“We must not make a scarecrow of the law”
(Measure for Measure, 2.1.1)
Charlotte O’Brien,
Senior Lecturer, York Law School, University of York
Laurent Pech,
Professor of European Law, Jean Monnet Chair of EU Public Law at Middlesex
University London
This
post primarily aims to clarify the scope of EU free movement rules with the
view of addressing some of the most common (legal) misconceptions one may
regularly encounter in the British media and elsewhere. We argue that the much of
the criticism of free movement has targeted a ‘straw man’, with little regard
to the actual regime.
In
the UK, for instance, there seems to be a wide consensus across the political
spectrum on the need to restrict ‘
current EU freedom of movement rules’ yet
‘current’ EU rules are often misunderstood or misrepresented. To argue that the UK has simply ‘no
control’ over immigration from the rest of the EU is inaccurate. Similarly, one
may regret that some EU actors tend to paint freedom of movement as one which
could not be subject to restrictions and one which would be inherently
connected with rules on the free movement of goods, capital and services.
These aspects and many others
will be addressed below via 10 questions & answers, which should be
of interest to members of the general public looking for an (hopefully) accessible
and legal overview of EU free movement law. The post will end with a brief
outline of the main models and possible options for the UK to consider when it
will have to agree the ‘framework for its future relationship with the Union’
to quote Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU).
(1) Does EU Law guarantee an absolute right
to move and reside anywhere in the EU?
No.
Treaty rights of free movement are subject to limitations.
Article
45(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter:
TFEU) states that the rights to (a) accept offers of employment, (b) move
freely between States to take up employment, (c) reside in other Member States,
and
(d) the right to stay in another Member State after
employment has finished, are subject to ‘
limitations
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health’. This
means, to simplify, that national authorities can adopt restrictive measures on
a case-by-case basis against EU workers on any of these three grounds. Arguably
the most mutable of these grounds is the public policy limitation, and
Gareth
Davies has argued that this limitation has been underexplored when
it comes to free movement concerns, suggesting that greater use of permitted
restrictions might have avoided free movement becoming as contentious an issue
as it did in the UK.
Article
45(4) TFEU adds a further exception – that the free movement provisions shall not
apply to employment in the public service, so that where roles are thought to
be nationally sensitive, involving participation
in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to
safeguard the general interests of the State, they may be reserved for
nationals. This does not amount to a right to employ non-nationals and then
treat them differently – once admitted to the labour market, they should not be
discriminated against.
Similarly, there
is another derogation in respect of activities connected with the exercise of
official authority for self-employed persons and providers of services (see
Articles 51 and 62 TFEU). Discrimination against non-nationals is allowed but
only with regard
to positions involving a direct and
specific connexion with the exercise of official authority. This is why it
would not for instance be lawful to adopt a general ban on non-UK academics
providing
‘advisory work’ for UK public bodies such as the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
on Brexit related matters.
The key point remains that EU Treaties have always clearly provided that
free movement rights are not absolute and included in addition a number of permanent
derogations to the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
nationality. Unsurprisingly, however, a number of guiding principles have been
developed by the Court of Justice to prevent an abusive reliance on these
exceptions by national authorities.
Secondary
EU legislation forms the ‘specific expression’ of the EU Treaty free movement
rights, and sets out additional and more specific conditions and limitations.
The key condition for those concerned about benefit tourism is that an EU
national does not have a right to reside in a host Member State if they become
an “unreasonable burden” upon the public purse. Directive 2004/38 (the “EU
citizens’ Directive”, which is the source of the main legal rules on this
issue) sets out the ‘categories’ of people with an EU-law based right to reside
in a host Member State for longer than three months – essentially, workers/the
self-employed and their family members, students, and the self sufficient.
Students must have health insurance and make a declaration of sufficient
resources.
In
recent years, CJEU rulings have made some of these limitations more explicit.
The
Dano
case made clear that someone who moved for the ‘sole’ purpose of claiming
benefits would not have a right to reside in a member state under EU law. The
Brey case approved of member states setting
a right to reside condition in order for a claimant to be eligible for
particular social security benefits, not just social assistance benefits. So
member states have discretion over the arrangement of their welfare systems and
eligibility conditions, and are entitled to set conditions tied to having a
right to reside that only apply to EU nationals, and make it impossible for
economically inactive EU nationals to claim benefits.
And
in
Alimanovic and
Garcia Nieto,
the CJEU emphasised that EU nationals do not have entitlement to social
assistance benefits during their first three months of residence in a host
Member State, or at any point at which they are classed as a ‘jobseeker’, even
where the benefit in question appears to be an unemployment benefit. EU
jobseekers are entitled to claim benefits that facilitate access to the labour
market, but not where the benefit has a social assistance element and primary
aim of the benefit is the preservation of dignity. In the
Commission v
UK case the CJEU appear to have extended the exclusion to full
social security benefits, not just those with a social assistance element.
Economically inactive EU nationals must be self sufficient in order to have a
right to reside, and EU nationals who are workers must demonstrate that their
work is genuine and effective.
