Showing posts with label Denmark. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Denmark. Show all posts

Friday, 14 February 2025

New Geo-Political Challenges and the Past and Future of EU-Greenland Relations

 


 

Ulla Neergaard, Professor of EU Law, University of Copenhagen

Photo credit: Gordon Leggett, via Wikimedia Commons 

 

*This contribution draws upon Ulla Neergaard’s forthcoming work, “‘Eurarctic’: Colonialism and EU-Greenland Relations” in Hanna Eklund's edited volume, “Colonialism and the EU Legal Order,” to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025. For a more comprehensive understanding and complete references, readers are encouraged to consult that work, as well as e.g. Ulla Neergaard: “Shadows of Europe’s Colonial Past as Interwoven in EU Law” in Catherine Barnard, Adam Łazowski & Daniel Sarmiento (eds.): “The Pursuit of Legal Harmony in a Turbulent Europe. Essays in Honour of Eleanor Sharpston”, Hart Publishing, 2024

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The inauguration of President Trump in the beginning of 2025 and the events to follow have elevated Greenland’s position within the Danish Realm and the European Union (EU) to a prominent geo-political focus. These developments have included an interest in purchasing Greenland, accusations regarding Denmark’s ability to ensure Greenland’s security, and threats of military intervention and tariff war. In response, the EU and its Member States have expressed solidarity with Denmark, but the EU may now be forced to rethink its relationship with Greenland and, more broadly, with the Arctic in a much, much stronger strategic way than it has so far (see e.g. the analysis by André Gattolin).

            This renewed situation reflects a global shift in power dynamics amidst broader geo-political disruptions, drawing increased attention to Arctic issues, including the forthcoming elections in Greenland on 11 March 2025, where the independence movement is at the center of attention in the election campaigns. Such unsolicited scrutiny raises concerns for Greenland, Denmark, and the EU alike.

            In this context, it is particularly noteworthy that Denmark is a Member State of the EU, whereas its two autonomous entities, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, hold the status of an ‘overseas country and territory’ (OCT) and a ‘third country’, respectively. Unlike the Faroe Islands, Greenland has been recognized as a former colony of Denmark and has maintained formal relations with the EU since 1973. The relationship between Greenland and the EU, primarily mediated through Denmark, is thus rooted in a complex history that merges colonial legacies with modern geo-political interests. Grasping this relationship is essential in relation to the current challenges which however remains rather under-researched. Thus, the following discussion will present this complex history and will focus on the overall links between the EU and Greenland highlighting how Greenland went from being part of a Member State through Denmark to becoming an associated OCT and the main implications thereof. It will finally offer a few reflections and some future prospects.

 

 The Overall Historical Links between Greenland and Denmark

 

Geographically, Greenland is classified as part of North America; however, in many other aspects, its closest ties are with Denmark, placing it within the European context. The evolution of this relationship has been detailed in a report by the Greenlandic Constitutional Commission from 2023, which proposes a Constitution for Greenland. The report outlines several phases of colonialism: 1) ‘Initial Colonization’ (1721-1782); 2) ‘Parasitic Colonialism’ (1782-1830s) and ‘Classic Colonialism’ (1830s to 1908); 3) ‘Intensive Colonialism’ (1908 to 1953); 4) ‘Hidden Colonialism’ (1953-1979); 5) ‘Early Decolonization’ (1979-2009); and 6) ‘Matured Decolonization’ (2009-present).

            According to prevailing Danish narratives, Greenland is viewed as having originally belonged to the Danish Crown under the Kalmar Union since the fourteenth century but regarded as ‘properly’ colonized by Denmark in 1721, following the arrival of the Danish-Norwegian priest Egede. When the first Danish Constitution was adopted in 1849, Greenland retained its status as a colony and was not explicitly recognized as a separate entity within the Constitution.

            Following the conclusion of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, it became evident that significant changes were underway regarding the colonial arrangements of European countries, which were increasingly deemed unacceptable. This shift notably affected the relations between Denmark and Greenland. In 1952, decisions were made that led to Greenland’s formal decolonization in 1953 through its integration into the Kingdom of Denmark. Unlike most other decolonization processes, this integration involved a connection with the metropole rather than a pursuit of independence. Crucially, although the idea of a constitutional right for Greenlandic self-determination was proposed at some stage, it was ultimately not included.  Greenland’s status then became, along with the Faroe Islands, what in Danish constitutional theory is commonly viewed as part of ‘Rigsfællesskabet’, which might be translated as the ‘community of the realm’ or ‘the commonwealth of the Danish State’. Against that background, Paragraph 1 of the Danish Constitution was (with effect from 1953) amended to read ‘This Constitutional Act shall apply to all parts of the Kingdom of Denmark’.

            The report from the Greenlandic Constitutional Commission emphasizes that the Greenlandic population was not invited to vote in the referendum concerning the new Danish Constitution. The absence of a referendum in Greenland was not only questioned but also criticized during UN negotiations; however, this criticism ultimately had no impact (see the report of the Danish Institute for International Studies). Consequently, on 9 September 1954, the UN acknowledged the requested change of status by adopting a resolution that removed Denmark from the list of colonial powers.

            Two significant events further stand out. The first occurred in 1979 when a ‘home rule’ framework was established following a referendum in which the majority of Greenlanders voted in favour of this governance model. The second pivotal event took place on 21 June 2009, when a new arrangement known as ‘self-rule’ was implemented. This change was also supported by a prior referendum, in which 75 percent of the population endorsed an enhanced version of home rule. Notably, the Act on Greenland’s Self-Governance outlines the process by which the people of Greenland can initiate a decision regarding their independence, although it requires the consent of the Danish Parliament.

 

 The Accession in 1973

 

Regarding the bonds with the EU, it is noteworthy that during the 1972 Danish referendum on membership in the European Community (EC), Greenland was not afforded the chance to hold a separate referendum. There was significant resistance in Greenland to EC accession, with a majority of Greenlanders voting against it. The isolated votes from Greenland were 4,062 in favor (‘Yes’) and 9,594 against (‘No’). However, unlike the Faroe Islands, Greenland – which at the time did not yet have a home rule arrangement – was required to accede as an integral part of Denmark in 1973.

            The referendum result has been seen as a significant catalyst for subsequent political initiatives as several Greenlandic politicians and commentators concluded that the unwanted foreign policy situation affecting Greenland could not be overlooked and necessitated political consequences. Consequently, the initial focus shifted to the future relationship between Greenland and Denmark, which was deemed essential for any further actions concerning the relationship with the EC.

