Sunday, 29 March 2015

Do Facebook and the USA violate EU data protection law? The CJEU hearing in Schrems


 

 

Simon McGarr, solicitor at McGarr solicitors

 

Last week, the CJEU held a hearing in the important case of Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, which concerns a legal challenge brought by an Austrian law student to the transfers of his personal data to the USA by Facebook, on the grounds that his data would be subject to mass surveillance under US law, as revealed by Edward Snowden. His legal challenge was actually brought against the Irish data protection commissioner, who regulates such transfers pursuant to an agreement between the EU and the US known as the ‘Safe Harbour’ agreement. This agreement takes the form of a Decision of the European Commission made pursuant to the EU’s data protection Directive, which permits personal data to be transferred to the USA under certain conditions. He argued that the data protection authority has the obligation to suspend transfers due to breaches of data protection standards occurring in the USA. (For more detail on the background to the case, see the discussion of the original Irish judgment here).

 

The following summarises the arguments made at the hearing by the parties, including the intervening NGO Digital Rights Ireland, as well as several Member States, the European Parliament, the Commission and the European Data Protection Supervisor.  It then sets out the question-and-answer session between the CJEU judges (and Advocate-General) and the parties. The next step in this important litigation will be the opinion of the Advocate-General, due June 24th.


Please note: these notes are presented for information purposes only. They are not an official record or a verbatim account of the hearing. They are based on rough contemporaneous notes and the arguments made at the hearing are paraphrased or compressed. Nothing here should be relied on for any legal or judicial purpose, and all the following is liable to transcription error.

  

Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner

Case C-362/14

 

Judges:

M.V Skouris (president); M.K. Lenaerts (Vice President); M.A. Tizzano; Mme R. Silva de Lapuerta; M. T. Von Danwitz (Judge Rapporteur); M. S. Rodin; Mme K. Jurimae; M. A Rosas; M. E. Juhász; M. A. Borg Barthet; M. J. Malenovsky; M. D. Svaby; Mme M. Berger; M. F. Biltgen; M. C. Lycourgos; M. F. Biltgen

 

M. Y. Bot (Advocat General)

 

Max Schrems

 

Noel Travers SC for Mr. Schrems told the court that personal data in the US is subject to mass and indiscriminate mass surveillance. The DRI v Ireland case struck down the EU data retention directive, establishing a principle which applies a fortiori to this case. However, the court held that Data Retention did not affect the essence of the right under Article 8, as it concerned only metadata. The surveillance carried out in the US accesses the content of data as well as the metadata, and without judicial oversight. This interference is so serious that it does violate the essence of Article 8 rights, unlike the data retention directive. Mr. Travers held that the Safe Harbour decision is contrary to the Data Protection directive’s own stated purpose, and that it was accordingly invalid.

 

Answering the Court’s question as to whether the decision precludes an investigation by a Data Protection Authority (DPA) such as the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, he submitted that compliance with fundamental rights must be part of the implementation of any Directive. Accordingly, national authorities, when called upon in a complaint to investigate breaches must have the power to do so.

 

Article 25.6 of the data protection Directive allows for findings on adequacy regarding a third country “by reason of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered into”. The Safe Harbour Principles (SHPs) and FAQs are not a law or an international agreement under the meaning of the Vienna Convention. And the SHPs do not apply to US public bodies. The Safe Harbour Principles are set out in an annex to a Commission Decision, but that annex is subject to US courts for interpretation and for compliance. Where there is a requirement for compliance with law, it is with US law, not EU law.

 

Irish Data Protection Commissioner

 

For the Data Protection Commissioner, Mr. Paul Anthony McDermott said that with power must come limitations. All national regulators are firstly bound by domestic law.  The Data Protection Commissioner is also bound by the Irish Constitutional division of powers. She cannot strike down laws, Directives or a Decision.

 

Mr. Schrems wanted to debate Safe Harbour in a general way- it wasn’t alleged then that Facebook was in breach of safe harbour or that his data was in danger. The Irish High Court had a limited Judicial Review challenge in front of it. Mr. Schrems didn’t challenge Safe Harbour, or the State, or EU law directly, and the Irish High Court declined the application by Digital Right Ireland to refer the validity of the Safe Harbour Decision to Luxembourg. Mr. McDermott asked the court to respect the parameters of the case.

 

Europe has decided to deal with the transfer of data to the US at a European level. The purpose of the Safe Harbour agreement is to reach a negotiated compromise. The words “negotiate”, “adapt” and “review” appear in the Decision. It is clear therefore that a degree of compromise is envisaged. Such matters are not to be dealt with in a court but, as they involve both legal and political issues, by diplomacy and realpolitik.

 

The Data Protection Commissioner can have regard to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights when she’s balancing matters but it doesn’t trump everything. It doesn’t allow her to ignore domestic law or European law, Mr. McDermott concluded.

 

Digital Rights Ireland

 

For Digital Rights Ireland (DRI), Fergal Crehan BL said that while it was clear that the Decision permits some member states, under existing legislation, to question the adherence of individual organisations to the Safe Harbour Principles, that the Decision purported to require Member states to accept it as a full and final determination as to the adequacy of the law and practices of the United States of America. In this regard at least DRI agreed with the submissions of the Commission. However, the Decision in fact could not require member states to do so. Citing Case 34/78 Yoshida, and related cases, he said that the Decision was clearly an item of tertiary legislation, relying on the Directive for its legitimacy. It follows that the Decision must comply, not only with the Charter, but also with the Directive from which it takes its being.