Furthermore,
there are some geographic limitations – free movement of persons applies for
people moving from the Overseas Countries or Territories associated with the
Union (OCTs), to the EU, but does not apply to people moving from the EU to
OCTs as will be explained below.
(2)
Does EU Law prevent temporal and geographical exceptions?
It would be wrong to think that
EU law has never allowed for some extensive geographical and temporal exceptions
with respect to the free movement of people.
While the default principle is
that EU law applies in the territory of all the Member states, some exceptions
exist especially when it comes to overseas regions and territories of relevant
Member States (so much so that there is a specialised field of study known as
EU Law of the
Overseas). This
means for instance EU free movement law does not uniformly apply to the whole
of the territories of all the Member States. The relevant legal framework is
rather complex. In a nutshell, there is free movement in one direction only.
Inhabitants of the countries making up the Netherlands Antilles may move to any
EU Member State as they are Dutch and EU citizens, but EU citizens from any
other Member State do not have symmetrical rights to move there. This is lawful
provided that the authorities of the countries of the Dutch Caribbean apply the
same restrictions on entry and residence equally to the nationals of the Member
State with which it is associated and the nationals of other EU Member States
(authors are grateful for Prof Kochenov’s insight on this issue. For more
details on ‘one-way EU free movement’ with respect to the OCTs, see his article
here).
But one does not have to go
overseas to see territories where the application of EU law may vary
dramatically depending on the subject matter. To give a single example, while
EU rules on free movement of goods apply to the Channel Islands, the rules
relating to the free movement of persons and services do not (see Protocol No 3
to the UK’s Act of Accession).
To make matters even more
complex, EU free movement rules may apply to nationals of non-EU Member States.
For instance, they apply to Swiss nationals and nationals of Norway, Iceland
and Liechtenstein (though note that free movement is in effect asymmetrical as
far as Liechtenstein is concerned – see question (7) below) which are not EU
Member States, by virtue – to simplify – of a number of bilateral agreements
between the EU and those countries.
With respect to temporal
exceptions to the free movement of people within the EU, one may for instance
refer to the
Treaties of
accession of 2003, 2005 and 2012, which included provisions
allowing for transitional restrictions to be imposed by existing EU Member
States on workers from the new EU Member States that joined the EU in 2004,
2007 and 2013 respectively. To give a single example, one may cite the chapter
entitled ‘freedom of movement for persons’ of Annex XII to the 2003 Act of
Accession regarding Poland. According to this text, the rules governing freedom
of movement of workers and freedom to provide services shall apply subject to a
number of transitional provisions on the basis of which the then EU-15 could
adopt national measures in order to regulate ‘access to their labour markets by
Polish nationals’ or adopt measures derogating from the freedom to provide
services as far as companies established in Poland are concerned.
By contrast to most EU Member
States, the UK decided not to derogate from the free movement of workers during
the seven-year period with respect to nationals of the countries that joined
the EU in 2004. In other words, the UK along with Ireland and Sweden sovereignly
decided to open their labour markets directly from 1 May 2004 with respect to
workers from countries such as Poland. The UK did however impose transitional
provisions departing from the principle of equal treatment (see Question (3) below).
The UK also subsequently decided
to derogate from free movement with respect to Bulgaria and Romania when these
two countries joined the EU in 2007. This meant that workers from the two
countries were not allowed, as a matter of principle, to work freely in the UK before
1 January 2013, that is, seven years after Bulgaria and Romania had joined the
EU. To oversimplify, Romanian and Bulgarian nationals wishing to work in the UK
had instead to secure the permission of the Home Office for doing so. The same
has applied to Croatian workers since Croatia joined the EU in 2013.
(3) Has EU Law led to an uncontrolled
migration regime within the EU?
The
free movement system means that EU nationals and their family members who
fulfil the conditions within EU law can move and reside freely within the EU,
which means that Member States cannot impose quotas, or add additional
conditions through an immigration points system – unless some derogation from
Article 45 TFEU were agreed to be necessary on pressing grounds of, e.g. public
policy.
Fulfilling
the conditions set by the EU, in order to exercise free movement rights,
typically means being a worker. This is therefore not uncontrolled migration,
but the means of control is not immigration law – it is the labour market,
which is the key to a right to reside and to stay in another Member State. This
is an important point too often ignored. Moving away from this labour market based
regulated form of intra-EU migration control would necessarily mean
implementing instead a
dirigiste
bureaucratic form of migration control. This would not be a cost-neutral policy
decision. It would likely be more time consuming and costly than the current market-based
regulation system derived from EU law. One well informed expert suggested in
this respect that ending the free movement of people in the UK would create a
‘bureaucratic
nightmare’.
As
noted above, Member States have in recent years been permitted to moderate the
effect of accession of new states upon their labour markets by temporarily
derogating from the free movement of workers with regard to new acceding
states. While, as previously mentioned, the UK chose not to derogate from free
movement for the A8 enlargement in 2004, it imposed a ‘
worker registration scheme’ according to
which A8 workers were not entitled to any out of work benefits until they had
completed 12 months of registered work, and if the registration was not
completed correctly, all subsequent work, until the lapse of the transition
measures, was to considered unlawful, not conferring a right to reside or
counting towards permanent residence. The transition measures ended in 2011.