 

 The Changed Status in 1985

 

A few years after the establishment of the home rule arrangement in 1979, a consultative and non-binding referendum took place in Greenland on 23 February 1982. The referendum sought to determine whether the EC Treaties should continue to apply in Greenland. It did not address the potential transition to an OCT status; rather, it focused solely on the question: ‘Do you want Greenland to remain a part of the European Communities?’ Additionally, the title of the Greenlandic act regarding the referendum clearly indicated that the primary concern was the continued application of the treaties governing the European Communities in Greenland.

            In the referendum, 32,391 individuals were eligible to vote. Among them, 12,615 voters, representing 52 percent of the total turnout, cast their ballots for ‘No,’ while 11,180 voters, or 46.1 percent, voted ‘Yes’ on the referendum’s question (and 470 votes were invalid). This resulted in a modest anti-EC majority. Although the Danish Government supported Greenland’s continued membership in the EC, it had previously stated that it would respect the referendum’s outcome. Following the results, the Danish Government, which held the authority in this matter, was asked to commence negotiations with the EC. Ultimately, Greenland's departure from the EC was formalised on 1 February 1985, transitioning to an OCT status instead.

            As mentioned above, the referendum in Greenland was concerned with whether Greenland should remain a part of the EC. However, it did not address the potential for Greenland to attain the status of an OCT. This omission may raise concerns that the decision ultimately reached may not fully align with the intended theme of the referendum as the view may be that Greenland did not withdraw from the EU as such but only changed status (see the thesis of Wessel Guersen on the territorial scope of the EU).

 

 Implications of the Current Status

 

The term OCT designates regions located outside the European Union (EU) that maintain historical, social, cultural, and/or political ties to an EU Member State. These territories do not possess sovereign status and international legal personality, and are placed in a unique position, as neither Member States nor third countries. Currently, OCTs are outlined in Annex II of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

            The overall implications of the OCT status became that Greenland to some degree remained related to the EC and subject to the applicability of some EC law (including some Treaty provisions). At that time, the legal framework of the OCT formula was adjusted to accommodate Greenland’s future re-association. Consequently, among others, a provision was added which is now Article 204 TFEU, affirming that the provisions regarding the OCTs are applicable in Greenland. Article 198 TFEU highlights the basic purpose of association as being to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories, and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole, as well as to serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire. Additionally, Article 200 TFEU specifies that customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in the OCTs shall be prohibited in conformity with the prohibition of customs duties between Member States in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties. It also states that customs duties on imports into each OCT from Member States or other OCTs are prohibited, as outlined in Article 30 TFEU.

            The Council Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland holds significant importance, too. The essence of the interrelationship is articulated in its preamble, stating: ‘The TFEU and the secondary legislation adopted on the basis of it do not automatically apply to the OCTs, with the exception of a number of provisions which explicitly provide for their application. Although not third countries, the OCTs do not form part of the single market and must nevertheless comply with the obligations imposed on third countries in respect of trade, particularly rules of origin, health and plant health standards and safeguard measures.’ The Decision includes several provisions that place Greenland (and other OCTs) in a more advantageous position compared to third countries, and in some respects, they are treated similarly to Member States. Specifically, Article 44 of the Decision stipulates that products originating from Greenland (and other OCTs) can be imported into the EU without incurring import duties. Furthermore, Article 45 mandates that the EU shall not apply to imports of products originating in Greenland (and other OCTs) any quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect. Consequently, as an OCT, Greenland enjoys direct access to the internal market without import restrictions, while also retaining the ability to implement customs or quantitative restrictions on imports from the EU, as outlined in Article 46 of the Decision. In addition, fishing has all along also been of importance (see the fisheries agreement with Greenland).

            Importantly, Greenlanders may be regarded as Union citizens, already because they are Danish citizens. Of interest in that regard is Article 20(1) TFEU stating that: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’ Reference may at the same time be made to the CJEU Eman and Sevinger judgment from 2006 saying that: ‘...persons who possess the nationality of a Member State and who reside or live in a territory which is one of the OCTs... may rely on the rights conferred on citizens of the Union...’ In a related context, the Charter of Fundamental Rights may be applicable when EU law is applied and/or implemented (see Kochenov and Geursens, ‘EU Law and the Overseas: General Principles’).

Notably, in 2021, the EU introduced its new Arctic policy, committing to enhanced engagement in the Arctic region to address various geo-political, environmental, economic, security, and social challenges, while also collaborating with others to seize emerging opportunities. Additionally, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, visited both the Faroe Islands and Greenland last year. During her visit to Greenland, she inaugurated the EU Office in Nuuk, which aims to establish a tangible European presence in Greenland and the broader Arctic region. At the same time, President von der Leyen signed agreements with Greenlandic Prime Minister Múte Bourup Egede and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, focusing on the EU-Greenland partnership, which amounts to nearly €94 million under the EU Global Gateway investment plan. This plan allocates €71.25 million for education and skills development and €22.5 million for green growth initiatives, including renewable energy, critical raw materials, and biodiversity conservation. The EU’s new Arctic policy also briefly addresses Greenland’s OCT status, highlighting that under the Overseas Association Decision, Greenland engages in extensive political and policy dialogue with the EU, benefits from preferential trade arrangements for accessing the EU market, and is one of the largest OCT recipients of EU support per capita, with €225 million allocated between 2021 and 2027.

As a final consideration, reference may be made to the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU. This clause stipulates that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Consequently, it raises the question of whether Greenland, as an OCT, in this context should be considered part of a Member State’s ‘territory’. This is likely to be the case (see, e.g., Geursen).  

 

 Reflections and Possible Future Prospects

 

The preceding discussion illustrates the connections between the EU and Greenland, primarily rooted in the relationship between the OCT, Greenland, and the Member State, Denmark. However, the bond between Denmark and Greenland is heavily influenced by a legacy of colonialism. Consequently, this may be central to the EU’s engagement with the Arctic and more specifically, Greenland. Thus, Greenland’s relationship with the EU - mediated through Denmark - is fundamentally linked to its OCT status, which pertains to former colonies. These connections can be seen as precarious, and the overall framework may be susceptible to potential backlash, as also indicated by recent events, even though it must also be taken into consideration that the general framework and thinking of today, after all, has changed.

The current implications of OCT status remain ambiguous, and the above discussions highlight that the existing relations between the EU and Greenland are marked by significant legal uncertainty and complexity. Looking ahead, the future of this relationship remains open to debate. Notably, a survey conducted in December 2024 indicated that 60% of Greenlandic citizens would support rejoining the EU, an increase from 40% in 2021. In this context, Danish MEP Morten Løkkegaard has recently proposed that Greenland should reconsider its EU membership.

