Tuesday, 29 December 2020

Analysis 1 of the Brexit deal: Healthcare entitlements in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement


 


 

Professor Tamara Hervey, University of Sheffield

 

What – if any – entitlements to healthcare are covered by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, agreed in principle on 24 December 2020? (For an overview of the agreement as a whole, see Steve Peers’ Twitter thread and the overview on this blog). (Update: later blog posts cover human rightsdispute settlement and environment and climate change in the Brexit deal). (This blog post was updated April 28 2021 to refer also to the final Article numbers of the TCA; it also retains references to the original numbering for convenience).

 

Introduction

 

If there are any, they will be found in the provisions on social security coordination (Heading Four: Social security coordination and visas for short-term visits). This is the equivalent of – but, as we will see, in many respects a weak equivalent of – the provisions of EU law on social security coordination. On the other hand, these are not ‘ordinary trade agreement’ provisions: there’s nothing like this in CETA for instance.

 

Those provisions of EU law include access to healthcare for EU citizens, and their families (irrespective of citizenship), who are resident in a Member State other than the ‘competent state’ for the purposes of social security coverage, and also access to healthcare necessary during a ‘stay’ (a short-term visit, not establishing a new place of residence) in another Member State. It is this latter provision that is covered by the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme.

 

Many people want to know whether the EHIC scheme or a version of it will continue. For many people, especially elderly people, private health insurance for travel is unaffordable (health insurance companies take EHIC into account when calculating premiums) and in some cases not available. For people who have been accustomed to regularly visiting family or friends in the EU or UK, EHIC or not will make a significant difference to how they live their lives after end December 2020.

 

But in order to answer that question, I need to work through the legal text methodically, and that is what this blog does. There are multiple parts of the legal text that apply to the coordination of social security: a chapter in the main text, a Protocol, and several Annexes. I am setting out my reasoning step by step so that others can check it.

 

Interpretation and enforcement

 

The wording of the parts of the Agreement on social security coordination is complex, hard to follow, and likely to be subject to disagreement. The analysis that follows is my best-attempt on a first take: I may be wrong. In some respects, the wording of the Agreement is also opaque: in part this is because the relevant equivalent provisions of EU law and of the Withdrawal Agreement, on which this part of the Agreement draws, are also opaque. (Remember that the Withdrawal Agreement remains in force separately, including its provisions on EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, discussed here).  That is why I’m starting this analysis with some words on interpretation and enforcement of the parts of the Agreement on social security coordination.

 

The Preamble to the Agreement recognises that social security coordination is important to human beings, not just those who are migrating as ‘economic entities’ (providing services, for example), but also their families. The Preamble also recognises that social security coordination applies not just to people who move between the UK and the EU to reside, but also to stay:

 

Preamble: “RECOGNISING the importance of the coordination of social security rights enjoyed by persons moving between the Parties to work, to stay or to reside, as well as the rights enjoyed by their family members and survivors,”

 

Provisions of the Preamble of an international agreement are an important reference point when it comes to interpretation of that agreement. Interpretation of the EU-UK Trade Agreement (‘the Agreement’) is to be in accordance with international law (not EU or UK law). This approach includes taking account of the context of the legal text, and the ‘object and purpose’ of the Agreement as a whole. It is possible – and perhaps in the context of the social security coordination rules, likely – that the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement on social security coordination will differ between the UK and the EU Member States. In the context of this Agreement, there is nothing like the Court of Justice of the EU, or the EFTA Court, to seek to prevent such divergent interpretation:

 

TITLE II: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITIONS

 

Article 4 (originally COMPROV.13): Public international law

 

1. The provisions of this Agreement and any supplementing agreement shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with their ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law, including those codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969.

 

2. For greater certainty, neither this Agreement nor any supplementing agreement establishes an obligation to interpret their provisions in accordance with the domestic law of either Party.

 

3. For greater certainty, an interpretation of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement given by the courts of either Party shall not be binding on the courts of the other Party.

 

The agreement will, however, be interpreted by the courts in the UK and the EU separately, and is subject to the treaty’s dispute settlement process (as noted below).

 

The EU Member States and the UK are obliged to ‘coordinate’ their social security systems, in accordance with the Protocol on Social Security Coordination. The object and purpose of this coordination is ‘in order to secure the social security entitlements of the persons covered therein’ (Article 488, previously Ch.SSC.1).

 

This is one of the few parts of the Agreement that has individual human beings as its focus. In general, the Agreement does not confer rights or impose obligations on human beings or legal persons. There is no provision for directly invoking the Agreement in domestic law. The Agreement is an instrument of international law, conferring obligations on the Parties to the Agreement (the EU, its Member States and the UK). It is totally different to EU law in this regard. It is also totally different to the Withdrawal Agreement, which includes a significant number of citizens’ rights provisions, and special measures for its enforcement.

 

Article 5 (originally COMPROV.16): Private rights

 

1. Without prejudice to Article SSC.67 of the Protocol on social security coordination (originally MOBI.SSC.67) and with the exception, with regard to the Union, of Part Three of this Agreement, nothing in this Agreement or any supplementing agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement or any supplementing agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties.

 

2. A Party shall not provide for a right of action under its law against the other Party on the ground that the other Party has acted in breach of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement.

 

The social security rights under the Agreement must be protected by each Party’s domestic legal order. The Parties have agreed that human beings (and companies) must be permitted, by domestic law (not by the Agreement itself) to invoke the provisions of the Agreement before domestic courts, tribunals and administrative authorities, and thus to seek ‘adequate and timely’ remedies for any breach. The word ‘and’ suggests that courts and tribunals must be included in the arrangements made for enforcing social security coordination rights under the Agreement, and that only providing for an administrative process, such as Ombudsman or other complaints process, would not be compliant with the Agreement.

 

TITLE V: FINAL PROVISIONS

 

Article SSC.67: Protection of individual rights

 

1. The Parties shall ensure in accordance with their domestic legal orders that the provisions of the Protocol on Social Security Coordination have the force of law, either directly or through domestic legislation giving effect to these provisions, so that legal or natural persons can invoke those provisions before domestic courts, tribunals and administrative authorities.

 

2. The Parties shall ensure the means for legal and natural persons to effectively protect their rights under this Protocol, such as the possibility to address complaints to administrative bodies or to bring legal action before a competent court or tribunal in an appropriate judicial procedure, in order to seek an adequate and timely remedy.

 

In the UK, such a process for protection of individual rights is likely to be through the Social Security and Child Support Tribunals, in the first instance, with appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber). Note that the draft UK bill giving effect to the TCA simply copies its social security provisions into domestic law (clause 26).