The
UK’s derogation from the free movement provisions in 2007 for the A2 States,
Bulgaria and Romania, involved adopting a worker authorisation scheme, which
essentially required Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to apply for
authorisation to work on the basis of falling into an authorised category of
work, ie specific sectors. These
transition measures ended on the 1 January 2014. The UK also derogated from the
free movement provisions on the accession of Croatia in 2013, and now requires
Croatian nationals to obtain authorisation to work, and limits such
authorisation to skilled work.
There
was some implication in the lead up to the UK referendum that membership of the
EU
increased the ‘risk’ of unauthorised immigration
and/or asylum seeking from third countries. But EU free movement law does not
affect Member States’ (non-asylum) immigration regimes applied to non-EU
nationals who are not family members of EU nationals. The Common European
Asylum System provides a means for determining the state responsible for
processing asylum claims, and under the problematic
Dublin system this usually means that the
country of first entry is responsible – putting most pressure on countries
around the periphery of the EU, not the UK. A proposal for a
reformed system for asylum burden sharing
is in preparation, but the UK has secured an opt-out.
(4) Does EU Law prevent Member States from
dealing with welfare tourism?
The
short answer is a clear no. The CJEU has found that Member States are entitled
to reserve the right to equal treatment as regards welfare benefits to those
with an EU law-based right to reside.
To
establish such a right, EU nationals must show that they fit one of the given
categories in
Directive 2004/38 – i.e. that they are
workers, family members of workers self-sufficient, or students (who must
declare self-sufficiency). EU law does not provide a right to reside for
persons who move solely to claim benefits, and creates only limited rights for
jobseekers, who are not entitled to claim social assistance.
There
is no entitlement for those who move to seek work to social assistance for the
first three months of residence; instead those who have been working elsewhere
and who are entitled to a contributory job seeking benefit in their home State
are entitled to bring it with them when they arrive in a host State, if they
meet the conditions for ‘exporting’ their benefit.
As
far as workers are concerned, EU law requires EU national workers to be treated
equally with own state nationals for the purposes of social and tax advantages.
In some cases this means that social security (but not social assistance)
benefits can be exported to another Member State, so long as the EU national is
a worker in the paying State. EU nationals who do not fall into these
categories do not have a right to reside
under EU law and so do not have equal access to welfare benefits.
Member
States thus have some considerable freedom to limit benefit entitlement to
those considered to be contributors, and so to avoid awarding benefits to those
perceived to be benefit tourists. It is therefore misleading to suggest,
as
Theresa May did in August 2015, that EU law would guarantee a freedom to
claim benefits.
However,
in any discussion of the need to ‘deal’ with welfare tourism, we cannot ignore
the absence of evidence that the problem exists. If we look to the take
empirical evidence on the costs/benefits of EU immigration, e.g. the
cost/benefit study by UCL, this suggests
that EU nationals are net contributors, and ONS figures show that in the UK, EU
nationals are
less likely than UK nationals to be unemployed.
The Department for Work and Pensions responded to a EU Commission query in
2013 saying that they had no evidence of
benefit tourism. Oxford University’s
Migration Observatory concluded that
the more recent the migrant’s arrival, the more likely the positive
contribution. One may finally mention a
report by
the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) at the London School of
Economics, published on 11 May 2016, in which its authors argue that ‘the
empirical evidence shows that EU immigration has not had significantly negative
effects on average employment, wages, inequality or public services at the
local level for the UK-born … At the national level, falls in EU immigration
are likely to lead to lower living standards for the UK-born. This is partly
because immigrants help to reduce the deficit: they are more likely to work and
pay tax and less likely to use public services as they are younger and better
educated than the UK-born. It is also partly due to the positive effects of EU
immigrants on productivity.’
(5)
Does EU Law prevent Member States to prevent abuse and fraud such as marriages
of convenience?
EU free movement law is
regularly presented as preventing national authorities from ‘controlling’ EU
citizens seeking to move and reside in the UK. One must however emphasise that
EU law cannot be relied upon in case of abuse. In other words, EU law
explicitly entitles Member States to ‘adopt the necessary measures to refuse,
terminate or withdraw any right conferred by [EU free movement law] in the case
of abuse of rights or fraud’ and gives the example of marriages of convenience
(see Article 35 of
Directive
2004/38).
To prevent any abusive use of
this ‘abuse clause’, whereby member states might unduly strip people of their
rights, EU law also unsurprisingly provides that any measure adopted by a
national authority on this basis must however be proportionate and subject to
the usual procedural safeguards such as access to judicial and administrative
redress procedures in the host Member State.
It would be wrong therefore to
claim that EU law prevents Member States from tackling abusive reliance on EU
free movement rights, which has been defined as any ‘artificial conduct entered
into solely with the
purpose of obtaining the right of free movement and residence under [EU] law
which, albeit formally observing of the conditions laid down by [EU] rules,
does not comply with the purpose of those rules.’ Fraud, that is, any deliberate
deception or contrivance made to obtain the EU right of free movement and
residence may similarly be sanctioned by the relevant host Member State.
