Asress Adimi Gikay (PhD), Senior Lecturer in
AI, Disruptive Innovation, and Law (Brunel University London) Twitter
@DrAsressGikay
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The Essence of the UK's pro-innovation regulatory approach
After several years of evaluating
the available options to regulate AI technologies, and the publication of the National
AI Strategy in 2021 setting out a regulatory plan, the UK government
finally set out its pro-innovation regulatory framework in a
white paper published in March of this year. The government is currently
collecting responses to consultation questions.
The white paper specifies that
the country is not ready to enact a statutory law in the foreseeable future
governing AI. Instead, regulators will issue guidelines implementing five
principles outlined in the white paper. According to the white
paper, following the initial period of implementation, and when
parliamentary time allows, 'introducing a statutory duty on regulators
requiring them to have due regard to the principles' is anticipated. So,
an obligation to enforce the identified principles will imposed on regulators,
if it is deemed necessary based on the lessons learned from the non-statutory
compliance experience. But this will most likely not take place in the coming 2
to 3 years, if not more.
The UK's pro-innovation regime
starkly contrasts with the upcoming
European Union(EU) AI Act's risk-based regulation, applying different legal
standards to AI systems based on the risk they pose. The EU's proposed
regulation bans specific AI uses, such
as facial recognition technology (FRT), in publicly accessible spaces while
imposing strict standards for developing and deploying the so-called high
risk AI systems, including detailed safety and security, fairness,
transparency and accountability. The EU's regulatory effort aims to tackle AI
risks through a single legislative instrument overseen by a single national
authority of member states.
Undoubtedly, AI poses many risks
ranging from
discrimination in healthcare to reinforcing
structural inequalities or
perpetuating systemic racism in policing tools that could
utilize (il)literacy, race, and social background to predict a person's
likelihood to commit crimes. Certain AI uses also pose risks
to privacy and other fundamental rights, as well as democratic
values. However, the technology also holds tremendous potential for
improving human welfare through enhancing the efficient
delivery of public services such as education, healthcare, transportation,
and welfare.
But is the UK's self-proclaimed
pro-innovation framework, which uses a non-statutory regulatory approach to
tackle the potential risks of AI technologies, appropriate?
I contend that with additional
fine-tuning, the approach taken by the UK better balances the risks and
benefits of the technology, while also promoting socio-economically beneficial
innovation.
Key components of the envisioned framework
The UK approach to AI regulation
has three crucial components. First, it relies on existing legal
frameworks relevant to each sector such as privacy, data protection, consumer
protection, and product liability laws, rather than implementing comprehensive
AI-specific legislation. It assumes that many of the existing legislations
being technology neutral would apply to AI technologies.
Second, the white paper
establishes five principles to be applied by each regulator in conjunction with
the existing regulatory framework relevant to the sector.
These principles are safety, security and robustness, appropriate
transparency and explainability, fairness, accountability and governance, and
contestability and redress.
Third, rather than a single
regulatory authority, each regulator would implement the regulatory framework
supported by a central
coordinating body that among others, facilitates consistent cross-sectoral
implementation. As such, it is up to individual regulators to determine how
they apply the fundamental principles in their sectors. This could be called a
semi-sectoral approach as the principles apply to all sectors, but their
implementation may differ across sectors.
Although the white paper does not
envision prohibition of certain AI technologies, some of the principles could
be used to effectively prohibit certain use cases, for example unexplainable AI
with potentially harmful societal impact. Regulators are given a leeway,
as a natural consequence of the flexibility offered by the approach
adopted.
There will not be a single
regulatory authority comparable to, for example, the Information Commissioner's Office that enforces
data protection law in all areas. Initially, a statute will not require
regulators to implement the principles. Actors in the AI supply chain will
also have no legal obligation to comply with the principles unless the relevant
principle is part of an existing legal framework.
For instance, the principle of
fairness requires developing and deploying AI systems that do not discriminate
against persons based on any protected characteristics. This means that a
public authority must fulfil its Public
Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under the Equality Act by assessing how the
technology could impact different demographics. On the other hand, a private
entity has no PSED as this obligation applies only to public authorities. Thus,
private actors may avoid the obligation to comply with this particular
aspect of the fairness principle unless they voluntarily choose to comply.
Why is the UK's overall approach appropriate?
The UK’s flexible framework is
generally a suitable approach to the governance of an evolving technology.
Three key reasons can be provided for this.
It allows evidence-based regulation.
Sweeping regulation gives the
sense of preventing and addressing risks comprehensively. However, as the
technology and its potential risks are yet to be understood reasonably, most AI
risks today are a product of guesswork.
This is a significant issue in AI
regulation, as insufficient and non-contextualised evidence is increasingly
used to advocate for specific regulatory solutions. For instance, risks of
inaccuracy and bias identified in
gender classification AI systems are frequently cited to support a total
ban on law enforcement use of FRT in the UK.