            Consequently, it may be pertinent for Greenland (and possibly the EU, too) to explore various possibilities in light of current geopolitical events in the coming years, including especially the following three: 1) whether Greenland rather than keeping its OCT status would prefer to transition to an ‘Outermost Region’ (OR) status, which would entail a closer association with the EU (as the EU acquis applies in full unless the contrary is stated – see Kochenov and Geursen; 2) whether Greenland would wish to reattain its former full membership status alongside with Denmark; or 3) whether Greenland – if it were fully severing ties with Denmark to become a sovereign state, no longer bound by the Danish Constitution, which again would end its current relationship with the EU – would wish to seek a different relationship with the EU, potentially aspiring to become a Member State rather than being classified as a third country, which would otherwise be its EU-legal status.

            While intentionally abstaining from providing any kind of direct advice to Greenland (and eventually the EU) on the matter, it is important to acknowledge that the inter-relational platform, despite its current volatility as evidenced by the current tensions, may also possess positive aspects. Under all circumstances, ultimately, the difficult decisions to be made in the coming years will be more crucial than ever for the future of EU-Greenland relations.


Tuesday, 13 December 2016

Dialogue or disobedience between the European Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-principle




Sune Klinge, PhD Fellow, Centre for Comparative and European Consitutional Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

Following the Court of Justice’s judgment in Case C-441/14 in the Ajos-case earlier this year, the Supreme Court of Denmark has handed down its judgment in the main proceedings. Despite the fact that the preliminary ruling left the Supreme Court with only two options; (1) apply national law in a manner that is consistent with the directive or (2) disapply any provision of national law that is contrary to EU law the Danish Supreme Court did neither. The Danish Supreme Court found that an interpretation consistent with EU law was not possible nor could the Supreme Court set aside national law since the Danish EU Accession Act did not confer sovereignty to the extent required for the unwritten EU principle prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age to take precedence over national law. If the courts were to set aside national law they would be acting outside their constitutional limits to their competences as judicial power. Thereby the Supreme Court chose a third option and set aside the judgement from the CJEU.

This case from the Danish Supreme Court no. 15/2014 deals with the scope of Directive 2000/78 (the EU employment equality Directive) and the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, adding another case to the ECJ’s Mangold and Kücükdeveci case law (on the requirement for national courts to suspend national law which breaches the principle of age discrimination) under Danish law.

The CJEU’s ruling in the Ajos-case has previously been discussed here. Consequently, only the main conclusions needed to fully understand the judgment in the main proceedings under Danish law will be revisited.

The Danish Supreme Court referred the following questions to the CJEU: The first question was related to the compliance of the national rules implementing the Directive and the application of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. The second question formulated by the Danish Supreme Court referred to the balancing of rights and principles, and will be cited in full, since it contributes to the understanding of the judgment from the Danish Supreme Court last week:

“Is it consistent with EU law for a Danish court hearing an action in which an employee seeks from a private-sector employer payment of a severance allowance which, under the Danish law described in question 1, the employer is not bound to pay, even though that is contrary to the general EU principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, to weigh that principle and the issue of its direct effect against the principle of legal certainty and the related principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and to conclude on that basis that the principle of legal certainty must take precedence over the principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, such that the employer is, in accordance with national law, relieved of its obligation to pay the severance allowance and, in order to determine whether such a balancing exercise may be carried out, is it necessary to take into consideration the fact that the employee may, in appropriate cases, claim compensation from the Danish State on account of the incompatibility of Danish law with EU law?” (my underlining)

The CJEU openly rejected the solution offered by the Supreme Court, leaving it for the national courts to balance the EU principles against each other, and gave clear guidance on how the Supreme Court were to settle the case:

“EU law is to be interpreted as meaning that a national court adjudicating in a dispute between private persons falling within the scope of Directive 2000/78 is required, when applying provisions of national law, to interpret those provisions in such a way that they may be applied in a manner that is consistent with the directive or, if such an interpretation is not possible, to disapply, where necessary, any provision of national law that is contrary to the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age. Neither the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations nor the fact that it is possible for the private person who considers that he has been wronged by the application of a provision of national law that is at odds with EU law to bring proceedings to establish the liability of the Member State concerned for breach of EU law can alter that obligation” (my underlining)

On this basis the hearing before the Supreme Court took place 11 and 14 November 2016, and bearing the CJEU’s guidance in mind, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the private employer could rely on the Danish rules and not pay severance allowance to the employee.

As emphasized above in the quotation, the preliminary ruling left the Supreme Court with only two options; (1) applying national law in a manner that was consistent with the Directive or (2) disapplying any provision of national law that was contrary to EU law. The Danish Supreme Court did neither. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the national constitutional reservation had to take precedence over EU law according to the EU Accession Act.

Before entering into the extensive argumentation leading to this controversial conclusion, it is worth considering the circumstances and the dilemma of the Supreme Court leading to the decision to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU.

In the Danish case Ole Andersen from 12 October 2012 the CJEU found, that the Directive precluded national rules (same national rules as in the Ajos-case) regarding payment of severance allowance. Paragraph 2a(3) of the Danish Law on salaried employees held that:

No severance allowance shall be payable, if the employee will – on termination of the employment relationship – receive an old age pension from the employer and the employee has joined the pension scheme in question before attaining the age of 50 years.

The CJEU found that the Directive must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which workers who are eligible for an old-age pension from their employer under a pension scheme which they have joined before attaining the age of 50 years cannot, on that ground alone, claim a severance allowance aimed at assisting workers with more than 12 years of service in the undertaking in finding new employment, and thereby overruling the national rule. 

In the national proceedings the Western High Court (the case was not tried at the Supreme Court) ruled in favor of the employee against a public authority as the employer – a vertical EU law relationship.

The question before the Supreme Court in the Ajos-case was if the same approach could be applied in a horizontal EU law relationship between two private individuals.

By referring the case to the CJEU, the Supreme Court highlighted a discussion carried out by the Advocates-General of the CJEU about the doctrinal basis of horizontal application of general EU principles.

Advocate General Kokott had in her opinion to the Ole Andersen-case questioned that the CJEU had relied directly on the general legal principle of the prohibition of age discrimination, stating that it was for the national court to set aside any provision of national law, which may conflict with that prohibition. She found in paragraph 22 that it appeared:

“to be a makeshift arrangement  for the purposes of resolving issues of discrimination in legal relationships between individuals, in which Directive 2000/78 is not as such directly applicable and cannot therefore replace national civil or employment law.”

The Advocate General also emphasized that the idea of an in-depth reappraisal and examination of the doctrinal basis of the controversial horizontal direct effect of general legal principles or fundamental rights between individuals were certainly appealing, but not necessary to resolve the case at hand.

Also Advocate General Trstenjak had in her opinion in the Dominguez-case reservations regarding legal certainty for private individuals and the risk of mixing sources of law as regard to directives as secondary law and general principles as primary EU law.

