third country’ despite the absence of EU recognition of its (claimed) Statehood. It needs to be noted that the background against which the judgment was given is not only politically laden, since five EU member States oppose Kosovo’s claim to Statehood, but also quite complex from an international law point of view – since the international legal status of Kosovo is unclear and legal opinion is divided (Vidmar, p. 44; see however, Crawford, p. 289). While the CJEU (wisely) refrained from delving into questions of Statehood and recognition, which are closely but not directly linked to the dispute at bar, its (rather terse) pronouncement on the issue at bar shows a reluctance to engage with relevant international legal considerations – something that ultimately detracts from its persuasive force.

 

Summary of the Judgment

Spain’s grounds of appeal boiled down to two main questions: a) whether Article 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation in conjunction with Article 111 of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) permit the participation of the NRA of Kosovo in the work of BEREC; and b) whether the Commission enjoyed the institutional competence to adopt the decision on the participation of the NRA of Kosovo in BEREC. In relation to the first question, Article 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation allows the participation in the agency of ‘third countries’ where those countries have entered into agreements with the EU to that effect. Thus, the interpretation of the concept of ‘third countries’ is key here. More particularly, Spain argued that adopting the GC’s broad understanding of the concept of ‘third countries’ under EU law (as including entities other than States) would create an autonomous category of EU law and it would thus confer on the concept a different scope in EU law from that in international law (para. 35).

The CJEU did not uphold the distinction between ‘third States’ and ‘third countries’ propounded by the GC (paras. 37- 47). More particularly, the Court argued that this distinction is not made in all language versions of the Treaties, and thus, it cannot necessarily be inferred that a difference in meaning between these two concepts exists as a matter of primary law (paras. 39-42). Noting that in some language version of the Treaties the terms are actually used synomously, the CJEU reprimanded the GC for failing to take into account the relevant linguistic divergences and thus, to pay heed to settled case-law to the effect that different language versions must be interpreted in a uniform manner and that no language version can be made to override others (paras. 40-42). Since the GC’s finding that the concept of ‘third countries’ within the meaning of Art. 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation goes beyond the concept of sovereign States was made on an erroneous premiss, namely that of a difference in meaning between ‘third States’ and third ‘countries’ in primary law, the CJEU found that the GC’s reasoning was erroneous.

Against this backdrop, the CJEU continued by exploring whether the term ‘third countries’ in Art. 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation could encompass Kosovo. The Court found that the principle of effectiveness entails that an entity not recognized as a sovereign State should be treated as a ‘third country’ within the meaning of that provision “while not infringing international law” (para. 50). As far as the latter is concerned, the Court referred to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence as proof that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law, UNSCR 1244/1999, or the applicable constitutional framework (para. 51). Furthermore, the Court argued that this conclusion does not affect the individual positions of Member States since the Commission’s decision concerning the participation of the NRA of Kosovo in BEREC expressly states that the designation ‘Kosovo’ is without prejudice to positions on status (para. 52).

The Court turned next to the interpretation of the concept of ‘third country’ in Article 35 of the BEREC Regulation. Article 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation stipulates that participation in the agency requires the existence of an ‘agreement’ between the third country and the EU ‘to that effect’ (para. 54). It underscored the fact that the Union has entered several international agreements with Kosovo, “thus recognizing its capacity to conclude such agreements” (para. 55). Article 111 of the SAA provides for co-operation between the EU and Kosovo in the area of electronic communications and is similar in substance to corresponding arrangements made with other Western Balkan States which were deemed sufficient for their NRAs to participate in BEREC. Thus, it is logical to conclude that the provision also covers the arrangement with Kosovo (paras. 56-59). The fact that the notion of ‘third country’ also extends to entities such as Kosovo is further buttressed by having recourse to the purpose of Article 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation. The provision was adopted with a view to ensuring the consistent implementation of the regulatory framework for electronic communications and thus, it corresponds to the objective of Article 111 of the SAA which is that Kosovo should adopt the EU acquis in that sector (paras. 61-63).

