Dr. Izabella
Majcher, Independent Consultant
Photo credit: Alamy stock photo
The current revision
of the EU rules on return has progressed rapidly since the European Commission
published its proposal for a Return Regulation on 11 March 2025 (discussed here and here). The Council of the European Union adopted its “general approach” to the proposal on 8 December 2025 (discussed
here). In addition to numerous critical opinions from civil society
organisations (see, for instance, here, here and here), on 26 January 2026, in an unprecedented step, 16 UN experts addressed a joint letter to both the Commission and the Council
expressing serious concerns about the proposal. The measures attracting
particular criticism included weakened procedural safeguards; expanded
immigration detention; the de-prioritisation of “voluntary” departure; increased
cooperation obligations, penalties and restrictions; risks of racial and
religious profiling; limitations on access to socio-economic rights;
insufficient protection of persons in vulnerable situations; and the
introduction of “return hubs”. To date, neither institution has responded to
the UN experts.
On the side of the
European Parliament, within the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs (LIBE), the rapporteurship for this file was assigned to the Renew
political group. The Rapporteur presented his draft report on 30 October 2025, which attracted over 2,200 amendments from political groups. As intra-LIBE negotiations on these
amendments proved challenging, shortly before the planned vote, the largest
political group, the European People’s Party (EPP), tabled alternative compromise amendments with the support of right-wing and far-right
groups (European Conservatives and Reformists, Patriots for Europe and Europe
of Sovereign Nations). Holding a majority within LIBE, these groups secured the
report's adoption on 9 March 2026. Despite mobilisation by civil society and observations issued by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights,
the Parliament adopted the report in plenary on 26 March 2026, with 389 votes in
favour, 209 against, and 32 abstentions.
This blog
post provides a brief discussion of the European Parliament’s position on
selected key measures proposed by the Commission and may be read alongside the previous analysis.
Detection
measures: As a rare
instance in which the Parliament prevents the application of coercive measures,
it removed the detection measures proposed by the Commission in Art. 6. These
measures, aimed at identifying persons staying in an irregular situation for
the purpose of their removal, had been criticised as likely to lead to racial
profiling.
Return
decision and safeguards (Art. 7, 12 and 26–28): The Parliament expanded the possibility,
already envisaged in the Commission’s draft, of not indicating the country of
return in the return decision. It provides that, where the country of return
cannot be determined at the time of issuing the return decision, the decision
may provisionally designate none, one or several countries of return. It
further clarifies that the country of return may be determined either in the
return decision itself or subsequently, in the removal order. Moreover, where a
country of removal has not previously been specified in the return decision, or
where it differs from the country designated therein, the Member State is
required only to notify the person in accordance with national law. In such
cases, the issuance of a new return decision or removal order is not required. This
approach may prevent individuals from effectively appealing removal to a
specific country, as notifications falling short of a formal decision or act
may not be subject to review. It therefore risks undermining the principle of
non-refoulement, the right to an effective remedy, and the principle of good
administration.
The absence
of an indication of the country of return in the return decision is highly
problematic from a non-refoulement perspective, as it suggests that an
individual assessment of the risk of refoulement may not be carried out at that
stage of the procedure. Indeed, the Parliament’s report requires Member States
to determine the country of return only “prior to carrying out the removal.” In
addition, it weakens the risk assessment envisaged in the Commission’s proposal
by transforming what appears to be an obligatory assessment into one that is
triggered only when the person raises the risk or when the authorities
otherwise become aware of it.
These
concerns are compounded by a further weakening of remedies. The Parliament’s
report explicitly states that an appeal does not have an automatic suspensive
effect, while merely preserving the possibility for national law to provide for
such an effect.
Mutual
recognition of return decisions (Art. 9): The Parliament largely retains the
Commission’s provisions on mutual recognition. It adds, however, that not only
return decisions but also removal orders may be enforced by another Member
State. This raises practical challenges, as only the main elements of the
return decision are to be included in the standardised form (European Return
Order) made available through the Schengen Information System. Crucially, given
the expanded possibility of not indicating the country of return in the return
decision, the enforcing Member State may in practice need to carry out a new
procedure to issue a return decision. The Parliament further clarifies that
Member States are not required to adopt administrative decisions or acts for
the purposes of recognition, which may further limit the individual’s ability
to challenge enforcement measures.