 

The law of the EU requires independent supervision of the Fundamental Right to Data Protection. This is established in Article 8.3 of the Charter, and fleshed out in the Directive, particularly at Article 28. Accordingly, by purporting to abridge this supervisory power, it is the SHD which runs contrary to the norms of primary and secondary EU law, and therefore it is the SHD which must yield.

 

To the Court’s question as to whether such powers can be made subject to requirements such as those at 3(1)(b) of the Decision, he give a similar answer. The powers granted to Data Protection Authorities in the Directive cannot be limited by a Decision, where that Decision is made on foot of the Directive, without inverting the hierarchical norms of the EU legal order. Insofar as the Decision purports to do so, it was invalid.

 

Turning to the Court’s question as to whether the Decision be reviewed, under Article 46 of Regulation 45/2001, by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), he noted that Article 41 of that Regulation sets out the EDPS' remit as not only the "processing of personal data by a Community institution or body", but also advising Community institutions on all matters concerning the processing of personal data.

 

To the court’s question as to whether a decision on adequacy was limited to an examination of laws and international agreements, he noted that the Directive provides that “The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation”

 

Accordingly, the Commission must consider the adequacy of practice as well as law. It would be both absurd and entirely inadequate to the requirements of the Directive were the Commission to simply open the statute book of a third country, and assess adequacy solely on the basis of a legal order which might not correspond to reality.

 

In the judgment of this Court in NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, it was held,:

 

“a third country can only be considered as a ‘safe third country’ where not only has it ratified the Geneva Convention and the ECHR but it also observes the provisions thereof.

 

It was further held in NS that mere ratification of conventions by a Member State cannot result in the application of a conclusive presumption that that State observes those conventions. The same principle is applicable both to Member States and third countries

 

Echoing Mr. Schrems, DRI submitted that an “adequate level of protection” must include effective judicial protection, noting that the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides, at Article 41 for the Right to Good Administration, and at Article 47 for the Right to An Effective Remedy.

 

However, FAQ 11 of the SHD offers organisations a choice of enforcement mechanisms, none of which involve submission to “an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law” as required by the Charter. Even where options 2 or 3 set out in FAQ 11 could be said to satisfy the Charter requirement, the fact that they are optional, and may be shunned by the Safe Harbour Organisation in favour of option 1, a private sector mechanism, chosen and paid for by the Safe Harbour Organization, meant the Decision fails to provide effective independent judicial protection.

 

DRI also noted that while data subjects may make complaints to the US Federal Trade Commission, the FTC is not obliged to investigate them, and has never done so on even one occasion. This weakness of the Decision in the area of Enforcement was the subject of constant criticism by the Article 29 Working Party [the advisory body set up by the data protection directive] at every stage in the evolution of the Safe Harbour Agreement.

 

Mr. Crehan noted that the Decision does not require Safe Harbour Organizations to comply with the Safe Harbour Principles in practice. Rather it states, at article 1.3, that where an organization self-certifies, certain conditions shall be considered to have been met. The key condition is that the organisation receiving the data has disclosed its commitment to comply with the Safe Harbour Principles. The Commission notably did not take the perhaps more logical approach of making compliance itself a condition under Article 1.2. The effect of this formulation is that an organisation is deemed compliant by reason solely of its making a commitment to comply. The decision, he said, was not a "finding", in the everyday sense of that word; it was simply a decision to cease looking.

 

The findings of the Commission in its Communications on the functioning of Safe Harbour were findings, in the true and literal sense of the word. These ran contrary to that which the Commission purported to “find”, in the Safe Harbour Decision. The result was an extraordinary state of affairs where a “finding” was being defended in the very face of the commission’s own later findings to the contrary.

 

DRI acknowledged the difficulties that might be caused by a state of affairs where each and every national authority was to make its own intervention, each perhaps coming to different conclusions, and submitted that the EDPS might be best placed to intervene in a coordinating role.

 

Irish government

 

For the Republic of Ireland, Mr. David Fennelly BL submitted that the Safe Harbour Decision is binding on the Member States and remains binding while it is in force. Article 25 of the Directive must be read in a holistic way. The protection of personal data must be safeguarded in an appropriate way, but that there can be variations in the means of safeguarding. In regulating EU data beyond the borders, the EU can’t unilaterally impose its standards on third countries. That’s why Article 25 does not require “equivalent” level of protection, but an “adequate” level of protection.

 

Ireland noted with concern the Commission’s findings regarding the working of Safe Harbour, but also noted that the Commission did not think these were sufficiently serious to justify them either repealing or suspending the Decision.

 

The scheme created under Article 25 says that findings must be made through negotiations, and Member States are bound by the positive adequacy finding and can’t make any findings or do anything which would undermine the Commission’s negotiations.

 

Belgium

 

Counsel for Belgium submitted that there is no hierarchy of norms within the Directive, placing Chapter 4, which provides for the Safe Harbour Decision, above Chapter 6, which provides for the powers of DPAs. Chapter 6 is a general chapter which may be supplemented by chapter 4 but is not necessarily subordinate to it. The independence of national supervisory authorities is vital. The primary goal of the adequacy decision is to bring legal certainty. The Decision has no temporal limit, and while circumstances can change, there was no requirement to review the Safe Harbour Decision in the light of those new circumstances.

 

A member state, Belgium submitted, must not make an interpretation of their domestic law that is in defiance of the EU Charter Rights. So protection of Charter Rights might require that any limitations on DPAs be negated.

