Dr Benedikt Riedl, Mjur (Oxford), postdoctoral researcher and academic assistant at the Chair of Public Law and Legal Philosophy (Prof Dr Peter M. Huber, former Justice of the Federal Constitutional Court and former Minister of the Interior) at LMU Munich.
Photo credit: Luxofluxo,
via Wikimedia
Commons
Who has the final say on where the European
Union’s competences end? This question lies at the core of one of the most
debated issues in EU constitutional law: ultra vires review. Long seen as an
instrument of national resistance to the primacy of EU law – especially in the
case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GCC) – ultra vires review
is often portrayed as an outlier. But that view misses the broader reality.
Across the EU, many constitutional courts claim a residual authority to decide
whether EU institutions have overstepped their conferred powers.
This blogpost – the first of two parts –
re-examines the legal nature of ultra vires review. In 83 theses, it argues
that ultra vires review is not just a defensive reaction, but a structural
element of the European legal order. It operates within a pluralist and
composite system in which both the CJEU and national constitutional courts have
essential and complementary roles. Part One begins by tracing the national
doctrines that support ultra vires review, showing how firmly it is anchored in
the constitutional traditions of many Member States (I.). It then turns to the
institutional tensions between national courts and the CJEU, focusing on the
latter’s claim to exclusive authority over the scope and limits of Union law
(II.).
I. Ultra Vires Review as a European
Practice: Constitutional Courts and the Limits of Integration
1 Ultra vires
review enables Member States’ supreme and constitutional courts to (indirectly)
assess whether EU institutions have acted beyond the powers conferred upon them
by the EU Treaties. These courts justify their role by emphasizing that the EU
operates on the basis of limited and conferred competences (the principle of
conferral) and that national constitutions impose boundaries on the application
of EU law. They argue that any exercise of power not explicitly transferred to
the EU by the Member States constitutes an infringement on national – and
ultimately popular – sovereignty. Accordingly, ultra vires review serves as a
democratic safeguard, protecting the constitutional autonomy of Member States.
2 The CJEU, by
contrast, regards the EU legal order as autonomous and independent of Member
States’ constitutions. It views ultra vires review as an infringement on its
exclusive authority to declare EU acts invalid. The Court argues that such
reviews undermine the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law, weaken the
integrity of the EU judicial system, and disrupt the principle of equality
among Member States. In its view, recognising ultra vires review would
ultimately threaten the effectiveness of the European project as a whole.
3 Ultra vires
review by national constitutional courts can potentially conflict with the CJEU’s
jurisdiction under Article 19(1) EU. However, the core issue in the ultra vires
debate is clear: the EU is bound by the principle of conferral, as set out in
Article 5(1) and (2) TEU. What remains unresolved is the procedural question: Which
court has the final authority to decide whether EU institutions, bodies,
offices, or agencies have exceeded their competences? Quis iudicabit? The EU
Treaties contain no explicit conflict-of-law provision to resolve judicial
disputes over ultimate decision-making power in matters of competence.
4 This thesis examines
ultra vires review as a legal institution within EU law and explores how a
common ultra vires procedure could be structured in accordance with the EU Treaties.
To this end, it compares the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law with the
fundamental principles enshrined in the Treaties, and analyses the extent to
which the perspectives of national constitutional courts have been integrated
into EU legal doctrine. The central question is whether ultra vires review can
be considered a legal concept within EU law, and to what extent constitutional
courts should be involved in a collective ultra vires procedure. The study is
based on a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional and EU law foundations
of ultra vires review. Its aim is to determine whether the power of
constitutional courts to declare EU measures ultra vires and inapplicable in
their domestic legal systems constitutes a general principle of EU law.
5 In most EU Member
States, constitutional reservations concerning the application of EU law exist.
Courts in Germany, Denmark, France, the Czech Republic, and Poland have already
declared CJEU judgments inapplicable on the grounds that they constituted ultra
vires acts, i.e. acts exceeding the EU’s conferred competences. Moreover,
constitutional and supreme courts in many other Member States have adopted
similar reservations, serving comparable functions in safeguarding national
constitutional limits within the EU legal framework.