About the absence of legal certainty for private individuals she emphasized in paragraph 164, that

“the principle of legal certainty requires that rules involving negative consequences for individuals should be clear and precise and their application predictable for those subject to them. However, as it will never be possible for a private individual to be certain when an unwritten general principle given specific expression by a directive will gain acceptance over written national law there would, from his point of view, be uncertainty as to the application of national law similar to that experienced where a directive is directly applied in a relationship between private individuals”

The Danish Supreme Court raised the same concerns and by referring the Ajos-case to the CJEU aimed to find a solution by balancing the conflicting principles. By rejecting the solution by the Danish Supreme Court the CJEU offered no way out for the Danish Supreme Court, but to turn on a plate and apply EU law as told by the CJEU if compliance were to be secured.

The Danish Supreme Court did not act as expected; instead, they found their own way of solving the problem and securing legal certainty under Danish law.

The reasoning of The Supreme Court

Interpretation consistent with EU law

The Supreme Court held – in line with the formulation of its question to the CJEU in 2014 – that the legal position under Danish law was clear, and that it would not be possible to arrive at an interpretation of the national law that was consistent with the Directive as interpreted by the judgment of the CJEU in the Ole Andersen-case by using the methods of interpretation recognized under Danish law.

Reflecting on the application of the contra legem assessment made by the Supreme Court it is worth relating it to the harshly formulated paragraph 34 of the CJEU’s Ajos-judgment, where the CJEU stipulated, that:

“the national court [the Danish Supreme Court] cannot validly claim that it is impossible for it to interpret the national provision at issue in a manner that is consistent with EU law by mere reason of the fact that it has consistently interpreted that provision in a manner that is incompatible with EU law.”

This seems to reflect a different understanding by the CJEU of the concept of “contra legem”, and therefore the reasoning on that matter is given a strong voice in the Danish Supreme Court’s judgement. The Supreme Court explains in details that the legal position under Danish law was clear and was not only relying on the interpretation made by the Supreme Court itself. The position had been reaffirmed over the years since the Danish Parliament introduced the rule in 1971 and the Parliament kept the same wording of the provision in the later amendment in 1996. Consequently, the Supreme Court found that it could not change the legal position as the CJEU suggested by using the methods of interpretation recognized under Danish law.

Therefore, the Supreme Court found that it would be “contra legem” to interpret the national law in conformity with the Directive since the national legal position was clear. In this reasoning the Supreme Court and the nine judges acted unanimously.

The general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age

In the second part of the judgement’s reasoning the majority of eight out of the nine judges came to the conclusion that the Supreme Court could not set aside national law since the Danish EU Accession Act did not confer sovereignty to the extent required for the unwritten EU principle prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of age to take precedence over national law.

The reasoning focuses on the lack of legal basis in the Danish EU Accession Act which is the Act that sets the limits of the conferred sovereignty to the EU in line with paragraph 20 of the Danish Constitution.

The Supreme Court went on to perform an in-depth analysis of the preparatory works of the Accession Act (travaux préparatoire) leading to Denmark joining the EU in 1972 and the subsequent amendments to the Accession Act.

The Supreme Court found that the Danish Parliament did not explicitly refer to the Mangold and Kücükdeveci case law in the preparatory works to the Lisbon Accession Act amendment. On this basis the Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion, that the CJEU did not have the competence or legal basis to give precedence to the unwritten principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age in a case where this was contrary to national law.

Reflecting further on the Mangold case of 2005, the Supreme Court also noted that the CJEU in the Mangold case law did not balance the legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations against the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age. It is not clear if the Supreme Court finds that the result in the Mangold case would have been different if the CJEU had reflected on this balancing. By revisiting the finding in the CJEU’s Ajos case one could make the argument, that it would not have changed the result. 

The facts of the case – the dismissal of the employee - were before the Lisbon treaty entered into force the 1 December 2009. Consequently, the Supreme Court stressed that the application of any Charter provision since it was not legally binding and thereby disregarded the argument that the employee could rely on the Charter provisions.

After concluding that the Danish Accession Act does not provide legal basis in a horizontal relationship to give precedence to an unwritten EU law principle the Supreme Court adds:  
“If the Supreme Court in a situation like this were to set aside national law the Court would be acting outside their limits to their competences as judicial power.” (Translation made by the author)

And thereby, not only referring to the Accession Act and sovereignty but also to the separation of power in the Danish Constitution section 3 as it would require an act of parliament to amend the national rules and reassure compliance with EU law.

In the end it should be noted that one judge found that the EU law should take precedence over national law, and that there was no conflict with the Danish EU Accession Act following the Supreme Courts judgments in the Maastricht and Lisbon cases on sovereignty. The minority judge voted to follow the directions made by the CJEU.

Reflection and follow-up litigation

Last week’s judgement from The Danish Supreme Court can definitely be seen as disobedience as the CJEU’s guidance in the Ajos-case was very precise and gave the Supreme Court only two options, but the Supreme Court choose a third. Or it can be seen as contributing to the debate about the dialogue between the courts; it depends on the eyes of the beholder.

It surely adds a chapter to discussion on where the contra legem test is best performed; in the national law regimes or by the CJEU and it sets out the limits of the Danish Supreme Courts constitutional mandate in order to reassure compliance with EU law.

The likely aftermath of the case is also fascinating since the employee has brought an action against the Danish state claiming that the state is liable for the loss of severance pay. The liability case has been suspended on the decision from the Supreme Court.

Another possible outcome could be follow-up litigation from the EU Commission by launching infringement proceedings against Denmark as a Member State on the lack of effective legal protection under article 19 TEU or the duty of sincere cooperation under article 4 (3) TEU. In any case the Ajos-case will be revisited and have a major impact on the relationship between the EU and Denmark.

---ooOoo---

Please feel free to contact me if you want more information about the case or the related issues from a national Danish perspective. I am doing a PhD project about the horizontal effect of EU law and member state liability from a national Danish perspective. Before I joined Academia I was practicing lawyer at one of the leading law firms in Denmark working extensively with EU law.

Photo credit: wikipedia

Barnard & Peers: chapter 6; chapter 8; chapter 9; chapter 20

Tuesday, 26 April 2016

Keeping up with the (Turkish) family: integration requirements for family reunification in Genc



Silvia Adamo, Postdoctoral Fellow, bEUcitizen – Barriers to European Citizenship/Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

What are the legitimate expectations regarding integration before family reunion in a Member State, and what is the position of Turkish citizens in that equation? The EU Directive on family reunion for third-country nationals gives Member States an option to impose such integration requirements before entry of the family members, and the CJEU dealt with the limits to the discretion of Member States in imposing such requirements in a 2015 judgment (K and A, discussed here). Moreover, in the Dogan judgment of 2014 (discussed here), the Court assessed the reach of the standstill clause in the protocol to the Association Agreement between EU and Turkey in relation to the conditions for family reunification for self-employed Turkish nationals. There’s an important distinction between the two legal instruments: all Member States are bound by the EU/Turkey association agreement, whereas the UK, Ireland and Denmark opted out of the family reunion Directive.