 

Who is covered?

 

The Protocol on Social Security Coordination applies only to ‘situations arising between one or more Member States of the Union and the United Kingdom’ (Article 490(1), previously Ch.SSC.3 (1)). People whose situations are confined in all respects to either the UK or the EU Member States fall outside the scope of the Protocol (Article 490(2), previously Ch.SSC.3 (2)). There is no further definition of this scope rule. Do I fall within the scope of the Protocol if I visit the EU from the UK? If I’m providing a service under the Agreement’s provisions on services (eg Articles 140-143, previously SERVIN 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, on performance of economic activities through the entry and temporary stay in the territory of the EU/UK of natural persons of the UK/EU, who are business visitors for establishment purposes, contractual service suppliers, independent professionals, intra-corporate transferees and short-term business visitors), then it would seem obvious that I fall within the scope of the Protocol. Equally, I would argue that if I am visiting the UK from the EU or the EU from the UK, as a tourist, or for other non-economic reason (eg to visit family or friends), on the basis of the visa-free travel provided for under the Agreement (Article 492, previously VSTV.1), I also fall within its scope.

 

But this looks suspiciously like a continuation of aspects of free movement of persons, an inseverable part of the disciplines of the internal market, according to the EU’s negotiating position. My counter-argument to that position is that the coordination of social security, while linked to the internal market as it supports free movement of persons in practice, is not an integral part of harmonised internal market law in the way that the EU law provisions on entry, residence or non-discrimination in employment or self-employment rights are. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Agreement includes provisions on entitlement to social security benefits (healthcare under a national health system) during a stay in the UK/an EU Member State (see further below).

 

The definition of who is covered by the Protocol on Social Security Coordination is based on the EU law on coordination of social security: people who are ‘subject to’ the social security legislation of one or more States (the UK, EU Member States), their families and their survivors (Article SSC.2 of the Protocol). Curiously, ‘subject to’ is not further defined, either in this Agreement, or in the Withdrawal Agreement, or in EU Law. In many situations, being ‘subject to’ social security legislation will be obvious: if one is paying social security contributions (eg for a pension), or receiving benefits (eg for invalidity or unemployment), then one is obviously ‘subject to’ the legislation. But in other situations, it is less obvious. Is someone who contends that they fall within the scope of the relevant social security rules ‘subject to’ those rules? The Agreement includes some provision on what happens if there is disagreement about whether someone falls within its scope (see below).

 

The Agreement further specifies that, in principle, the Protocol on Social Security Coordination applies only to people who are lawful residents of the UK or an EU Member State (Article 489, previously Ch.SSC.2 in the main Agreement). But this rule does not affect ‘entitlements to cash benefits which relate to previous periods of legal residence of persons covered by Article SSC.2’). So someone might no longer be lawfully resident in the EU or UK, but still fall within the scope of who is covered by this part of the Agreement, for example if they are entitled to pension benefits under the Agreement, but live outside of the EU and UK.

 

What is covered?: General rules

 

The Protocol on Social Security Coordination covers all the main branches of social security that are covered by EU law and by the Withdrawal Agreement. These include ‘sickness benefits’ (Article SSC.3 (1) (a)) (in cash or in kind) – that is, medical treatment. Like in EU law and the Withdrawal Agreement, medical assistance is not covered (Article SSC.2 (4) (b)). Neither is voluntary social insurance, unless it is the only social insurance scheme for the particular branch of social security in the relevant State (Article SSC.13). Neither are ‘assisted conception services’ (Article SSC.3 (4) (e)), defined as ‘any medical, surgical or obstetric services provided for the purpose of assisting a person to carry a child’ (Article SSC.1 (c)). Just to be clear, Article SSC.5 explicitly excludes the matters listed in Article SSC.3 (4) from the general non-discrimination principle (Article SSC.5).

 

EU Member States and the UK may charge a health fee as part of an application to enter, stay, work or reside in that State (Ch.SSC.4). But given that, at least until due notification is given, and if possible at least 3 months before a requirement for visa for a a short-term visit take effect, visa-free travel for short term visits applies between the UK and EU Member States (Article VSTV.1), I think that this provision must apply in practice, at least in the short term, only to applications for residence or work permits, not for visitor entry or short-term visits.

 

The general rules (and there are exceptions) for the Protocol are that (Article SSC.4) social security coordination rules are on the basis of non-discrimination between Member States of the EU. However, this rule is without prejudice to the Common Travel Area arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. To access Irish state healthcare, UK nationals need show either an EHIC, or proof of their UK residence. This continuation of the existing rules from 1 January 2021 is confirmed in the UK government’s website.

 

In general (again there are exceptions), the people who are covered by the Protocol enjoy the same benefits (and are subject to the same obligations) as the nationals of the relevant State (Article SSC.5). In general, the Protocol applies a principle of ‘equal treatment of benefits, income, facts or events’ (Article SSC.6).

 

There are two key aspects to this. First, if receipt of social security benefits (or income) has certain legal effects in one State, that State must also recognise equivalent benefits (or income) acquired under the legislation of another state. Second, where legal effects flow from facts or events taking place in one State, that State must take into account ‘like facts or events’ taking place in another State, as if they had taken place on the territory of the first State (Article SSC.6 (a) and (b)). In general, the Protocol requires the aggregation of periods of social insurance, employment, self-employment or residence, completed in any of the States Parties to the Agreement (Article SSC.7). There is a whole section of ANNEX SSC-7: Implementing part on specifics of the aggregation rules (Article SSCI.11 and 12). In general, receipt of cash benefits under the Protocol must not be made conditional on residence (Article SSC.8). All of these provisions are similar to those in the Withdrawal Agreement (Article 31 WA) and in EU law (Regulation 883/2004/EC, Articles 4,5,6,7).

 

Again, as in the Withdrawal Agreement and in EU law, the ‘single state rule’ applies. In general, ‘persons to whom this Protocol applies shall be subject to the legislation of a single State only’ (Article SSC.10). The starting point here is employment or self-employment, and only if neither applies does residence become relevant. If someone is employed or self-employed in a State, that State is the State whose social security legislation they are ‘subject to’ (Article SSC.10 (3) (a) (b)). There are rules for people who normally are employed in both the UK and one or more EU Member States (Article SSC.12): basically if someone is resident where they perform a substantial part of their work, that is the relevant state; if not, the place in which the employer is registered; or the ‘centre of interest’ of the activities of a self-employed person is the relevant state. There is, obviously, lots of room for interpretation of these rules in specific situations.

