Here's the EU Council legal service's opinion on whether the Brexit deal can be concluded by the EU alone, or requires also the participation of its Member States (known as a 'mixed agreement'). It concludes that it can be concluded by the EU alone, because it is a mixture of competences exclusive to the EU and competences shared between the EU and its Member States. Following the case law of the CJEU, it's an option for the EU to conclude a treaty including provisions on shared competence either by the EU alone, or together with its Member States. (The main points are also summarised in a Twitter thread).
I.
Introduction
1.
At the meeting of Coreper on 23 November 2020,
the representative of the Council Legal Service (CLS) made an oral intervention
on the legal nature of the future agreement with the United Kingdom (UK) which
was being negotiated, and more particularly on the issue of mixity and on the
possible EU-only nature of that future agreement, through the exercise by the
EU of its so-called potential competence. In the meantime, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between
the EU and Euratom, of the one part, and the UK, of the other, was signed on 30
December 2020 (the Trade and Cooperation Agreement).
2.
In reply to a request by several delegations, in
particular at the meeting of the UK Working Party on 13 January 2021, this
opinion confirms and develops in writing the answers already provided orally by
the CLS. It focuses more particularly on the issue of the EU exercising
externally its potential competence - i.e. the exercise of its competence in
areas of shared competence which are not already subject to common rules within
the meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU and the related case-law - and the legal
consequences of such an exercise of competences.
3.
In view of the short time available in the ongoing conclusion
process, this opinion focusses on the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
and does not provide
an in-depth examination of all its aspects, nor does it provide a comprehensive
and detailed competence analysis.
II.
Factual and Legal BACKGROUND
4.
On 25 February 2020, the Council
adopted its decision[1]
authorising the opening of negotiations for a future agreement with the UK, to
which the negotiating directives were annexed[2].
This decision also nominated the Commission as the EU negotiator. In parallel,
the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
recorded a statement[3] to
the Council minutes. In this statement, the Member States' representatives
authorised the Commission to conduct negotiations in areas of the future
relationship that fall within their competences and stated that the question
whether the new agreement would be concluded by the EU or by the EU and its
Member States remained to be determined at the end of the negotiations[4]
5.
The negotiations, which were completed on 24
December 2020, resulted in three agreements: the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement; the Agreement between the EU and the UK concerning security
procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, which
supplements the Trade and Cooperation Agreement; and an Agreement between the
Government of the UK and Euratom for Cooperation on the Safe and the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy. As indicated above, this opinion focusses on the first
Agreement.
6.
Under its first Article, the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement "establishes the basis for a broad relationship
between the [EU and the UK] within an area of prosperity and good
neighbourliness characterised by close and peaceful relations based on
cooperation, respectful of the Parties' autonomy and sovereignty"[5].
When deciding to sign the Agreement, the Council characterised it as
"[establishing] the basis for a broad relationship between the [EU
and the UK] involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and
special procedures" which is the wording from Article 217 TFEU on
association agreements, on the basis of which the Council chose to sign the
Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the UK[6].
7.
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the UK
sets out arrangements in a vast array of areas such as trade in goods,
services, investments, digital trade, capital movements and payments,
intellectual property, public procurement, energy, aviation and road transport,
fisheries, social security coordination, the absence of visas for short term
visits (Part Two of the Agreement), law enforcement and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters (Part Three), thematic cooperation (health and cybersecurity)
(Part Four) and participation in EU programmes (Part Five).
It is underpinned by provisions ensuring a common institutional
framework (Part One of the Agreement), including a dispute settlement mechanism
(Part Six), and a level playing field between the Parties. There are 49 annexes
and three protocols to the Agreement : a Protocol on administrative cooperation
and combating fraud in the field of value added tax and on mutual assistance
for the recovery of claims relating to taxes and duties; a Protocol on mutual
administrative assistance in customs matters; and a Protocol on social security
coordination.
The Agreement provides in its second Article that future
bilateral agreements between the EU and the UK "shall constitute
supplementing agreements to this Agreement, unless otherwise provided for in
those agreements" and that "such supplementing agreements
shall be an integral part of the overall bilateral relations as governed by
this Agreement and shall form part of the overall framework"[7].