In that context, the Dogan case attracted the attention of the Danish Ministry of Justice. After all, Turkish nationals are the largest immigrant group in the country, and the issue of family life with a third country national in Denmark is very controversial. In a legal note commenting on the case shortly after the judgment in Dogan, the Ministry found that the national rules on family reunification (significantly restricted since 2002) could be evaluated as constituting new and more stringent conditions that are not allowed to be introduced for Turkish nationals, in light of the standstill clause. (Note that the protocol to the association agreement has applied since 1973 for the first nine Member States – such as Denmark and the UK – but at the date of accession for the 19 Member States which joined the EU later). At the same time the Ministry did not advise to amend them. Instead, it assessed that there were ‘doubts’ as regards the reach of the restriction test, including the proportionality test, for the manifold requirements for family reunification in Denmark. One of the requirements to fulfil for family reunification is that of potential for successful integration (for the child) and of achieved integration (for the sponsor parent).

The question that has now found its way to the courtroom is the following: Can a Member State require Turkish children to fulfil a successful integration evaluation, before granting them family reunification with their economically active parent? The CJEU recently answered this question in the Genc case. Its judgment is relevant to family reunion with Turkish nationals in all Member States – and would apply by analogy to other forms of new restrictions on family reunion with Turkish citizens besides integration requirements.

Facts

Mr. Genc is a Turkish national born in 1991. His father moved to Denmark in 1997 and obtained a permanent residence permit there in 2001. After the divorce of his parents, his father had obtained legal custody over him; however Mr. Genc continued to live in Turkey with his grandparents. In 2005, when he was fourteen years old, he applied for family reunion with his father in Denmark, who was at the time in active employment.

Mr. Genc’s application was denied in 2006 by the Danish Immigration Service, and again in 2007, by the Ministry of Integration. The reasons for the denial were twofold: having lived in Turkey all his life and being able to speak only Turkish, the Ministry stated that Mr. Genc had no possibility of establishing sufficient ties with the Danish society to allow a successful integration. The other reason given was that his father was not considered well integrated either, and thus he was referred to continue family life through visits to his son in Turkey, as he had been doing already.

Mr. Genc brought the case to the court of first instance and later to the Eastern Regional Court, which decided to refer the case to the CJEU in 2014. The Danish national courts are generally reluctant and not particularly active in referring cases to the CJEU, but since the Dogan case had stirred the waters around the conditions for family reunification for Turkish nationals, the time was ripe to submit to the Court’s evaluation the condition for successful integration before family reunion – at least as far as this group of foreign nationals is concerned.

The Danish Aliens Act establishes that a residence permit can be granted upon application to a child under the age of fifteen who wants to live with the parent having full or partial custody, but only if the child has not established her own family yet. The sponsor parent living must be the holder of either Danish citizenship, citizenship in one of the Nordic countries, refugee status, a permanent residence permit, or a temporary residence permit that has the possibility of becoming permanent. Other conditions are: self-sufficiency (the sponsor parent should not be receiving State help or social security subsidies); adequate housing; no conviction for abuse against children; and respect for the best interest of the child. Different conditions may apply for refugees.

Finally, the requirement for successful integration demands that if the child and one of her parents are living in their home country or another country, the residence permit will be given only if she already has, or has had, a possibility to obtain such an attachment to Denmark that will constitute a basis for a successful integration. The integration requirement is only applied when more than two years pass from the moment a parent becomes eligible to apply for family reunification to when s/he finally files the papers.

Judgment

The referring court formulated four questions, requesting clarification on the earlier case law of the CJEU on the standstill clause vis-à-vis the Dogan judgment. As a whole, the questions referred reflected the doubts expressed in the Ministerial note and concerned the restriction test and proportionality assessment of the integration requirement for family reunification with respect to Article 13 of Decision No. 1/80 on the development of the Association Agreement (prohibition on introducing new restrictions on the conditions of access to employment to legally resident and employed nationals). Unlike the standstill considered in the Dogan case, this standstill relates to workers, not self-employed persons, and has applied since 1980 for the first nine Member States.

The CJEU decided to consider the questions referred together, and to focus on evaluating whether the integration requirement in Danish law was to be considered a new restriction. The Court started by affirming that the situation in question related to the freedom of Turkish workers within the EU, and thus it was covered by Article 13 of Decision 1/80. The CJEU then affirmed that its interpretation in Dogan that applied the standstill obligation to spouses could also be transposed to other family members, since restrictions to family reunification would affect the exercise of the economic freedom of (in this case) workers.

Thus the CJEU insists on the fact that -national legislation that restricts family reunification for Turkish workers is covered by the standstill clause, denying that this is equal to granting a right to family reunification or a right of establishment and residence for family members (para 44–45).

In order to sustain the exercise of the economic activity of Turkish nationals, a requirement that further restricts the possibility of obtaining family reunification must be considered a new restriction. As such, according to the Court’s case law since Demir, national provisions that impose conditions more stringent than the ones applicable at the time of entry into force of Decision No. 1/80 can only be allowed if the requirement is justified on public interest grounds, and is proportional, i.e. apt to achieve a legitimate objective and not going beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. In fact, after Dogan and the reach of the standstill requirement there established, any new integration requirements for family reunion can only be introduced on the grounds of public interest.

The Court invokes Article 79 (4) TFEU, which refers to the prospect of EU measures on integration of non-EU citizens, to establish that an integration objective can indeed constitute an overriding reason in the public interest (para 55– 56). However, the Danish law at stake in this case did not pass the proportionality test. In the eyes of the Court, the two year deadline which imposes the integration requirement is not indicative of the potential for successful integration of the child, nor of the intentions of the parents as regards ‘shielding’ their children from the host country’s society (of note is also the opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi on the non-existence of correlation between a prolonged stay in a third country and the possibilities for integration, at para 48–49 of the opinion). To the contrary, the deadline imposed does not consider the individual circumstances of the case, may lead to automatic and systemic refusals of family reunification which are not suitable to be appealed, and may lead to discrimination against children in similar situations.