 

If someone is neither employed nor self-employed, the general rule is that their residence (which means ‘where the person habitually resides’ Article SCC.1 (aa)) determines the relevant State. There is a whole section of the ANNEX SSC-7: Implementing part on the elements for determining residence (Article SSCI.10). There are special rules for people who work on ships and aircraft (Article SSC.10 (4) and (5)).  

 

Like many international agreements, the Protocol on Social Security Coordination allows for States Parties to derogate from its general terms in some respects. The Protocol allows Member States to derogate from the single state rule for ‘detached workers’ (Article SSC.11). ‘Detached workers’ are either employed by an employer in a State which normally carries out its activities there, and sent by their employer to another State to work on the behalf of that employer; or self-employed and normally pursuing a self-employed activity in one State, and who go to another State to pursue a similar activity (Article SSC.11 (1) (a) and (b)). There is no list of these Member States yet in the text (see p 1246). Article SSC.11 obliges the European Union to notify the UK, by the time the Agreement enters into force, whether each Member State falls into one of three categories: A: the Member State wishes to derogate from the general rules of the Protocol on which state is the state responsible for social security (Article SSC.10); B: the Member State does not wish to so derogate; or C: the Member State has not indicated either A or B. That list of three categories of Member States will become Annex SSC-8, when the Agreement enters into force. One month later, categories B and C will cease to exist. Member States in category C will be deemed to be in category A for one month. After that, such a Member State can join category A by the Union notifying the new Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination (see below) to that effect. A Member State can leave category A in the future by the same mechanism. For Member States in category A, transitional rules for ‘detached workers’ will apply for a 24 month transitional period.

 

This is one of a myriad of examples of Brexit not being ‘done’.

 

What is covered? ‘Sickness benefits’

 

Title III of the Protocol sets out special provisions for each category of benefits (pensions, unemployment benefit and so on). Chapter 1 concerns sickness benefits. Like in EU law, there is a set of rules for ‘insured persons’ (people ‘subject to’ social security legislation of the ‘competent state’, and members of their families) and a separate set of rules for pensioners and members of their families.

 

‘Insured persons’ and their families who are resident in a State other than the competent state, are entitled to receive in the State of residence ‘sickness benefits in kind’ provided by the ‘institution of the place of residence’, as though those people were insured under the legislation of the place of residence (Article SSC.15; Article SSC.21 (pensioners)). People in this category include frontier workers (who live in one state and work in another – special rules apply to them (Article SSC.16)); posted workers (who are sent by their employer to work in another state); and also people who return home for intervals longer than a week (the frontier worker definition).

 

So, if someone is ‘subject to’ UK social security legislation for the purposes of receiving healthcare in the UK, because under the UK legislation they are deemed ‘resident’ in the UK (that being the national rule determining access to the NHS), and they are employed or self-employed in the UK (see the single state rules above), but they are also deemed ‘resident’ in Spain by Spanish legislation, because they are in Spain sufficiently to count as ‘resident’ under Spanish legislation, this provision of the Protocol entitles them to access Spanish healthcare as if they were insured under the Spanish legislation. These provisions are almost identical to the equivalent provisions of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Articles 17 and 18, 23-26).

 

Articles SSC.17 and SSC.25 (pensioners) cover ‘stay’ outside the competent State. This is the equivalent of the EHIC provision in EU law. It entitles an insured person, and members of their family, who are staying in a state other than the competent state, to healthcare which becomes necessary on medical grounds during their stay. The determination of necessity must take account of the nature of the healthcare or medical treatment and the length of the stay. It is the healthcare provider in the state providing the healthcare that determines necessity. The entitlement under Article SSC.17 or SSC.25 does not cover someone who travelled with the purpose of receiving the healthcare or medical treatment. (There is an exception for a passenger or someone working on a ship or aircraft, who became ill during the voyage or flight). These provisions are almost identical to the equivalent provisions of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Articles 19 and 20, 27).

 

Healthcare provided under these provisions must be fully reimbursed by the competent State (Article SSC.30).

 

What is different from EU law is that a person seeking to receive healthcare or medical treatment during a stay outside the competent state must present a ‘valid entitlement document’. The entitlement document is covered in Appendix SSCI-2. For EU Member States, the valid document is essentially the EHIC: it has to comply with the technical specifications of the relevant EU law determining EHIC cards (Decision No S2 of 12 June 2009 of the Administrative Commission concerning the technical specifications of the European Health Insurance Card) (Appendix SSCI-2 1). For the UK, the entitlement document has to contain the following information (Appendix SSCI-2 2):

 

(a) surname and forename of the document holder;

(b) personal identification number of the document holder;

(c) date of birth of the document holder;

(d) expiry date of the document;

(e) the code “UK” in lieu of the ISO code of the United Kingdom;

(f) identification number and acronym of the United Kingdom institution issuing the document;

(g) logical number of the document;

(h) in the case of a provisional document, the date of issue and date of delivery of the document, and the signature and stamp of the United Kingdom institution.

 

The UK must notify the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination ‘without delay’ of the technical specifications of the UK document (Appendix SSCI-2 3).

 

The UK government’s website explains that people who have valid EHICs will be able to continue to use them from 1 January 2021, to access necessary healthcare on a visit to an EU country. For Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, a new GHIC (UK Global Health Insurance Card) is available. When someone’s EHIC expires, they will be able to apply for a GHIC for free.

 

Appendix SSCI-2 confirms that the entitlements under Article SSC.17 of the Protocol on Social Security Coordination include medical treatment for pre-existing illnesses and chronic conditions, as well as medical treatment in conjunction with pregnancy and childbirth, unless the purpose of the trip is to receive these treatments. But for vital medical treatment that is only available through a specialised medical unit, authorisation in advance is required before the trip. This includes (but is not limited to)

 

(a) kidney dialysis;

(b) oxygen therapy;

(c) special asthma treatment;

(d) echocardiography in case of chronic autoimmune diseases;

(e) chemotherapy.

 

So some medical treatments that used to be available under the EHIC scheme will after 31 December 2020 only be available if the relevant State (the UK or EU Member State) gives prior authorisation. This will be the case, for instance, for UK patients accessing kidney dialysis in EU Member States. As far as I am aware, the UK has not yet indicated whether it will authorise such treatments, or under what conditions.

 

As in EU law, there is scope for authorisation of medical treatment in another State under the Agreement. The UK used this provision infrequently when it was an EU Member State. Some Member States, eg Malta, rely on it significantly. If authorised, there is an obligation on the healthcare institution of the place to which the person authorised travels to provide the medical treatment authorised as if the person was insured in that State (Article SSC.18). There is also, as in EU law, in effect an obligation to grant authorisation ‘where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the State where the person concerned resides and where that person cannot be given such treatment within a time limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account their current state of health and the probable course of their illness’ (Article SSC.18). This provision also gives entitlements to family members of the ‘insured person’. There is provision for if the family members and the insured person reside in different States.