By way of contrast to the GC, however, the CJEU found that the Commission lacked the institutional competence to unilaterally draw up working arrangements applying to the participation of the NRA of Kosovo in the work of BEREC, and thus, it set the judgment under appeal aside and annulled the relevant decision – while maintaining its effects until its replacement by a new act (paras. 96-140).

 

Comment

Interpretative Approach and Methodology

While the Court, in a similar vein to the AG, upheld the principle of linguistic equality which dictates that different language versions must be construed in a uniform manner and that, therefore, an interpretation of the concept of ‘third countries’ on the basis of the Treaties alone is inconclusive, it refrained from clearly setting out its methodological choices in interpreting the term on the basis of the BEREC Regulation. The Court merely relied on the purpose of ‘ensuring the effectiveness’ of Art. 35 (2) of the BEREC Regulation in order to argue that Kosovo should be considered as falling within the scope of the concept of ‘third country’ within the meaning of the provision. However, it is not immediately apparent how the principle of effectiveness guides the interpretative process in casu. Arguably, the Court missed here an opportunity to clarify the role of effectiveness as an interpretative guide which emphasises, or even prioritises, a teleological approach when the interpreter is confronted with equally plausible interpretative choices. By way of contrast, the AG clearly articulated the framework of enquiry into the meaning of the term in the Regulation (by having recourse to its regulatory context, origin, purpose as well as relevant international legal considerations) (AG’s Opinion, paras. 64-86) – an approach which was methodologically sound and thus, led to a much more convincing line of reasoning.

 

The Concept of ‘Third Country’ and Relevant International Legal Considerations

It is important to note that the CJEU was quite laconic in its reasoning as to why Kosovo should be considered as a ‘third country’ and it did not really invoke relevant international legal practice in order to substantiate the view that Art 35(2) of the BEREC Regulation should be interpreted as covering territorial entities that have not been recognized as ‘States’ by the Union.

There are many reasons why this approach is problematic. First, by omitting such references, the Court failed to address Spain’s argument to the effect that affording a broader meaning to the term ‘third countries’ under EU law would create discrepancies with international law – “while States are the key subjects of international relations” (para. 35). Both the GC (paras. 31-32) and the AG (paras. 83-85), had invoked the treaty-practice of the Union itself with territorial entities that have not been recognized as sovereign States by the EU - such as PLO, Hong Kong and Macao as well as Kosovo - in order to buttress the proposition that entities, other than States proper, may also enjoy (limited) capacity to act on the international plane. Indeed,  modern international law acknowledges that legal personality is a spectral concept – while States are actors that “possess the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law” (ICJ, Reparations for Injuries, p. 180), other actors (such as insurgent groups, national liberation movements and non-self-governing territories) may enjoy a degree of legal personality that affords them the capacity to act on the international plane (including treaty-making capacity). Thus, as the Union’s own treaty-making practice attests to, disengaging international legal personality from the capacity to act avoids the misleading dichotomy between ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of international law (as Spain’s argument goes) and allows the weight of enquiry to fall on the extent of the legal capacity a particular entity enjoys in each case. The capacity to act, including treaty-making capacity, is largely a question of recognition; other actors must recognize the (limited) capacity of an effective territorial entity by entering into legal relations therewith. To be sure, the CJEU did mention that “the European Union has entered into several agreements with Kosovo, thus recognizing its capacity to conclude such agreements” (para. 55) – which arguably shows a degree of awareness of the distinction between States, as the subjects par excellence of international law, and the wide circle of participants (with varying degrees of legal capacity) in modern international law. However, the Court’s failure to expound on the issue and to provide examples from international legal practice or from the Union’s own treaty-making practice with non-recognized entities for that matter means that its logic remains implicit.