8.
On 29 December 2020, the Council adopted
Decision No (EU) 2020/2252, on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and on
provisional application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and of the
Security of Information Agreement ('the decision on signature')[8].
9.
Through this decision, the Council, "in
view of the exceptional and unique character of the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement, which is a comprehensive agreement with a country that has withdrawn
from the Union (…) [decided] to make use of the possibility for the
Union to exercise its external competence with regard to the [UK]"
(recital 6). The Council hence made the political choice that the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement was to be concluded as an EU-only agreement. This is
explicitly indicated in the decision on signature.
The reasons for this political choice are explained in recital 6
- "in view of the exceptional and unique character of the [Agreement]"
- but also, indirectly, in recital 16 of the decision on signature which
explains the reasons for the Council deciding to provisionally apply the
Agreement by the fact that that it concerns "a country that has
withdrawn from the Union", the UK being therefore "in a
different and exceptional situation with regard to the Union compared to other
third countries". The level of cooperation between the EU and the UK
was indeed going to decrease from a very high level at the end of the
transition period - during which the EU acquis still applied to the UK -
to a lower level of cooperation as from the end of that period, thus causing
disruption the severity of which could be limited through provisional application
of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
11.
On 25 December 2020, the Commission submitted a
proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement[9]. The discussions within the Council on this
proposal are ongoing.
III.
Legal Analysis
12.
The views of the CLS have been sought in
relation to the legal nature of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and more
specifically, on the issue of the EU exercising its potential competence, on
the issue of the EU-only nature of the Agreement and on the issue of the legal
consequences for Member States of such an exercise of competences. As indicated
in paragraph 3 above, the CLS will not examine each title of the agreement or
proceed to a comprehensive and detailed competence analysis.
A.
EU exclusive and shared competences, as interpreted
by the Court of Justice
13.
In accordance with Article 3(1) TFEU, the EU has
exclusive competence, in particular, in the following areas: customs union, the
establishment of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the
internal market, the conservation of marine biological resources under the
common fisheries policies, and the common commercial policy.
14.
In accordance with Article 3(2) TFEU, the EU
"also [has] exclusive competence for the conclusion of an
international agreement (…) in so far as its conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope". As clarified by the Court in its
judgment in the Broadcasting Convention Case[10],
this last limb of Article 3(2) codifies the so-called AETR, or ERTA,
jurisprudence[11].
15.
On shared competences, Article 4(1) and (2) TFEU
provides the following:
"1. The Union shall share competence with the
Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not
relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.
2. Shared
competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following
principal areas:
(a) internal
market; (…)
(e) environment;
(f) consumer
protection;
(g) transport;
(…)
(i) energy
(j) area
of freedom, security and justice
(k) common
safety concerns in public health matters (…)"
16.
The Court has consistently held that there is a
risk that common EU rules may be affected by commitments undertaken by Member
States, or that the scope of those rules may be altered, such as to justify an
exclusive external competence of the EU under Article 3(2) TFEU, where
those commitments fall within the scope of the said common EU rules[12].
17.
A finding that there is such a risk does not
presuppose that the area covered by the international commitments (whether
actual or envisaged) and that covered by the EU rules coincide fully. In
particular, the scope of common EU rules may be affected or altered by
international commitments where those commitments fall within an area which is
already largely covered by such rules. Furthermore, such a risk of common EU
rules being affected may be found to exist where the international commitments
at issue, without necessarily conflicting with those rules, may have an effect
on their meaning, scope and effectiveness[13].
When analysing the relationship between the international
instrument at stake and the relevant EU rules, that analysis must take into
account the areas covered, respectively, by the rules of EU law and by the
provisions of that instrument, their foreseeable future development and the
nature and content of those rules and those provisions, in order to determine
whether the said instrument is capable of undermining the uniform and
consistent application of the EU rules and the proper functioning of the system
which they establish[14].
B.
Consequences of EU exclusive
competences on the Member States
18.
The exercise internally, by the EU, of its
competence has consequences on the Member States insofar as, if the EU thereby
acquires exclusive competence, Member States may no longer enter into
international commitments outside the framework of the EU institutions in the
areas falling within EU exclusive competence[15].
