Showing posts with label X. Show all posts
Showing posts with label X. Show all posts

Friday, 20 February 2026

Digital Services Act: summary and links (last updated October 2026)

 


Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Animated Heaven, via Wikimedia Commons

 

Introduction

The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) sets out rules for regulating online platforms and search engines. The following sets out a summary of what the Act does, and links to key resources. It draws upon (and updates) a blog post on the Commission’s first non-compliance decision under the Act. This post will be updated. (First update: 18 October 2026; new developments since February 2026 are in bold and underline)

 

Overview of the Digital Services Act

The DSA contains rules that govern online platforms generally, regardless of size, but its most prominent rules concern a special regulatory regime for the biggest platforms, defined as ‘very large online platforms’ (VLOPs) and ‘very large online search engines’ (VLOSEs), which subjects them to greater regulation. The Act gives the EU Commission power to designate such platforms and search engines (on the basis that 10% of the EU population visit them monthly) and to enforce the provisions of the DSA against them. Other online platforms or search engines are subject to fewer obligations under the DSA, and enforcement of these rules is carried out by Member States' authorities.

The Commission’s list of designated VLOPs and VLOSEs includes US companies (including Meta, X, Google, LinkedIn), and also Chinese companies (AliExpress, TikTok, Temu, Shein), EU companies (Booking.com, Zalando, and two porn sites), and a Canadian site, Pornhub. Overall, nearly half of the companies designated as operating VLOPs and VLOSEs are non-American (although some of the American companies operate more than one platform). The list was most recently updated in August 2026, to add ChatGPT as a VLOSE, and Roblox and Reddit as VLOPs. 

For VLOPs, enforcement of the DSA involves a number of measures, including requests for information, a start of an investigation into possible breach of the Act, a preliminary finding of a breach, and a final decision finding a breach – which can result in a fine (of up to 6% of worldwide annual turnover) and orders to change practices. A VLOP or VLOSE can also agree avoid a fine by agreeing binding commitments to change its practices with the Commission (in effect, a settlement) before it reaches a final decision. If a finding of breach is not complied with, the Commission can impose very high fines – up to 5% of worldwide annual turnover per day.

The Act imposes a very high threshold before a ban can be imposed against a platform – essentially a refusal to remove illegal content, with additional safeguards including involvement of a court.

The case law has not yet fleshed out the relationship between the DSA and Member States’ laws on overlapping issues, or clarified whether there can be private enforcement of the DSA (ie individuals challenging the VLOPs and VLOSEs in court for breach of the Act, rather than the Commission enforcing it; or similarly individuals challenging smaller platforms or search engines, rather than Member States' authorities) in parallel. Nor has the case law yet discussed any potential overlap with other EU law. 

Substantively, the Act’s requirements on VLOPs and VLOSEs (in its Articles 33-43) start with risk assessment: they must ‘diligently identify, analyse and assess any systemic risks in the Union stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services’. Systemic risks are further defined as including ‘dissemination of illegal content through their services’, ‘negative effects’ upon various human rights, ‘actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and public security’, and ‘actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health and minors and serious negative consequences to the person’s physical and mental well-being’.  

Very large platforms and search engines are also obliged to (as further defined): mitigate these risks; comply with a decision requiring a response to a crisis; perform independent audits; offer a recommender system not based on profiling, at least as an option; make public a repository of advertising data; provide access to their data to researchers; explain their algorithms to regulators; establish independent compliance bodies; provide further public data on their operations; and pay an annual supervisory fee to the EU Commission.

The DSA also includes rules exempting online platforms from intermediary liability for transmitting content under certain circumstances, taking over the relevant provisions previously in the e-commerce Directive.

The September 2026 proposal for an EU KIDS Act, which would set out specific rules on child protection online, is closely linked to the DSA but would not amend it as such.

 

The DSA in the EU courts

Challenges to designations as a VLOP 

Amazon, Zalando, Google Shopping and several porn sites have challenged their designation as VLOPs.

-          Zalando lost its challenge in the EU General Court in September 2025, but has appealed to the EU’s Court of Justice (appeal pending)

-          Amazon also lost its challenge in the EU General Court against designation as a VLOP, and has appealed to the CJEU (the Commission has cross-appealed)

-          Amazon had won an interim measures ruling in this case – delaying its obligation to publish information about its advertisers – but that interim measure was overturned by the Court of Justice, following a successful appeal by the Commission)

-          Four porn companies brought legal challenges to their designations as VLOPs. A challenge by Pornhub is still pending (a hearing was held in November 2025). A challenge by Stripchat was rejected by a judgment of the EU General Court in October 2026. (Stripchat went to court even though the Commission dropped its designation as a VLOP). Two other challenges - by XVideos and XNXX - were withdrawn in early 2026.