 

Austria

 

Counsel for The Republic of Austria noted that adequacy decisions are not directly applicable under EU Member States’ law, but are rather directed to Member States, requiring them to take necessary measures. Art 25.6 of the Directive doesn’t contain any express requirement on the Commission to act in the light of ongoing circumstances. However, other forms of EU law place an implicit requirement on the Commission to review matters. If the Commission doesn’t act, the adequacy decisions can be looked at by national supervisory authorities. Article 3 of the Decision provides for an “emergency exit” by granting powers to Data Protection authorities. But the Decision provided so narrow an exit, with so many different requirements for it to be invoked, that the national supervisory authorities in effect are prevented from enacting their powers.

 

How should these requirements be interpreted? It can’t just be a theoretical legal examination, but rather it needs to be a practical issue. Contrary to Ireland’s submissions, Austria saw this not as trying to force EU law on third parties but rather as taking EU citizens’ rights as a starting point and seeking to have them protected. Legal and judicial protection for EU citizens is a central issue.

 

There is no adequacy decision under Article 25.6 of the Directive. Safe Harbour is not a safe harbour for EU citizens but rather a safe harbour for data pirates. Safe Harbour has not amended US law or created any international requirements, so there is no legal basis for the Safe Harbour Decision. It should be repealed, though perhaps with a transitional period for legal certainty.

 

Poland

 

Counsel for Poland referred to Digital Rights Ireland’s point that the Decision was based on the Directive and must be interpreted in the light of the Directive. Therefore the Decision cannot prevent national supervisors from acting under their directive powers, as the Directive is of a higher rank so cannot be limited by the Decision. There can be a presumption of adequacy created by the Desicion, but the presumption must be rebuttable.

 

The safeguard mechanism is there to allow national supervisors to suspend flows, but it is too limited. Supervisory authorities must be permitted to conduct investigations, and if they find there is a problem, they must have the right to suspend data transfer. The Directive says that the adequacy of the protection in third countries must be considered in the light of all the circumstances – not just the rules, but also the facts.  This must include the availability of effective judicial oversight.

 

Slovenia

 

Counsel for Slovenia also submitted that national data protection authorities (DPAs) were not prevented from investigating by the Decision. To ensure an adequate level of protection in third parties, the Commission is not limited only to the assessment of legal norms but also their practical implementation. EU citizens have got judicial protections and if there are any breaches under Safe Harbour, there must be judicial remedies at the level of the EU law. The Commission’s findings point to a violation of human rights in respect of transfers and there should not be a requirement on the part of Mr. Schrems to prove an actual breach but to show a strong possibility of a breach.

 

United Kingdom

 

Counsel for the UK submitted that Member States must take all measures necessary to give effect to the Decision’s assessment. Article 25 of the Directive empowers the Commission to establish a common position for the Union, so as not to have conflicting findings. This is integral to international relations on data to allow for international trade.

 

DPAs can investigate the lawfulness of data processing. However, once the Commission has given its decision, the issue of lawfulness has been dealt with. But examining adequacy of individual data transfers remains within the local authorities’ remit. In this way the Directive is therefore in compliance with the Charter.

 

The Commission’s findings on the functioning of Safe Harbour were expressions of policy. They have no legal status, and there is not a requirement to act on foot of them. Had there been such a requirement, the Commission would have done so. Rather, they are part of an ongoing discussion on how to improve the arrangements and this Court isn’t the right place to usurp the Commission Decision. He also noted that if the Court did strike the Decision down, there would be serious effect on transfers to the US risking disruption to trade.

 

European Parliament

 

Counsel for the European Parliament noted that the Commission may make a finding of adequacy ‘only if’ there is adequate protection. The default is a presumption that there is not adequate protection. The Commission only creates a presumption, which can be rebutted in the face of evidence.

 

The Commission cannot, by its Decision, prevent supervisory authorities from exercising their powers under Article 28 of the Directive. The legislature did not give any powers to the Commission under Article 28. Article 25, which allows for the finding on adequacy, does not provide powers to restrict the supervisory authorities.

 

The Commission must take into account all circumstances in determining adequacy. It may exercising power having regard to two particular issues (law and international commitments), but that doesn’t preclude the Commission from taking anything else into account. Rules of law to be taken into account must include effective judicial protection.

 

US law and practice allows for large scale, unnecessary and disproportionate collection of EU data, and does not provide adequate protection for EU citizens’ data. The Commission therefore cannot maintain there is adequate protection. The Commission was required to suspend Safe Harbour. They have failed to respond to the Parliament’s call to do so. The EDPS and national authorities must and should intervene in the face of clear evidence of a serious violation of EU rights.

 

Commission

 

Finally, Counsel for the European Commission made his submissions. He submitted that every adequacy decision has a procedural safeguard, allowing that suspension is permitted where a specific data transfer is not, in fact, adequate. The limitations on DPAs in the Decision do not limit the right to supervision under Charter Article 8.3 but rather give shape to it. The review powers of the EDPS are only to do with data processing by EU institutions, and the EDPS also is not empowered to review the Commission’s adequacy decisions.

 

In finding on adequacy, the Commission is not restricted to reviewing the laws on the books but also the law in action. There is a requirement for appropriate redress - taking account of different traditions in third countries. Redress can be sought before the FTC or the Dept of Transport or US courts or domestic courts. Echoing Ireland, counsel for the Commission argued that ‘adequate’ does not mean ‘equivalent’.

 

Talks with the US are ongoing and making some progress, but they are complex and political. The Commission cannot conclude that there is an adequate level of protection of all data transfers made under the Safe Harbour principles. However, the Commission must be allowed to have a margin of discretion. It has to balance citizen’s rights with the need for legal certainty, for trade and for the EU’s international relationships.