19.
Conversely, internally, where the EU has not
(yet) exercised its shared competences in a given area, the Member States can
continue exercising their competences in that area "to the extent that
the Union has not exercised its competences" (Article 2(2) TFEU). The
same is true, externally, where it would result from the analysis of an
(envisaged) international commitment that the conditions for exclusivity set
out in Article 3(2) TFEU, as interpreted by the Court in its extensive case-law
on external competences (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above), are not met and that,
as a consequence, Member States can still exercise their competences
externally.
20.
By way of example, the EU has not yet adopted
common internal rules with regard to air traffic rights granted to third
countries. The competence to conclude agreements with third countries on such
matters has therefore not become an exclusive competence of the EU[16]
and can be exercised either by the Member States or by the EU[17].
C.
Mixity of international
agreements: obligatory or facultative
21.
It is recalled that, in accordance with the
principle of conferral (Article 5 TEU), an international agreement is mixed,
i.e. it is signed and concluded both by the EU and its Member States, if it
concerns competences that belong both to the EU and to its Member States.
22.
There are, in practice, two types of mixity:
obligatory or facultative.
Mixity is obligatory where, in addition to areas of EU
competence, the envisaged agreement covers one or several areas that fall
outside EU competences, i.e. where the Treaties have not conferred competences
on the EU in that particular area. In such a case, there is no political
choice: the agreement must be concluded both by the EU and its Member States.
Mixity is facultative where the envisaged agreement
covers one or several areas where the EU has shared competences which are
potential, i.e. not yet exercised or not yet covered by EU common rules
regarding which the envisaged agreement would have consequences as mentioned in
Article 3(2) and the related case-law. In such a case, the agreement may be
concluded either by the EU and its Member States or by the EU alone. Depending
on whether the Council decides to exercise all the EU potential competences or
not, the agreement will be an EU-only or a mixed agreement. This is a political
choice to be made by the Council on the basis of the relevant Treaty provisions
which confer competence on the EU.
23.
In its Singapore FTA Opinion,[18]
the Court provided clarifications as to the division of competence between the
EU and the Member States in the field of trade and investment. The Court
concluded that most of the Free Trade Agreement with Singapore fell within the
exclusive competence of the EU either because it was covered by the Common
Commercial Policy, including on foreign direct investment, as defined in
Article 207(1) TFEU, or because it was covered by the Common Transport Policy
(Articles 91 and 100(2) TFEU)[19].
24.
In the same Opinion, the Court recalled that
foreign direct investment is an exclusive competence of the EU. However, to the
extent that the FTA provisions related to indirect investment (i.e. portfolio
investment), the competence for that was "shared between the European
Union and the Member States pursuant to Article 4(1) and (2)(a) TFEU"[20].
On the possible exercise of such potential shared competence, the Court
clarified in its judgment in Weddell, that
"(…) the mere fact that international action of the [EU] falls
within a competence shared between it and the Member States does not preclude
the possibility of the required majority being obtained within the Council for
the [EU] to exercise that external competence alone"[21].
25.
In the case of facultative mixity, where the EU
has competence for the matters covered by an agreement, of which at least some
fall within its potential competence, that potential competence can still be
exercised by the Member States if they wish. The Council may however decide,
for a particular agreement, to exercise the potential EU competence on the
basis of the relevant Treaty legal basis,[22]
in accordance with the voting rules provided therein. Exercising or not the EU
potential competence externally when concluding an agreement is a matter of
political choice for the Council[23].
26.
This is to be distinguished from cases of obligatory
mixity where the subject matter of an agreement partially covers matters for
which the EU has competence, and partially matters for which the EU has no
competence whatsoever. In such a situation, as said above in paragraph 22,
mixity is not a political choice but a legal obligation[24].
D.
The particular case of the trade and cooperation
agreement with the UK
28.
While not entering into a detailed examination
of its different Titles and provisions, a rapid examination of the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement shows that no situation of obligatory mixity arises:
the EU has competence in all the fields covered by it.
29.