Comments

Denmark introduced the requirement of successful integration for family reunification with children in 2004. The rules had a dual objective: to get rid of the practice of children’s so called ‘re-education journeys’ to the parents’ homeland, as well as to prevent children from being left outside of Denmark as long as possible before they reach adult age, in order to be educated and influenced by their homeland’s culture, traditions, values, and norms. The maximum age at which a child living abroad can obtain family reunion was lowered to fifteen years old. In order to make sure that those children who would live in Denmark as adults would be integrated, they are expected to relocate with their parents as early as possible in order to be exposed to the national culture, language, norms, and values, especially through schooling.

From a critical perspective, the objections that can be raised against the national law are essentially three.[1] First, when applying the requirement for successful integration, the lack of the integration of the sponsor parent weighs more than the appraisal of the integration potential of the child. Integration in Danish law is connected to participation in the labour market, but also to assimilation of national values and norms. Unemployed and non-integrated immigrants are rarely granted the possibility to be family reunited with their children in Denmark. Family sponsored migration from non-Western countries has been reduced via a string of convoluted rules that have diminished this channel of legal migration. Integration requirements are in this context employed in order to limit migration via family reunification.

Second, as also noted by the CJEU, the national authorities have employed a narrow and literal interpretation of the rules, funding the evaluation on the detailed requirements listed in the  preparatory work to the national law (duration of stays in Denmark and in the home country, in which country the child has spent most of her upbringing and gone to school, which language the child speaks, etc.). This limits the discretionary power of the authorities and impairs genuinely considering the individual circumstances of the case, including the best interest of the child. The requirement of the potential for a successful integration thus looks more like a legal construction that renders possible the automatic rejection of family reunification applicants that have spent too many years in their parents’ home country and who do not speak Danish, and where the parent has not been able to prove that s/he is well integrated.

Third, the requirement will always be applied to children of eight years or older, where the child has stayed with the other parent outside of Denmark, when more than two years have passed since the parent could legally apply for family reunification. In these cases, it will be impossible to fulfil the requirement of potential for successful integration. In this optic, integration becomes a key factor for evaluating also the best interest of the child. The child's legal status is made dependent on the parent's, and the instrumental interpretation of the principle of the best interest of the child entails that it is the opportunity for the child to develop a social connection to the host country’s culture and society which weighs more than the possibility to live with a parent. Yet, this also means denying family reunification to children as young as eight years old.

In this light, the limits of the Genc judgment are two, in my view: First, it only concerns Turkish nationals, possibly leaving space for continuing to enforce the arbitrary and non-proportional integration requirement onto other third country nationals and their children. The second limit is that it only concerns employed Turkish nationals, perhaps regrettably highlighting that the right to family life is precluded for non-economically active citizens. A week after Genc, the CJEU held the same stand and stated in Khachab that a national rule requiring a (non-EU and non-Turkish) sponsor parent to be in possession of sufficient resources (basing that prediction on previous income) before granting family reunification is compatible with the Family Reunification Directive. Hence at the same time that the protection of the family life of Turkish workers in the EU appears to increase, other third country nationals may still experience discrimination and limits to their family life.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26
JHA4: chapter I:6



[1] Adamo, S. What is ‘A Successful Integration’? Family Reunification and the Rights of Children in Denmark. Retfærd. Nordic Journal of Law and Justice, Year 39, Volume 1/152, 2016, 38–58.

Sunday, 24 January 2016

Can Member States seize asylum-seekers’ assets?





Kees Groenendijk (Professor Emeritus, Radboud University Nijmegen) and Steve Peers

In recent days, several EU and non-EU countries have been in the news for taking asylum-seekers' assets upon arrival. Is this compatible with EU law? We examine first of all national practice, then the legislative history of the relevant EU rules, then reach our conclusions.  

Denmark

In November 2015 the Danish government presented among a catalogue of 34 measures to discourage people from seeking asylum in Denmark, to introduce the possibility to confiscate cash, jewellery and other assets of asylum seekers in other to make them contribute in the costs of their reception. They proposal caused heated debate after a Minister suggested that wedding rings could be also confiscated. In January the Social-Democratic Party voiced that it would only support this proposal of the centre-right minority government, only assets above 1,340 euro could be confiscated. The new law is to be voted on 26 January.

Similar practices or rules are to be found in the national law of other Member States.

Switzerland, only few asylum seekers concerned

According to Dutch newspapers, Swiss legislation requires asylum seekers who enter the country with more than 1,000 Swiss francs have report and hand over the surplus to the Swiss authorities. The rule only covers money, not other valuables such as personal jewellery. Of the 45,000 asylum seekers coming to Switzerland in 2015, only 112 had to hand in a surplus, totalling around € 150,000 that year. Not really an impressive amount. Most asylum seekers, apparently, do not carry large amounts of money, once they arrive in Western Europe. Besides, under Swiss law beneficiaries of protection with income from employment, have to pay 10% of that income to contribute to reception costs during ten years.

Germany, an old practice?

The German legislation on reception of asylum seekers, the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, provides, already several decades that asylum seekers can be forced to contribute from their own assets and income to the cost of their reception. Asylum seekers have to declare their assets and income. The rules for applicant for public social assistance are applicable. From the assets only 200 euro and the goods necessary for exercising a profession or employment are exempted (§ 7(5) of the law). German national TV news reported on 21 January 2016 that in Bavaria asylum seekers were asked by the police to hand over their cash in excess of €750. In Baden-Wurttemberg the threshold is €350. The federal law leaves room for difference in application between the Lander. A spokesman of the Baden-Wurttemberg minister of integration stated that although cash was taken from refugees in individual cases following police spot-checks, searches are not carried out on every refugee. He was quoted as saying "In the context of a general police check it was established that individual refugees had cash with them" and "Refugees are not being systematically searched for cash or valuables".

Netherlands, only contributions from income not from assets

The Junior Minister for Immigration recently told the press that that he was not going to follow the Danish and German example and force asylum seekers to hand over small amounts of cash and jewellery. His spokesman explained this is not on the agenda right now, since we do not expect that it will reduce the influx.” (Volkrant 23 January 2016) Already for decades asylum seekers in the Netherlands if lawfully employed (only possible after six months and until an asylum status is acquired for 24 weeks per year only) have to pay the surplus above 185 euro of his monthly income as a contribution in reception costs.

Compatible with EU law?

Are such rules and practices on seizure of assets in order to contribute in reception costs compatible with EU law, and especially with the Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33? We do not deal here with the question whether such confiscation of valuables and jewellery is compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol and Article 8 ECHR.

The relevant provisions are to be found in Article 17(3) and (4) of the 2013 recast Reception Conditions Directive, reading:

“3.   Member States may make the provision of all or some of the material reception conditions and health care subject to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health and to enable their subsistence.
4.   Member States may require applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions and of the health care provided for in this Directive, pursuant to the provision of paragraph 3, if the applicants have sufficient resources, for example if they have been working for a reasonable period of time.
If it transpires that an applicant had sufficient means to cover material reception conditions and health care at the time when those basic needs were being covered, Member States may ask the applicant for a refund.”