-          The porn companies’ applications for interim measures as regards publishing advertisers’ information were dismissed (see the General Court orders re Pornhub and XVideos, and the failed appeals to the Court of Justice as regards Pornhub and XVideos).  

Google Shopping is challenging the Commission's refusal to remove its designation as a VLOP.

Regulation fees

The Commission’s decisions on fees for regulation have also been challenged. First of all, two challenges to the fees imposed for 2023 were both successful in the EU General Court (see the judgments as regards Tiktok and Meta), although the Commission has appealed both the Tiktok and Meta judgments to the Court of Justice (appeals pending; the hearings in these two appeals are scheduled for 12 November 2026).

In the meantime, Tiktok, Meta and Google have brought a second round of legal challenges (all still pending) to the regulation fees imposed for 2024.

A third round of cases includes challenges (also all still pending) by Google, TikTok, Amazon, Meta, Stripchat and Zalando to the supervisory fees for 2025.

Non-compliance decisions

X, X.AI and Elon Musk have challenged the December 2025 non-compliance decision against X (cases pending).

Temu and AliExpress have each challenged the 2026 findings of breach against them (cases pending). 

Other enforcement

Pornhub's corporate parent has challenged the extension of the investigation of Pornhub (case pending).

Access to documents

In October 2026, the EU General Court ruled against Zalando in a dispute about the Commission's refusal to disclose documents related to the DSA. 

Infringement actions

The Commission is suing Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Poland for non-enforcement of their obligations to apply the DSA at national level (cases pending).

 

Enforcement of the DSA

Non-compliance decisions

So far, the EU Commission has adopted three final decisions for non-compliance with the DSA. 

First, it adopted a final decision  of non-compliance against X in December 2025, following its preliminary findings in July 2024.

This decision includes a fine to enforce the DSA for the first time: €120 million for three breaches of the Act by X. It concerns certain issues, namely deceptive practices as regards X’s ‘blue ticks’,* researchers’ access to data, and the repository of advertisers.

The Commission subsequently accepted corrective measures from X in July 2026 to address the second and third of these issues, but these corrective measures do not address the 'blue tick' issue.

Second, in May 2026 the Commission fined Temu €200 million for breach of the DSA as regards failed risk assessment on the sale of illegal products. (See previously the preliminary finding in this case) 

Third, in July 2026 the Commission fined AliExpress €550 million for breach of the DSA, again regarding failed risk assessments on the sale of illegal products. 

Other enforcement actions

Other Commission enforcement actions under the DSA include:

- The Commission has opened proceedings against X on other issues besides those that led to a non-compliance decision, first of all the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of rules against disinformation. In January 2026, the Commission opened proceedings against X on further issues: its recommender systems and ‘nudification’ apps;

- The Commission has accepted binding commitments from AliExpress on various issues (other than those that led to a non-compliance decision);

- Similarly, in addition to the non-compliance decision against Temu as regards illegal products, an investigation continues as regards other issues; 

- It has opened proceedings against porn sites for inadequate protection of children, and reached a preliminary finding of breach in March 2026;

- It has adopted a preliminary finding that Meta (Facebook and Instagram) is in breach as regards researchers’ access to data, and as regards flagging illegal content and allowing for appeals against content moderation decisions; a later preliminary finding in April 2026 found a breach as regards access to by children under 13; and a further preliminary finding in July 2026 found Meta (Facebook and Instagram) in breach as regards risk assessment and risk mitigation of addictive design. An investigation as regards deceptive advertising, political data, and misinformation on Meta is still underway; 

- It has accepted a commitment from TikTok to suspend the ‘TikTok Lite’ programme, which was apparently designed to (further) encourage social media addiction by children, having used the threat of issuing an intention to impose interim measures under the DSA earlier on in this case. Another decision, following a preliminary finding, accepts further commitments regarding information on advertisers;

- The Commission has also adopted a preliminary finding against TikTok as regards researchers’ access to data, a preliminary finding of breach as regards addictive design, and a preliminary finding of breach in July 2026 as regards childrens' accounts; 

- It has begun an investigation of Shein for illegal content (child sex dolls), recommender systems and addictive design; and

- It began an investigation of Snapchat in March 2026 for breach of child protection rules. 

Sunday, 7 December 2025

The Digital Service’s Act Main Character: the EU Commission finally fines X

 


 

Steve Peers, Professor of Law, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: Animated Heaven, via Wikimedia Commons

 

Introduction

The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) was conceived before Elon Musk bought Twitter (soon renaming it X); but they were literally born simultaneously, with the DSA being published in the EU’s Official Journal on the same day that Musk completed his takeover. Since then, Musk’s behaviour running X (see my review of a book on the takeover and the aftermath) has exemplified many of the reasons why the EU (and other jurisdictions) contemplated regulating social media in the first place: in particular arguments about the legality of its content and the fairness of its algorithms.