6 The GCC’s
approach to ultra vires review is based on Article 23(1) sentences 2 and 3, in
conjunction with Article 20(1) and (2), and Article 79(3) of the German Basic
Law. By applying ultra vires review, the GCC
ensures that EU law remains democratically legitimate in Germany, thereby
adhering to the so-called “integration programme” (Integrationsprogramm)
defined by the parliaments’ acts of assent. This review is triggered only in
cases of manifest and structurally significant overreach of competences and is
handled exclusively by the GCC, with a mandatory referral to the CJEU. The GCC
respects the CJEU’s interpretation of competence limits and confines itself to
reviewing the methodological soundness of that interpretation. The core
rationale behind ultra vires review – the protection of popular sovereignty – is
persuasive. The concept of “responsibility for integration” (Integrationsverantwortung)
illustrates how the review mechanism serves to preserve democratic legitimacy.
This responsibility, entrusted to German constitutional bodies, compensates for
the partial loss of German citizens’ political self-determination resulting
from the transfer of sovereign powers to the EU. While ultra vires review does
not interfere with the substance of EU decisions, it ensures democratic
openness by exposing breaches of legitimacy and blurred lines of accountability.
In doing so, it partially offsets the absence of a fully developed European
public sphere, enabling citizens to retain as much political self-determination
as possible. As a last resort, it prevents citizens from being excluded from
fundamental political decisions affecting their community.
7 In Denmark, the Højesteret
bases its ultra vires review on the principle of legal certainty as articulated
in § 20(1) of the Danish Constitution. This provision allows for the transfer
of sovereign powers to international organisations and the EU, but only “to a
specified extent.” The court’s justification is formal yet consistent, as
linked directly to the principle of conferral. The scope of EU law's primacy is
defined by the national act of assent; if the EU extends its competences beyond
what is covered by that act, it is considered a violation of § 20, which falls
under the scrutiny of the Højesteret. However, the standard of review and the
limits of ultra vires control compatible with EU law remain vaguely defined in
Danish case law. In the Carlsen v. Rasmussen judgment, the application of ultra
vires review appeared to be confined to particularly exceptional circumstances
and was closely tied to the outcome of the CJEU’s preliminary ruling. By
contrast, in the Ajos case, the Højesteret upheld an ultra vires finding without
elaborating on any such restrictive conditions, leaving the precise contours of
the doctrine unclear.
8 In France, a
flexible balancing of principles allows both the Conseil constitutionnel and
the Conseil d'État to indirectly review the principle of conferral, alongside questions
of constitutional identity. Although both courts formally recognise the primacy
of EU law, they continue to treat the French Constitution as the supreme legal
authority, in line with Article 88-1 of the French Constitution. To reconcile
these positions, the courts have developed two review mechanisms: the identity
test (employed by the Conseil constitutionnel) and the equivalence test (applied
by the Conseil d’État). The core objective of both is to ensure that EU law
maintains a level of protection equivalent to that guaranteed by the French
Constitution. Within this broad, principle-based balancing approach, substantive
legal issues can be linked to the preliminary question of competence, as
demonstrated in the French Data Network decision by the Conseil d’État.
Functionally, the equivalence test renders a separate ultra vires review redundant,
thereby allowing for greater flexibility in individual judgments. However, the
fact that the standard of review remains implicit – particularly where
constitutionally protected interests are vaguely defined – can lead to diminished
legal certainty.
9 The independent
Polish Constitutional Tribunal – prior to the judicial reforms introduced by
the PiS government – based its ultra vires review on Article 8(1) in
conjunction with Article 90(1) of the Polish Constitution. According to Article
8(1), the Polish Constitution remains the supreme law of the Republic of
Poland. Article 90(1) permits the transfer of certain competences to the EU,
granting them priority of application. However, any subsequent expansion of
competences must still comply with the requirements of Article 90. For the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal, the procedural review mechanism was regarded as a
necessary safeguard for the substantive principle of limited conferred powers.
Although the procedure and standard of review were never clearly defined, the
ultra vires review remained confined to exceptional cases involving a
significant and manifest overreach of competences, and required a prior
referral to the CJEU. In this respect, the Tribunal’s case law was largely
modelled on that of the GCC. However, the more recent ultra vires ruling in case
K 3/21, issued by a Constitutional Court now widely viewed as politically
aligned, has been criticised as politically motivated and stands in clear
contradiction to fundamental principles of EU law.