Secondly, this omission is also rather unfortunate in the light of the ‘effectiveness’ argument put forward by the CJEU. The Court could have grounded its effet utile argumentation exactly by pointing to the wide circle of participants on the international stage. Thus, the Court could have relied on this line of practice to further bolster the proposition that a broad interpretation of the provision at hand is needed in order to ensure that the EU functions as an effective actor on the global stage – which is no longer dominated by States alone. Of course, this construction would entail affording a greater role to effectiveness considerations in the context of interpretation than what they currently have. Instead of the narrower role of protecting the full effect of EU law, considerations of effectiveness of the type asserted here would entail protecting the effectiveness of EU external action – thereby providing the Court with extra tools to ensure the functionality of the Union as an international actor.

In this light, it is perhaps ironic that the Court’s actual reference to international law in the judgment is rather cryptic. The Court stated that on grounds of securing the effectiveness of the provision at hand entities not recognized as sovereign States by the Union should be treated as ‘third countries’ within the meaning of that provision “while not infringing international law” (para. 50). It is unclear what the non-infringement of international law meant. The Court’s subsequent reference to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence (para. 51) presumably implies that Kosovo can be considered as a ‘third country’ since its declaration of independence does not violate international law – as per the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion.

This is where things get murky. According to Art. 41(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, there is an international law obligation bestowed upon third parties not to recognize either formally or implicitly an effective territorial situation created in breach of a jus cogens norm (see also Advisory Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence  para. 81).  However, the CJEU was wrong to assume that the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion answered the broader question of the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral secession from Serbia. The ICJ merely gave an affirmative answer to the considerably narrower question of the accordance of Kosovo’s’ unilateral declaration of independence with international law – without touching upon questions of Statehood or recognition. Since a declaration of independence in and of itself does not create a State, or a new legal situation, it may be considered a legally neutral act – or as Crawford eloquently put it “the sound of one hand clapping.” (Crawford, p. 47). In this light, the CJEU’s reliance on the ICJ’s dictum in order to support the proposition that dealing with a territorial entity as a ‘third country’ under EU law does not infringe international law was rather misplaced.

In reality, there was no need for the Court to make this particular reference to ‘infringements of international law’. The case did not directly involve any questions of formal – and more importantly, implicit - recognition by the Union of Kosovo as a State and hence no question of responsibility of the Union could technically arise here. Art. 2 of the Kosovo SAA expressly states that the agreement does not constitute recognition of Kosovo’s status as a State by the Union and, similarly, the Commission decision at hand expressly states that the designation Kosovo “is without prejudice to questions of status.” The AG avoided this misstep much more eloquently – by addressing the question whether the Commission’s decision constituted implicit recognition of Kosovo as a ‘State’ head on (paras. 87-91).

The above remarks leave the question of whether the EU has an obligation under international law to withhold recognition of Kosovo as a State open. The answer is quite complex and it cannot be comprehensively answered here. There are however several indicia that such an obligation of non-recognition does not exist in relation to Kosovo. First, there is little evidence to suggest that Kosovo’s unilateral secession was attributed to a violation of a jus cogens norm and in casu no specific resolution by the UN calling for collective non-recognition has been issued (by way of contrast to, for example, Southern Rhodesia or the TRNC). Recognition by other States also plays an important role here – having a curative effect in relation to possible deficiencies in which a State came into being (Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Quebec, para. 155). Some 100 States have recognized Kosovo’s claim to Statehood – something which could be viewed as evidence that Kosovo’s attempt at State creation has been successful.

Despite its shortcomings in terms of reasoning on the basis of international law, the judgment is important as it clarifies that the (rather artificial) distinction made by the GC between ‘third States’ and ‘third countries’ does not exist – at least as a matter of EU secondary law. Its implications for Kosovo’s future relations with the EU remain to be seen – particularly since the question of whether Kosovo constitutes a ‘State’, as Art. 49 TEU seems to require, remains open.