In practice, it is for each
Member State to decide how best to tackle fraud and abuse of EU free movement
rights. As noted above, EU law does not prevent Member States from
investigating individual cases where there is a well-founded suspicion of abuse
and adopt necessary sanctions in cases of proved abuse. It is not unusual for
national authorities to choose not to go to the expense of doing so; a recent
analysis on the
Free Movement blog noted that ‘
the latest figures suggest there are very
few investigations and the Home Office is unwilling to release information on
the outcome of the investigations.’ However,
this lack of
action is sometimes attributed to the legal constraints of EU free movement law
(see e.g. the
letter sent by David Cameron to
Donald Tusk on
10 November 2015 citing inter alia ‘sham marriage’ to justify a rewriting of EU
free movement rules). These legal constraints however merely call for a
case-by-case assessment of any possible abuse of EU free movement rights and
for any individual investigation to be carried out in accordance with
fundamental rights. In other words, EU law only requires Member States to
comply with the rule of law in this area.
(6)
Does EU Law prevent Member States from removing criminals from their
territories?
Some British newspapers
regularly seek to paint the EU as preventing the UK from denying entry,
refusing residence or deporting citizens from other EU Member States. This is
plainly false. The EU Treaties explicitly provide that national authorities can
limit the exercise of EU free movement rights on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health. The main piece of EU legislation dealing with
the rights of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely
within the EU contains a whole chapter on ‘restrictions on the right of entry
and the right of residence on grounds of public policy, public security or
public health’ (see Chapter VI of
Directive
2004/38).
In other words, and to cite the
European Council, host Member States may ‘take the necessary restrictive
measures to protect themselves against individuals whose personal conduct is
likely to represent a genuine and serious threat to public policy or security.
In determining whether the conduct of an individual poses a present threat to
public policy or security, Member States may take into account past conduct of
the individual concerned and the threat may not always need to be imminent.
Even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, Member States may act on
preventative grounds, so long as they are specific to the individual
concerned.’ (Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the
European Council, concerning
a new
settlement for the UK within the EU – N.B. This
statement merely summarises the current situation notwithstanding
that it appears in the now defunct ‘new settlement’ following the outcome of
the UK’s Brexit referendum)
Compliance with the rule of law
and respect for human rights however mean that EU Member States must comply
with a number of substantive and procedural safeguards provided by EU law. When
it comes for instance to public policy or public security, national measures
justified on these grounds must be proportionate and based exclusively on the
personal conduct of the individual concerned, which must represent a genuine,
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental
interests of society. EU law also provides for a number of procedural
safeguards. For instance, any decision to deny entry or expel an EU citizen
must be notified in writing and include precise and full information of the
grounds on which the decision is based. In the absence of such safeguards,
nothing would prevent national authorities from behaving arbitrarily and target
certain individuals or groups for political or economic reasons.
While one may legitimately
defend the view that the substantive and procedural safeguards provided by EU
law are too protective of EU citizens and their family members, critics in most
cases fail to make clear the extent to which the current safeguards should be
lowered.
To argue however that the EU
Court of Justice has prevented the UK from deporting 50 criminals from other EU
Member States, as was argued by
Vote
Leave during the Brexit campaign, is simply false. The record on this issue
has been set straight by Professor Steve Peers in
this blog post.
(7)
Does EU Law prevent Member States from imposing a ‘brake’ on EU immigration?
The short answer is yes as EU
law currently stands. This certainly does not mean that EU Law provides for any
‘absolute’ right to move and reside freely within the territory of EU Member
States. As described above in our answer to Question 1, EU free movement rights
can only be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limitations laid
down in the Treaties and the legal instruments adopted thereunder. And while
the EU Treaties provide for general derogations as regards the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality with respect to employment in the
public service or activities connected with the exercise of official authority,
any permanent quota or reliance on a ‘brake system’ regarding intra-EU
migration would not be compatible with EU law. Any general ban on EU workers
being treated equally with national workers as regards employment, remuneration
and other conditions of work and employment would similarly breach EU Treaties.
The compatibility of a provisional,
temporary ‘emergency brake’ on equal treatment with EU Treaties was however
assumed by the European Council when it agreed last February to push for the
adoption of a new ‘alert and safeguard mechanism’ in order to assuage the
concerns of the UK government then led by David Cameron (this mechanism formed
part of the ‘
new settlement
for the UK within the EU’
whose entry into force was however dependent on a decision by the UK to stay in
the EU). This proposal was not for a brake on immigration, but on EU national
workers’ access to in-work benefits.
This mechanism was supposed to
work as follows:
(i)
Any
Member State facing an inflow of workers from other Member States of ‘an
exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time’ could avail of the new
alert and safeguard mechanism;
(ii)
In
order to be authorised by the Council to limit the access of newly arriving EU
workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for a total period of up to four
years, the Member State was expected to demonstrate the existence of ‘an
exceptional situation’ affecting ‘essential aspects of its social security
system’ or leading ‘to difficulties which are serious and liable to persist in
its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure on the proper
functioning of its public services’.