 

This provision (the ‘S2’ in EU law, Regulation 883/2004, Article 20) is used relatively infrequently between Great Britain and the EU, but several hundred people a year do rely on it to receive health care across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The question of whether a time limit before which someone receives treatment is ‘medically justifiable’ is obviously contentious. When the UK was an EU Member State, EU law was used to seek judicial review of this question, and a number of English NHS Hospital Trusts reduced waiting times for elective procedures such as hip replacements in response. Apparently there is ongoing litigation in Northern Ireland which seeks judicial review of the NHS there for breaching waiting time limits, in part relying on EU law. Given the COVID-19 context, we might see further attempts to use litigation before domestic courts in a similar way in the future – reliant on the domestic legislation implementing the Agreement, rather than the Agreement itself.

 

Article SSC.19 makes provision for those States which provide cash benefits for healthcare, rather than benefits in kind. This is the direct equivalent to the relevant provision of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Article 21).

 

Implementation, Administrative Arrangements and Dispute Settlement

 

Annex SSC-7: Implementing Part sets out significant detail on the practicalities of implementing the parts of the Agreement on Coordination of Social Security. There is an obligation on the UK and the EU Member States to ‘provide or exchange all data necessary for establishing and determining the rights and obligations of persons to whom the Protocol applies’ and to do so ‘without delay’ (Article SSCI.2). A Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination is empowered to authorize – if it so decides – the use of the EU’s Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information for exchange of information. If this decision is taken, the rules applying to that system (which are rules of EU law) will apply (Article SSCI.4 (2)).

 

There is an obligation to make sure necessary information is made available, so that people concerned are able to assert their rights under the Protocol and Annex (Article SSCI.3 (1). Information must be forwarded, and documents issued, ‘without delay’ and in accordance with any time limits specified in national legislation (Article SSCI.3 (3)).

 

If a decision is made to refuse benefits, reasons must be given, and information communicated about remedies and time periods for appeals (Article SSCI.3 (3)).

 

Where there is a difference of views between States on what is the applicable legislation or on which is the competent state which is responsible for providing cash benefits or benefits in kind (eg medical treatment), there is an obligation under the Agreement to provisionally apply the legislation of one State (Article SSCI.6 (1) and (2)). For determining applicable legislation, this State is the state where the person actually pursues employment or self-employment, if there is such a state; or the state of residence if the person concerned pursues employment or self-employment in two or more States and performs part of their activity or activities in the State of residence, or if the person concerned is neither employed nor self-employed. In all other cases, it is the State to which a claim was first made, if the person pursues an activity, or activities, in two or more States.  For determining the competent state, the legislation of the person’s place of residence applies or, if that person does not reside on the territory of one of the States concerned, that person is provisionally entitled to the benefits provided for by the legislation applied by the institution to which the request was first submitted.

 

These provisions mean that people should not be left in limbo while complex cases are decided.

 

There is provision for bilateral procedures between States to depart from those in the Annex, provided that they do not have an adverse effect on people’s rights (Article SSCI.8). The bilateral procedures have to be notified to the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination and listed in the Appendix SSCI-1, thus securing (at least some) transparency. Any pre-existing bilaterals serving the same or similar purposes to the social security provisions in the Agreement will continue to apply, but they must also be listed in Appendix SSCI-1.

 

Finally, the Agreement includes provisions for a Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination, which addresses matters covered by Heading Four of Part Two and the Protocol on Social Security Coordination (Article 8(1)(p), previously INST.2 (p)); and for Parliamentary Cooperation and participation of civil society (Articles 11-14, previously INST.5 to INST.7).  These will be important sites for scrutiny of compliance with the Agreement, any future divergence in interpretation of obligations, and (given that the role for an over-seeing court is non-existent) for legal contestation. It will be important to ensure that the UK Parliament, and, where appropriate the Parliaments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales exercise oversight over executive powers; and to ensure that relevant NGOs are represented in the civil society processes.

 

Article 8(4) (previously INST.2 (2)) provides that Specialised Committees shall have the power to: (a) monitor and review the implementation and ensure the proper functioning of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement; … (c) adopt decisions, including amendments, and recommendations in respect of all matters where this Agreement or any supplementing agreement so provides or for which the Partnership Council has delegated its powers to a Specialised Committee in accordance with point (f) of Article 7(4) (previously INST.1(4) [Partnership Council]); (d) discuss technical issues arising from the implementation of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement; (e) provide a forum for the Parties to exchange information, discuss best practices and share implementation experience; (f) establish, supervise, coordinate and dissolve Working Groups; and (g) provide a forum for consultation pursuant to Article 738(7) (previously INST.13(7) [Consultations], in the Dispute Settlement provisions of Part Six).

 

The Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination will have power to make recommendations (which have no binding force) and decisions, by mutual consent: Article 10 (previously INST.4). Decisions adopted by the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination will have binding force on the Parties to the Agreement. The Committee will make decisions, for instance, on ‘the structure, content and format of forms and documents issued on behalf of the States for the purposes of implementing the Protocol’ (Annex SSC-7, Article SSCI.4 (1)). The Committee is tasked with reconciling differing points of view on ‘information provided by the persons concerned, the validity of a document or supporting evidence or the accuracy of the facts on which the particulars contained therein are based’ (Article SSCI.5 (4).

 

The Agreement’s general provisions on dispute settlement also apply to the social security coordination provisions (Article 735, previously INST.10: Scope), although not in individual cases (Article 735(5), previously INST.10(5)). Note that it's not possible, in the event of a successful complaint by one party about breach of the treaty, to retaliate by suspending the social security provisions (Article 749(3)(a), previously INST.24(3)(b)). This also applies to successful complaints about breaches of the withdrawal agreement (Article 749(4), previously INST.24(4)).  Other people will already have written about this – but the basic message here is that this is international law, not anything like EU law.

 

Conclusion

 

In summary, this is a significantly better settlement than No Deal at the end of transition would have been, from the point of view of people who relied on EU law to receive healthcare and medical treatment in the UK or an EU Member State.

 

For UK/EU residents, in the EU/UK access to healthcare continues on the same basis as national residents, as before. For visitors, a form of EHIC entitlements are preserved going forward.

 

What is different is the legal basis on which these rights are enjoyed, with corresponding implications for how rights are enjoyed and enforced. All will be well so long as the parties to the Agreement comply with their obligations under it.

 

* This post was amended on January 1, 2021, to add details about the absence of a power to suspend the social security provisions pursuant to the dispute settlement rules, on January 2, 2021 to add a link to the overview of the trade and cooperation agreement published on this blog, and on April 28, 2021 to refer to the revised Article numbers of the final TCA.   