Identical provisions were already present in Article 13(3) and (4) of the original Reception Conditions Directive 2003/9. They returned unchanged in the 2013 recast of the Directive. In order to understand those provisions it may be useful to have a short look at their legislative history. The various drafts are set out in more detail in the Annex, but we will summarise them here.

Legislative history of EU rules on financial contributions by asylum seekers

The Commission in its proposal for the original 2003 Directive (COM(2001)181) inserted an Article 19 on financial contributions. Member States could require applicants who can afford to do so to contribute to the cost of their material reception conditions. The relevant decisions should be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons shall be given. An effective judicial remedy against such decisions should be available, making explicit reference to Article 47 EU Charter.

During the first negotiations on this Article reaction eight Member States made proposals for amendments. Six Member States proposed to refer to “the general principle of the real need of the applicant, which would lead to entitlement to material benefits” (document 11320/01, p. 33). Germany proposed that “some of the applicant's income should be protected in all cases”. That proposal only covered the asylum seeker’s income. But it implied that all the income above a certain threshold could be seized by a Member State. The Netherlands made a similar proposal linking the asylum seeker’s contribution to his income: “if the applicant has a certain income, a contribution may be asked of him to cover some or all of the costs”. Both proposals intended to regulate a possibly contribution in reception costs, but did not include the asylum seekers’ assets as an object of seizure.

In January 2002 the text of Article 19 was consolidated with two other Articles in a new Article 18, entitled ‘Financial means test’ (document 5300/02). The Dutch proposal, concerning contribution out of income from employment was included. The German proposal, implying that a Member State could seize all income above a certain fixed threshold, did not find its way in this and later versions of provisions on financial contributions by asylum seekers. During the negotiations in February 2002 this Article was considerably shortened (a.o. replacing the general means test by the condition that the applicants do not have sufficient means to cover their basic needs, and deleting the reference to income from employment) and it was renumbered Article 17 (document 6253/02). Only three Member States made suggestions: Portugal and Greece pleaded for more reduction of the reception conditions, once an asylum seeker or his family member had been allowed access to the labour market. Germany proposed to integrate Article 17 in the general Article on material reception conditions.

Early March 2002, the Asylum Working Party examined the amended proposal based on drafting suggestions from the Spanish Presidency (document 6906/02). Parts of the former Article 17 were now included in Article 13, apparently following German suggestion.

In April 2002 on suggestion of Germany the words “and health care” were added in par. 3 of Article 13. Moreover, the words “for example if they have been working for a reasonable period of time” were added in par. 4, re-introducing an explicit link with participation in the labour market again (document 7802/02). This version of Article 13 of the amended proposal was accepted by Coreper and by the Council in 2002 and became part of the Directive adopted with unanimity on 27 January 2003.

In addition, the 2013 recast Directive now states that Member States can refuse or withdraw benefits if asylum-seekers have ‘concealed financial resources’ (Article 20 of the 2013 Directive). The CJEU, in its CIMADE and GISTI judgment, has ruled that Article 20 sets out an exhaustive list of grounds for reducing or withdrawing benefits.
Analysis

If this legislative history is combined with the general principles of EU law and the EU Charter, we conclude:

(1) The issue of financial contributions by asylum seekers in material reception costs from their own means was been discussed repeatedly during the negotiations on the Directive.

(2) This issue was discussed repeatedly also in relation to the access of asylum seekers to the labour market in the Member State and the income derived from such employment.

(3) The Directive allows Member States to impose a means test for access to material reception conditions, but this does not entail confiscation of assets. The test is not whether the asylum seeker has more than a certain fixed amount of money or assets, but whether the asylum seeker does have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for his health and to enable his subsistence.

(4) Since (a) the issue of financial contributions by asylum seekers in material reception costs is covered by the directive and (b) the Directive sets out minimum standards in order to avoid second movements between Member State (recitals 7 and 8), Member States are not allowed to apply less favourable rules only more favourable rules (see recital 15); the Court of Justice repeatedly held that Member States cannot introduce other conditions than those provided for in the EU Directive or Regulation, see the judgments in Ben Alaya, Koushkaki and Air Baltic. Also, by analogy with the CIMADE and GISTI ruling, the grounds in the Directive to refuse or regulate access to benefits are surely exhaustive.

(5) Article 13(3) allows Member States to make the grant of material reception conditions and health care subject to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health and to enable their subsistence. It follows that such decision to exclude an asylum seeker from material reception conditions can only be made after the Member State first has established that applicants have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health and to enable their subsistence in the Member State. In accordance with the general principle of proportionality in EU law, it is questionable whether a Member State could refuse any access to the benefits system, just because an asylum-seeker has a small amount of cash or valuables. Access should only be refused where the applicant either has an ongoing alternative source of funds, or the asylum-seeker has so much wealth that he or she could live off it for a considerable period of time.

(6) Article 13(4) allows Member States to require applicants to contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions and of the health care, when the applicants have sufficient resources. The conditions of paragraph 3 explicitly apply here as well. The Commission with regard to Article 19 of its proposal rightly stated: “Decisions on applicants’ contribution should be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons must be given if they are negative in order to make possible their review as accurate as possible.”

While, in the final version of the Directive this clause applies to the reduction or withdrawal of benefits, not the obligation to contribute toward costs, the general principles of EU law still require that national administrative decisions linked to EU law must be fair (see the CJEU’s YS and M and S ruling on asylum procedures, discussed here; and the Mukarubega and Boudjliba judgments on the return of irregular migrants, discussed here). This means that any decision on asylum-seekers’ contributions has to be an individual decision giving reasons, taking into consideration the individual situation of each asylum seeker.

Such decisions must also comply with other general principles of Union law, in particular the principle of proportionality, which means that any confiscation of property must be necessary to achieve a genuine government end. It is hard to see how it is necessary to confiscate property when a less severe measure (delaying or curtailing benefit payments by an equivalent amount, in accordance with the rules on a means test) could achieve the same objective. Again, the principle suggests that asylum-seekers should only be required to contribute where applicants either have an ongoing alternative source of funds, or have so much wealth that they could live off it for a considerable period of time.

It must also be possible to challenge any decision made by a national authority on confiscation, in accordance with Article 47 (the right to an effective remedy) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

(7) In conclusion: a national rule allowing authorities to confiscate all means of an asylum seeker above a fixed amount, irrespective of the individual circumstance on the grounds mentioned in point 4 and 6 above is not compatible with Union law.