 

European Data Protection Supervisor

 

Counsel for the European Data Protection Supervisor, Mr. Dockson, stated that Safe Harbour, quite apart from current concerns regarding mass surveillance, was adopted in the face of doubts. The Article 29 working group have tried to make it work. However, 18 months after criticisms were issued by the group, they remain unacted upon. Mass surveillance of the sort when the Decision was made was not imagined. The Safe Harbour system was not designed to allow for the level of surveillance now obtaining in the US. 

 

Echoing counsel for Mr. Schrems, he noted that DRI v Ireland clarified when the essence to the right to privacy was infringed. There is serious inference where there is access to the content of the data. In DRI v Ireland, the Court criticised the failure to require the holding of data within the EU, under the control of an Independent data protection authority. In the US, such protections are wholly absent.

 

Regarding the role of the EDPS’ authority, Mr. Dockson referred to the European Parliament’s consideration of EDPS powers. Independence of data protection authorities is crucial. Independence cannot be curtailed by a Commission comitology Decision.

 

The improvements by the US in the coming months must be sufficient. If there is not a positive outcome, then there is a need to suspend the Decision.

 

Court questioning

 

Counsel’s observations having finished, the Judge-Rapporteur led the Court’s questioning.

 

He asked Counsel for the Commission whether the EDPS could or should intervene if the Commission is inactive. Counsel for the Commission replied firstly that the Commission is not inactive, and added that national authorities cannot intervene in respect of third countries while the Commission Decision stands.

 

The Advocate-General then took up the questioning. He referred to Recital 5 of the Decision, which requires that adequacy shall be “ensured”. The Decision itself merely states that it shall be “considered ensured”.

 

Per Pg 35 of the Decision, where US law provides for a breach, then that breach is allowed. So everything that is in the Safe Harbour agreement can be set aside by US national law? If so, how can you then plead that these regulations ensure adequacy? Having taken some advice, counsel for the Commission stated that what must be assessed is a situation, not just a system of laws. The United States ensured that they would enforce the Safe Harbour Principles.

 

The Judge-Rapporteur (JR) now intervened:

 

There is no explicit competence given to the Commission to limit the powers of DPAs. Article 3 does not have any bearing on adequacy.

 

Commission: There is a safety valve in all these adequacy decisions, which can only be a general finding. Rules can be adequate, but their implementation may be problematic.

 

JR: but you say you’re limiting the powers of the independent national authorities. Where do you get that power?

 

Commission: Read Art 25 and 28 together. Adequacy decisions must be complied with by the Member States, and the national authorities must comply.

 

JR: you’ve stated here that you can’t confirm today that adequacy is respected. If this is your finding, what is the implication of recital 57? Or isn’t it limiting your discretion? Shouldn’t you explain your justification for continuing with the Decision?

 

Commission: Legal certainty is a very important consideration. There is a lot of reliance on the Decision currently. And also we need to consider the relations with the third party country.

 

JR: So, you say you’re remaining with the margin of discretion. Are you in essence pleading that the Safe Harbour decision is not subject to Art 8.3 of the Charter? Yes or No?

 

*Commission take instructions*

 

Commission: It is not the task of a national supervisory authority to examine whether the Commission complies with Art 8.3 of the Charter.

 

JR: The answer is no?

 

Commission: The answer is no.

 

The Judge Rapporteur asked counsel for the Commission to consider C-518/07 Commission -v- Germany where it was held that all actions by Independent authorities must be interpreted in the light of their duties.

 

After a lunch break, the questions resumed, with the Court’s Advocate-General (AG) taking the lead.

 

AG: What is the meaning of “ensure”? This verb should mean ‘to make sure that’, i.e that the third country could be obliged to do something?

 

Commission: Under Article 25 [of the Directive], read as a whole, it is up to the member states to examine the adequacy of the protections. That is not an obligation on a third country. It is an examination of a state of affairs. However, when the Commission reaches the conclusion that there is an adequate level of protection, it has been satisfied that sufficient data protection will be guarantee in the future. What has happened in the case of the Safe Harbour decision is that the US communicated a letter to the Commission. They ensured us they would enforce the principles.

 

AG: A different question, re Charter Article 8.3. You said that there was an area that was the exclusive competence of the Commission which could not be challenged by the national authorities. In this case, how do you think effective protection can be provided if they were not permitted to consider a swathe of data?

 

Commission: Well, we can only control data protection in the EU, under the Safe Harbour decision as it is applied. As it is currently applied, there is no guarantee that the fundamental rights of the EU citizens are adequately protected in the US. The Commission has taken action.

 

AG: Let’s imagine I’m on Facebook and I decide my rights have been breached. But I don’t see the Commission taking action.

 

Commission: The Commission has analysed the facts, examined the problems and engaged in talks with the US authorities. We were assured by the US President in a speech that there was to be a review.

 

AG: - Until then, what happens?

 

Commission: National authorities need to take whatever actions they need to take for individuals. There’s a lot a data is already in the US.

 

President Judge: This can’t be your main argument. I don’t understand it. Because there are already violations, then the violations need to continue?

 

Commission: Well, there’s lots of data flowing.

 

President Judge: you don’t intend to change the decision, but rather to seek to get assurances from the US?

 

Commission: Yes, we hope for concrete guarantees. But it’s too early to tell.

 

President Judge: How long will that take? Your recommendations were made in 2013.

 

Commission: There is some hope that our recommendations may be accepted. We shouldn’t be pushed by changing the Safe Harbour situation. It might not improve our position with the US.

 

AG: Perhaps my position is self-centred, but in the meantime my data is still being transferred.

 

Commission: Close your Facebook account. An individual can revoke consent.

 

AG: If I wish to approach a National Authority, I am not able to do so?