The CLS recalls in this context that, by way of
example, provisions related to trade or fisheries contained in Heading One of
Part Two (Trade) and Heading Five of Part Two (Fisheries) are exclusive
competences of the EU by virtue of Article 3(1) TFEU. Other provisions of the
Agreement, for instance, Title II of Heading Two (Aviation safety) or of Part
Three (Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), cover
matters that have become exclusive by exercise or are largely covered by EU acquis
that will be or risk being affected by the Agreement[25].
30.
Conversely, there are certain other provisions,
for instance traffic rights in the aviation area, which belong to shared EU
competences not yet exercised internally, and which are therefore only potential
EU competences. In relation to these potential competences, the Council could
decide, when adopting the decision on signature, that the EU would exercise
this type of non‑exclusive potential competences, thus making the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement an EU‑only agreement.
31.
When it adopted the decision on signature on 29
December 2020, the Council made this political choice and decided to exercise
the EU competence in the areas of potential EU competence. That decision
produces legal effects not least because it has entered into force on the day
of its adoption by the Council (29 December 2020) and the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement is being provisionally applied since 1 January 2021. It follows that
the Agreement must also be concluded as an EU-only agreement.
32.
As indicated above in paragraphs 21 to 25, only
where the EU is vested with the competence to do so in the Treaties, can it
conclude an international agreement, in accordance with the relevant legal
basis. In the case at stake, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed
and provisionally applied on the basis of Article 217 TFEU, as the substantive
legal basis, in conjunction with the relevant procedural legal bases (Article
218(5) and (8) TFEU).
33.
Article 217 TFEU empowers the EU to conclude
with a third country an agreement establishing an association involving
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure. The
areas covered by such an agreement should be within the limits of the powers
that the Member States have conferred on the EU in the Treaties to attain the
objectives set out therein.[26]
Article 217 TFEU can be used whenever there is EU competence - i.e. where the
Treaty confers the appropriate competence on the EU in the different areas
covered by the agreement - even if this competence has not been exercised fully
or is only potential. Article 217 TFEU however is not to be used as a legal
basis if there is no underlying competence, i.e. the underlying sectoral
competence must exist for Article 217 TFEU to be used as a legal basis.
34.
Article 217 TFEU allows the EU to conclude, by
unanimity, a wide ranging agreement on matters of EU competence without the
need to identify in detail the areas where the EU has already exercised or not
its competence. It can include areas of EU competence where the sectoral legal
basis requires unanimity or qualified majority voting, as well as areas of
potential EU competence not yet exercised internally.
E.
Exercise vis-Ă -vis the UK of the
EU shared competence in social
security coordination and aviation traffic rights
35.
By way of example, the EU has a shared
competence in the area of social security coordination (Articles 48
TFEU). The EU has concluded several agreements with third countries that
contain rules on the coordination of social security. This is typically the
case for association agreements based on Article 217 TFEU. The lack of
completion of free movement of persons is not a hindrance to the conclusion of
an EU agreement in the field of social security coordination[27].
So far, agreements with third countries covering also the area of social
security coordination have been generally concluded as mixed agreements.
However, given that the EU has competence in this area, this is a matter of
political choice. It is equally possible for the EU to choose to exercise its
competence externally and to conclude such an agreement as an EU-only
agreement.
36.
Similarly, the EU has shared competence in the
area of air transport (Articles 91 and 100(2) TFEU). Once and to the
extent that the EU exercises internally such shared competence, it becomes
exclusively competent externally for matters affecting those internal rules. As
the EU has not yet exercised this shared competence internally with regard to traffic
rights granted to third countries, agreements with third countries on such
matters are often concluded as mixed agreements (facultative mixity). The
Council can choose whether or not to use it externally.
F.
Effect for Member States of the
EU exercising its shared (potential) competence
37.
The external exercise of the above EU
competences with regard to a given third country does not prevent Member
States from exercising their competence on that same matter vis-Ă -vis
other third countries. To take an example, the EU has an aviation agreement
with Switzerland that has existed for more than 20 years[28]
and which covers traffic rights. The existence of this agreement has not
prevented the Member States from concluding agreements on traffic rights with
other third countries.
38.