Voluntary
departure (Art. 13):
Compared to the Commission’s proposal, the Parliament further deprioritises
“voluntary” departure. While the Commission’s draft implicitly allows for a
period of zero days for voluntary departure, the Parliament’s report explicitly
provides for the possibility of imposing immediate “voluntary” departure. It
also makes the granting of a longer period contingent upon a request by the
person concerned and removes the non-exhaustive list of circumstances
justifying such an extension, including family links and children’s schooling. The
Parliament appears to overlook that voluntary departure is not only more
favourable to the individual, and consistent with the principle of
proportionality, but also serves the interests of the State.
Safeguards
pending removal (Art. 14): The Parliament removes the basic rights to which persons are, in
principle, entitled during the period of postponement. This list includes the
fulfilment of basic needs, respect for family unity, emergency health care and
essential treatment of illness, access to the basic education system, and the
protection of the special needs of vulnerable persons. These safeguards are
laid down in the current Directive (Art. 14(1)), and the Commission’s proposal
slightly expanded this list. They also reflect human rights obligations,
including the rights to education, health, and basic subsistence.
Monitoring
of removal (Art. 15):
The detailed provisions on return monitoring included in the Commission’s
proposal have been significantly curtailed. Notably, the Parliament removed key
elements relating to the powers and capacities of the independent monitoring
mechanism, including the requirement to ensure appropriate means, autonomy in
action, and a mandate to communicate substantiated allegations of failures to
respect fundamental rights to the competent national authorities.
Detention
(Art. 29–35): The
Parliament’s report retains the Commission proposal’s deletion of the current
requirement that detention may be imposed only where no sufficient but less
coercive measures can be applied in a specific case (Art. 15(1)). It also
expands the grounds for detention to include non-compliance with cooperation
duties. Given this extensive list of grounds, detention risks becoming a
regular measure, in violation of the principles of necessity and
proportionality inherent in the right to liberty. The maximum detention period
of two years (12 months + 12 months) in a given Member State is maintained,
representing a significant increase from the current 18-month limit (Art. 15(5)-(6)).
In contrast to the Commission’s draft, the review of detention would no longer
need to be concluded within 15 days. On a positive note, the Parliament
introduced, in the preamble (§32), a provision stating that children, as a
rule, should not be detained.
As regards
detention conditions, the Parliament retains the limitations proposed by the
Commission and, in some respects, further amplifies them. Compared to the
current directive (Art. 16), the proposed rules significantly lower standards
governing detention conditions and treatment. Detention may take place not only
in specialised facilities but also in designated sections of other facilities,
and where prisons are used, migrants are to be kept separated from ordinary
prisoners only where possible. Temporary measures may be adopted to expand
capacity in exceptional return situations. Access to open-air spaces,
introduced by the Commission, may be temporarily restricted where necessary and
proportionate to ensure the proper functioning of detention facilities. Contact
with the outside world will be subject to security and administrative
considerations. Families without children will not be entitled to separate
accommodation ensuring privacy.
Entry
ban (Art. 10–11):
The Parliament further broadens the already expanded scope of entry bans
proposed by the Commission. It removes the maximum duration of 10 years for
entry bans (compared to the current maximum of 5 years in cases not involving
security threats under Art. 11(2)) and also eliminates any maximum period for
persons considered to pose security risks. In addition, the Parliament renders
less explicit the circumstances in which an entry ban may be withdrawn,
suspended, or shortened.
It also
removes the safeguards proposed by the Commission for entry bans imposed when a
person’s irregular stay is detected at exit, including the requirement for
justification based on the specific circumstances of the individual case,
respect for the principle of proportionality, and the rights of defence.
Furthermore, the Parliament’s report introduces additional situations in which
entry bans may be imposed in the context of departure, such as where a person
leaves the territory without a return decision having been issued, or departs
before such a decision is adopted. Entry bans imposed on persons seeking to
leave the territory without completing a return procedure are
counterproductive, disproportionate, and disregard the requirement of an
individual assessment.