Barnard & Peers: chapter 27

Photo credit: Health Europa





Wednesday, 16 December 2020

Overview of Digital Services Act


 


Professor Lorna Woods, University of Essex

 

The following is a summary of the proposal for the Digital Services Act, based on the leaked version of the document. 

Background 

The legal regime for online services has been unchanged since the e-Commerce Directive and as such it reflects the technology, services and thinking of more than twenty years ago.  The Commission committed to updating these horizontal rules in its Communication, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future (Feb 2020).  A number of European Parliament resolutions, while calling for revisions, also emphasised that some core principles from the e-Commerce Directive still remain valid.  So the Digital Services Act (DSA), which is proposed as a regulation not a directive, does not repeal the e-Commerce Directive but builds on it, including the internal market principle found in Art 3 e-Commerce Directive.  It is therefore envisaged that there be one Member State with regulatory responsibility for a service provider, that is the Member State in which the main establishment of the provider of intermediary services is located (article 40).  By contrast with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), this is a very simple provision.  The proposal does however delete the immunity provisions (Arts 12-15 e-Commerce Directive) and replaces them with a new structure which claims to recognise the impact of some very large actors on not only the economy but also European society.  Note the e-Commerce Directive allowed Member States to take their own regulatory action within the limits imposed by EU law; it does not seem that this proposal completely harmonises the field either. 

The Regulation does not deal with other information society services (which remain regulated by the e-Commerce Directive); its relationship with sector-specific rules (notably the provisions relating to video-sharing platforms in the AVMSD) will need to be considered.  As lex specialis, those rules will apply in preference to the more general rules here – though the general rules could cover any gaps in that regime.  The rules do not displace the general consumer protection rules either and the DSA is without prejudice to the operation of the GDPR. 

Regulated Entities 

The DSA distinguishes between four levels of actors, all based on the definition of ‘information society service’ (and presumably to be interpreted in the light of the Uber judgment): 

-          providers of intermediary services (defined Art 2(f));

-          hosts and online platforms providers (defined Art 2(h));

-          online platforms; and

-          very large online platform providers (defined Article 25). 

Online platforms could include social networks and online marketplaces (recital 13). Where the function is ancillary to another service, that service would not be caught by these rules. Notably, the press comments sections would not be included.  There is a boundary issue between closed groups which could in principle fall in the regime and information shared within groups consisting of a finite number of pre-determined persons.  Interpersonal communication services within the meaning of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) (Directive 2018/1972) – for example emails or private messaging services, fall outside the scope of the proposed Regulation (Rec 14). 

Each is subject to a different set of rules; this is in the interests of proportionality – though it is questionable whether this differentiating recognises that some small platforms are used as the basis for extremism and other potentially dangerous activities. Note also that the ‘very large platforms’ are defined by reference to use by population at the EU level, potentially overlooking national platforms of significance. This also means that the definition of very large platform is under EU level control. 

Chapter II: Retention of Immunity for Content of Third Parties 

The baseline positions seems to be a retention of the position under the e-Commerce Directive; that is, immunity from liability for content transmitted (and not immunity from all rules) provided that the service provider “acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information” and a restatement that there is no general obligation to monitor – though this is linked to the information the intermediaries transmit or store (Article 7).  Whether we read these provisions in the light of the jurisprudence on the e-Commerce Directive provisions remains to be seen; the recitals which refer to technical and automatic processing of information (recital 18) suggest that this might be the case. In passing, it is unclear how this might interact with the proposed exception to the e-Privacy Directive as regards the fight against child sexual exploitation material (COM(2020) 568 final). This is the retention of the ‘conditional immunity’ approach from the previous regime. The fact that the immunity does not apply to all rules is made explicit as regards hosting service providers; Art 5(3) states that immunity “shall not apply with respect to liability under consumer protection law of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders ….”.  Article 6 seems to constitute a form of ‘Good Samaritan’ clause.  Another addition is the obligation to act in relation to orders in relation to a specific item of illegal content. “Illegal content” is a defined term, meaning 

any information, which, in itself or by its reference to an activity, including the sale of products or provision of services is not in compliance with Union law or the law of a Member State, irrespective of the precise subject matter or nature of that law. (art 2(g)) 

The recitals give us more detail, though this is not an exhaustive definition: 

-          illegal hate speech or terrorist content and unlawful discriminatory

-          content, or that relates to activities that are illegal, such as the sharing of images depicting child sexual abuse, unlawful non-consensual sharing of private images, online stalking, the sale of non-compliant or counterfeit products, the non-authorised use of copyright protected material or activities involving infringements of consumer protection law (rec 12). 

There are also provisions regarding the provision by the intermediary service operator of information about specific recipients of the service.  These two provisions seem to be part of the procedural tidying up of weaknesses in the operation of the e-Commerce Directive. 

Chapter III: General Rules 

There are some specific obligations with regards all intermediary service providers: 

-          establishment of single point of contact (SPoC);

-          establishment of legal representative within EU for providers which are not established in the EU;

-          providers are to implement their terms and conidtions in a ‘diligent, objective and proportionate manner’;

-          except for micro or small enterprises, publish, at least once a year, clear, easily comprehensible and detailed reports on any content moderation they engaged in during the relevant period (content of rules specified in directive). 

Hosting providers, including online platforms, are subject to additional rules: 

-          reporting mechanisms for illegal content (containing specific elements) – these are called ‘notice and action mechanisms’ though this is not a defined term – the recitals envisage these applying to file storage and sharing services, web hosting services, advertising servers and paste bins (recital 40);

-          providing a statement of reasons in relation to a decision to remove/disable access to specific items of content and the information to be included in the statement of reasons are set out in Art 15(2);

-          decisions are to be made available in a database managed by the Commission. 

While there is a focus on problem content, the obligations themselves are not about defining such content but rather about the mechanisms that the platforms should have in place to deal with problems, a point recognised in the recitals (recital 26).  This shift can be seen in the more extensive obligations imposed on the online platforms, especially the very large online platforms and seems to be part of a more general policy shift across a range of countries. 

Chapter III: Rules Relating to Online Platforms 

Online platforms, other than micro and small enterprises, are subject to more specific rules found in Section 3. Online platforms are to provide the following: 

-          access to an effective, free internal complaint-handling system in relation to decisions to suspend an account or remove/disable content (it is not clear what the position is for someone who has complained about content but that content has not been removed)

-          out of court dispute settlement system in relation to disputes against the platform (not this is without prejudice to other routes available to users)

-          assumes a trusted flagger system, which allows those notices to be dealt with without delay

-          trusted flaggers must meet certain criteria and notes that Europol or the INHOPE organisations would meet these criteria (recital 46). 