 

Commission: You can approach them and if they are restricted by article 3 of the Decision, then that Article needs to be interpreted in the light of Fundamental Rights.

 

Judge Berger of Austria then addressed a question to the Counsel for the Data Protection Commissioner

 

Judge Berger: Your Data Protection Authority is hopelessly understaffed and you want to attract IT companies to site in Ireland and so are soft on data protection, we understand from the media. Is this why the Data Protection Authority is so willing to exercise self-restraint in exercising powers?

 

DPC: No, new resources have been given.

 

Vice President Lenearts then addressed some questions to counsel for the Commission.

 

Vice President: The legality of a law must be considered in the light of what is legal at the moment that it is made. All of this happened in the year 2000. Irrespective of the actual form of question referred to the court, validity has been discussed, and let’s not quarrel about semantics.

 

Should we 15 years later be bound by the historical case of fact finding? Should the Commission be seen in all times after that, to be still confirming the 2000 appraisal in the context  of all the facts known at subsequent moments.

 

Commission: This is novel and the court should tread carefully. The Court has asked about “old school” validity, but also it may look and see if there was a subsequent duty to act.

 

Vice President: But a national court is looking to this court to know the state of the law. If the Commission is not acting 15 years later, then the court can then assess that decision?

 

Commission: But action does not require the removal or amendment of Safe Harbour. The Court may not substitute its own decision as to when is the right time to review a measure.

 

Judge Rodin: A question of a factual nature: What was the harm to your client [Mr. Schrems]?

 

Schrems: The harm is the breach to his right to privacy.

 

Judge: But do you have any evidence that this happened re your client’s data?

 

Schrems: No, but there is no need in case law flowing from the primary breach to prove an individual breach.

 

Judge: Is the right to privacy absolute or not?

 

Schrems: No right is absolute except perhaps that against torture, but there is no objective reason for access of the data in US law.

 

Judge: A question for the Commission, assuming that mass surveillance took place, might there be an overriding reason for it that would mean that it was still adequately protected?

 

Commission: Over-broad use of the national security exception would damage adequacy.

 

There followed some brief replies from the main parties. Mr. Herwig Hoffman for Mr. Schrems pointed out that the Commission has repeatedly stated that it cannot now state EU citizens’ data is adequately protected. Private companies are not bound by the Safe Harbour principles, where they clash with any US domestic law. In order to justify itself, the Commission has said here that the Decision does not need to comply with Art 8 of the Charter. Independence of the national DPA contains an obligation to uphold individual rights. Article 3 of the Decision purports to fetter this independence. Striking down this Safe Harbour agreement will only affect a couple of thousand of companies, who have signed up to it. It will simply place all US companies in the same position as non-Safe Harbour companies have been up until now.

 

Mr. McDermott for the Data Protection Commissioner said that Mr. Schrems has not shown that he personally has been harmed in any way. That is hardly surprising, as the NSA doesn’t care about accessing the essays of an Austrian Law Student. The Court could take advantage of the fact that Mr. Schrems is not being harmed to allow the Commission some time to complete negotiations with the US. The solution is for the walls of Safe Harbour to be built higher, not to allow the harbour to be dismantled brick by brick by individual national authorities.

 

Mr. Crehan for DRI noted that Article 3 provides only for investigations into compliance with the Safe Harbour principles. These principles are such that even if they are complied with, this does not respect fundamental rights.

 

The Commission, concluding, stated that if the Commission can find adequacy, it can find adequacy in a conditional way also. Article 3 does not require too narrow a reading and if they need to, national DPAs can always use their authority under the Charter to read it as widely as they require to act in individual cases.

 

However, this independence does not mean that the Data Protection Authorities are not bound by the law and so they must accept the adequacy Decision. A harmonised approach is necessary to ensure that different member states may not make different findings about the US.

 

Case concluded. Advocate General's Opinion on 24th June.

 

Simon McGarr will present on aspects of this case in a talk titled "Regulation, Litigation and the rise of Fundamental Rights" at the forthcoming Digital Rights Europe conference, 15 April in Dublin.

Thursday, 26 March 2015

Benefits for unemployed EU citizens: the CJEU may complicate David Cameron’s renegotiation strategy


 

Steve Peers

The issue of the free movement (or ‘immigration’) of EU citizens between Member States has become highly controversial politically, especially in the UK. In particular, their access to benefits remains highly contentious. The CJEU has the chance to clarify some key issues on this point, in the pending case of Alimanovic, in which an Advocate-General issued an opinion today.

Today’s opinion is not binding, so we must wait to see if the CJEU is willing to follow it. But if it does, the Court will complicate the Conservative party’s strategy to renegotiate the UK’s EU membership. Even if the result of the upcoming UK general election means that the Conservative party’s plans are moot, the judgment will still be relevant to the Labour party’s less far-reaching plans to restrict EU citizens’ access to benefits.

Background

The CJEU ruled in November 2014 in the well-known Dano judgment (discussed here) that unemployed EU citizens who moved to another Member State could not access social benefits there, if they were not looking for work. This ruling did not apply to other categories of unemployed EU citizens: those who moved to another Member State and were looking for work there, and those who had worked there already and become unemployed. Today’s opinion concerns both of these categories.

According to the EU citizens’ Directive, unemployed EU citizens looking for work in another Member State cannot obtain social assistance benefits from another Member State if they have not worked in that State. However, the case law of the CJEU states that those citizens can rely on the free movement of workers rules in the EU Treaty in order to claim benefits related to the labour market.