(8) Of course, Denmark and Switzerland are not bound by the Directive, Denmark because of its opt-out and Switzerland because it is not a Member State. Ireland opted out as well. But all other Members State are bound by Directive 2013/33 and the UK is opted in and is bound by the original Reception Conditions Directive 2003/9.

*The paragraph on Germany was amended on 27th January 2016 to add further detail.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 26
JHA4: chapter I:5
Photo: Danish police officer and asylum-seeker
Photo credit: www.channelnewsasia.com


Annex

Legislative history of Article 13(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/9 = Article 17(3) and (4) of Directive 2013/33 on financial contributions by asylum seekers in reception costs

In the Commission’s proposal for the original 2003 Directive COM(2001)181 there was a separate Article 19 reading:

Article 19
Financial contribution
1. Member States may require applicants who can afford to do so to contribute to the cost of
their material reception conditions or to cover it. Decisions to provide material reception
conditions not free of charge shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and
reasons shall be given.
2. Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to bring proceedings before a court against the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 and that they have access to legal assistance.

The Explanatory Memorandum to this Article 19 read:
“This Article concerns the financial contribution applicants for asylum may be asked to
provide if they are provided with material reception conditions.
(1) This paragraph allows Member States to require applicants who can afford it to contribute
to the cost of their material reception conditions. The purpose is to meet the Council’s
concern regarding the requirement of “inadequate” resources of the applicants for
asylum. In any case Member States should ensure that applicants for asylum have the
possibility of being housed as even applicants with sufficient financial means might find
it impossible to find suitable housing. Decisions on applicants’ contribution should be
taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons must be given if they are
negative in order to make possible their review as accurate as possible.
(2) In conformity with the Charter of fundamental rights (Article 47) and in line with the
case law of the Court of Justice, this paragraph ensures that the decisions taken according
to paragraph 1 can be reviewed by a judicial body (including an administrative judicial
body such as the Conseil d’Etat in France) at least in the last instance.”
The first reaction of Member States on this Article was in document 11320/01, p. 33:
D/E/NL/P/S and UK: reference should be made to the general principle of the real
need of the applicant, which would lead to entitlement to material benefits.
D: some of the applicant's income should be protected in all cases.
NL: stipulate that if the applicant has a certain income, a contribution may be asked of him
to cover some or all of the costs.
D and UK: establish a general principle laying down that Member States may decide
whether or not the applicant requires material benefits.
L and A: make provision for the case in which an applicant is invited to stay in the territory
of a Member State by a national who, if applicable, has served as guarantor for the purpose
of obtaining a tourist visa. In this case, it should be possible to call on the national to
contribute to the costs.
A: reservation on the second sentence in that it creates an obligation to notify these
decisions in writing.
3 A and S: reservation on the financial aspects of legal assistance.
D and UK: a general provision on forms of appeal at the beginning of the Directive should
be sufficient.

In January 2002 the text of Article 19 was consolidated in a new Article 18, consolidating several provisions of the proposal (document 5300/02):
Article 18 (consolidating Articles 14 bis, 15(4) and 19)
Financial means test
1. Member States may make the grant of all or some of the material reception conditions,
as well as the requirement that applicants and their accompanying family members
cover or contribute to the cost thereof, subject to a financial means test of applicants and
their accompanying family members in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
2. Member States may also reduce or withdraw material reception conditions within a
reasonable period after applicants or their accompanying family members commence an
employment activity in accordance with Article 13, applying the test established in
paragraph 1.
3. Applicants and their accompanying family members may be subject to one or more of
the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 when it is confirmed that they have
sufficient means.
4. Decisions under this Article shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and
reasons shall be given.

In February 2002 this Article was considerably shortened (a.o. deleting the means test and the reference to income from employment) and renumbered as Article 17, reading together with the footnote by Member States and the Commission (document 6253/02):
Article 17 (formerly 18)1
Financial means criteria
1. Member States may make the grant of all or some of the material reception conditions subject to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient means to cover their basic needs.
2. If it transpires that an applicant had sufficient means to cover these basic needs at the time
when material reception conditions were being provided, then Member States may ask these
to refund.2
3. Decisions under this Article shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and
reasons shall be given. 3

1 D : this provision should be placed at the end of Article 15.
2 P, supported by EL, suggested adding the following :
"3. Member States may also reduce or withdraw material reception conditions within a
reasonable period after applicants and their accompanying family members have been
allowed access to the labour market in accordance with Article 13, applying the test
established in paragraph 1.
4. In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, if they are not financially independent, Member
States shall grant them the food allowance mentioned in Article 8 and access to basic
social care."
(present paragraph 3 would become 5).
3 Cion : reinsert a paragraph which was included in 12839/01 ASILE 49 (former
Article 14A(6)) :
"Member States shall ensure that before the decisions referred to in paragraph 2 are notified to
the applicants for asylum [and their accompanying family members] the other Articles of
Chapter III of this Directive are applied".
At its meeting on 5 and 6 March 2002, the Asylum Working Party examined the amended proposal based on drafting suggestions from the Spanish Presidency, document 6906/02. Parts of the former Article 17 were now included in Article 13, apparently following the suggestion made before by Germany with regard to that former Article 17.

Article 13
General rules1
1. Member States shall ensure that material reception conditions are available to applicants when they make their application.
2. Member States shall make provisions on material reception conditions to ensure a standard of living adequate for the health and the well-being of applicants.
Member States shall ensure that standard of living is met in the specific situation of persons
who have special needs, in accordance with Article 17, as well as in relation to the situation of
persons who are in detention.
3. Member States may make the grant of all or some of the material reception conditions subject to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient means to have a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being.2
4. Member States may require applicants to cover or contribute to the cost of the material
reception conditions and of the health care provided for in this Directive, pursuant to the
provision of paragraph 3, when the applicants have sufficient resources.
5. Material reception conditions may be provided in kind, or in the form of financial allowances or vouchers or in a combination of these provisions.
Where Member States provide material reception conditions in the form of allowances or
vouchers, their amount shall be set in accordance with the principles set for in this Article.

1 A : a general rule providing for exceptions to be applied by Member States in extraordinary
situations should be introduced.
2 B, D, F and P : the term "well-being" is s too vague and should be defined.
NL, S, UK : say "to enable their subsistence" instead of "to have a standard of living adequate
for their health and well-being".
In April 2002 on suggestion of Germany the words “and health care” were added in par. 3. Besides the words “for example if they have been working for a reasonable period of time” were added in par. 4, introducing an explicit link with participation in the labour market again (document 7802/02).
This version of Article 13 of the amended proposal was accepted by Coreper and by the Council. It became part of the Directive adopted on 27 January 2003