A Twitter user coined the phrase ‘today’s main character’ to describe a poster who becomes the centre of attention for a day – usually due to an absurd or obnoxious post that prompts many negative responses. For the DSA, X has been its main character since its creation, with much of the public debate about the potential use of the Act focussing on how it might apply to the controversial social network.

This debate has now come to a head. Last week, following its preliminary findings back in July 2024, the EU Commission adopted a final decision imposing a fine to enforce the DSA for the first time: €120 million for three breaches of the Act by X. This initial decision is likely to impact upon the broader debate over the Act’s implementation, and – due to Musk’s influence in the current Trump administration – also play a role in the fast-deteriorating relations between the EU and the US.

This blog post first provides an overview of the DSA, then examines the legal issues arising from this specific enforcement decision, and concludes with an assessment of the broader context of this decision: the enforcement of the DSA more generally, and the relations between the EU and the USA.

 

Background: overview of the Digital Services Act

Adoption of the DSA

Although the critics of the EU Commission fining X are quick to argue that the EU is undemocratic, EU legislation needs the support of elected Member State governments and elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to be adopted. In fact, the Act received unanimous support from Member States and a large majority of MEPs.  

In any event, even without the Act, Member States would likely regulate social media – perhaps more quickly and more stringently than the EU has applied the Act in some cases. And even if the whole EU ceased to exist, as Elon Musk and Russian government mouthpieces demand, those countries would still be regulating Big Tech, with national equivalents of the Digital Markets Act and the GDPR, for instance. Indeed, despite leaving the EU, the UK has its own national versions of all three laws: the Online Safety Act, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, and the UK GDPR, which sits alongside the Data (Use and Access) Act. While UK regulators may be famously timid about enforcing these laws, Australia – a long way from the EU – was not dissuaded from banning under-16 year olds from social media.

But until Musk and his sympathisers manage to destroy the EU, we have the DSA. It contains rules that govern online platforms generally, regardless of size, but its most prominent rules concern a special regulatory regime for the biggest platforms, defined as ‘very large online platforms’ (VLOPs) and ‘very large online search engines’ (VLOSEs), which subjects them to greater regulation. The Act gives the EU Commission power to designate such platforms and search engines (on the basis that 10% of the EU population visit them monthly) and to enforce the provisions of the DSA against them.

While some claim that the DSA was adopted only to punish US tech firms, the list of designated VLOPs and VLOSEs includes also Chinese companies (AliExpress, TikTok, Temu, Shein), EU companies (Booking.com, Zalando, and two porn sites), and a Canadian site, Pornhub. Overall, nearly half of the companies designated as operating VLOPs and VLOSEs are non-American (although some of the American companies operate more than one platform).

Content of the DSA

For VLOPs, enforcement of the DSA involves a number of measures, including requests for information, a start of an investigation into possible breach of the Act, a preliminary finding of a breach, and a final decision finding a breach – which can result in a fine (of up to 6% of worldwide annual turnover) and orders to change practices. A VLOP or VLOSE can also agree avoid a fine by agreeing binding commitments to change its practices with the Commission (in effect, a settlement) before it reaches a final decision. If a finding of breach is not complied with, the Commission can impose very high fines – up to 5% of worldwide annual turnover per day.

While many critics of X excitedly demand that the EU Commission ban it, the Act imposes a very high threshold before a ban can be imposed – essentially a refusal to remove illegal content, with additional safeguards including involvement of a court. The case law has not yet fleshed out the relationship between the DSA and Member States’ laws on overlapping issues, or clarified whether there can be private enforcement of the DSA (ie individuals challenging the VLOPs and VLOSEs in court for breach of the Act, rather than the Commission enforcing it) in parallel.

Substantively, the Act’s requirements on VLOPs and VLOSEs (in its Articles 33-43) start with risk assessment: they must ‘diligently identify, analyse and assess any systemic risks in the Union stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services’. Systemic risks are further defined as including ‘dissemination of illegal content through their services’, ‘negative effects’ upon various human rights, ‘actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and public security’, and ‘actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health and minors and serious negative consequences to the person’s physical and mental well-being’.  

Very large platforms and search engines are also obliged to (as further defined): mitigate these risks; comply with a decision requiring a response to a crisis; perform independent audits; offer a recommender system not based on profiling, at least as an option; make public a repository of advertising data; provide access to their data to researchers; explain their algorithms to regulators; establish independent compliance bodies; provide further public data on their operations; and pay an annual supervisory fee to the EU Commission.