10 The Czech
Constitutional Court bases its ultra vires review on Article 10a, in
conjunction with Article 9(2) and Article 1(1) of the Czech Constitution. Under
Article 10a, the validity of EU law in the Czech legal system depends on the
national acts of assent. The ultra vires review serves to protect democratic
self-determination and state sovereignty, both of which are unalterably
safeguarded under Article 9(2) in conjunction with Article 1(1). The Court’s
justification for ultra vires review therefore goes beyond the formal principle
of conferral, encompassing broader substantive constitutional values such as
sovereignty and self-determination. However, the legal standard governing Czech
ultra vires review remains underdeveloped. Given that the Constitutional Court recognizes
the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction to declare EU acts invalid, it confines its
own review to “very exceptional” cases as a measure of last resort. In its
ultra vires decision in Holubec, however, the Court did not clarify the
criteria for such exceptional cases and declined to refer the matter to the CJEU,
thereby failing to adequately observe the duty of cooperation under EU law.
11 The Hungarian
Constitutional Court’s judgment No. 22/2016 (XII. 5.) on constitutional
identity and ultra vires review – alongside the Polish judgment K 3/21 – clearly
illustrates the instrumentalisation of these control mechanisms. Rather than
serving as an independent instrument of constitutional oversight, they function
primarily as political gestures by captured courts in favour of their
respective governments. The Hungarian ruling lacks dogmatic coherence and is
not grounded in a legal tradition compatible with EU law. Instead, it relies on
a superficial and overly modular legal comparison that lacks both depth and
consistency. The most serious flaw, however, is the absence of a meaningful
commitment to dialogue and cooperation with the CJEU. While the judgment
formally invokes a willingness to engage, it fails to substantiate this claim
with any concrete standards compatible with European legal principles.
12 In an obiter
dictum to its judgment No. 62/2016, the Belgian Constitutional Court addressed
the constitutional limits of the EU legal order. It based its constitutional
identity reservation in Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution, which permits
the transfer of sovereign powers to international organisations and the EU, but
only to a limited extent. Article 34 also implies that the validity of EU law
within the Belgian legal order is conditional upon a constitutional review of
its boundaries. The provision does not grant EU institutions a carte blanche, i.e.
a general or unlimited authorisation to act. The identity review was central to
the Court’s reasoning. At the same time, an ultra vires restriction is
implicitly embedded in the constitutional logic of conferral through the
national delegation of powers under Article 34 – even if not expressly
articulated as such.
13 The Estonian
State Court defines the sovereignty of the Estonian people and state as establishing
the constitutional boundaries of the EU legal order. While the primacy of EU
law is acknowledged, any treaty amendments or expansions of competences must be
legitimised by the Estonian parliament in order to have domestic legal effect.
The Court thus assesses whether the delegation of competences results in a
constitutional infringement and whether such delegation has been sufficiently
legitimised through parliamentary approval. Since neither the autonomy nor the
absolute primacy of EU law is recognised and the validity of EU law is grounded
in the Estonian Constitution, there exists a clear constitutional basis for the
potential future development of an ultra vires review.
14 In Ireland, the
primacy of EU law must not override the country’s constitutional identity,
which includes essential fundamental rights – such as the right to life – as
well as legislative and judicial sovereignty, the principle of democracy, and,
most importantly, the sovereignty of the people. This constitutional identity,
as anchored in Article 5 of the Irish Constitution, imposes clear limits on
integration into international organisations, including the EU. However, the
Irish Constitution and the Irish Supreme Court adopt a distinct approach to
safeguarding popular sovereignty: they place primary emphasis on maximising
democratic legitimacy at the point of transferring sovereign powers. As a
result, any such transfer to the EU requires a constitutional amendment, which
in turn must be approved by referendum.
15 The Italian
Constitutional Court bases its constitutional reservation (controlimiti) on the
principle of Italian sovereignty, which – although it can be limited by the
national legislature – cannot be fully relinquished. The Court examines whether
such limitations infringe upon fundamental rights, essential constitutional
principles, or the elements of constitutional identity. Since the primacy of EU
law is viewed as a consequence of the domestic limitation of sovereignty under
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution, the ultra vires reservation is
implicitly embedded in the Constitution. This provision enables the Corte
Costituzionale to review national acts of assent for their compatibility with
the fundamental values of the Italian Constitution. The concept of ultra vires
review is most clearly articulated in the Fragd decision, where the Court not
only scrutinised the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law but also questioned
whether the CJEU had acted beyond its conferred competences. However, due to
the Court’s broad understanding of identity review, ultra vires review has been
functionally sidelined, operating instead as a supplementary mechanism of
constitutional oversight.
16 The Croatian
Constitutional Court has indicated in several obiter dicta that it does not recognise
an absolute or unlimited primacy of EU law. Instead, it affirms that constitutional
limits apply to the primacy of EU law within the Croatian legal system.