Tuesday, 14 December 2021

Are "sovereign" decisions by Member States really above the law? Can Member States’ decisions on the seats of EU agencies be challenged?

 



 

Ezio Perillo, former judge on the EU General Court and EU civil service tribunal

 

Following the Sharpston-Council orders, declaring the former British Advocate General’s action against the appointment of a new AG inadmissible (cases C-684/20P and C-685/20P, 16 June 2021), even the decisions that the governments of the Member States claim to take by mutual agreement for determining the seats of the European agencies seem to fall outside the EU Court’s judicial review. This is, at least, the opinion expressed by AG Bobek, delivered on 6 October 2021, in joined cases, EMA (European Medicines Agency, relocated to Amsterdam) and ELA (European Labour Authority, located in Bratislava), C-59/18, C-182/18 and C-743/19, and in a parallel opinion in Cases C-106/19 and 232/19. According to the AG, these are "decisions taken by the Member States outside the framework of the Treaties" (paragraph 173).

 

(With reference to the Sharpston orders, see L. Gradoni, Unpersuasive but Wise: how the CJEU (Almost) Made the Right Call in Sharpston, in Verfassung Blog, 24 June 2021. On EMA and ELA cases see, T. Bucht, Sometimes less is more, a critical view on AG Bobek’s Opinion on the seats of the agencies, in European Law Blog, 14 October 2021.)

 

I will say right away, in tweet-mode, that the opposite solution is also true.

 

1.      “Sovereign” national decisions or obligations of European origin?

 

In establishing the Community’s institutions, the Masters of the Treaties decided at that time, for political and practical reasons, to “delegate” to their respective governments the task of determining their seats. Article 341 TFEU still provides, nowadays, that "the seats of institutions of the Union shall be determined by common agreement of the governments of the Member States".

 

These decisions are therefore taken by the national governments in their own name and on behalf of the authors of the Treaties but, substantially, in the exclusive interest of the European Union, since the seats to be determined are those of the institutions belonging to this new legal order.

 

It follows that, in this context, national governments fully act within the EU legal framework and not outside of it, as if they were actors of international law. In so acting, they shall therefore respect the limits attached to this delegation as well as the prerogatives which the Treaties confer in similar matters to the EU institutions.

 

In other words, if they extend, at their discretion, the scope of the delegation received by the Masters of the Treaties, national governments act ultra vires. In this event, the corresponding decisions must be subject to the judicial review of the Court of Justice which has indeed the duty to ensure the observance of the institutional balance between the prerogatives the treaties confer to the national governments and those conferred to the EU institutions.

 

These decisions are therefore "atypical Union law acts".

 

The same applies, by the way, also to the appointments of the members of the EU Court, which the Masters of the Treaties did not certainly intend to leave to the arbitrium (the free will) of their governments.

 

 

For instance, article 253 TFEU currently provides that “every three years there shall be a partial replacement of the Judges and Advocates-General”. Not timing that best suits their respective governments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

 

"The Community is a legal order and not a mere arrangement founded on convenience", stated Robert Lecourt, the eminent president of the EU Court, back in 1976, pointing his finger at certain governments lagging behind. Indeed, "the institutional provisions of the Treaties [those relating, in this case, to the appointment of the EU judges], and the dates when they are to be applied are binding and leave no room for discretion" (See, Curia, Formal Hearings, 1976, p. 27.).

 

2. Determining the seats of the institutions and agencies: two different procedures

 

First of all, there is no specific provision of EU law on the seats of European agencies similar to that of Article 341 TFEU on the seats of the institutions.

 

Instead, the general competence for establishing European agencies, on a sector-by-sector basis, is with the European Parliament and the Council, as EU lawmakers, and, in a specific case, solely with the Council.

 

Article 45 TEU specifically states that the "statute, seat and operational rules” of the European Defence Agency are established by the Council and, therefore, not by the governments of the Member States (see, in this regard, also current Articles 85(1) and 88(2) TFEU on Eurojust and Europol).

