Steve Peers*
From its panicked conception in
the febrile months following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the European
Arrest Warrant (EAW) has been the flagship of EU criminal law. Replacing
traditional extradition law with a fast-track system which scraps most of the
traditional restrictions on extradition, it has alarmed critics concerned by
miscarriages of justice, but thrilled supporters who welcomed the speedier
return to justice of a greater number of fugitives.
Despite qualms by national
constitutional courts, the ECJ has long been insouciant about the human
rights critique of the EAW. It dismissed
a challenge to the validity of the EAW law on human rights grounds, and (in
effect) ridiculed
a national court which asked if it was possible to refuse to execute an EAW due
to human rights concerns, answering a ‘straw man’ argument the ECJ invented
instead of the serious questions sent by the other court. In its Melloni
judgment, the ECJ placed a ceiling on the application of national human rights
protection to resist execution of an EAW; but it never enforced a corresponding
floor for those rights. Again and again, the Court ruled that national courts
could only refuse to execute EAWs on the limited grounds expressly mentioned in
the EAW law, instead focussing exclusively on the need to make the EAW system
as effective as possible.
However, since the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty, this staunch approach has been mitigated by the
adoption of six new EU laws on various aspects of fair
trial rights – five of which also confer procedural rights on fugitives
challenging the application of an EAW. (On the implementation of the first two of
these laws, see the report
just adopted by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency). In the last year, the ECJ
has begun to interpret these laws (see the judgments in Covaci,
Balogh
and Milev).
But even apart from these fair
trials laws, the ECJ in the last eighteen months has begun to show a striking
concern for ensuring at least some protection for human rights within the EAW
system. Last year, in Lanigan
(discussed here),
the Court ruled that if a fugitive was kept in detention in the executing State
while contesting an EAW there, the limits on the length of detention in extradition
cases set out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
apply, by virtue of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
This spring, the ECJ turned its
attention to detention conditions in the Member State which issued the EAW. Following soon after
concerns expressed by the German constitutional court on these issues
(discussed here),
the ECJ ruled in Aranyosi and Caldaruru
that the German authorities, when executing EAWs issued by Hungary and Romania,
had to consider concerns raised by the fugitives about prison overcrowding in
those countries, which had led to ECtHR rulings finding violations of Article 3
ECHR (freedom from torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment). The national court had to apply a two-step procedure in such
cases, assessing whether there was a) a systemic failure to ensure decent
prison conditions in those States, and b) a ‘real risk’ that the individual
fugitive would be subject to such conditions if the EAW was executed.
What if these tests were
satisfied? The ECJ was unwilling to backtrack from its position that the list
of grounds to refuse to execute an EAW set out in the EAW law is exhaustive. Instead,
it ruled that the executing State’s authorities had to postpone execution of the EAW until the situation in the issuing
State had improved. (The EAW law is vague about grounds for postponing the
execution of an EAW, and the ECJ had already ruled in Lanigan that the deadlines to execute an EAW set out in the law could,
in effect, be ignored if necessary). If the fugitive was detained in the
executing State in the meantime, the limits on detention set out in Lanigan applied, with the additional
proviso that a fugitive could not be detained indefinitely pending execution of
an EAW. (In the later case of JZ,
the ECJ aligned the definition of ‘detention’ in the EAW with the ECtHR case
law on this issue).
This was only the beginning of
the ECJ’s scrutiny of issuing States’ laws and practice in the EAW context. In Bob-Dogi,
the Court ruled that Hungary could not simply issue EAWs as a stand-alone
measure, with no underlying national arrest warrant, inter alia because the purpose of requiring the prior issue of a
national arrest warrant was to ensure the protection of the suspect’s
fundamental rights. The previously paramount objective of efficiency of the EAW
system – which would obviously have dictated the opposite conclusion – was mentioned
only in passing. Moreover, the Court side-stepped its prior refusal to accept additional
grounds for refusal to execute an EAW, concluding that the EAW had not been validly
issued in the first place.
Next, in Dworzecki,
the ECJ insisted that a Member State issuing an EAW following a trial held in absentia had to have made proper
efforts to find the fugitive before the trial. In this case, the law expressly allows
for non-execution of the EAW.
Finally, in a trilogy of cases
decided last week, the Court ruled that issuing Member States don’t have full
discretion to decide what a 'judicial authority' is, for the purpose of
issuing EAWs. The concept extended beyond judges to include those administering
the justice system, such as Hungarian prosecutors (Ozcelik).
However, it does not extend to the Swedish police (Poltorak),
or to officials in the Lithuanian justice ministry (Kovalkovas).
(British readers may wish to compare these rulings to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in the Assange case).
Again, as in the Bob-Dogi judgment, the Court
side-stepped the ‘exhaustive grounds for non-execution’ problem which it had
previously created for itself, by ruling (in Poltorak and Kovalkovas) that the relevant EAWs had never
been validly issued at all. Also, in an interesting use of ‘soft law’, the
Court ruled that Sweden and Lithuania could not argue that those invalid EAWs should
remain valid for a limited period until they changed their laws, since the
Council had warned them back in 2007 in an evaluation report that these
practices infringed the EAW law. Criminal defence lawyers – and justice
ministry officials – may want to look at the Council
evaluations of all Member States in detail in this light, since they
contain many other criticisms of national implementation of the EAW.
Comments
Has the Court turned from poacher
to gamekeeper of human rights in the EAW context? Certainly there are still many
concerns about miscarriages of justice as regards the EAW (see the Fair Trials website, for instance).