(iii)
Assuming
that such a demonstration had been offered, the Council could authorise the
Member State concerned to restrict access to non-contributory in-work benefits
to the extent necessary.
(iv)
Finally,
any authorisation would have a limited duration and the 4-year restriction on
access to non-contributory in-work benefits could only apply to EU workers
newly arriving during a maximum period of 7 years.
Contrasting
legal views have been expressed regarding the compatibility of this new
safeguard mechanism with the EU Treaties. In our opinion, this mechanism would
have been vulnerable to legal action as its compatibility with EU Treaties is arguable
in the absence of a Treaty amendment.
Notwithstanding
this legal issue, we have always found it difficult to understand how the UK
could rationally avail itself of such mechanism considering that it then
enjoyed the highest rate of employment in UK history. Furthermore, evidence of
any negative impact of EU work immigration to the UK on vulnerable workers and
the sustainability of the UK welfare system was lacking (see this
Financial Times
article
published on 22 February 2016). Furthermore, it has since emerged that the UK
government did not in fact possess any hard evidence which would show the
negative impact of EU migration to the UK and could justify the activity of the
agreed ‘emergency break’ (see
this article by the former deputy director
of the policy unit’s in David Cameron’s government: ‘To be honest, we
failed to find any evidence of communities under pressure that would satisfy
the European Commission. At one point we even asked the help of Andrew Green at
MigrationWatch, an organization that has
been critical of migration. But all he could provide was an article in the
Daily Telegraph about a hospital maternity ward in Corby. There was no hard
evidence.’)
This EU safeguard mechanism is,
in any event, no longer on the table. The UK could however seek to join the
EFTA and remain part of the EEA post Brexit, which would offer the advantage of
maximum access to the EU’s internal market with the additional option of availing
of the special safeguard regarding free movement of people laid down in Article
112 of the
EEA agreement:
1.
If serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or
regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Contracting Party may
unilaterally take appropriate measures under the conditions and procedures laid
down in Article 113.
2.
Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and
duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation.
Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning
of this Agreement.
3. The
safeguard measures shall apply with regard to all Contracting Parties.
Assuming that the UK aims and is
able to remain part of the EEA after its eventual exit from the EU, triggering
this provision with the view of limiting EEA labour immigration to the UK would
not however be cost-free. Indeed, and to the best of our knowledge, none of the
contracting parties to the EEA has ever done so with respect to labour immigration
if only because another provision of the same agreement entitles parties
negatively affected by safeguard measures to take ‘proportionate rebalancing
measures’ (the special regime granted to Liechtenstein with regard to nationals
of EU Member States and EFTA States, which will be briefly mentioned below, is
not directly based on Article 112 EEA).
In other words, should the UK as
an EEA member trigger this provision in order to impose quantitative
limitations or restrictive rules regarding entry, residence and employment of
EEA nationals in the UK, it could then be subject to what would be essentially
retaliatory measures focusing for instance on UK banks’ passporting rights
(i.e. rights derived from EU law which enable banks based in the UK to offer
financial services to the rest of the EEA without having to follow the
regulations of the countries where they are offered). Furthermore, the UK would
have to accept that any dispute in this context may be referred to an
arbitration panel (see
Protocol 33 on arbitration
procedures of the EEA Agreement).
In addition to this EEA general
safeguard mechanism, the EU and EFTA countries were able to agree a rather
unique arrangement regarding Liechtenstein with respect to free movement of
people, which was initially supposed to be provisional (see
Protocol 15 on
transitional periods on the free movement of persons) but ended up becoming de facto
permanent (for more details see this
2015
Communication
from the European Commission). In a nutshell, due to its specific nature as a
microstate with a population of 36,925 with an already unusually high
percentage of non-national residents and employees, Liechtenstein was permitted
to introduce quantitative limitations (aka a quota system) to control the
number of EEA citizens wishing to take up residence via a system limiting the
number of residence and short-term permits a year. In 2015, the Commission
concluded that there is ‘no need to make any changes to the current rules’
until another review of this specific arrangement takes place in 2019.
It has been suggested that a
Liechtenstein-inspired solution may be the way forward as far as the UK is
concerned (see the proposal by
Vicky
Ford, a Conservative MEP as reported in The Guardian).
This is highly doubtful if only because the quota system agreed for
Liechtenstein was explicitly justified on the basis of this country’s ‘specific
geographic situation’ and a total number of employees which is almost equal to
the number of residents, 52 % of whom commute from neighbouring countries, a
situation in no way comparable to the UK’s (see Question 10 below for an
overview of other possible options for the UK to consider).
(8)
Does EU Law only guarantee a right of permanent residence after five years?
There has been a fair amount of
confusion on the EU right of permanent residence in the UK. To put it briefly,
it is regularly argued that such a right would only arise after five years of
residence but this is not entirely accurate.
This point is not easy to
explain briefly. To begin with, it is correct to state that EU Law provides for
a right of permanent residence for EU citizens and their family members after
five years of continuous legal residence in the host EU country. This right
directly derives from EU law and is explicitly mentioned in
Directive
2004/38.