Hence, the fact that the Council has decided to
opt, in the specific case of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the UK,
for an EU-only agreement does not prevent Member States from continuing to
exercise their national competences vis-Ă -vis other third countries in that same
area of potential EU competence. Exercise by the EU of its potential
competences in the concerned area vis-Ă -vis the UK does not trigger a
situation of exclusivity as regards its relations with other third countries
nor a situation of exclusivity for the area of traffic rights concerning other
third countries as if that competence had been exercised internally. Therefore,
Member States remain free to continue concluding international agreements in
these areas of shared competence with third countries other than the UK under
the same conditions as before the signature of the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement. As explained above in paragraph 10, this possibility is explicitly
confirmed in recital 15 and Article 10 of the decision on signature.
G.
Provisions on possible so-called "top-ups"
by Member States
39.
Moreover, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
provides for, or does not exclude, the possibility for Member States to enter
into bilateral agreements with the UK concerning specific matters covered by
the Agreement in the areas of air transport, administrative cooperation in the
field of customs and VAT and social security coordination.[29]
Member States may do so provided such agreements are compatible with EU law, do
not undermine the functioning of the Agreement and are otherwise compatible
with the conditions set out in Articles 6 to 8 of the decision on signature,
which foresees an internal mechanism of information and cooperation between the
Member States and the Commission, culminating with the possibility of
authorising bilateral arrangements or agreements that Member States would
conclude with the UK in those areas.
40.
This internal mechanism is an expression of the
duty of sincere cooperation incumbent on the Member States (Article 4(3) TEU)[30],
which is of general application and does not depend on whether the competence
concerned is exclusive[31].
On this basis, Member States have a duty to refrain from any action which could
jeopardise the attainment of the EU objectives, and to ensure that such
arrangements or agreements are compatible and do not undermine the functioning
of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. To the extent that it frames and
organises the possibility of certain
bilateral agreements supplementing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (so-called
'top-ups') as allowed or not prohibited by the Agreement itself, this
internal mechanism is also an expression of the fact that the Agreement is part
of EU law, is binding in accordance with Article 216(2) TFEU, and has therefore
primacy.
41.
The
existence of the internal mechanism is independent of the nature of the
competence at stake. To take the example of traffic rights, the EU is
exercising in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement its external competence on
certain traffic rights vis-Ă -vis the UK. Certain bilateral agreements
supplementing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement are permitted by the
Agreement itself in accordance with the conditions set out therein[32]. The Agreement itself specifically
prohibits further top-ups (Article AIRTRAN.23)[33]. The internal empowerment mechanism in
Article 6 of the decision on signature regulates how the permitted top-ups are going to be
authorised. Therefore, at least as far as top-up agreements concerning air
traffic rights are concerned, the authorisation mechanism is not only an
expression of the duty of sincere cooperation. It is also necessary because the
shared, previously unexercised, external competence on traffic rights vis-Ă -vis
the UK is now governed by the provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement
which has primacy, and is a matter of exclusive EU competence vis-Ă -vis the
UK. However, as stated above in paragraphs 37 to 38 and explicitly
confirmed in recital 15 and Article 10 of the decision on signature, that EU competence is not exclusive
vis-Ă -vis other third countries.
42.
Lastly,
the CLS takes this opportunity to clarify, as it did in Coreper on 22 January
2021, that contrary to the statement made by the Commission to the
minutes of the Council on 29 December 2020, in connection with the
adoption of the decision on signature,[34] it does not see any legal obstacle for a
legal act based on Articles 217 and 218 TFEU, such as the decision on
signature, or the future Council decision concluding the agreements, to contain
such an internal mechanism for authorisation of bilateral arrangements or
agreements between individual Member States and the UK. Such internal
authorisation or empowerment mechanisms may be set out either in a legal act
adopted on the basis of the relevant sectoral substantial legal basis (i.e. a
legislative act) or in a legal act adopted by the Council for signing and
concluding international agreements[35].
IV.
Conclusion
[1] Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/266 of 25 February
2020 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement (OJ L 58,
27.2.2020, p. 53).