But the rulings suggest a significant change of direction, which addresses some
concerns and may have opened up the door to addressing others. What might
explain this turn-around?
One factor may be the ruling of
the German constitutional court on detention conditions in the EAW context,
although it’s notable that the ECJ was never previously receptive to
constitutional courts’ concerns about the EAW. Another factor may be a
willingness to compromise after the ECJ’s controversial
ruling on EU accession to the ECHR, in which it lambasted the draft
accession treaty for (among other things) not taking sufficient account of the ECJ’s
case law on mutual recognition in Justice and Home Affairs matters, which only
allowed for human rights to trump mutual recognition in ‘exceptional’ cases. It’s
possible that having marked its territory in that judgment, the ECJ felt it
could relax and adopt a more flexible approach of its own volition (and under
its own control), which might facilitate discussions on renegotiation of the
accession agreement.
Another aspect of the background
to this case law may be concerns about the adequate protection of human rights
and the rule of law in a number of Member States. The formal process for
sanctioning or warning Member States about such concerns is set out in Article
7 TEU, but the EU is unwilling to use it at the moment. The preamble to the
EAW law says that the EAW system can only be fully suspended as regards an
entire Member State if Article 7 is invoked. The ECJ clocked that provision in Aranyosi and Caldaruru, but then
concocted the compromise position of postponing execution of EAWs in individual
cases until concerns about detention conditions could be addressed: a measured,
individualised solution for these particular human rights problems with the
EAW.
Furthermore, the guarantee of judicial
control of the issue of EAWs in recent judgments is expressly justified by
reference to ‘the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the
rule of law’. Despite the reluctance of the EU to chastise Member States for
systematic concerns about the rule of law, the CJEU’s rulings at least ensure
that any general human rights concerns are addressed at the level of application
of EU legislation.
Indeed, these recent judgments
might not be the end of the story: they can fuel arguments for the postponement
or invalidity or EAWs due to other human rights concerns too. In particular,
fugitives could argue that the prospect of long pre-trial detention in another
Member State is also a reason to postpone execution of an EAW – although this
argument is only coherent if the fugitive is not being detained in the executing State in the meantime. Already
the Aranyosi and Caldaruru judgment
raises awkward questions about how to judge what happens in another Member
State’s prisons – so much so that the German courts have referred the Aranyosi case back
to the CJEU with further questions. Postponing the execution of an EAW does not,
by itself, tackle the underlying problem of prison overcrowding, and it leads
to the risk that those who have committed crimes may consider moving to another
Member State to increase their odds of enjoying de facto impunity for them.
This strengthens the case for EU
legislative intervention as regards prison conditions and length of pre-trial
detention in the EAW context. The Commission issued a Green
Paper on this issue back in 2011, and Member States were not enthusiastic.
But the Commission has indicated in light of the recent rulings that it may make a
proposal in future. (See also the new report
of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency on these issues). This would be a good
opportunity to make further reforms to the EAW system, to require a
proportionality check before issuing EAWs in the first place – so that no one
is subject to an EAW for the theft of a piglet, or someone else’s beer at a house
party – and to build in more frequent use of European
Supervision Orders (a form of ‘Euro-bail’), the EU laws on transfer of prisoners and
sentences, and the use of modern technology to conduct more criminal proceedings
with the virtual (but not the physical) presence of the suspect (see generally
the Ludford
report on possible reforms of the EAW system). There is a better balance
between effective prosecutions and human rights concerns waiting to be struck.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 9,
chapter 25
JHA4: chapter II:3, chapter II:4
Photo credit: picture – alliance/Horst
Galuch
* This post is based on a keynote
speech I gave on 10th November 2016, at a conference on criminal
justice and human rights organised by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in
Bratislava
I have written a case note this year on Aranyosi and Caldararu (http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15718174-24032092;jsessionid=2nLMPcETP4BuxxolQIov9H0J.x-brill-live-03). I think in this specific case the importance of the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment played a crucial role in why the CJEU seems to have backtracked from its previous approach to HR and the EAW. I think something that needs further discussion is how Melloni can be reconciled with Aranyosi. One argument can be that Aranyosi is different because the Article 3 ECHR right is absolute, therefore it requires extra safeguards. Another could be that in Aranyosi the national and EU levels of protection of the fundamental right coincided, while in Melloni they didn't.
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comment. In my view Melloni was always subject to being interpreted narrowly, because the specifics of the case turned on in absentia trials where the EU had gone for full harmonisation of the law. Other aspects relating to the EAW have not been so fully harmonised.
DeleteHi! I'm writing my thesis on the protection against degrading conditions of detention within the European system of surrender. I noticed that in your blog you speak of the Aranyosi case as requiring that a) a systemic failure to ensure decent prison conditions in the issuing state exists, and b) a ‘real risk’ that the individual fugitive would be subject to such conditions if the EAW was executed before the surrender can be denied be denied by the executing state. I do not completely agree though. I was under the impression that because different kinds of deficiencies (systemic, general, or which may affect certain groups of people or certain places of detention) can be used to show that detainees in the issuing member state run a real risk of being exposed to degrading conditions of detention, not only a risk emanating from the failure of a system is good enough to rebut the principle of mutual trust.
ReplyDeleteWhat are your thoughts on this? Because it does make a great difference in the protection offered by the executing Member State. If also a risk stemming from other (less widespread) deficiencies can be protected, the protection offered in the European system of surrender seems less problematic in light of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
That interpretation would be more consistent with what the CJEU and ECtHR have said about detention conditions/deficiencies and asylum cases. However, it is easier to have a different country consider an asylum application than it is to have a different country bring a criminal proceeding.
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