 

It follows that, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the basic, general rule on this matter is: "only who has the authority to establish an agency (the European Parliament and/or the Council), has the authority to determine its seat as well".

 

3. The location of the EU agencies and Protocol No. 6 to the Lisbon Treaty

 

Still, according to the Council, Protocol No. 6 to the Lisbon Treaty extended the scope of Article 341 TFEU to include the location of the seats of agencies.

 

However, unlike all the other 36 Protocols annexed to the Treaty (the introductory line of which is "The High Contracting Parties ... have agreed"), Protocol No. 6 begins with the words "The representatives of the Governments of the Member States", i.e.  legal entities which, in principle, are not entitled to adopt Protocols or amend or interpret the Treaties. It is worth noting that in the Treaty for European Constitution, Protocol No. 6 began with the words "the High Contracting Parties". After failure to ratify that Treaty, however, this sentence was replaced, as in the previous Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, with the correct wording, namely "the representatives of the Governments of the Member States ...".

 

Therefore, regardless of the countless “practices”, which are certainly not customary, followed in recent years by the Council (sometimes, perhaps, even contra legem Unionis), Protocol No. 6 remains a mere implementation act pursuant to Article 341 TFEU and can in no way constitute an appropriate legal source allowing for an extensive interpretation of this article so as to include the location of the agencies. According to article 341 TFUE, the national governments are, indeed, “obliged” to implement the scope of this provision and not “authorised” to extend it. To quote, once again, president Lecourt, “the Community is a legal order and not a mere arrangement founded on convenience".

 

In the case, for instance, of the first regulation establishing the EMA, adopted at the time by the Council with the Parliament merely giving its opinion, Article 74 of that act provided: “This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that on which the competent authorities have decided on the seat of the Agency”. The entry into force of a Community’s regulation cannot be affected by a decision resting with unidentified authorities not involved in the legislative process in question, such as the national governments. If that were the case, this would constitute a clear breach of the principle of legislative autonomy characterizing the Union's legal system. In any event, the rules governing the adoption of the legislative Union acts are not available to the institutions nor the national governments. The Court should therefore not go along with it, especially when the institutional balance’s observance is at stake.

 

 

4. The notion of “institutional balance” and the broad interpretation of Article 263 TFEU

 

In its Post-Chernobyl judgment dated 22 May 1990, C-70/88, the EU Court, reversing its own initial case-law, stated that the same was required to "ensure preservation of the institutional balance and, consequently, [to ensure, with respect to each institution, the necessary] judicial review", because this entails protection of the prerogatives which the Treaties expressly have conferred on each of them (paragraphs 21-23).

 

Thus, "the absence in the Treaties of any provision giving the Parliament the right to bring an action for annulment may constitute a procedural gap, but it cannot prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties" (paragraph 26).

 

It follows that the list of challengeable acts in that article, just like the list of persons entitled to bring an action, is not comprehensive.

 

However, in Sharpston, EMA and ELA cases, the acts challenged before the Court were not acts by the institutions, as in the Post-Chernobyl case, but decisions taken, upon common accord, by the national governments.

 

Even considering this important difference, I believe that our jurisprudential framework remains unchanged.

 

Observance of the EU institutional balance is in fact an “autonomous”, European legal principle, which “requires that it should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur" (paragraph 22). Constitutionally speaking, institutional balance means “separation of powers”, i.e. a legal structure governed by constitutional “checks and balances”. So, if it is for the institutions and the national governments to respect the “EU Treaties balances”, it is for the EU Court to ensure, in case of breach of the institutional balance, the due “EU judicial checks”.

 

5. Three examples of national governments' decisions

 

Let’s suppose that the national governments were to appoint, upon common accord, not only some judges of the EU Court or of the EU General Court (see article 253 and 254 TFUE) but also, during the same intergovernmental meeting, certain judges of a specialised court, such as, for example, the European Civil Service Tribunal (before its abolishment a few years ago).