The DSA in the EU courts

Even before the first fine was imposed to enforce the DSA last week, its application in practice has been frequently litigated. First of all, Amazon, Zalando and several porn sites have challenged their designation as VLOPs. Zalando lost its challenge in the EU General Court in September, but has appealed to the EU’s Court of Justice (appeal pending). More recently Amazon also lost its challenge in the EU General Court against designation as a VLOP, but it still has time to appeal that judgment to the Court of Justice (Amazon had won an interim measures ruling in this case – delaying its obligation to publish information about its advertisers – but that interim measure was overturned by the Court of Justice, following a successful appeal by the Commission).

The porn companies’ legal challenges to their designations as VLOPs are still pending (see the summary of the arguments made by Pornhub, XNXX and XVideos; a challenge by Stripchat is also still pending even though the Commission has dropped its designation as a VLOP); their applications for interim measures as regards publishing advertisers’ information have been dismissed (see the General Court orders re Pornhub and XVideos, and the failed appeals to the Court of Justice as regards Pornhub and XVideos).  

Of these cases, the recent Amazon judgment has broad implications for the DSA as a whole, considered further below.

Secondly, the Commission’s decisions on fees for regulation (for 2023) have also been challenged. These challenges were all successful in the EU General Court (see the judgments as regards Tiktok and Meta), although the Commission has appealed both the Tiktok and Meta judgments to the Court of Justice (appeals pending). In the meantime, Tiktok, Meta and Google have brought a further round of legal challenges (all still pending) to the regulation fees imposed for 2024.

We can also now expect X to challenge the enforcement decision against it. (If it also requests interim measures, at least that aspect of the case will be decided soon).

Other enforcement of the DSA

In addition to the new decision enforcing the DSA against X, other Commission enforcement actions under the DSA have been adopted or are pending against VLOPs. Leaving aside requests for information (such as the one recently sent to Shein as regards reports of sales of child-like sex dolls):

-          The Commission has accepted binding commitments from AliExpress on various issues, but at the same time also adopted a preliminary finding that its risk assessment as regards illegal products was insufficient;

-          It has opened proceedings against porn sites for inadequate protection of children;

-          It has adopted a preliminary finding that Meta (Facebook and Instagram) is in breach as regards researchers’ access to data, and as regards flagging illegal content and allowing for appeals against content moderation decisions; an investigation as regards deceptive advertising, political data, and misinformation on Meta is still underway; and

-          It has adopted a preliminary finding that Temu has breached the DSA as regards illegal products, and an investigation continues as regards other issues

Finally, the Commission has been particularly active as regards TikTok. It has accepted a commitment to suspend the ‘TikTok Lite’ programme, which was apparently designed to (further) encourage social media addiction by children, having used the threat of issuing an intention to impose interim measures under the DSA earlier on in this case. A new decision, following a preliminary finding, accepts further commitments regarding information on advertisers – also a great irritant to Amazon and the porn companies, as can be seen in the litigation summarised above, as well as an issue in the X case, discussed below. TikTok has deadlines to implement the various commitments it has made, and there are specific powers to monitor whether it is complying with them under the DSA. The Commission has also adopted a preliminary finding against TikTok as regards researchers’ access to data, and further investigations against Tiktok are still underway.

Overall, it can be seen that to date the majority of enforcement actions under the DSA have been initiated against companies that are not American. Also, to date all the offers of binding commitments that have been accepted, in place of fines and enforcement orders, have come from Chinese companies. The potential of negotiating binding commitments instead of an enforcement order is, however, open to a VLOP based anywhere.  

 

The non-compliance decision against X

What did the decision address?

First and foremost, the non-compliance decision against X only concerns certain issues, namely deceptive practices as regards X’s ‘blue ticks’,* researchers’ access to data, and the repository of advertisers. The Commission complaint about ‘blue ticks’ is that they are a ‘deceptive practice’ banned by the DSA (note that this rule applies to platforms generally, not just VLOPs), in that they purport to indicate that an account has been verified, when it has not been. Under Musk, X has earned revenue from the blue ticks by selling them to anyone willing to pay for them, although the sale of the ticks, and the monetisation programme (ie giving money to X users whose posts lead to large numbers of reactions) are apparently not the subject of the non-compliance decision as such. The preference given to blue ticks in the X algorithm is not the subject of the decision as such either.

(*Disclosure: I applied for and obtained a ‘blue tick’ from Twitter prior to Musk’s purchase, when a proper verification system applied. I did not pay for the tick under Musk, and it was initially removed as a result. However, it was reinstated involuntarily – not at my request, and without my paying for it, or monetising my posts – as part of a process of reducing the social opprobrium of having a blue tick under Musk, in which the ticks were reinstated for some accounts. I initially hid the reinstated tick, but the facility to do that was removed. It remains there today; I have not used X since August 2024, due to my objection to Musk encouraging violent racial conflict in the UK, except for a handful of posts encouraging others to leave the platform. I have retained my account there to reduce the risk of anyone impersonating me, which has happened several times.)