[2] Doc 5870/20 ADD 1 REV 3, Annex to Council Decision
authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement, 25 February 2020.
[3] Annex B of Doc. 6239/20.
[4] "[T]he Member States' representative authorise
the Commission to conduct negotiations in areas (…) that fall within the
competences of the Member States (…)" and "the question of
whether the (…) agreement will be concluded by the Union or by the Union
and its Member States will be determined at the end of the negotiations." (emphasis
added).
[5] See Article
COMPROV.1 (Purpose) of the Agreement. This wording is similar to that in
Article 8(1) TEU on the EU's relationships with neighbouring countries.
[6] See recital 5 of
Council Decision (EU) 2020/2252 of 29 December 2020 on the signing, on behalf
of the Union, and on provisional application of the Trade and Cooperation
Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community,
of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
of the other part, and of the Agreement between the European Union and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning security
procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information (OJ L 444,
31.12.2020, p. 2).
[7] See Article COMPROV.2 (supplementing agreements).
[8] See above footnote 7.
[9] COM (2020) 856 final.
[10] Case
C‑114/12, Commission v. Council ('Broadcasting
Convention'), judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 September 2014,
EU:C:2014:2151, paragraphs 66 and 67. See also Opinion 1/13 of the Court of
Justice (Grand Chamber) of 14 October 2014, Child Abduction Convention, EU:C:2014:2303,
paragraphs 69 to 74.
[11] Case
22/70, Commission v Council ('ERTA'), judgment of 31 March 1971, EU:C:1971:32, paragraphs 17 to 19: "17.
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules,
whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right,
acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third
countries which affect those rules. 18. As and when such common rules come into
being, the Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out contractual
obligations towards third countries affecting the whole sphere of application
of the Community legal system. 19. With regard to the implementation of the
provisions of the Treaty, the system of internal Community measures may not
therefore be separated from that of external relations."
[12] Opinion 2/91 of the Court of Justice of 19 March 1993,
ILO, EU:C:1993:106, paragraph 25; Case C-467/98, Commission v Denmark
('Open Skies'), judgment of the Court of 5 November 2002, EU:C:2002:625,
paragraph 82; and Opinion 1/03 of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 7
February 2006, Lugano Convention, EU:C:2006:81, paragraphs 120 to 126.
[13] See Opinion 2/91 ILO (op. cit. footnote 13),
paragraphs 25 and 26; Judgment in 'Open Skies' (op. cit. footnote 13),
paragraph 82; Opinion 1/03 Lugano Convention (op. cit. footnote 13),
paragraphs 120 and 126; Judgment in 'Broadcasting Convention' (op. cit.
footnote 11), paragraphs 68 to 73; as well as Joined Cases C‑626/15 and C‑659/16,
Commission v Council ('Weddell') judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) of 20 November 2018, EU:C:2018:925, paragraphs 113 and 114 and the
case-law cited.
[14] See Opinion 3/15 of the Court of Justice (Grand
Chamber) of 14 February 2017, Access Rights, EU:C:2017:114,
paragraph 108 and the case-law cited.
[15] Opinion 2/91 ILO
(op. cit. footnote 13), paragraphs 25 and 26; Judgment in 'Open Skies'
(opt. cit. footnote 13), paragraph 82.
[16] Judgment
in 'Open Skies' (opt. cit. footnote 13), paragraphs 90 to 92.
[17] See CLS opinion in 5990/18
on the Regulation on competition in air transport, paragraphs 23 and 24.
[18] Opinion 2/15 of the Court
of Justice (Full Court) of 16 May
2017, Singapore
FTA, EU:C:2017:376.
[19] In the case of transport services, the Court deduced
this from its AETR case law: see Opinion 2/15 Singapore FTA (op.
cit. footnote 19), paragraph 170 and further. Note however that air transport
services were not covered in the Singapore agreement, see paragraph 63 of that
Opinion.
[20] Opinion 2/15 Singapore FTA (op. cit. footnote 19), paragraph
243.
[21] Judgment in 'Weddell' (opt. cit. footnote 14),
paragraph 126.
[22] See CLS opinion in 12866/19 on the CETA Investment
Court System (ICS), paragraph 6.