They are subject to the following additional obligations: 

-          Online platforms are obliged to suspend, for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning

-          the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content and/or

-          the processing of notices and complaints by individuals or entities or by complainants that frequently submit notices or complaints that are manifestly unfounded

-          platforms are obliged to notify suspicion of criminal activity

-          platforms are required to ensure that traders using their platforms must be traceable (giving specified information). 

There are enhanced transparency reporting requirements, including transparency of online advertising (that the information is an advertisement; who placed it and why the user is seeing that ad, including information relating to any profiling (recital 52)). 

Chapter III: Very Large Online Platforms

 Section 4 deals with ‘very large online platforms’; that is platforms with active participants in the EU of 45 million or more.  The proposal highlights the systemic risks posed by such platforms, influencing online safety, shaping public opinion as well as online trade. They are therefore subject to further obligations on top of those already set out: 

-          6 monthly assessment of ‘any significant systemic risks’ including:

-          dissemination of illegal content, for example the dissemination of child sexual abuse material or illegal hate speech, and the conduct of illegal activities, such as the sale of products or services prohibited by Union or national law, including counterfeit products;

-          negative effective on the right to private and family life, freedom of expression, the prohibition of discrimination and certain rights of the child, and

-          intentional manipulation of the service ‘with an actual or foreseeable negative effect’ on ‘public health, minors, civic discourse, or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security’ (art 26(1));

-          in making this assessment the platforms should take into account the functioning of content moderation, recommender algorithm systems and targeting of adverts and also notes the role of fake accounts, the use of bots, and other automated or partially automated behaviours;

-          implementation of ‘reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures’;

-          these measures are to be independently audited – those doing the audit have to meet certain criteria including “proven objectivity and professional ethics, based in particular on adherence to codes of practice or appropriate standards”; 

There are reporting requirements in relation to risk assessment, risk mitigation and auditing processes: 

-          explanation of parameters used in recommender systems, and provision to allow user to modify such systems;

-          additional transparency as to online advertising by instituting a repository of adverts;

-          provision of data that is necessary to monitor compliance with this regulation;

-          provisions of access to vetted researchers (ie attached to academic institutions and ‘independent from commercial interests’ (how this affects research institutions which have received significant grants from ‘Big Tech’ is unclear) and

-          required to have a compliance officer (who must have certain professional experience/qualifications). 

Transversal Provisions concerning Due Diligence 

Section 5 deals with standards (Art 34) and codes of conduct (Art 35) to support the functioning of the systems and the due diligence requirement.  Civil society may be involved in the development of codes in addition to service providers and other interested parties. Article 36 puts an obligation on the Commission to “encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at Union level” in relation to transparency of online advertising. In a pandemic world it is unsurprising that the draft also makes provision for ‘crisis protocols’ dealing with “extraordinary circumstances affecting public security or public health” (Art 37).  The recitals suggest the following as constituting “extraordinary circumstances”: “any unforeseeable event, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, pandemics, war and acts of terrorism, where, for example, online platforms may be misused for the rapid spread of illegal content or disinformation or where the need arises for rapid dissemination of reliable information” (recital 70). 

Institutions and Enforcement 

Chapter IV deals with the institutions for implementation and enforcement.  The system requires regulator(s) at national level. A Member State must designate such a responsible body as its Digital Services Coordinator (DSC). There are provisions in cross border cases for cooperation between DSCs.  A European Board for Digital Services (EBDS) is established to advise the respective DSCs and the Commission. There are questions of possible overlap between the remit of this body and that of ERGA – the equivalent body set up under AVMSD – at least as regards the video sharing platform provisions. 

The DSC coordinates the national response and has specific tasks under the regulation (see specifically Art 41). While the DSC is to carry those tasks out in an ‘impartial, transparent and timely manner’ and to ‘act with complete independence’ (Art 39), it does not appear that the DSC needs to be independent in the same was the national supervisory authority is required to be independent in the telecommunications, audiovisual and data protection fields.  The Regulation lists the minimum enforcement powers to be granted to the DSC including the power to accept commitments, the power to order cessation of infringements and to adopt interim measures; the power to impose fines. In extreme circumstances it is envisaged that the DSC may “request a competent judicial authority of that Member State to order the temporary restriction of access of recipients of the service concerned by the infringement or, only where that is not technically feasible, to the online interface of the provider of intermediary services on which the infringement takes place” (Art 41(2)(f)).  Penalties are not to exceed 6% of the provider’s annual turnover; penalties for failure to comply with information requests are capped at 1%.  Users are given the right to comply to the DSC. 

The EDBS is made up of the DSCs, represented by high level officials. In this there seems to be some similarity with existing EU structures (e.g the EDPB under the GDPR). The EBDS may, for example, issue opinions, recommendations or advice and support the development of codes and guidelines as well as supporting joint investigations. 

There are specific provisions relating to the supervision of very large platforms. First of all the relevant national DSC (and the Irish regulator will be clearly one such) will be obliged to “take utmost account of any opinion and recommendation” under the enhanced supervision system set down in Art 50.  Further, there is a mechanism whereby the Commission, or the DSCs in destination states may “recommend” the DSC with jurisdiction to investigate a suspected infringement of the DSA.  In implementing any decisions, the DSC with jurisdiction must communicate certain information to the EDBS/Commission who may communicate their views when they are of the opinion that any action plan proposed is insufficient.  Significantly, the Commission may in some circumstances initiate action in relation to very large platforms. The Commission has power to request information, to interview and to conduct on-site investigations and the Commission may issue interim measures or make commitments binding. The Commission also has the power to adopt a ‘non-compliance decision’ and impose fines.  Some of these provisions reflect the approach found in the competition enforcement processes at EU level, including the right of the very large platform to be heard and have access to the file.  Again there are questions of overlap in terms of all these powers with the rules pertaining to video sharing platforms and the remit of the AVMSD – which does not have equivalent provisions. 

Conclusions 

This is just the start of what will be a long and, if the experience of the recently agreed terrorist content proposal is anything to go by, contentious process.  While the main themes of the proposal are on one level straight forward and seemingly broadly in line with the proposals of the UK Government, the devil is always in the detail and there will no doubt be some sensitivity about who gets to exert control (national or EU level), the differing views and sensitivities of some of the Member States and concerns about freedom of expression and the right to private life, especially given the proposal seems to encompass some forms of content that is not illegal (e.g. misinformation/disinformation).