What is usually misunderstood
however is that EU citizens and their family members (irrespective of
nationality) can acquire a right of permanent residence, in the sense of
continued and uncontested – but conditional - residence as soon as they move
and reside in a different Member State. In other words, provided that an EU
citizen maintains his/her status as worker or self-employed person, or that
he/she have sufficient resources for himself/herself (and eventual family
members) as well as a comprehensive sickness insurance cover, EU law guarantees
a right of continued residence in the host Member State.
The added value of the new right
of permanent residence after five years of residence laid down in Directive
2004/38 lies in the fact that once it is obtained, this right is no longer subject to the conditions
previously mentioned.
To summarise, EU law guarantees
a conditional right of permanent residence before five years and a nearly
unconditional one after five years (it may be lost through continuous absence
from the state for over 2 years; and there are powers to remove criminals from
the country as discussed in the answer to question (6) above).
To claim that only those having
resided in the UK for more than five years are entitled to claim a right of
permanent residence misrepresents EU law as it stands. This is an important
point considering that it is regularly reported in the press that the UK
government may only seek to allow EU citizens with a right of permanent
residence to stay in the UK by the time the UK leaves the EU, while those with
allegedly no permanent residence right by then would be offered an ‘amnesty’
(see
this article from
The Telegraph published on 7 October 2016).
This reflects a misunderstanding
of EU law. As noted above, and just to give a single example, any EU worker
residing in the EU is entitled to reside permanently in the UK from day 1 of
his/her residence in the UK as long as he/she maintains his/her status of EU
worker. It might be clearer to propose that rights attach to ‘Article 16’ (of
the EU citizens’ Directive) or ‘unconditional’ permanent residence, rather than
just ‘permanent residence’.
In any case, if the yardstick is
those with an unconditional right to reside thanks to the Directive 2004/38
concept of permanent residence, then the threshold is not always five years.
There are exceptions for instance for those who retire in the host member state
(the threshold is 3 years of residence, if they have been working in the host
state for at least the past 12 months), or if they have to stop working as a
result of permanently incapacitating illness (the threshold is two years), or
if they become incapacitated as a result of an accident at work or occupational
disease (and are entitled to a relevant benefit from the host state), in which
case there is no duration of residence requirement. It is therefore not only EU
nationals who have resided for five years who have a ‘
clear cut’
right to reside.
One should also note in passing
that to speak of amnesty in this context is to deeply misunderstand the legal
meaning of this concept, which either refers to a general official pardon for
people, convicted of political or criminal offences or an undertaking by public
authorities to take no action against specified offences during a fixed period.
To speak of ‘amnesty’ to address the situation of EU nationals who have
exercised their free movement rights to move to the UK in full compliance with
the conditions laid down in EU Law, creates an unfortunate and misleading
depiction of lawfully resident and working EU nationals.
(9) Would EU Law or International Law protect
‘acquired’ free movement rights following a British exit from the EU?
First
of all, it is worth noting that we are talking about protection of rights in
the event of a ‘repeal’ of those rights – i.e., if legislation in the UK is
amended to remove free movement rights following the formal withdrawal of the
UK from the EU. It is worth pointing out in this respect that counsel for the
government in the litigation on whether triggering Article 50 requires
parliamentary consent, has argued that the rights of EU nationals
do
not simply fall away on exiting the EU. Those rights are part of domestic
law, implementing EU law. It is not impossible that the UK could leave the EU
and leave all the free movement rights in tact. However, we face a question of
what happens if it does not.
Prior
to the referendum, there have been repeated
suggestions
that British citizens in the EU and EU nationals in the UK would be
able to rely upon the Vienna Convention’s
protection of ‘acquired rights’ to enable them to stay and to protect their
status there.
“Does not affect any right, obligation
or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty
prior to its termination.”
However,
this provision refers to rights of ‘the parties’. The parties to the EU
Treaties are Member States,
not
individuals. It was therefore wrong for Gisela Stuart or Boris Johnson to
imply that Article
70 of the Vienna Convention directly addresses individual free movement rights
acquired Pre-Brexit. For instance, the International Law Commission had for
instance made clear that this provision is simply not concerned with
the acquired or vested rights of
individuals. This
is why Jean-Claude Piris (former General Director of the Legal Service of the
Council of the EU) described the Vienna Convention claim as a ‘
new legal theory’ with no ‘legal
support in the Treaties’,
which must be disregarded as it ‘would lead to absurd consequences’.
To summarise, while
international law does recognise the notion of ‘acquired rights’, there is, as
observed by
Professor Vaughan Lowe QC
a ‘general agreement that the category
of ‘acquired rights’ does not extend beyond property
rights and certain contractual rights’, which means that the EU
‘rights to live, work, receive medical care and retire in
an EU Member State other than one’s own (or for companies, the right
of establishment) would not be included within that category.’