[23] See Case C-600/14, Germany v. Council ('OTIF'),
judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 December 2017, EU:C:2017:935,
paragraph 68; see also Judgment in 'Weddell' (opt. cit. footnote 14),
paragraphs 126 and 127.
[24] See Opinion 2/15 Singapore FTA (op.
cit. footnote 19), paragraph 292. See also CLS opinions in 12866/19 (CETA ICS)
and 6442/19 (UN Convention on Investor-State Arbitration).
[25] See, inter alia, Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in
the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (OJ L
212, 22.8.2018, p. 1) and
Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention,
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious
crime (OJ L
119, 4.5.2016, p. 132).
[26] See Case C-81/13, UK v Council ('social
security Turkey'), judgments of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 December
2014, EU:C:2014:2449, paragraphs 61 and 62.
[27] As regards Turkey,
for example, the Court compensated for the lack of completion of free movement
with the addition of Article 217 TFEU to Article 48 TFEU as a substantial legal
basis for the adoption of the EU position, to be taken within the Association
Council set up by the EU-Turkey Association Agreement, with regard to the
adoption of provisions on the coordination of social security systems (see
judgment in 'social security Turkey' (op. cit. footnote 27), paragraph
63.
[28] Agreement
between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport,
signed on 21 June 1999 (OJ L 114, 30.4.2002, p. 73).
[29] See Article AIRTRN.3 and Article 41 of the VAT
Protocol.
[30] Article 4(3) TEU: "Pursuant to the principle
of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual
respect, assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the
Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties
or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States
shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives."
[31] C-246/07, Commission v Sweden, judgment of the
Court (Grand Chamber) of 20 April 2010, EU:C:2010:203, paragraph 71.
[32] Article AIRTRN.3(5) TCA: "the rights mutually
granted in accordance with paragraph 4 (i.e. top-ups) shall be governed by the
provisions of this Title."
[33] "The United
Kingdom and a Member State may not grant each other any rights in connection
with air transport to, from or within their respective territories other than
those expressly laid down in this Title, save as provided for in Article
AIRTRN.3 (4) and (9) [traffic rights]."
[34] Doc. 5525/20 ADD 1.
[35] The CLS recalls that Article 4 of the Council Decision
on the conclusion of the Withdrawal Agreement establishes a similar internal mechanism
in relation to agreements in areas of EU competence that certain Member States
are allowed, under the conditions referred in that provision, to conclude with
the UK (see Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 of 30 January 2020 on the conclusion
of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community, OJ L 29, 31.1.2020, p. 1).
Shared competences belong to both the EU and the MS. The MS, in ratifying the Treaty, have not agreed that these competences belong exclusively with the EU. But here the Council - not the MS acting through domestic political processes, but rather the MS acting through the EU - has decided to treat these competences as exclusive to the EU. I know the Court says that is lawful. But that does not make it correct. The Council has here adjusted the EU system from within, changing the allocation of competences - a clear violation of the principle that the EU's competences are defined and limited by the Treaty and can be changed only by the MS revising the Treaty and securing ratification according to domestic constitutional requirements
ReplyDeleteThis is a misconception of what the legal service and the CJEU have said, and what the Treaties provide for. Article 2(2) TFEU includes this rule as part of the definition of shared competence: "The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence." This is residual, ie it applies to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence; so the exercise of EU competence displaces the Member States' exercise of theirs. The external version of this rule appears in Article 3(2) TFEU - "The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement...in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope."
DeleteThe nature of shared competence is that the Member States within the EU can choose to let the EU act as regards those competences, or reserve them for Member States' use; but if they choose to let the EU act then it constrains what the Member States can do in those areas. Your conception is that 'shared' competences somehow remain with the Member States even after Member States choose to let the EU act in those areas. But Article 2(2) TFEU specifies that this only happens to the extent to which the EU has ceased to exercise those shared competences: "The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence."