 

Photo credit: TodayTesting, via Wikimedia commons

Tuesday, 15 December 2020

European Democracy Action Plan – an Overview

 


 

Professor Lorna Woods, University of Essex

The European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) (COM(2020)790 final) is part of a suite of measures all potentially affecting the online environment; indeed, it is one of the major initiatives announced in the agenda set by Commission President von der Leyen.  The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) are also eagerly expected (probably just before Christmas so everyone is too distracted really to comment).  As well as reflecting the shift in some of the underlying assumptions about the approach to the Internet, these measures also challenge our understanding of what we expect the EU to do and where the limits to its (legislative) competence lies.

 The backdrop to EDAP is the importance of democracy as well as human rights and the rule of law, hot topics at the moments and ones on which there is now apparently no easy consensus to be had.  The Communication starts by recognising the challenges that the institutions of democracy have been under threat and that matters have been made worse by COVID-19.  It also notes the importance of trying to ensure that there is a coherent approach between internal activities and external actions in this context – although the Union’s competence varies in this regard. The UK will of course form part of the external environment.  EDAP provides a ‘reinforced EU policy framework’ which includes specific measures aimed at 

-          Promoting free and fair elections and strong democratic participation;

-          supporting free and independent media; and

-          countering disinformation.

 At the same time, the action plan relies heavily on ‘empowering citizens and civil society to counter the threats’. 

Democratic Participation

 There are four elements to this theme: 

-          transparency of political advertising and communication;

-          financing of European political parties;

-          cooperation to ensure free and fair elections; and

-          democratic engagement beyond elections.

 Political Advertising

There is, apparently, wide recognition of the risk of interference in elections, and the use of social media in this regard is central.  While the Communication recognises that some of the issues in this area may well fall within the GDPR already, it states that is will present a legislative proposal on the transparency of sponsored political content to sit alongside the rules relating to online advertising in the proposed DSA (with the aim that these rules be in place by the next EP elections).  While little can be divined from one sentence, it is clear that there will be much heartache about which material falls within the rules.  Note, for example, that the target of the measure will be ‘sponsored’ (is this payment for the content to be carried or might it cover financial relationships more broadly) or ‘political content’ (so presumably not limited to content that is understood as being an advert). Further, subjects of the regulation are proposed not to be limited to ‘sponsors’ but to those in production/distribution channels (including agencies and political consultancies) as well – of course – as the platforms themselves (though we do not yet know what precisely is a platform – does it include a search engine?).  Interestingly, these rules do not seem intended to run just through election periods because the Communication also states that the Commission will investigate whether further/better rules would be needed during these periods.  Key elements of the proposal seem to relate to putting in place transparency requirements to allow accountability, auditability, as well as tools related to information flow rather than content-based rules (for example, labelling, record-keeping, transparency of targeting and amplification criteria); the shift away from rules targeting specific types of content can be seen elsewhere too. The Communication also flags the possibility of co-regulatory codes (and supervisory authority).  

Funding of European Political Parties

Funding of European political parties is governed by EU; the Commission envisages a review on the legislation (Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties) in this area. 

Strengthened Cooperation to ensure free and fair elections

Elections are mainly a matter of Member State competence albeit with influence in some aspects from EU law (notable data protection).  The Commission’s role in this context would be to facilitate cooperation between Member States based on the existing European cooperation network on elections.  Possible activities include an online forum, joint training, pooled resources and expertise, as well as online monitoring capabilities.  The Communication also suggests that these processes and their administration could fall within critical infrastructure regimes (e.g. Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union); again, this seems part of a more expansive view of critical infrastructure. 

Beyond technical security and the possibilities of e-voting, the Communication raises the issue of balanced media coverage during elections (a matter at the least outwith legislative competence), identifying the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) set up under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) as relevant. In passing it may be noted that this is the body with the independent national supervisory authorities on it (see Article 30b AVMSD) rather than the Contact Committee.  The Contact Committee may include representatives from the Member States’ governments. There is the potential for a competence question for ERGA  here. Its tasks are set out in Art 30b(3) AVMSD, but while it is to provide technical expertise on ‘matters related to audiovisual media services within its competence’, it is not clear what ERGA’s competence actually is. Certainly, matters within the AVMSD would fall within remit, but balanced media coverage is not a matter covered by the directive. 

The Communication also draws links with external relations in the context of elections, referring to the Council of Europe, UNESCO and the OSCE with the aim of sharing best practice. 

Promoting democratic engagement 

The EU has long struggled with citizen engagement – what used to be described as being part of the democratic deficit.  Much of what the Communication proposes here has links to matters covered by the 2020 Citizenship Report and its Rule of Law Report as well as the 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy (COM(2020)152); the EU Youth Strategy (2019-2027); the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)565).  As such, this Communication seems to function as a basket into which a range of pre-existing strategies can be put, a theme which is seen elsewhere in the Communication too. 

More concretely, the Communication puts forward proposals with regard to tackling online hate speech, dealt with on a voluntary basis through the Code of Conduct on Tackling Illegal Hate Speech. The list of EU crimes (Article 83(1) TFEU) will be extended to include hate crime and hate speech (though it is not clear from this which characteristics might be protected – would the intention be to cross refer to those listed in Article 21 EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, as in the AVMSD?).  Of course, this to some extent may become superfluous in the light of the DSA which, one might hope, would at least have hate speech within scope. 

Media Freedom 

The Communication identifies two main aspects to media freedom and pluralism: 

-          the online and physical safety of journalists, as well as protection from abusive litigation (anti-SLAPP);

-          the impact of the role of platforms as digital gatekeepers (and absorbers of advertising revenue). 

Safety of Journalists 

Impunity for threats against journalists has long been a problem and has been the subject of much debate for at least a decade.  The Commission proposes to add to the dialogue through the European News Media Forum that it will establish, together with proposing a recommendation on the safety of journalists (to add to the various recommendations and declarations put forward by a phalanx of international human rights bodies). Of course, the EU is limited in terms of what it can do in terms of law internally in this field; externally, it proposes monitoring and public diplomacy.  The provision of funding to support journalists (e.g. for legal aid and shelters for those in need) seems more likely to have concrete effects. 

Anti-SLAPP and Professional Standards 

Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPS) are noted as being a technique to harass journalists and others working in the public interest; this forms part of an increasingly hostile environment.  SLAPPS take place within the Member States’ own national legal systems, though the Communication notes that they may have cross border effects, with risk of forum shoppping and  increased complexity for a defendant (the impact of such actions and the countervailing interest in providing individuals with protection for their legitimate personality rights has not been fully considered in the context of the free movement of services and whether any such rules constitute a restriction). Some of this relates to areas where there is existing EU law: the Communication notes the evaluation of Rome II and Brussels Ia Regulations. A new initiative is planned in preparation for which the Commission is carrying out a mapping study. The Commission will set up an expert group on SLAPPs. 