In
any case, claiming a continued right
of residence is a claim for a present and future right, not an acquired one. It
would be strange were it possible to claim continued reliance upon EU Treaties
which have ceased to apply, given that Article 70 (a) of the Convention states
that the termination of the Treaty “Releases the parties from any obligation
further to perform the treaty”. The sorts of past State rights that might be
protected by the Convention could be that the EU could not demand that the UK
pay back Structural Funds paid to correspond with past periods during which the
UK was a member of the EU, where those funds were paid in good legal order.
And
it is worth pointing out that the Convention is a UN instrument, and there is
little ground for supposing that it would be readily actionable to claimants
facing negative administrative decisions, since it does not create direct
rights. Nor is it able to trounce both EU and national laws in other Member
States. If it were able to do so, that would raise significant questions of
supremacy, sovereignty and transparency.
During
the course of the campaigns, Matthew Elliot of Vote Leave
also suggested that the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights would protect
British nationals’ rights to stay in the EU. However, (a) the Charter is silent
on the matter of rights of ex-EU nationals; (b) it does not create any
additional rights not already in existence within EU law; and (c) The Charter
is an EU instrument. If the UK exit agreement includes provisions on UK
nationals in the EU (and EU nationals in the UK), then those provisions must be
interpreted in accordance with the Charter – e.g. in accordance with a right to
family life. Outside of the agreement, these individuals may anyway fall within
the scope of EU law, e.g. through having married a national of a Member State
who has exercised their right to free movement, or being the primary carer of a
host State national. In any event, if the UK was no longer bound by the Charter
as a non-member, then UK nationals in the EU seeking to rely upon it would have
to show that their situation fell within the scope of EU law (such as EU legislation
on migration from non-EU countries) for the Charter to apply, and then show
that a fundamental right covered by the Charter was engaged.
The
key point here is that international law relating to ‘acquired rights’ does not
offer any solid basis for a claim to retain EU rights of residence post-Brexit.
And this is why the UK
government, without mentioning the Vienna Convention, has decided that the
criteria which would ‘enable
EU citizens to remain in the United Kingdom following exit from the European
Union will depend on the outcome of the negotiations and the scope of any
reciprocal agreements concerning British citizens who live in other member states.’
(
Lord Keen of Elie, 29 June 2016)
While
there are no clear legal guarantees for either the residence rights of UK
nationals in the EU or of EU nationals in the UK, there are nevertheless strong
legal arguments in favour of offering protections to EU nationals in the UK.
The ‘bargaining chip’ stance is dehumanising and ethically problematic; it puts
the lives of nationals from other EU countries living in the UK ‘on hold’ for
an indefinite period of time (with very practical consequences such as
increased difficulties to get loans or mortgages, not to mention the anxiety it
has created). This is why, for instance, Michael Howard, the former Conservative
leader, called on Mrs May to
‘lead
by example’ end the ‘dreadful uncertainty’ facing EU migrants living in the
UK.
That
being said, the suggestion implicitly made by David Davis that
EU
nationals could be deported retrospectively (i.e. even if they arrived
before the UK leaves the EU) may, in circumstances where their right to family
life was at stake, be open to legal challenge on the basis of the UK’s Human
Rights Act. See e.g. Matthew White’s post on ‘When can EU citizens be expelled
from the UK after Brexit?’ available
here
and Camino Mortera-Martinez & John Springford’s CER insight piece ‘Britain
will struggle to make EU migrants ‘go home’’ available
here.
Equally, UK citizens in the remaining EU
could invoke the right to family and private life in the European Convention on
Human Rights, as well as rights in national constitutions, even if they were
not covered by EU immigration law or transitional arrangements. It should be
noted however that winning an
Article
8 ECHR claim in the immigration courts it is not straightforward.
(10) What are the main options available to
the UK government?
It is not yet entirely clear
whether the UK government wishes to revise or completely reject the application
of current EU rules in the UK. A complete rejection would not be compatible
with an extensive access to the EU’s single market à la norvégienne (see below for more details on this model).
There is however a large
spectrum of different free movement options that are, in theory, possible for
the UK to consider but the default (political) principle may be summarised as
follows: The more extensive the UK restrictions on the free movement rights of
EU citizens and family members, the less extensive the UK’s access to the EU’s
single market is likely to be. This was the point made by the German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, when she stated that full access to the European
single market depended on whether on the acceptance of the EU’s four freedoms,
including the freedom of movement of people: “
If Britain says
no, it can’t get full access to the European single market”.
Assuming
the UK wishes to retain as much access to the European single market as
possible, it would then have to seek membership of the EEA – the so-called
Norway model. This involves not being an EU member, but applying much of EU
law,
including provisions on free movement,
equal treatment on the ground of nationality, and social security coordination.
Some have suggested, slightly further along the spectrum, a Norway-minus model,
that adapts the EEA model, to allow for more restricted movement of workers,
perhaps in return for ‘
a bit less single market’ access. Alternatively,
the UK could instead join the EEA and seek to trigger its safeguard mechanism
as noted above in our answer to question 7.