 

The difference is obviously not a formal one. According to article 257 TFUE, the appointment of the judges of a specialised court is a decision of the Council which, as such, is an act potentially subject to an action for annulment pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. On the contrary, any “all-in-one” appointment decision by the national governments, concerning all the three categories of EU Court members, would not, at least on paper (or according to the nomen auctoris criterion), be included among the acts specifically provided for by that article.

 

The EMA and ELA cases are not much different from this hypothesis.

           

In these cases, the national governments have in fact decided to transfer (in EMA) and set up (in ELA) the seat of two EU agencies despite the fact that (i) Article 341 TFEU verbatim limits such power to the determination of the seat of the EU “institutions”, and (ii) Protocol n. 6 does not allow the extension in the scope of the delegation under such Article.

 

In these three cases and in light of the Post-Chernobyl judgment, the institutional balance has clearly not been observed.

 

Therefore, the national governments, acting in compliance with the obligations referred to in Articles 253 and 341 TFEU, i.e. in “the fields covered by Union law” (Article 19 TEU), are fully subject to the EU Court judicial review process. And, in this context, it belongs only to the EU Court to ensure the crucial “effective judicial protection” (Article 19 TEU) against breach of the institutional balance at stake. Otherwise, such decisions would be deprived of any kind of judicial review, since no other Court, whether national or international, such as the European Court of Human Rights, could legitimately hold jurisdiction over the legality of EU collective national governments acts.

 

 

6. Conclusions

 

Observance of the institutional balance is a general rule designed to ensure the proper functioning of the entire system for the distribution of competences created within the Union's legal system. Accordingly, “any breach of that rule” shall be subject to a sanction by the EU Court for the purpose of ensuring an “effective legal protection”, notwithstanding any procedural shortcomings of Article 263 TFEU.

 

Ultimately, the combination of these two factors – i.e. observance of the institutional balance and effective judicial protection – also strengthens the legality of the intergovernmental decisions taken by the national governments according to articles 253 or 341 TFUE. Indeed, in Union law these decisions cannot constitute “les faits des princes”. On the contrary, they are acts taken in the exclusive interest of the Union and which shall therefore be adopted in compliance with rule-of-law and democracy values around which the entire legal structure of the Union revolves.

 

Reblogged from the Free Group blog and Verfassungsblog

Photo credit: Massimo Catarinella on wikicommons

Sunday, 31 January 2021

EU Migration Agencies: the Operation and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol

 



 

Dr. David Fernández-Rojo, Universidad de Deusto - davidfrojo@deusto.es

 

The so-called “refugee crisis” revealed the urge to ensure the functioning of the Schengen area and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the desire to operationally assist those Member States most affected by the sudden and extraordinary arrival of mixed migratory flows, and the need to implement effectively and uniformly the EU measures adopted in regard to migration, asylum and border management matters. Against this background, the decentralized EU Agencies, Frontex, EASO and Europol, have emerged as key actors, not only in providing emergency operational assistance to the frontline Member States, but also in implementing the hotspot approach. The expansion of the operational role, multilateral cooperation, presence on the ground and institutional significance within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of Frontex, EASO and Europol, is now unquestionable.

 

Hence, my book entitled “EU Migration Agencies: The Operation and Cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol”, published by Edward Elgar Publishing, comparatively analyzes the evolution of the operational tasks and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol. Special attention is paid to the expansion of the legal mandates of these AFSJ agencies, the reinforcement of the activities they undertake in practice on the ground and to what extent a gap exists between these two dimensions.