The Commission has not yet made a final decision – or even a preliminary finding – as regards other issues involved in its opening of proceedings against X, namely the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of rules against disinformation.

How can the decision be enforced?

X now has 60 days to inform the Commission about measures it will take to enforce the non-compliance decision as regards blue ticks. It has 90 days to submit an action plan to address the other two issues, and the Commission must respond to the action plan two months after that. In the event of non-compliance with the decision, as noted above the DSA gives the Commission the power to impose much higher fines. The method of calculation of last week’s fine is not explained in the press release. (The non-compliance decision itself may explain the calculation, but like most DSA decisions of the Commission, it has unfortunately not been made public; Article 80 of the DSA requires the main content of this decision to be published though)

If X challenges the decision in the EU courts, it can request an interim measures ruling suspending all or part of the decision; the EU General Court will decide on that (subject to appeal to the Court of Justice), as it has done in several DSA cases already, as detailed above. The final judgment of the EU courts can annul the Commission’s non-compliance decision in whole or part, and the DSA (Article 81) gives the EU courts unlimited jurisdiction to cancel, increase or reduce the fine. As for the collection of the fine (and any further fines that might be imposed on X for continued breach of the DSA), Article 299 TFEU sets out the process of enforcing fines imposed by EU bodies; although if X removes all its assets from the EU to the US, it might try to prevent collection by using US law that blocks the enforcement of foreign judgments on ‘free speech’ grounds (perhaps the SPEECH Act, although that concerns defamation; other routes may be available, or fresh routes adopted in light of the Commission decision).

This brings us neatly to the question of whether the non-compliance decision is arguably invalid on ‘free speech’ (or other) grounds.

Is the decision legal?

What are the legal issues as regards last week’s non-compliance decision? As noted above, the recent judgment in the Amazon case addresses two of the issues in the non-compliance decision (advertising repositories and access to data), while also addressing broader criticisms of the Act, some of which may be relevant if X challenges the finding as regards ‘deceptive practices’, or takes this opportunity to challenge the legality of the Act more generally (as Amazon did when challenging the legality of its designation as a VLOP; on such challenges, see Article 277 TFEU).

Amazon’s legal challenge to its VLOP designation did not advance the obviously untenable argument that fewer than 10% of the EU population uses Amazon monthly (conversely, Zalando and the porn sites are arguing about the calculation of the numbers). Rather, Amazon argued that the entire system of special rules for VLOPs in the DSA was invalid, because it violated a number of human rights set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. All of these arguments were rejected by the EU General Court.

First of all, the Court rejected the argument that the VLOP regime breached the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter). In the Court’s view, although the regime interfered with the freedom to conduct a business, because it imposed significant costs on VLOPs and also had a considerable impact on their organisation or required complex technical solutions, that freedom was not absolute, and the interference with it was justified. According to Article 52(1) of the Charter, limitations on Charter rights have to be prescribed by law, have public interest objectives, respect the essence of the right and be proportionate. Here the limits were admittedly prescribed by law (being set out in the Act) and respected the essence of the right (as Amazon could still carry out its core business); Amazon instead argued mainly that the limits were disproportionate, as online shops did not present systemic risks, the objectives could be satisfied by less onerous means, and the costs were significant. However, the Court believed that there was a systemic risk of illegal content in online marketplaces; other means of designating VLOPs were not necessarily more proportionate; making advertising repositories open to the public was justified in the interests of consumer protection; and the arguments about economic impact made by Amazon as regards recommender systems, researchers’ access to data and advertiser repositories were unconvincing.

Secondly, Amazon’s argument that its right to property was infringed (Article 17 of the Charter) was dismissed at the outset, as it had not identified any of its property rights that were affected by the DSA: an administrative burden did not constitute interference with a property right. Thirdly, the Court rejected the argument that the VLOP regime breached the general right to equal treatment (Article 20 of the Charter), by treating larger companies differently from smaller ones, on the grounds that larger companies presented bigger risks.

Fourthly, Amazon’s arguments about freedom of expression (Article 11 of the Charter) were rejected too. This argument was only made as regards applying the DSA rules on recommender systems to Amazon. On this point, the Court reiterated that the Charter freedom of expression rules must be interpreted consistently with the freedom of expression set out in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), referring also to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court did not see how the freedom of expression of third-party sellers might be affected by the DSA rules, but it accepted that Amazon’s freedom of expression was limited by having to offer a recommender system not based on profiling.

However, limitations of the right could be justified: the limitation here was prescribed by law; it did not affect the essence of the right (as Amazon could still offer a profiling-based recommender system as an option); it had an objective of general interest (consumer protection); and it was proportionate by only requiring the offer of one non-profiling based recommender system as an option – taking account of ECtHR case law that allows more interference with commercial expression than political expression.