As for those EU citizens who have worked in that Member State and become unemployed, the Directive says that they retain worker status (and therefore access to benefits, including social assistance) if they have worked there more than one year. They also retain worker status if they have worked there for less than that period, although in that case they only keep that status for six months. However, again relying on the Treaty free movement rules, the CJEU has ruled that worker status can be retained in other cases too, for instance by women who have stopped work briefly due to maternity (see discussion here).

The Conservative party position is that EU citizens working in a Member State should have to wait four years to get access to tax credits, social housing and housing benefits, as well as no taxpayer support for job-seekers. As I discussed before, these are the first and eighth of Cameron’s nine objectives in the planned renegotiation of EU membership (in so far as it concerns ‘migration’ from the rest of the EU). The Labour party position is that EU citizens should have to wait two years for benefits.

The case concerns Swedish citizens (a mother and her children) who had lived in Germany before, left for a number of years, and then returned there. The mother and oldest child then worked in Germany briefly, but became unemployed. Do they have access to benefits?

The Opinion

The Advocate-General first clarifies that the benefits are social assistance, not labour-market related. So job-seekers in general do not have access to them; only former workers do. But as part of this analysis, he reaffirms the current rule that the Treaty gives job-seekers access to labour-market related benefits.

Then he examines whether people who become unemployed after short periods of work in a host Member State can be considered former workers – and therefore retain access to social assistance benefits – in cases besides those listed in the Directive. He argues that they can, in part on the basis of the EU Treaties, and that any Member State which refuses to extend such benefits to them automatically breaches EU law. Instead, a Member State must consider the benefit request on a case-by-case basis, assessing whether there is a sufficient link with the labour market of that State.

Comments

If it is followed by the CJEU, the Opinion makes both the Conservative and Labour plans to renegotiate UK membership as regards EU citizens’ access to benefits harder to achieve. The crucial point is the extent to which renegotiation concerns a Treaty amendment, which is far harder to achieve (unanimous agreement of all Member States, and national ratification) than an amendment to EU legislation, like the citizens’ Directive (qualified majority of Member States, proposal from Commission and agreement of European Parliament).

First of all, the Opinion reaffirms that the Treaty requires that all job-seekers get access to labour-market related benefits. So only a Treaty amendment could overturn that rule.

Secondly, the Opinion asserts that the Treaty requires that former workers might have access to benefits, on a case-by-case basis, if they have stopped work in circumstances other than those listed in the Directive. This goes further than the status quo, since the CJEU has only established this point as regards women interrupting work for maternity. The workers concerned have only been employed in Germany for short periods, well below the four-year waiting period that the Conservatives want, or even the two-year period that Labour supports.

It remains to be seen whether the Court will accept today’s opinion, or instead opt for a judgment that more obviously reflects the political sensitivities surrounding unemployed EU citizens’ access to benefits – as it plainly did in the Dano judgment.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 13

Wednesday, 25 March 2015

The protection of temporary agency workers according to the CJEU: The AKT judgment


Alejandra Victoria García Sánchez *

Research and Documentation Department of the Court of Justice of the EU (The opinions expressed in this blog post are solely those of the author)

Last week the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its first ruling on Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work, the judgment in AKT, Case C-533/13. The following blog post sets out the legal context of the Directive, the main points of the judgment and an analysis of the judgment, comparing it to case law on related legislation and commenting on the main issues that it raises.

Legal context of the on temporary agency work Directive

Temporary agency work is regulated by Directive 2008/104, which was adopted under the legal basis provided by Article 153, paragraph 2, of the TFEU. Two other forms of so-called ‘atypical work’, part-time work and fixed-term work, are regulated by Framework Agreements negotiated by the social partners (these Agreements are annexed to Directives 97/81/EC and 1999/70/EC respectively).  The recitals of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work stated an intention to adopt a similar Agreement on temporary agency work; however, the failure of the social partners to reach such an Agreement led the EU legislators to adopt a Directive instead. The Commission reported on the transposition of the Directive by Member States in 2014.

Field of application of the Directive

The CJEU had previously clarified in its judgment in Della Rocca that fixed-term workers placed by a temporary work agency at the disposition of a user enterprise are not covered by the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work but by the Directive on temporary agency work (paragraph 36).

In order to determine whether a worker is protected by the Framework Agreement or by the Directive, the type of employer prevails over the type of contract that binds that employer to the employee.

The facts and the judgment of the CJEU in AKT

In the AKT judgment, the CJEU clarified the scope of the obligations stated in Article 4(1) of the temporary agency work Directive, entitled “Review of restrictions or prohibitions”. This provision states that “prohibitions or restrictions on the use of temporary agency work shall be justified only on grounds of general interest relating in particular to the protection of temporary agency workers, the requirements of health and safety at work or the need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented”. Article 4(2) states that Member States shall review restrictions that are not based on general interest grounds.

The undertaking SAF has been employing temporary agency workers for several years. The AKT, a trade union, contended before Finnish courts that SAF was employing temporary agency workers to perform the same tasks as its own workers and required SAF and Öljytuote ry, an employers’ association, to pay a penalty provided by Finnish law punishing improper use of temporary agency workers. The defendants contended that the Finnish provision establishing a penalty for improper use of temporary agency work is contrary to Article 4(1) of Directive 2008/104, since that limitation is not justified on the grounds of general interest. The national court doubted whether Article 4(1) of the Directive obliges national authorities, including the courts, to not enforce or not apply national provisions containing prohibitions or restrictions that are not justified on grounds of general interest.