 

The evolution of the operational tasks of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed and two trends are highlighted. Firstly, while the Regulations of these AFSJ agencies continue to stress that their operational role is limited to providing the competent national authorities with the technical assistance they may require, the tasks of Frontex, EASO, and to a more limited extent, Europol, have an operational nature on the ground. Secondly, Frontex, EASO and Europol are increasingly involved in guaranteeing the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management measures, as well as ensuring that the concerned Member States do not jeopardize the functioning of the Schengen area or the CEAS. These two emerging trends are discussed in turn.

 

In this book I point out that Frontex, EASO and Europol closely accompany the frontline Member States in the implementation of EU migration, border management and asylum policies. These agencies focus on operationally supporting the competent border, asylum and law enforcement national authorities in effectively implementing EU law. The expansion of EU competences in AFSJ matters has gone hand-in-hand with the reinforcement of their administration, which no longer falls exclusively on the Member States, but rather, on a conundrum of diverse actors, among which Frontex, EASO and Europol play a prominent operational role.

 

The growing integration that the AFSJ is experiencing has led to a Europeanization of its administration. It is necessary to ensure a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management, asylum and migration laws. The long-standing notion of administrative and implementation power in AFSJ matters is therefore progressively shifting. The deepening of the operational powers and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is eroding the exclusive procedural autonomy that Member States previously enjoyed, when implementing EU law. These AFSJ agencies increasingly steer and shape the effective and uniform implementation of EU migration, asylum and border management laws and policies at the national level.

 

Furthermore, the extent of the operational functions of Frontex, EASO and Europol may theoretically range from merely coordinating and providing technical assistance to the Member States, to developing full-fledged enforcement and coercive powers. Since Frontex, EASO and Europol do not have independent executive competences, their tasks can no longer be described as merely technical or supportive. Despite the lack of transparency and the vague legal provisions regulating the activities that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake in practice on the ground, their tasks do have an operational nature. The issue is that the legal frameworks of Frontex, EASO and Europol lag behind the real operational powers that these agencies exercise on the ground, which creates legal uncertainty.

 

The reinforcement of the legal mandates and inter-agency operational cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol thus reveal a trend, under which these AFSJ agencies are mandated to increasingly develop operational and implementation activities. The operational and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol has followed a constant and linear progression since their respective establishment. While Europol, due to its still markedly intergovernmental nature, is starting to operationally assist the national law enforcement authorities in their national investigations about illegal migrant smuggling, Frontex and EASO already conduct significant operational tasks on the ground and ensure the implementation of the adopted European Union measures at the national level. Whereas the current tasks already represent an erosion of the operational powers and implementation prerogatives of the Member States, none of these AFSJ agencies have been bestowed centralized, fully autonomous operational and enforcement powers on the ground.

 

The reinforcement of the operational tasks and implementation role of Frontex, EASO and Europol is not in itself an issue. What is problematic is the broad formulation of these AFSJ agencies’ legal bases and the lack of transparency surrounding their operational activities and cooperation, rendering the task of determining the degree of discretion they enjoy difficult. The key challenge involves determining the degree of discretion that Frontex, EASO and Europol enjoy and whether the institutional balance in the EU is respected. In this light, and despite the fact that Frontex, EASO and Europol have not been vested with strictly delegated powers, this book followed the CJEU’s non-delegation doctrine as useful guidance to analyze the legality of these AFSJ agencies’ operational functions under EU constitutional law.

 

The CJEU, in its Short-Selling judgment (discussed here), updated and relaxed its initial Meroni doctrine, by no longer confining delegation to clearly defined executive powers, but rather to powers precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority.

Unlike in the case of Short-Selling, the operational powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol are neither circumscribed by well-detailed conditions that limit their discretion, nor clearly detailed in a legal framework or their Regulations. These AFSJ agencies’ operational tasks are not restricted to merely providing technical support to the frontline Member States, but rather, they develop expanding cross-agency operational cooperation and activities on the ground. These agencies’ tasks entail the exercise of discretional prerogatives that are not narrowly delineated or clearly conditioned in any national or EU legal instrument. For instance, Frontex and EASO played a strong recommendatory role in the hotspots, which in principle, is compatible with the non-delegation doctrine, since the concerned Member States are not bound by Frontex and EASO’s recommendations.