Finally, Amazon complained about a breach of the right to privacy (Article 7 of the Charter). This was a remarkable thing for a company with a business model based on surveillance of its customers to argue about, but the Court considered its arguments seriously nonetheless. Again it followed the ECtHR case law on the corresponding rule (Article 8 ECHR), which states that businesses could invoke the right to privacy. Here the argument concerned the DSA rules on ad repositories and researchers’ access to data. Again the EU court agreed that the DSA interfered with the right, but ruled that it could be justified: it was prescribed by law, did not infringe the essence of the right, and complied with the principle of proportionality, particularly because of the limits built in to the obligations (for instance, no obligation to disclose the personal data of advertising recipients, or about the success of advertising; controls on which researchers can access the data).

How does this judgment (noting that Amazon could still appeal it to the Court of Justice) apply to a legal challenge that X might make to last week’s non-compliance decision? First of all, the judgment in principle disposes of many arguments that X might make about two aspects of the non-compliance decision, as regards ad repositories and researchers’ access to data – although X might try different arguments, or contend that the nuances of its case are different.

While the main US response to the EU Commission’s decision has been to claim that the EU is engaged in censorship, note that Amazon did not even argue that the DSA rules on ad repositories or researchers’ access to data infringed freedom of expression, and remember that X is only being investigated for the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of rules against disinformation. Obviously a freedom of expression argument might be made in respect of those issues, but, as noted above, X has not been subjected to a final decision or even a preliminary finding in respect of them.

Furthermore, according to the Amazon judgment, a VLOP challenging a Commission decision under the DSA can only challenge the validity of those parts of the DSA that are the legal basis for the decision made against them: so X cannot, at this point, specifically attack the validity of the DSA rules on risk assessment or risk mitigation, since there is no decision that it has breached them yet.  X can attack the validity of the DSA system for VLOPs generally, which includes the rules on risk assessment and risk mitigation. Although Amazon has already tried this and failed, X might try to argue its case differently; but it looks like a long shot, given that a non-compliance decision is inherently more narrowly focussed than designation as a VLOP.

Another key point to remember in this debate is that, as the Amazon judgment confirms, the human rights standards applied by the EU courts are those of the EU Charter, interpreted (where relevant) in light of the corresponding ECHR rights, and the ECtHR case law on those rights. The ECHR approach to rights differs in some respects from that of the US courts, arguably providing greater protection for the right to privacy (although not enough for Amazon to win its arguments on this point), but lesser protection for the right to free speech (allowing more leeway for interference with the right). But that is the nature of doing business in another jurisdiction. US law may take the view that (hypothetical) X user ‘ZyklonB1488’, regularly posting ‘Next year in Auschwitz!’ at Jewish people, has the right to set out his stall in the marketplace of ideas. But other legal systems may legitimately take the view that he does not.

Applying this to the sole remaining issue in the Commission’s non-compliance decision – the deceptiveness of X’s blue tick system – this is not directly connected to the content of what blue tick holders (still less anyone else) may post on X. Any effect on freedom of expression of last week’s decision is therefore marginal – although again, free speech arguments would be stronger as regards future decisions the Commission might make in respect of X as regards other issues still under investigation (or Meta – subject to some broadly similar investigations, as summarised above), especially because ‘illegal content’ is the one breach of the DSA that might (subject to many conditions and safeguards) lead to a ban on the whole platform. And to the extent that the non-compliance decision on blue ticks does interfere with freedom of expression, there is a strong argument that the interference is justified both on the ground of consumer protection (cf the scams featuring impersonations of consumer advocate Martin Lewis) and (as Article 52 of the Charter also provides for) on the ground of ‘the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ (ie anyone being impersonated, including myself!).

 

Context: enforcing the DSA

Last week’s decision is a definitive sign that the Commission is willing to enforce the DSA, even to the extent of adopting non-compliance decisions. The world is full of ‘light-touch’ regulators – perhaps one of Britain’s more unappealing exports. Usually, the Commission is not seen as such; but its obvious stalling on taking a final decision regarding X, for 17 months since its provisional findings, may have given the impression that – on the DSA, at least – the lion had turned pussycat.

The non-compliance decision should be viewed alongside with the Amazon judgment, which it likely also takes account of. VLOPs now know not only that the Commission is willing to act to enforce the DSA, but also that the EU courts (subject to possible appeal) back up at least some key provisions of the Act. Also, the recent judgment may explain TikTok’s simultaneous willingness to agree on its compliance with the ad repository rules; and the Commission’s willingness (again) to accept commitments, combined with the recent judgment, shows VLOPs that it may be less hassle to negotiate commitments with the Commission, rather than embark upon court action that is unlikely to succeed.  The context also includes a dog that did not bark: the Commission did not propose any amendment to the DSA (or the Digital Markets Act) in its recent proposal for an ‘omnibus’ bonfire of some provisions of EU tech laws.