Art 2(2) is clearly an inaccurate description of the nature of shared competence. Look at Arts 153(4), 169(4), 193. Exercise of EU competence does not displace exercise of MS competence, it co-exists with it. And this is why permitting an agreement covering areas of shared competence to be concluded exclusively by the EU subverts the structure of the Treaty
ReplyDeleteArticle 2(6) states that the details of competences are further set out in the rest of the Treaties. Your claim about the meaning of 'co-existence' ignores not only the clear wording of Art 2(2) but extensive case law dating back 50 years to ERTA. The Treaty provisions you refer to specify that the EU sets only minimum standards in certain areas - but in each case Member States' higher standards must also be 'compatible with the Treaties'. Obviously Member States must also *comply* with the minimum standards, so they are constrained in that sense too. And the obvious a contrario implication of these provisions is that where the EU is *not* constrained to set minimum standards in areas of shared competence, it has a choice to harmonise the law fully - having an even greater impact on Member States until, as Article 2(2) specifies, the EU ceases to exercise that competence.
Delete"Article 2(6) states that the details of competences are further set out in the rest of the Treaties" - indeed they are, and (see 153(4) etc) in a way that contradicts the inaccurately binary formula in Art 2(2).
Delete"Your claim about the meaning of 'co-existence' ignores not only the clear wording of Art 2(2)" - yes it does, but Art 153(4) etc equally ignore the clear wording of Art 2(2). Because Art 2(2) mis-states the true nature of shared competence in areas where the EU may set only minimum standards.
"The Treaty provisions you refer to specify that the EU sets only minimum standards in certain areas - but in each case Member States' higher standards must also be 'compatible with the Treaties'." Agreed, but this does not mean that MS are deprived of competence in the way that Art 2(2) claims. Unless you think free movement law entails exclusive EU competence because obstacles to interState trade have to be compatible with the Treaties, ie justified.
"And the obvious a contrario implication of these provisions is that where the EU is *not* constrained to set minimum standards in areas of shared competence, it has a choice to harmonise the law fully." Yes, agreed, and in those instances Art 2(2) is accurate. But Art 2(2) is not accurate where the EU may set only minimum standards because in those cases MS may act (by setting stricter rules) even where the EU has also acted.
So - big picture - Art 2(2) overstates the exclusion of MS competence once the EU has acted, and that is now being used in external relations law to exclude MS competence in areas where internally they remain competent. It's politically convenient, but it's storing up trouble if you believe in the rule of law
All this is covered by the words "to the extent that" in Art 2(2) - which logically refers not only to cases where the EU chooses to only partly harmonise an area of law which it *could* have harmonised fully, but also areas where it only partly harmonised an area of law because it could *not* legally harmonise it fully. None of the examples of the EU being constrained to set minimum standards is relevant to the EU/UK treaty; so it follows that the choice to use the EU only to sign up to the treaty is an unproblematic decision about how to exercise shared competence in this case. This is not "now" being used as a new approach to external relations - the case law referred to in the legal opinion had already followed this approach to external relations. Member State competence is only "excluded" here to the extent that its exercise would conflict with the EU's exercise of its powers - entirely as Article 2(2) provides.
DeleteThe "rule of law" isn't a magical phrase that trumps proper legal analysis. Just because somebody has a different interpretation of the law, it does not follow that the "rule of law" is threatened. This is an "everyone who disagrees with me is a Nazi" level of argument.
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ReplyDeleteArticle 2 says that in areas of shared competence "The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence". This is false. Arts 153, 169, 193 show that MS competence may be exercised whether or not the Union has exercised its competence. Article 2 says "The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence". This is false. Arts 153, 169 and 193 show that MS competence may be exercised before or after the Union has ceased to exercise its competence. None of this is covered by the words "to the extent that" Art 2(2).
ReplyDeleteIf you are referring to the possibility for Member States to set higher standards than EU law, that is only relevant where the EU has exercised its competence to set standards in the first place. The words "to the extent that" obviously also cover situations where the EU has not exercised its competence at all, therefore Article 2 is not "false". Also where the EU sets minimum standards, Member States are obliged to give effect to them, so their competence to set *lower* standards *is* impacted by the exercise of the EU's competence. Their competence to set higher standards is not. There is no sense in which Article 2 is "false" here either. And as a general point, claiming that Treaty Articles are "false" is not a very persuasive argument.
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