The CJEU analysed Article 4(1) “in its context”. It highlighted that paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the same Article require the Member States to review and verify whether the limitations laid down by their laws are compatible with Article 4(1), that they notify the Commission of the review and that the Member States remain free to either remove or adapt the restrictions and limitations laid down by their laws (paras 26-30). The CJEU stated that the tasks indicated in Article 4 are to be performed by the competent authorities of the Member States, and not by national courts. Furthermore, the CJEU concluded that Article 4(1) does not require the adoption of specific legislation (para.31).

The case law on the part-time work Framework Agreement

It is interesting to compare the treatment of Article 4(1) of the temporary agency work Directive with the case law on the similar provision of the part-time work Framework Agreement.

The latter  Agreement contains a provision that is similar to Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of Directive 2008/104: Clause 5(1)(a) of the Framework Agreement imposes an obligation on Member States to “identify and review obstacles of a legal or administrative nature which may limit the opportunities for part-time work and, where appropriate, eliminate them”.

Clause 4 of the part-time work Framework Agreement, which states the principle of non-discrimination of part-time workers in respect of employment conditions, has been considered by the CJEU as articulating a principle of European Union social law which cannot be interpreted restrictively (Case C-395/08, Bruno e.a., para. 32).

In Case C-395/08, Bruno e.a, paras. 80-81, the CJEU reached the conclusion that, where national legislation is found by a national court to be incompatible with Clause 4, i.e., it discriminates against part-time workers, discouraging the workers from pursuing their occupational activity on such a basis, Clauses 1 and 5(1) of the agreement would have to be interpreted as also precluding such legislation.

An example of a measure that has been found to infringe Clause 5 was identified in case C-55/07, Michaeler a.o., where Italian national law required employers to notify part-time work contracts 30 days after their conclusion, with the possibility to impose fines in case of lack of notification. The measure was found by the CJEU to dissuade employers from using part-time work contracts and thus, to be precluded by Clause 5(1)(a) (paras. 28-20).

This case law provides guidance on the issue of when a measure should be eliminated according to Clause 5(1)(a) and can be applied by analogy to Article 4(1) of the Directive in order to clarify the causes why a Member State is entitled to restrict or prohibit the use of temporary agency work and when is it required to withdraw a restriction or prohibition.  However, this was not at issue in the AKT judgment. The issue is not when but who should withdraw an unjustified restriction upon temporary agency work. According to the above mentioned case law, under Clause 5(1)(a), both the Member States and the national courts can perform the task of eliminating unjustified restrictions. This mechanism ensures that, if restrictions persist, a national court can solve the problem by eliminating the obstacles, contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Agreement.

 Comments

In the AKT judgment, the CJEU entrusted solely the governments of the Member States with the task of complying with the objective of article 4(1). Thus, the case law regarding Clause 5(1)(a) cannot be used by analogy, as it could have been expected, in order to interpret who should review or eliminate a measure not compatible with article 4 of the Directive, since, as it has been interpreted by the CJEU, only the Member States’ competent authorities have the power to review or eliminate national provisions in order to decide when and how to comply with the objectives of the Directive.

The CJEU in this judgment interpreted Article 4(1) in “its context”; however, the “context” was limited to the other paragraphs of Article 4. It is true that looking at those provisions, only governments and social partners (if such restrictions or prohibitions are laid down by collective agreements, according to Article 4(3)) can proceed according to Article 4(1). However, the CJEU did not mention the objective of the Directive settled in Article 2. The Directive aims at recognising temporary work agencies as employers, while taking into account the need to establish a suitable framework for the use of temporary agency work with a view to contributing effectively to the creation of jobs and to the development of flexible forms of working. Thus, from the point of view of social policy, the rationale behind the adoption of the Directive seems clear: to stabilise the situation of temporary work agencies and to settle their legal status as employers, limiting the use of their temporary workers only on grounds of basic work standards such as health, safety or prevention of abuses, which are basic principles of social policy applied in many other fields of labour law. Once this policy step has been taken, from the point of view of legal consistency, the objective of the Directive being clear, the combination of Articles 2 and 4(1) of the Directive should lead to the empowerment of national courts to not apply national laws that restrict temporary agency work further than necessary, which are contrary to EU law (as is the case with Clause 5(1) of the part-term work Agreement).

The exclusion of the competences of the national courts to not apply measures that run counter to Article 4(1) might thus be paradoxical, since, the unjustified restrictions that have not been modified or derogated from by the “competent authorities” will have to be applied by national judges, even if they consider them to be contrary to the Directive.

However, this judgment has been welcomed by trade unions, since it has been considered that it “guarantees the social partners’ autonomy in regulating the use of temporary agency work through collective agreements”. Their joy should be limited, as we should not forget that Article 4(3) states that the review referred to in paragraph 2 may be carried out by the social partners who have negotiated the relevant agreement. Furthermore, the Directive is still clearly in favor of recognising that temporary agency work is a form of employment that should be protected, and only limited on the basis of fundamental work standards. The fact that national courts are not entitled to set aside unjustified restrictions (according to the CJEU) does not mean that the Directive’s objective has changed, but it does mean that the achievement of that objective is delayed and more difficult to reach, since the political will of governments and social partners might not be focused on these aims.

[See also: Steve Peers' article on non-discrimination against atypical workers, in the Yearbook of European Law.] 
[See also:

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20

Tuesday, 24 March 2015

Choosing to go GM-Free? The New EU Legal Framework for Genetically Modified Crops


 


 

Mary Dobbs, Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast

 

Until April 2015, whether to permit genetically modified (GM) cultivation or not was a European rather than national or regional decision. However, Directive 2015/412 returns important powers to the EU Member States that will enable them (and potentially their subnational regions) to choose whether to restrict GM crops in their territories. Indeed, Germany is already debating whether it will implement a national ban or leave the matter up to the individual Länder. Whilst of relevance to all Member States, it will be of particular interest to view the impact upon States where there are substantial conflicting stances towards to GM crops internally as highlighted by the UK.