17 The Latvian
Constitution provides the doctrinal foundations for a potential future ultra
vires review. Article 68 serves as the constitutional basis for the primacy of EU
law within the Latvian legal system. According to the case law of the Latvian
Constitutional Court, the ratification of the EU treaties is compatible with
the Constitution only insofar it does not undermine fundamental constitutional
values, particularly the principle of popular sovereignty. The Court has
affirmed that compliance with these core values remains subject to judicial
review, even in the context of European integration.
18 According to the
judgment of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, the primacy of EU law is
derived from Section 2 of the Constitutional Law and is therefore rooted in
domestic law. In exceptional cases, where an EU legal provision is found to conflict
with the Lithuanian Constitution, that provision would have no effect within
the Lithuanian legal order. However, the case law on the relationship between
EU law and the Lithuanian Constitution remains underdeveloped and requires
further clarification, particularly concerning its alignment with EU law
principles. From a constitutional perspective, an ultra vires review would be
legally permissible.
19 In Spain, the
transfer of sovereign powers to the EU is governed by Article 93 of the Spanish
Constitution. The Spanish Constitutional Court distinguishes between the formal
supremacy (supremacía) of Spanish constitutional law and the primacy (primacía)
of EU law, not conceiving them in a hierarchical relationship but rather as
separate spheres of application. The transfer of competences under Article 93
imposes constitutional limits on European integration, requiring EU law to remain
compatible with the fundamental principles of Spain’s social and democratic
constitutional state. The Court explicitly reserves a constitutionally
entrenched power of final decision, derived from Article 93, which it may
invoke in exceptional cases to safeguard the sovereignty of the Spanish people
and the supremacy of the Spanish Constitution. Although the Court has
acknowledged the hypothetical possibility that EU primary law could exceed
conferred competences – potentially infringing on Spanish sovereignty and the
constitutional core – it has not explicitly established an ultra vires review
as a distinct legal instrument.
20 In Greece, the
primacy of EU law is grounded in Article 28(2) and (3) of the Greek
Constitution. These provisions also establish limits to the primacy of EU law, particularly
concerning human rights, the foundations of the democratic state, and national
sovereignty.
21 In Portugal,
according to Article 8(4) of the Portuguese Constitution, EU law is applicable
within the national legal system only insofar as it respects the principles of
the democratic constitutional state. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has
ruled that in a multi-level constitutional system, where multiple legal orders
coexist, legal norms that have domestic effect cannot override the
Constitution. Accordingly, EU law must respect the national identity of Member
States, including Portugal.
22 In Romania, the
transfer of certain powers to the EU occurs through the national act of assent,
in conjunction with Article 148(1) of the Romanian Constitution. The Romanian
Constitutional Court derives the primacy of the national Constitution over EU
law from Article 11(3) of the Constitution. Recent rulings suggest that the
Court is strategically asserting the supremacy of the Romanian Constitution in
relation to EU law, positioning it as a counterweight within the national legal
order.
23 In Luxembourg
and Slovakia, the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law
remains unclear. In Malta, Article 6 of the Maltese Constitution explicitly
designates the Constitution as the highest source of law within the national
legal system. A similar position exists in Bulgaria, where Article 5(1) of the
Bulgarian Constitution states that no other laws may contradict the
Constitution. The Finnish Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs has
recently begun to address both the ultra vires issue and the protection of core
constitutional principles. In Slovenia, the primacy of EU law is based on the
national act of assent in conjunction with Article 3a(1) of the Slovenian
Constitution, making an ultra vires challenge possible in the future. In
Sweden, courts generally acknowledge the primacy of EU law, though
constitutional reservations are not ruled out. In Austria, the transfer of
sovereign powers to the EU is carried out through the parliament’s act of
assent and is subject to Article 44(3) of the Austrian Constitution, which
offers special protection to the fundamental principles of the Federal
Constitution. The Austrian Constitutional Court has recently implicitly
recognised the principle of democracy as part of Austria’s constitutional
identity. Only in the Netherlands and Cyprus, the absolute primacy of EU law is
generally assumed, though even there, its validity is still grounded in
national acts of assent by the Member State parliaments. Finally, in the United
Kingdom, which formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, the Supreme Court
continues to apply an ultra vires doctrine, drawing on the jurisprudence of the
GCC.
