Laurent Pech, Professor of Law, University of Middlesex
On 2 March 2021, the European
Court of Justice issued its third judgment in a preliminary ruling case
originating from a Polish court regarding Poland’s rule of law breakdown which
began more than five
years ago (a total of 35 national requests for a preliminary ruling have
been submitted by Polish courts to compare to a total of 3 infringement actions
lodged with the Court by the Commission to date).
In this judgment known as AB
and others, the Court of Justice’s interpretation of EU law makes it unequivocally
clear that the referring court will have to conclude that Polish authorities
violated EU law when they changed Polish law to prevent effective judicial
review of the judicial appointment decisions made by Poland’s new National
Council of the Judiciary (“KRS” hereinafter), which was re-established in flagrant
breach of Polish Constitution and has since been suspended from the European Network of
Council for the Judiciary due inter alia to its lack of independence.
One may however expect the Court
of Justice’s judgment in AB to know
the same fate as the Court’s judgment in AK
(Joined
Cases C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18), which was the first judgment adopted
in response to a national request for a preliminary ruling originating from a
Polish court. AK was swiftly and
defiantly ignored by Polish authorities after Poland’s Supreme Court (the independent
components of it) applied it and held the KRS to lack independence and the
infamous “Disciplinary Chamber” not to constitute a court. In reaction, Polish
authorities adopted a “muzzle
law” which, in a nutshell, unconstitutionally “legalised” the violation of
the Court of Justice’s judgment in AK, which has since been furthermore nullified
by the unlawfully composed “Constitutional Tribunal” and the unconstitutionally
established “Disciplinary Chamber”. And yet the Commission did not react in the
face of this delinquent behaviour. It similarly did not react to the flagrant
violation of the ECJ
order of 8 April 2020 regarding the “Disciplinary Chamber”. And while the
Commission did launch an infringement
action against the muzzle law at the end of April 2020, we are still
waiting for the Commission to refer it to the ECJ. Meanwhile, irreparable
damage to the rule of law is done with the Commission only seemingly able to
produce a feeble “let-me-explain-to-you-what-you-yourself-live-through”
reply to a letter from more than 5,000 judges asking it to decisively act at
last.
Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s
procrastination, not to say to dereliction of duties, has been understood as a
sign of weakness by current Polish authorities, which is why they are now actively preparing
the ground for the systemic violation of the Court’s judgment in AB. Adding insult to injury, the
Commission has recently indicated its unwillingness to do its job as Guardian
of the Treaties in a case originating from one of the growing number of
individuals unlawfully appointed to Polish courts. This pending case, known as Case
C-132/20, is the first ever preliminary ruling request submitted by a “fake
judge”. Coincidence or not, the hearing in this case took place on 2 March
2021, the same day the Court of Justice issued its judgment in Case C-824/18.
1. Doing the Job: The Court of Justice
The Court of Justice’s judgment
in AB is both rich and significant
which makes a brief presentation of this case challenging. That caveat aside,
the AB judgment’s most important contribution
to the defence of the rule of law in the EU is the confirmation that EU Member
States must respect EU requirements relating to judicial independence when they
decide to change the rules governing the process of appointing judges and
connected rules governing judicial review of judicial appointment decisions.
National authorities cannot
therefore seek to hide behind the national constitution, which Polish
authorities continue to routinely violate with impunity following their unconstitutional
takeover of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, to adopt arbitrary
substantive conditions or procedural rules in respect of judicial appointments;
deprive a national court of its previous jurisdiction; to force the
discontinuation of ongoing appeals and/or prevent national courts from
referring questions on judicial appointments to the Court of Justice.
Another important aspect of the
Court’s judgment is its finding – implying a manifest breach of the EU principle
of sincere cooperation – that Polish legislature adopted the amendments in
dispute with the deliberate aim of systemically preventing the Court from
ruling on the questions referred to it by Poland’s Supreme Administrative
Court. Also unprecedented is the Court’s more general denunciation, albeit in
diplomatic terms, of Polish authorities’ bad faith and lawless behaviour as
they have repeatedly sought to curb preliminary ruling requests from Polish
courts and prevent any effective judicial review of the (unlawful) judicial
appointment resolutions adopted by the (unconstitutionally
established and unlawfully
composed) new KRS.
In this context, and for the
first time, the Court of Justice denounced the “retrograde impact” of the
legislative amendments in dispute and the unlawful behaviour of the Polish
President who blatantly ignored a freezing order of Poland’s Supreme
Administrative Court to (unlawfully) appoint eight “usurpers”
to Poland’s Supreme Court. Another noteworthy aspect of AB is the mention of the possibility for the referring court to consider
inter alia the existence of special relationships between the members of the
KRS thus established and the Polish executive when assessing the independence
(or rather lack thereof) of the individuals appointed to the Supreme Court in
open violation of the Supreme Administrative Court’s freezing order. The
existence of this “special relationship” has already been solidly
established.
The inescapable conclusion from
the Court’s judgment – but one to be confirmed by the referring court assuming
it will not be prevented from doing so – is that Polish authorities have
organised the systemic violation of EU (rule of) law and deliberately presided
over the manifestly unlawful appointment of multiple individuals (who cannot therefore
be called “judges”) to the Supreme Court.