Return
hubs (Art. 4(3) and 17): The Parliament’s report provides that the agreement or arrangement
forming the basis for return hubs may be concluded not only by a Member State
but also by the Union. It also weakens notification obligations towards the
Commission and removes families with children from the category of persons
exempted from removal to return hubs, leaving only unaccompanied children
exempted. Crucially, the list of countries of return, which includes countries
hosting return hubs at its end, clarifies that the order of the list does not
determine the sequence in which those countries may be applied. This suggests
that a person may be removed to a return hub even before any attempt is made to
return them to their country of origin, raising concerns as to compliance with
the principle of good faith and increasing the risk of human rights violations
associated with transfers to third countries.
Alternatives
to return (Art. 7(9)):
The Parliament retains the approach in the Commission’s proposal whereby the
current possibility under Art. 6(4) of not issuing a return decision is removed
from the list of situations in which such a decision is not adopted. Under the
Parliament’s proposal, decisions by Member States to grant an autonomous
residence permit, long-stay visa, or other authorisation granting a right to
stay on compassionate, humanitarian, or other grounds may only result in the
withdrawal or suspension of a return decision, rather than its non-issuance.
References
to national law:
Finally, the Parliament defers to national law in defining a range of measures,
which sits uneasily with the nature of a regulation, as opposed to a directive,
and may give rise to disproportionate and arbitrary outcomes. The measures
whose applicability or scope may be determined at the national level include
removal (Art. 12(1)), cooperation duties (Art. 21(2)), penalties for
non-compliance with such duties (Art. 22(1)), detention (Art. 29(3)), and
restrictive measures (so-called alternatives to detention) (Art. 31(2)). The
notion of “security risks”, which triggers the application of multiple coercive
measures, also encompasses threats defined under national law.
Concluding
thoughts
The
European Parliament’s report on the proposed Return Regulation reflects a
markedly coercive approach towards persons in an irregular situation, raising
serious concerns as to its compatibility with fundamental rights. These include
the prohibition of refoulement, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment,
the right to due process and procedural safeguards, the rights of the child, as
well as socio-economic rights, alongside broader principles of proportionality
and human dignity. This approach stands in stark contrast to the Parliament’s December 2020
resolution, which reflected safeguards developed by UN
human rights mechanisms and may be regarded as a counterbalance to the Commission’s 2017 recommendation on
the implementation of the Return Directive. In that resolution, the Parliament emphasised
that voluntary return should be prioritised over forced return; unaccompanied
children should only be returned where this is demonstrably in their best
interests; children should never be detained for immigration purposes; and
detention must remain a measure of last resort. It also expressed concern over
the widespread automatic imposition of entry bans and broad criteria for
assessing the risk of absconding, and encouraged greater use of autonomous
residence permits.
The current
European Parliament does not appear to provide an effective counterweight to
executive proposals that raise concerns from both a human rights and
effectiveness perspective. While the Commission’s proposal for the Return
Regulation had already been widely criticised as disproportionate and
problematic from a fundamental rights standpoint, the Parliament largely
retains its most contentious elements and, in many respects, further reinforces
their coercive nature. In practice, the Parliament’s position is closely
aligned with that of the Council, itself regarded as particularly restrictive.
As a result, trilogue negotiations are expected to proceed swiftly, mirroring
the accelerated adoption of recent instruments such as the regulations on safe third countries
and safe countries of origin.
This marks
a striking departure from the legislative dynamics during the 2005–2008
legislative process leading to the adoption of the Return Directive (discussed here, here and here). At that time, acting under the then newly
established co-decision procedure, which placed it on equal footing with the
Council, the European Parliament was widely regarded as a key defender of
fundamental rights. It significantly strengthened safeguards in the draft
Directive proposed by the Commission and, during the subsequent negotiations
with the Council, played a decisive role in preventing the adoption of some of
the Council’s more restrictive proposals. The institutional dynamics were
famously characterised as a triad of the “Good” (Parliament), the “Bad”
(Council), and the “Ugly” (Commission). Nearly two decades later, however, this
configuration appears to have shifted, with all three actors now converging
towards the “Bad.”
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