24 In summary, ultra
vires review is not a concept limited to Germany; it is explicitly recognised
in the case law of six EU Member States: Denmark, Germany, the Czech Republic,
France, Poland, and Hungary. Furthermore, constitutional rulings and legal
foundations in Belgium, Estonia, Italy, and Latvia also acknowledge the
possibility of invoking ultra vires arguments. Additionally, Croatia,
Lithuania, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain accept at least the doctrinal
basis for a potential ultra vires review. A significantly higher number of
Member States conduct some form of identity review or apply comparable
constitutional safeguards. In total, 18 Member States – a clear majority –
explicitly reject the notion of absolute primacy of EU law. This number is
particularly notable given that in several of the remaining Member States, the
scope of EU law's primacy has yet to be addressed, often due to the absence of
constitutional jurisdiction.
25 The CJEU’s
justification of the primacy of EU law based on its autonomy concept is not
accepted by any national constitutional court. Instead, the validity and
precedence of EU law are understood to derive from the acts of assent passed by
the parliaments of the Member States, which authorize the application of EU law
within their respective legal systems.
26 On this basis,
the clear majority of constitutional and supreme courts in the Member States do
not accept the absolute primacy of EU law over their national constitutions,
but instead assert constitutional reservations. In most EU countries, it is
standard practice to assess EU treaties in light of national constitutional
law. Many constitutional courts extend these reservations to secondary EU law,
typically through one of three types of review: the Solange review (equivalent
protection doctrine), identity review, and ultra vires review. These mechanisms
serve to protect various dimensions of constitutional identity – whether it involves
safeguarding fundamental rights, preserving core substantive constitutional
principles, or defending national sovereignty and the integration programme.
II. The CJEU’s Constitutional Vision:
Autonomy, Primacy, and the Rejection of Ultra Vires Review
Taken together, the constitutional
jurisprudence of the Member States reveals a clear trend: ultra vires review is
not an isolated German construction, but a widespread legal safeguard anchored
in the principle of conferred powers. At least eighteen Member States
explicitly reject the idea of absolute primacy and maintain constitutional
reservations, particularly where Union acts threaten to undermine the
democratic legitimacy or constitutional identity of the state. The CJEU, by
contrast, categorically rejects the legitimacy of such review. This is not just
a matter of institutional competition – it reflects a deeper constitutional
conflict. The CJEU views EU law as an autonomous legal order that does not
depend on national constitutions for its validity. Based on this view, it
claims absolute primacy of EU law over all national norms, including
constitutional provisions. However, this conception is neither codified in the
Treaties nor accepted by most Member States. It rests on a dogmatic assumption:
that the EU legal order is self-originating. Nevertheless, the CJEU relies on
it to support a far-reaching claim to institutional supremacy. Over time, the
CJEU has translated its concept of autonomy into a hierarchical constitutional
structure. It does so not only through substantive doctrines like absolute
primacy, but also via procedural mechanisms that establish the CJEU as the
final judge of its own jurisdiction. The result is a constitutional logic in
which Member States lose both the ability to define the limits of EU
competences and to protect their constitutional identity.
1 The CJEU rejects
ultra vires review based on its interpretation of the primacy of EU law as
being absolute. However, this concept of primacy has never been explicitly
codified in the EU treaties. The Protocol on the Application of the Principles
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, merely
alluded to the primacy of EU law. A formal codification was intended in the
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, yet the ratification of this treaty
ultimately failed. The subsequent Treaty of Lisbon did not include a binding
provision on primacy either. Instead, only a legally non-binding interpretative
declaration was attached, which referred back to the CJEU’s established case
law on the matter. Similarly, Article 20 of the Unified Patent Court Agreement
(UPCA) does not contain any provision explicitly stipulating the primacy of EU
law.
2 According to
established CJEU case law, all forms of EU law take precedence over national
law, including national constitutional provisions and the jurisprudence of
constitutional courts. The CJEU seeks to establish an absolute hierarchy,
placing EU law above national constitutional orders. This position, however,
directly conflicts with the Member States’ understanding of constitutional
limits, which are considered inviolable. Since ultra vires review is grounded
in the constitutional identity of the Member States, this creates a central point
of tension between the CJEU’s approach and the constitutional reservations
upheld by national constitutional courts.
3 The CJEU’s
central argument for asserting absolute primacy is the autonomy of the EU legal
order – the idea that EU law does not derive from the legal systems of the
Member States. This key concept of autonomy not only forms the basis for the
absolute primacy of EU law but has also been invoked in recent CJEU judgements
to justify a comprehensive monopoly on jurisdiction within the European
constitutional court network. Its claim to institutional supremacy has evolved
into a specific application of the autonomy principle and is used to reinforce
and safeguard the absolute primacy of EU law.