Although FRT has been used by
law enforcement authorities in the UK several times, no considerable risk
of inaccuracy has been reported because the context of law enforcement of FRT,
especially in the UK, is different from online gender classification AI
systems. Law enforcement use of FRT is highly regulated, so the technology
deployed is also more stringently tested
for accuracy, unlike an online commercial gender classification algorithm
that operates in less regulated environments. Ensuring that relevant and
context-sensitive evidence is used in proposing regulatory solutions is
crucial.
By augmenting existing legal frameworks
with flexible principles, the UK's approach enables regulators to develop
tailored frameworks in response to context-sensitive evidence of harm emerging
from the real-world implementation of AI, rather than relying on mere speculation.
Better enforcement of sectoral regulation
Scholars have debated for a while
on whether sector-specific regulations enforced by a sectoral regulator are
suitable in algorithmic governance. In a seminal piece, 'An FDA for
Algorithm,’ Andrew Tutt advocated for creating a central regulatory
authority for algorithms in the US comparable to the Federal Drug Administration.
The EU has adopted this approach by proposing a cross-sectoral AI Act,
enforceable by a single national supervisory authority. The UK chose a
different path, which is likely the more sensible way forward.
Entrusting AI oversight to a
single regulator across multiple sectors could result in an inefficient
enforcement system, lacking public trust. Different regulatory agencies
possessing expertise in specific fields, such as transportation, aviation, drug
administration, and financial oversight, are better placed to regulate AI
systems used in their sectors. Centralising regulation may lead to corruption,
regulatory capture, or misaligned enforcement objectives, impacting multiple
sectors. In contrast, a decentralised approach allows specific regulators to
set enforcement policies, goals, and strategies, preventing major enforcement
failures and promoting accountability.
The ICO can provide a good
example. Its track record in enforcing data protection legislation is
exceptionally poor, despite having the opportunity to bring together all the
required resources and expertise needed to perform its tasks. The ICO has failed
miserably, and its failure impacts data protection in all sectors.
As the
Centre for Data Innovation asserted, “If it would be ill-advised to have
one government agency regulate all human decision-making, then it would be
equally ill-advised to have one agency regulate all algorithmic
decision-making."
The UK's proposed sectoral
approach avoids the risk of having a single inefficient regulatory authority by
distributing regulatory power across sectors.
Non-statutory approach and flexibility to address new risks
The non-statutory regulatory
framework allows regulators to swiftly respond to unknown AI risks, avoiding
lengthy parliamentary procedures. AI technology's rapid advancement makes it
difficult to fully comprehend real-world harm without concrete evidence.
Predicting emerging risks is also
challenging, particularly regarding "AI systems that have a wide range of
possible uses, both intended and unintended by the developers"(known as
general purpose AI) and machine learning systems. Implementing a flexible
regulatory framework allows the framework to be easily adapted to the evolving
nature of the technology and the resulting new risks.
But two challenges need to be addressed
The UK's iterative, flexible, and
sectoral approach could successfully balance the risks and benefits of AI
technologies only, if the government implements additional appropriate
measures.
Serious enforcement
The iterative regulatory approach
would be effective only if the relevant principles are enforceable by
regulators. There must be a legally binding obligation for relevant regulators
to incorporate these principles in their regulatory remit and create a
reasonable framework for enforcement. This means that regulators should have
the power to take administrative actions while individuals should be empowered
to seek redress for the violation of their rights or to compel compliance with
existing guidelines. If no such mechanism is implemented, the envisioned
framework will not address the risks posed by AI technologies.
Without effective enforcement
tools, companies like Google, Facebook, or Clearview AI that develop and/or use
AI will have no incentive to comply with non-enforceable guidelines. There is
no evidence to support this, and there will never be.
Defining the Role of the central coordinating body
The white paper emphasizes the
need for a central
function to ensure consistent implementation and interpretation of the
principles, identify opportunities and risks, and monitor developments. But
regulators must consult this office when implementing the framework and issuing
guidelines.
Although the power to issue
binding decisions may not need to be conferred, the central office should be
mandated to issue non-binding opinions on essential issues, similar to the
European Data Protection Board. Regulators should also be required to
initiate a request for an opinion on certain matters formally. This would
facilitate cross-sectoral consistency in implementing the envisioned framework
and enable early intervention in tackling potential challenges.
Conclusion
The UK has taken a step in the
right direction in adopting a flexible AI regulation that fosters innovation
and mitigates the risks of AI technologies. However, the regulatory framework
needs to be enhanced to maintain the UK's leadership in AI. The lack of a
credible enforcement system and solid coordination mechanism may undermine the
objective of the envisioned framework, including deterring innovation and
undermining public trust and international confidence in the UK regulatory
regime.
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