 

Nonetheless, the national authorities, subject to extraordinary migratory pressure, may decide to rubber-stamp the recommendations put forward by the agencies. Frontex’s influence over the Greek officials in determining the nationality of the arriving migrants, Europol’s advice and operational support to the national enforcement authorities to dismantle migrant smuggling networks, and EASO’s admissibility assessment of the asylum applications or the detection of vulnerable applicants encompass in practice discretional and political choices. In these cases, the responsibilities of the agencies are blurred, since the national authorities adopt a final decision based on the assessment of the agencies.

 

Although fully autonomous enforcement and coercive powers are not possible under the current Treaties and would breach the non-delegation doctrine, the ambiguity and lack of transparency surrounding the operational tasks that Frontex, EASO and Europol undertake on the ground challenge the determination of their discretion and whether they actually make policy choices. In the author’s view, the main limitation and control of Frontex, EASO and Europol’s distinctive operational and implementation role comes from the Member States. While it is true that Frontex, EASO and Europol assist the Member States in matters closely linked to their national sovereignty prerogatives, the competent national authorities that vote at the management boards tightly control their recently reinforced operational, implementation and supervisory functions. Only two representatives of the European Commission have voting rights in Frontex and EASO’s management boards and this figure falls to just one representative in the case of Europol. The presence of the European Parliament in Frontex, EASO and Europol’s management boards is non-existent. Member States also exert their influence over the appointment and supervision of the executive directors, who lead the governance, management and daily administration of Frontex, EASO and Europol.

 

Member States’ reluctance to fully abandon their well-established bilateral practices, share information and operationally cooperate with Frontex, EASO and Europol in core national sovereign matters, like border management, asylum or migration, is especially reflected in these AFSJ agencies’ management boards. The Member States will thus maintain control of the strategic decisions and the daily management of Frontex, EASO and Europol. While centralizing on the executive, decisional and enforcement powers of Frontex, EASO and Europol will ensure a fully effective and harmonized implementation, it is important to bear in mind that these agencies represent an institutional trade-off or a common ground between intergovernmentalism and communitarization in the AFSJ. That is, Member States do not wish to relinquish further sensitive competences to the EU Institutions; but at the same time, they increasingly need supranational operational assistance regarding matters that can only be effectively managed in an integrated manner at the EU level. For this reason, whereas Europol, Frontex and EASO have been conferred upon significant operational tasks, none of these agencies are vested with full decisional, enforcement or coercive powers, which remain as an exclusive competence of the competent national authorities.

 

Hence, this book makes four main contributions. First, it maps Frontex, EASO and Europol as EU decentralized agencies, which are clearly distinguished by their operational powers and by the possibility to directly assist the competent national authorities on the ground. In particular, the establishment and early operational functions conferred on Frontex, EASO and Europol are studied. Second, it comparatively analyzes the reinforcement of the operational tasks vested on Frontex, EASO and Europol, as well as the extent of their assistance on the ground and influence on the implementation prerogatives of the national authorities in the aftermath of the “refugee crisis”. Third, it explores the bilateral and multilateral inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, EASO and Europol. Specifically, the expanded multilateral and operational cooperation that takes place in the hotspots is studied. Fourth, the limitations to the reinforced operational activities and cooperation of Frontex, EASO and Europol is analyzed. The constitutionality and legal bases of these AFSJ agencies, as well as the degree of discretion that they enjoy according to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) non-delegation doctrine, is examined. The internal administrative organization and governance of Frontex, EASO and Europol is also studied as to determine the influence and real control that the Member States and civil society may exert over the increasing operational powers these AFSJ agencies have been conferred.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter II:4

Photo credit: Rock Cohen, via wikimedia commons