The Commission aims to promote stronger cooperation between media self-regulation bodies (presumably this is aimed at the press or the journalists themselves as television broadcasting and the like is regulated by virtue of the AVMSD). 

Additional Support 

The Communication notes the 2018 revision of the AVMSD requires transparency of media ownership. Note that while Art 5(1) revised AVMSD requires the provision of a service providers name, contact details and the Member State under the jurisdiction of which it operates (similar to requirements in the e-Commerce Directive as regards information service providers), the requirement on Member States to oblige media service providers to give further information regarding their beneficial owners and ownership structure is optional.  This is a potentially significant gap and may disappoint some groups who have campaigned for more transparency in this regard. 

In terms of ownership, there is a plan to analyse national rules on media diversity and media concentration, against a backdrop of the role of online platforms. There is no intention to legislate at Union level (the attempt to do so from the 1990’s sinking on the rock of EU competence); instead, the aim is to coordinate within a range of existing tools: competition law, freedom of establishment and the revised AVMSD (which contains more provisions expressly permitting Member States to take action on certain issues, for example the prominence of public service content).  The Communication does not consider whether media services (or some of them) should be considered from the perspective of national security and the protection of critical national infrastructure.  The Communication notes the need for (financial) support on the part of the Member States, but also underlines the fact that this would have to comply with the State Aid rules.  There have been many decisions on such support – to the press as well as to public service broadcasters – but the Council has invited the Commission to consider these rules in relation to the press sector (whatever is comprised under that heading).  Nonetheless, this still leaves a potential weakness in that the deployment of support seems to be a matter of individual Member State choice. 

The Communication also highlights the importance in some Member States of state advertising (and this importance has been noted elsewhere, its withdrawal being seen as an interference with media speech by some international human rights bodies). EDAP suggests that transparent rules and fair criteria for the allocation of such advertising could mitigate the risks in this area; it also draws attention to the public procurement strategy.  To a certain extent this maps on to issues dealt with by the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan (launched the same day as EDAP), key themes of which are about supporting the media and by tackling the segmentation of the European market. Comprising three main strands of activity (Recover, Transform and Empower), the Media and Audiovisual Action Plan contains no immediate or specific legislative proposals, a section deals with looking at the implementation of the revised AVMSD. 

Countering Disinformation 

Often documents talking about disinformation start by distinguishing between disinformation and misinformation and stating that we should not really use the term ‘fake news’.  The Communication spares us the latter point and, drawing on work from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, adds to the classification so it now comprises four elements: 

-          misinformation

-          disinformation

-          information influence operation

-          foreign interference in the information space.

These may each require different treatment (though the boundaries between the categories may not be easy in practice to draw or maintain) and the possibility of introducing oversight may give rise to concerns in some quarters in relation to freedom of expression. Whether such a concern is justified is another question.  The proposals seem to draw on existing initiatives in this field but emphasise certain factors in the online environment which give rise to or exacerbate problems: manipulative amplification of harmful content; the economic incentives for spreading disinformation; and the lack of costs for foreign actors seeking to engage in influence operations. These activities are stated not to “interfere with people’s right to express opinions or to restrict access to legal content” [p 19]. This may link to the distinction between have the ability to air certain views and the way that content is promoted/how easy it is to find. The Communication also notes the importance of fact-checking.  

The actions in this section fall into three categories:

-          capacity building;

-          obligations and accountability in re platforms; and

-          empowering citizens.

 Capacity Building

 This section notes the ease with which information may be weaponised by foreign actors, but also domestic actors. The first aspect of any response is to better understand the threat landscape and the Communication calls for closer cooperation internally as well as with relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, and with international partners. Here the EDAP refers back to the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)605 final) from July 2020. Within this, the Commission plans to develop a common framework and methodology for collecting systematic evidence on foreign interference. The existing Rapid Alert System, one of the four pillars of the  Action Plan against Disinformation from 2018 and run by the EEAS, will continue to function but the Communication envisages the possibility of extending the bodies it cooperates with (already including NATO and G7) to the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO – established 2020) and even Europol.

One new proposal is that of seeking to impose costs on perpetrators.  In the response to its consultation on the Communication, the Commission noted that civil society organisations stressed the need to make the threat of targeted sanctions more credible and frequent, to raise the cost of foreign influence operations and thereby deter interference. The mechanisms to do this need further development and also need to synergise with the ‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’ from 2017.  The Communication also recognises the need to tackle threats through tackling them in third countries, suggesting that democratic governments should be equipped with the means to respond to such threats, especially in the European Neighbourhood and Enlargement region. 

Platform Accountability

Increasingly policy-makers are recognising that the platforms are not neutral as to the content they encourage and promote; the recent assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation re-iterated this point (see also views of ERGA).  The Commission now proposes a co-regulatory oversight mechanism, forming part of the DSA; this linkage significantly reinforces the importance ascribed to this issue.  The DSA is described as requiring a risk managed approach to their systems (and if this is so, it seems to be following a similar approach to that proposed by Carnegie UK Trust [disclaimer: I co-authored the report] which seems to have influenced the UK Government’s Online Harms White Paper which talks about ‘safety by design’).  In the meantime, the Commission will issue guidance on tackling misinformation with the aim of strengthening the code; the Commission also envisages more robust and on-going monitoring of the code. The Commission also emphasised the importance of the EDPB guidance on the application of the GDPR in this context. 

Empowering Citizens

This is essentially about strengthening media literacy through a number of mechanisms, including civil society and higher education establishments and it ties with a number of media initiatives.  Intuitively, this sounds right but may be more difficult to achieve in practice and media literacy initiatives’ success may depend to some extent on changing to the business systems that at the moment seem to promote misinformation and disinformation and trigger ‘frictionless communication’. 

Conclusion

The plan is broad and it will be interesting to see the speed at which these new initiatives are rolled out and more detail added to them (e.g. imposing costs on perpetrators). Much of the work is not of a legislative nature but rather about ensuring co-operation and making effective initiatives that already exist.  While desirable in its own right, this fact also reminds us that we are in terrain where the EU’s competence is limited, certainly as far as legislative capacity goes.  It is also noteworthy that much of EDAP refers to other strategies and action plans. A cynic might say then what, in concrete terms is new; but another perspective notes that the issue of disinformation and misinformation is complex and touches on many areas. In this light, the EDAP is a mechanism pulling these disparate strands and actors together. It remains to be seen this impact that increased cooperation will have on the problems in this area.

 

Photo credit: via Wikimedia commons, by Skeptical Science