The
Swiss bilateral agreement model is another option that involves
free movement but permits greater
restrictions on equal treatment with regard to welfare benefits. The model is
complicated, relying on a ‘
patchwork’ of agreements that need regular
updating. The relationship is not entirely stable – calls to renegotiate the
free movement provisions have been rejected by the EU; a Swiss quota initiative
has
soured the EU-Swiss relationship, in the
light of which the Swiss government appears to be considering a
second
referendum which could ask voters to decide between the unilateral imposition
of curbs on EU migrants and maintenance of Switzerland’s current access to the
EU’s single market (another alternative plan is to sidestep ‘
quota
in favour of giving current Swiss residents labor-market precedence’ but
this idea is unlikely to be agreed by the EU).
The
Turkish system is much closer to the other end of the spectrum, since there is
no free movement as such, but there are some special arrangements, such as the
accrual of increasingly ‘equal’ employment rights. Turkish workers legally
employed in the EU are entitled to the same working conditions as EU nationals,
and also have a sliding
scale of rights: after one year of legal employment they are entitled to have their
work permit renewed if a job is available; after three years of legal
employment they are entitled to switch employers and respond to other job
offers within the same occupation; after four years of legal employment they
have free access to any paid employment in that EU country. Borrowing
from this approach could involve heavy restrictions – such as requirements for
residence and work permits – but allowing EU workers, once they had been
accepted into the UK, to accrue residence, employment and social rights during
their time here.
Or
it is possible to envisage ad hoc models at different points along the
spectrum. One such is a
Continental Partnership, involving a
reciprocal quota system – the UK imposing a quota system on EU entrants, and
the EU imposing a quota system on UK entrants. This is problematic, since it is
not clear how this could be made workable, partly in light of the substantial
cross border populations already in situ, and the migration flows that stem
therefrom, and also because of the fluidity with which people would likely
shift status (assuming the system did not apply to visitors). The idea of a
quota imposed on the EU as a whole would be tricky to administrate fairly – how
could/should a system deal with a quota being ‘used up’ by one or more states
disproportionately? And should UK nationals be denied the possibility to move
to Poland because the EU quota has already been met by UK nationals in Germany?
The EU Treaties also state that quotas
on non-EU citizens coming to work are decided by Member States individually
(Article 79 TFEU).
A
variation on this idea is ‘preferential movement’ – allowing free movement for
immigrants above a set salary or skill level, and setting quotas below it –
primarily because that accords with ‘
UK
public attitudes to immigration’, rather than with
economic evidence. It would likely be administratively and legally complex to
set the categories, then maintain two parallel immigration systems for the same
nationality cohort and monitor continued status for each individual within the
allocated category. Furthermore, it would seem irresponsible for public policy
to be driven by popular ‘feelings’ about the impact of immigration rather than by
evidence of the impact of immigration, especially in a context where the public
may have been misled by media misrepresentation (see e.g.
this
article in
The
Economist on the EU myths propagated by the British media
).
Another
idea floated recently was that of a
‘job-first’ model. This is also not
without problems. It is not clear that it would reduce immigration (which is
the apparent purpose), but would simply place the recruitment process one step
back. This could give more power to gang-masters, who already have the
machinery for cross-border recruitment in place, and are often linked to
employers who provide tied accommodation, and transport their workers to and
from the place of work. This could lead to EU nationals being imported in
groups, and living quite controlled lives, segregated from much of the UK
population.
The
other scheme apparently debated by the UK cabinet, which one may label
‘targeted work permit system’, is similarly problematical. As reported by the
Financial
Times, this system would ‘most likely allocate
a set number of visas by sector’ for highly skilled workers in receipt of a job
offer. By contrast, unskilled workers could only gain entry into the UK on the
basis of a temporary workers scheme, which would grant EU unskilled workers
access to the UK for a fixed period of time with no accrued residency rights.
Such a ‘targeted work permit system’ however assumes that one can clearly
define what is an ‘unskilled worker’ as opposed to an ‘highly skilled’ one. It would
be incompatible with access to the European single market in a similar way to
Norway or Switzerland and would be incredibly administratively complex.
Others
have suggested the devolution of immigration policy as far as EU nationals are
concerned. This would mean for instance giving Scotland, Northern Ireland but
also London and
Gibraltar
the right to continue to apply current free movement rules to EU nationals and
family members (EEA membership for Scotland would make this a compulsory
feature as rightly noted in this
Financial
Times article by Martin Sandbu) or alternatively,
to apply a different but more liberal immigration system on a regional basis
(see e.g. the ‘regional visa system’ proposal made by the City of London which
is available
here).
However, it is difficult to see how such systems could be made tenable, without
introducing intra-national migration controls.
In
our opinion, the UK government should not seek to fundamentally undermine the
current EU’s labour market-based system of intra-EU migration control, where
evidence suggests that the system
works
well for the UK – a system which both the
Japanese
government and the
US
Chamber of Commerce have described as key for attracting
and maintaining foreign investment in the UK. Instead of devising cumbersome
and costly alternative schemes, it may be more appropriate to instead aim to revisit
the question of restrictions already permitted within EU law, while also
questioning whether the ‘mischief’ that these proposals are intended to address
actually exists.
Barnard
& Peers: chapter 13, chapter 27