Having said that, it is striking that the Commission is moving forward on non-compliance decisions and preliminary findings other than on the issues relating more closely to content on social media networks (cf the ongoing investigations into Meta and X), which raise not only the more difficult legal issues (given their greater impact upon freedom of expression) but also have the greater political impact (given the subject-matter, and the closeness of both zillionaire owners to the US government). And this brings us nicely to the impact of the decision upon US/EU relations.  

 

Context: EU-USA relations

Coincidentally, the non-compliance decision was released the day after the US government published a foreign policy review that was intrinsically hostile to the EU, and hyperpartisan in its support of right wing populist parties in Member States. In that context, the decision against X is just a drop in the rapidly-widening Atlantic Ocean. Famously, US diplomat Dean Acheson was ‘present at the creation’ of the post-war alliance; the Trump administration’s goal seems to be to preside over its destruction.

Yet, as noted already, supporters of Trump are nevertheless enraged by the decision, despite its limited impact. Even though, as explained above, the DSA was approved by elected governments and MEPs, does not solely apply to US companies and is not solely enforced against US companies, and the recent decision has at best a marginal impact upon freedom of expression, the response is the same: “They’re eating our free speech!”

Of course, it’s hard to take concerns about free speech from the Trump administration seriously: these are folks who want to expel legal migrants for criticism of a foreign government, and whose leader, between naps, frequently insults and threatens journalists who are insufficiently North Korean in their adoration of him. If these people are genuine free speech defenders, then I’m Alexander Hamilton.

As hypocritical and inaccurate as the Trumpian reactions to the decision are, they were presumably anticipated by the Commission before it took its decision. Even if the EU courts rule in the Commission’s favour in the event of a legal challenge, its MAGA critics will likely remain just as irrational (“They’re eating the snails!”). Yet the Commission took the decision anyway.

The choice to go ahead with the decision regardless can be understood either as a calculated risk that the US will not punish the EU for it – at least no more than it was inclined to punish the EU anyway, for various other reasons – or that even if the US does punish the EU for the decision, it is worth exercising its regulatory powers anyway. Perhaps this is a response to the perception that the Commission had seemed unwilling to stand up to Trump to date. Or maybe the assumption is that Trump is unlikely to pay much attention to this matter for long, particularly if the EU can devise a way to distract him: something like a shiny gold award for ‘best European’, for ending the war between Narnia and Freedonia, may work.  

Whatever happens, the Commission’s decision was certainly a gamble, in the current context of fraught EU/US relations, with far broader trade and security issues at stake. Time will tell whether this assertion of regulatory strength is worth it in light of the reaction it may trigger.

 

Friday, 27 September 2024

So long, no thanks to all the fash: review of Character Limit: How Elon Musk Destroyed Twitter, by Kate Conger and Ryan Mac



Professor Steve Peers, Royal Holloway University of London

Photo credit: mikemacmarketing, image via vpnsrus

 

Full disclosure first: After exactly ten and a half years, I stopped posting on X (formerly Twitter) on August 10, 2024. I could not accept the owner’s view that those encouraging race riots in Britain online should not be punished, his promotion of those who held such views, or his racist memes about the British justice system that sought to bring them to account. I was not alone: X lost 30% of its UK users in the last year, and 20% of its US users. How did the supposed ‘global public square’ end up in this position?

The answer is obviously the owner, Elon Musk; and the new book by Kate Conger and Ryan Mac, Character Limit, recounts the story in detail. They divide the book into three acts. In Act One, dominated by former boss Jack Dorsey – depicted here as a diffident dude phoning in his governance from tropical islands – the story is retold until Musk makes his bid for Twitter. Act Two recounts the process of that bid, culminating in his purchase of the company. Act Three covers the subsequent developments: the frantic cost cutting, the frenzied management style, the fast-disappearing advertisers. The book ends in late 2023, with a short epilogue from early 2024 in which the authors astutely note that Musk has replaced Trump on the platform – in effect taking his place as Twitter’s main character. Musk’s personality – a fragile, petty, vicious, paranoid, narcissistic man-child – drives the narrative of the book. Musk’s legion of fanboys are frequently referred to, largely murmuring offstage like a Greek chorus manifesting as a Simpsons meme.

The book is highly readable – compelling the reader to turn its pages in much the same way that legal academic books don’t. It’s a highly personalised retelling of events, and one can easily imagine a Netflix version of its cinematic story – with its ending scene matching Hearst’s deathbed sled revelations, or Zuckerberg’s obsessive page refreshing, with Musk’s very public suggestion that advertisers “go fuck yourself”.