4 In contrast to
other legal systems, the CJEU has institutionally expanded its concept of
autonomy, aiming to secure itself a monopoly over jurisdiction and competence
vis-à-vis national constitutional and supreme courts. Through infringement
proceedings and by extending state liability to cases where national supreme
courts violate EU law, the CJEU has structurally integrated and subordinated
national courts within the broader European judicial system. This development
marks a clear shift from a cooperative relationship among courts of equal
standing to a hierarchical judicial structure with the CJEU at the top. Since
the Portuguese Judges ruling, the CJEU has also gained the ability to issue
detailed substantive criteria regarding the organisation of national judicial
systems. Looking ahead, this could even extend to national courts being
required to disregard ultra vires rulings issued by their own constitutional
courts – invoking the overarching principle of the rule of law as justification.
5 At the
intersection with international law, the CJEU has progressively strengthened
its institutional position to safeguard the uniform application of EU law,
including in relation to international courts. While this analysis does not
focus on the EU’s external legal relationships, it is nonetheless clear that
the CJEU understands the autonomy of EU law not only as independence from
Member States, but also as a means of protection from external judicial
interference. In institutional terms, the concept of autonomy thus translates
into a reluctance to cooperate with “competing” judicial actors within a multi-level
international legal order. The CJEU positions itself as the central authority
in the European legal order, thereby establishing a hierarchy in which all
legal systems interacting with EU law – and all courts whose jurisdiction
overlaps with that of the CJEU, including the ECHR, arbitration tribunals, and
national constitutional courts – are subordinated to EU law.
6 In the procedural
and institutional conflict surrounding ultra vires review, the CJEU underscores
the link between the autonomy of EU law, its absolute primacy, and the question
of competences. It treats the scope of EU law's validity – including its limits
– as falling within the domain of its absolute primacy. Consequently, national
courts are never permitted to declare EU legal acts invalid, even if the
alleged invalidity stems from an overreach of competences. Relying on this
understanding of primacy and autonomy, the CJEU claims exclusive authority to
determine both the validity and outer boundaries of EU law – effectively
asserting judicial competence over competences. Thus, the CJEU has recently
rejected any form of constitutional reservation by Member States in this
regard.
7 Based on this
interpretation, the concept of autonomy becomes a code for the CJEU’s exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters concerning EU law. Any court addressing issues
that affect EU law must defer to the CJEU’s final judgment. This absolute
monopoly on judicial authority effectively excludes the possibility of
cooperation within the network of constitutional courts – even with regard to
questions of jurisdiction. The CJEU disregards the views of the Member States,
treating its notion of autonomy as overriding even standards set out in primary
EU law. Institutionally, this results in the absolutisation of the Court’s
role. Under the guise of autonomy, the CJEU claims the power to continuously
expand the boundaries of its jurisdiction, both within the EU and in relation
to external actors.
Taken together, the conflict over ultra vires
review reveals a deeper constitutional tension within the EU legal order: while
the CJEU seeks to consolidate a uniform system based on the principle of
absolute primacy, most national constitutional and supreme courts insist on the
conditional nature of EU law’s validity, grounded in their domestic
constitutional orders. This divergence cannot be resolved by institutional
assertion alone. It requires a principled legal response that reflects the
composite structure of the Union. Ultra vires review offers such a response.
Far from being a disruptive anomaly, it is a functional safeguard embedded in
the constitutional practice of a clear majority of Member States. It reflects
the principle of conferral under Article 5(1) and (2) TEU and embodies the idea
that competences remain with the Member States unless expressly transferred.
The absence of a conflict-resolution mechanism in the Treaties does not negate
the legitimacy of this review; rather, it implies the need for constitutional
safeguards that ensure the accountability of EU institutions within the limits
of conferred powers. In this light, ultra vires review is not merely a national
instrument of resistance, but an emerging general
principle of EU law. It serves to stabilise the Union’s
legal architecture where the Treaties are silent, and it institutionalises
constitutional pluralism without dissolving legal unity. Properly understood,
it expresses a shared constitutional responsibility for the integrity of the European legal order. The
second part of this blogpost examines whether – and how – ultra vires review
can be understood as structured, treaty-compatible mechanism that operates as a
joint procedure between national courts and the CJEU.
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