The Court’s AB judgment does arguably suffer from two key weaknesses: It does
not tackle the issue of these manifestly unlawful judicial appointments by
directly relying on the right
to a tribunal established by law, which would arguably make it even clearer
that we are not dealing with judges here rather than judges lacking
independence; it fails to make clear that Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal is
no longer a court as it is unlawfully composed (the former president of the German
FCC accurately described it as a “puppet”)
while the Court of Justice also fails to explicitly address the violation and
nullification of its own judgment in AK.
Notwithstanding these weaknesses,
AB is a welcome and important
judgment regarding EU law and national judicial appointment procedures. Unfortunately,
AB will not in and of itself halt the
deliberate annihilation of judicial independence organised by current Polish
authorities for two main reasons: The limitations inherent in the preliminary
ruling jurisdiction of the ECJ which require independent judges to subsequently
apply its preliminary rulings and eventually set aside national law if a
violation of EU law is confirmed; the Commission’s repeated failure to do the
job.
2. Not doing the Job: The Commission
The Court’s judgment is AB indirectly demonstrates the
Commission’s persistent failure to do its job as Guardian of the Treaties. In
addition to constantly acting in a too
little too late fashion on the enforcement front, the Commission appears to
have decided to be as unhelpful as possible in rule of law-related preliminary
ruling cases by adopting the most possibly narrow interpretation of the scope
of application of the principle of judicial independence.
In Case C-824/18, the Commission
has essentially argued the opposite of what the Court of Justice eventually decided
by arguing, inter alia, that neither Article 19(1) TEU nor Article 267 TFEU
preclude the legislative amendments in dispute. For the Commission, EU law
would only be violated in a situation where there is a “structural rupture in
the [judicial] appointment process”. What “rupture” means here escapes me but
the intent appears clear enough: to only offer service minimum when it comes to
defending judicial independence. This means inter alia avoiding difficult
problems by pretending that they are not serious enough to warrant action or that
they do not exist as the Commission did in pending Case C-132/20. This is a
less well known case which however deserves to be more widely known. It is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first ever national request for a preliminary ruling
request submitted by an individual who has, in my view, been manifestly unlawfully
appointed to a judicial position (more background here).
Not content to undermine the judiciary at home, this is the first time an
autocratic government is seeking to corrupt an EU procedure which is supposed
to be for judges only.
Leaving aside the ludicrous
questions submitted by this usurper who is for instance questioning the lack of
independence of Polish
judges appointed before 1989, the Court of Justice is indeed now faced with
a national request submitted by an individual who benefited from an appointment
procedure whose flagrant irregularities have just been outlined by the Court of
Justice in Case C-824/18, including the flagrant violation of an order issued
by Poland’s Supreme Administrative Court.
Yet rather than mounting a strong
defence of the view that the reference submitted by this individual is inadmissible
as it was not submitted by a court, what did the Commission argue at the
hearing on 2 March 2021? Well, it failed to take a clear stance regarding the
lack of independence of the referring individual ignoring inter alia that his
appointment directly follows from the open disregard of a court’s binding
interim order. Worse, the Commission did not raise any objection with respect
to the “established
by law” criterion suggesting instead that the reference came from Poland’s
Supreme Court and could therefore be presumed to come from a proper court.
This (flawed) logic must have
delighted Poland’s autocratic government. Not only would this approach allow
the current ruling party to ignore the case law of the ECJ regarding the review
of judicial appointments marred by manifest procedural irregularities, it would
also mean that the fake judges it unlawfully put in place can then seek to
legitimise themselves by seeing their (bogus) requests for a preliminary ruling
heard and decided by the ECJ. They could then claim on Poland’s State TV, the
one routinely used to smear
independent judges: “See, even the Court of Justice recognises our judges
as proper judges”. While Caligula may not have succeeded with his (alleged)
intentions of making his horse a consul in the Roman Senate, thanks to the
Commission’s line of reasoning, Duda would be able to get away with appointing those
who have so incompetently managed Poland’s state-owned
stud farms to the Supreme Court. The Commission’s failure to protect the
very integrity of the system of legal remedies laid down in the Treaties is
irresponsible. Let’s hope the Court will see the utmost importance of not
offering autocrats a potentially new option to gangrene the EU legal order from
within by flooding the Court with bogus requests from their fake judges.
The depressing picture which
emerges from the above is that we are currently in the worst of all possible
worlds. First, the Commission continues to act in a too little too late fashion
on the enforcement front with Case C-824/18 a striking example of measures the
Commission ought to have targeted but did not. This is leaving no choice to
national judges but to risk their professional and family life to refer to the
Court of Justice unlawful measures the Commission is irresponsibly refusing to
challenge. Second, the Commission appears keen to undermine national requests
raising judicial independence issues submitted by independent judges under
siege by refusing to adopt a rule of law enhancing interpretation of EU law
and/or its scope. Case C-824/18 being a case in point. Third, the Commission
has now refused to strongly challenge the admissibility of a preliminary ruling
request submitted by one of the Polish ruling party’s fake judges who are now openly
and actively colluding with the PiS-led executive to finish
off judicial independence once and for all.
Fear not however as the death of
judicial independence in Poland will be reported in the Commission’s Rule of
Law Report, if not in its forthcoming second edition, in its third edition
scheduled for 2022.
Photo credit: User Darwinek, via Wikimedia Commons
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