There’s a detailed account of sources, but in the journalistic tradition some of them are off the record interviews. One thing this academic would have liked to have seen would have been some broader analysis of why things developed as they did: was this all an inevitable consequence of the political and social media dynamics of the last few years, or an example of the (not so) great man theory of history?

If the latter, what explains Musk’s behaviour exactly? Drug use is mentioned – in a passage appearing so heavily lawyered that it has its own sharp and useless look about it. Nevertheless, the reader will notice Musk’s obvious extreme mood swings and erratic behaviour. At first, the prospect of saving Twitter financially may be have been taken seriously: the authors usefully remind the reader that Twitter often lost money even before Musk’s takeover (it also had controversies about hate speech already, and the previous management was planning to cut staff before Musk did). But that motivation is hard to take seriously for long, as advertisers (Twitter’s main source of income) started fleeing from the outset, with no lessons learned from their exit. Rather, it seems that the main incentive was Musk’s personal obsession with Twitter, also mentioned at several points; the political objectives that many have suggested are not much explored.

Having said that, this is a very readable book, for those interested in the fate of this well-known social network over the last decade. And one striking feature for this reader is the role of the law in all this.

It’s obvious throughout that Musk cares nothing, and knows less, about the law; he shares these traits with such luminaries as Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Dominic Cummings. Although he has an early victory when a jury inexplicably clears him of defaming a critic of his Thai cave rescue attempt as a ‘pedo’, other litigation and regulatory struggles are a constant theme. Musk is only compelled to complete his purchase of Twitter due to litigation brought by its board (bound, as the authors frequently point out, by their fiduciary duty to shareholders) to enforce the deal Musk signed without undertaking prior due diligence. Compliance with an FTC consent order regarding privacy is an ongoing issue. Massive staff cuts lead to litigation over employment law and executive compensation. Twitter stops paying Thorn – a specialist in detecting online child abuse material. Conflict with a Brazilian judge over Twitter’s refusal to take down tweets backing Bolsonaro’s coup attempt leads to well-known consequences (although they occur after the book’s finale). Refusal to pay rent sparks legal challenges worldwide. And having cancelled the cleaners and crammed staff into less space in Twitter’s headquarters to save on office costs, the washrooms are soon overused. As cockroaches scuttle from the drains, desperate staff bring toilet paper from home or flee to nearby coffee shop loos to avoid those in Twitter offices. Cory Doctorow famously developed a thesis about the ‘enshittification’ of online businesses; he probably never expected it to be quite so literal.

I think it’s possible that future brushes with the law will concern in particular the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) – which, in a remarkable coincidence, was published in the EU’s Official Journal on the same day that Musk completed his takeover of Twitter. X is already the subject of the first preliminary findings of a breach of the Act on some issues, and investigations into further issues – including illegal content, the one thing that could get X suspended in the EU – are ongoing. I wonder if the risk assessments required by the Act should take specific account of the personal behaviour of the owner of a very large online platform – given Musk’s direct role in spreading disinformation and the negative effect of his posts on civic discourse, electoral process and gender-based violence. Recently, Musk threatened to give Taylor Swift a baby; but regulators gonna regulate.

A particular issue throughout the book – and an implied obligation under the DSA – is content moderation. It raises a series of inherent contradictions. Reflecting the sometimes conflicting human rights of freedom of expression and equality, the DSA requires very large online platforms to ensure free speech while considering the need to limit it. As for users, the book makes clear that content moderation repels free speech advocates while attracting opponents of hate speech; it costs money but its absence loses revenue, as advertisers are alarmed to see their ads appearing next to Nazis. But it is also clear from the book that Musk’s supposed free speech fundamentalism is hypocritical, as he bans and fires critics while acceding to censorship demands of the Indian government. As so often with authoritarians, there is an in-group which the law protects but does not bind – and an out-group which it binds but does not protect.

One final thought about the consequences of unlimited speech, returning to the reason why I stopped posting on the platform. When defending the ‘rights’ of those encouraging race riots in Britain, Musk and his fans compared those supporting limits on such speech to communists and Nazis. Let’s put this in historical context. After I flew to Vienna for a holiday after departing X, I visited the Sigmund Freud museum and was struck by the fact that his four sisters, staying behind in Vienna after he fled to London, all died in 1942-3. Their deaths were not caused by those who tried to censor Nazis, but by the Nazis themselves. And the postwar allies were not confused about this: Julius Streicher was tried, convicted and executed at Nuremberg for publishing the extremely anti-semitic Der Sturmer. Incitement played a role in the Holocaust. Words have consequences; and the real extremists are those who demand that the advocacy of hatred and violence should not be effectively limited.