 

EU background

 

Under EU law, prior authorisation is required for every GM crop, but once it receives EU authorisation it is automatically authorised within all Member States. Restrictions are only permitted in accordance with EU law, e.g. where new scientific evidence shows that there are real risks to human health or the environment. However, despite the EU-wide authorisation process, there is no EU-wide agreement on whether GM cultivation should take place. This is as GM crops tend to be contentious, linked in part to the surrounding scientific uncertainty and their very nature – as involving the modification of DNA. They engage interests regarding societal and cultural traditions, trade, consumer choice, producer choice, environmental protection, health and food security, with no clear-cut ‘right’ approach for GM cultivation. Indeed, due to the decision-making process, crops can be authorised contrary to the wishes of some or even the majority of Member States (as occurred in the case of Novartis BT176). Consequently, within the EU there have been numerous national and regional bans and the creation of a GM-Free Network – of questionable legality in EU law.

 

As a result of the on-going disputes and tension, in 2010 the Commission proposed to introduce an opt-out clause into the main legislation (Directive 2001/18) that would permit Member States to ban GM crops. A striking example of de-harmonisation within the EU, this was intended as a compromise that would provide the Member States with the desired flexibility whilst hopefully freeing up authorisations and encouraging States to lift bans based on the safeguard clauses. Following substantial negotiations, political agreement has finally been reached in the EU over the content. The result is Directive 2015/412, which comes into force in April 2015, with important consequences for the entirety of the EU Member States and their regions.

 

Opt-out provision

 

The new Article 26b will permit Member States to request notifiers to apply geographical restrictions to any (re-)authorisation notification, i.e. to exclude all or part of that Member State’s territory from the scope of the notification. If the notifier accedes, the matter ends there – any (re-)authorisation will be accordingly restricted until the Member State changes its mind. However, if the Member State does not make the request in the relevant time period or if the notifier refuses the request, the Member State may still opt-out from cultivating that GM crop by claiming that the restriction is necessary to protect a legitimate objective. The provision includes a non-exhaustive list of potential objectives, including agricultural policy, land use and environmental policy objectives, but specifically not based on a conflict with the EU environmental risk assessment carried out under the authorisation process. This will apply for any future (re-)authorisations, but there will also be a transitional period regarding currently authorised crops and so Member States will be posed with the question shortly.

 

A UK approach?

 

The possibility of opting out may seem inconsequential to the UK, as the UK as a whole officially has a pro-GM cultivation stance. Indeed the UK’s outlook focuses more on the possibility that this compromise may loosen up the authorisation process and allow for future GM cultivation nationally. However, whilst England may reflect the general UK approach and Northern Ireland is torn on the issue, the same cannot be said of Wales and Scotland who hold relevant devolved powers. These two regions are adamant in their desire to be GM-Free, as are a number of localities across the UK.

 

However, whilst any requests or opt-outs may relate to regions or localities within a Member State, rather than the entirety of the State, the provision leaves the decision in the hands of the Member State rather than individual regions (even where they hold legislative competence nationally). Therefore the challenge for Wales, Scotland, or indeed the other regions within the UK, is to convince the UK to make the request on their behalf during the relevant time period (each and every time). Considering that the relevant powers to deal with environmental and agricultural issues are devolved to these regions, it would be hoped that the UK would agree to make the request in the appropriate timeframe. If the regions do not act initially, then they will have the harder task of convincing the UK to opt-out based on an objective justification and risk the European Commission and eventually the Court of Justice of the EU considering that the opt-out is unnecessary. It will be interesting to see how the internal negotiations will play out, but the regions and UK as a whole need to consider what approach they will take as soon as possible in light of the transitional arrangements.

 

This option then begs the question of what approach should the UK and the regions take? Are the benefits that the GM crops bring (for the regions, the UK or society more generally) sufficient to counter the potential appeal of being a GM-Free region? There is no simple answer. There are unlikely to be huge environmental or health risks posed, since the crops go through a risk assessment prior to authorisation. This does not prevent them having impacts on the environment or food production and security however – as with any form of agricultural cultivation. More immediately pressing though is whether the UK and its regions wish to maintain non-GM crops. It is extremely difficult to maintain the harmonious coexistence of compatible GM and non-GM crops in a locality and neither Great Britain nor the island of Ireland are the largest of landmasses. Any stance in Northern Ireland will also have to bear in mind the approach taken in Ireland and deal with resulting cross-border issues over admixture (contamination). Pragmatically, the UK and the regions in Great Britain will also have to consider approaches across Great Britain and the potential for admixture there also. In other words, if the UK accedes to the regions’ requests and applies for restrictions on their behalf, there will be a consequent need for significant coordination and strong coexistence measures to attempt to manage the potential for admixture between regions as best as feasible. It is for this reason that the German regional agricultural ministers have been pushing for a national ban instead.

 

Conclusion

 

Although discussed in light of the UK, the option is open to Member States across the EU – including those where regions have relevant decentralised powers and are already members of the GM-Free Network. The forthcoming months in particular will prove crucial for these regions and their Member States, in determining what requests to make of the notifiers, whether to apply for opt-outs if necessary and in ensuring coordination within and between the Member States where varying approaches are taken. This will become even more significant if the amendment facilitates indirectly the EU authorisation of further GM crops, leading to the increased possibility of admixture.

 

*See also: my German Law Journal article on ‘Legalising General Prohibitions on Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms’
 
Photo credit: www.sheknows.com