Opinion of AG de
la Tour in Joined Cases C, B (C‑704/20) and X (C‑39/21)
Alicja Słowik, Assistante de recherché, Centre
d’études juridiques européennes (CEJE), Université de Genève
Photo credit: Abouttt, via Wikimedia
commons
Striking a fair
balance between the principle of national procedural autonomy and the necessity
to guarantee effective judicial protection of rights derived from EU law has
never been an easy task for the European Court of Justice (‘the ECJ’/’the
Court’). Yet, the task becomes particularly complex when what is at stake is
effective judicial protection of rights of fundamental nature. How could the concern for protection of EU
fundamental rights affect the application of national procedural rules? Can
national rules limit the power of the judge to assess the lawfulness of
detention of foreign national or would such a limitation lead to serious
encroachment on the fundamental right to liberty? The recent Opinion of AG Jean
Richard de la Tour in the Joined
cases Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v. C, B (C‑704/20,
‘Case C, B’) and X v. Staatssecretaris van
Justitie en Veiligheid (C‑39/21, ‘Case
X’) concerning the issue of ex officio review
of detention measures provides for precious insights on the possible answers to
these questions.
Legislative background and facts of the Joined cases
The two Joined cases
at hand concern the scope of powers of national judges to examine the
lawfulness of detention of third country nationals. In EU law, such a detention
may be exceptionally imposed with regard to asylum seekers or migrants staying
illegally on the EU territory. Articles 15 to 17 of the Return
Directive, 8 to 11 of the Reception
Conditions Directive and Article 28 of Dublin
III Regulation provide for legal basis and conditions pertaining to detention.
It is thus by reference to these provisions that the judge examines the
lawfulness of detention of third country nationals (‘TCNs’).
In the Netherlands,
detention of foreign nationals is governed by administrative procedural law
which does not allow national courts to examine the conditions of the
lawfulness of detention of their own motion (ex officio). This means that it is
impossible for a national judge to review detention measure on the grounds
other than those relied on by the foreign national during the proceedings.
Moreover, the judge cannot release the detainee even after having found that
the detention is unlawful on grounds different than those put forward by the
person concerned. The preliminary questions addressed by two Dutch
jurisdictions: the Council at State (Raad van State) and the District Court in the
Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag) related to the problem of compatibility of Dutch
legislation with EU law, especially, with the right to an effective remedy and
right to liberty.
The first case, C
and B, concerned detention measures imposed with regard to two TCNs. The first individual
concerned was put in detention for the purpose of determining the elements
necessary for the examination of his application for international protection. The
second applicant was placed in detention with the aim of securing his transfer
to Italy in accordance with Dublin III Regulation. Both contested the detention
orders before the District Court which ordered their release on the ground relating
to the non-respect of the obligation of due diligence. Importantly, the
argument concerning the non-respect of due diligence obligation was not raised
by the detainees during the proceedings.
The Secretary of
State brought an appeal against the judgements ordering the release of two
foreign nationals before the Council of State. The two TCNs argued that, by
virtue of EU law, the national jurisdictions had a duty to examine the
lawfulness of detention measure of its own motion. Yet, as explained above,
such an ex officio review of detention was impossible to perform under the Dutch
legislation. In these circumstances, the Council of State decided to ask the
ECJ for clarifications on the interpretation of Article 15, paragraph 2, of
Return Directive and Article 9 of the Reception Conditions Directive in light
of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (‘the Charter’)
which guarantees the right to liberty.
The second case,
X, concerned the application of the Return Directive. A TCN had been put in
detention on grounds relating to the maintenance of public order. The applicant
challenged the decision on the continuation of detention before the District
Court. The judge again had doubts on the compatibility of Dutch legislation
prohibiting the ex officio review of detention with EU law.
Opinion of the Advocate General
At the very
beginning of the Opinion, the AG noticed that the role of the judge does not differ
much depending on whether he assesses the lawfulness of the detention order or
of the order on the continuation of detention (§68). Further, relevant
provisions of Return Directive, Reception Conditions Directive and Dublin III Regulation
embody the same key principles concerning the power of the judge called upon to
assess the lawfulness of detention (§68). For this reason, it was possible to jointly
examine the compatibility of Dutch legislation with regard to all these three
instruments.
Subsequently,
the AG presented briefly a set common rules concerning the judicial control of
detention orders. He recalled in particular that detention of the TCN ordered
by an administrative or judicial authority shall be subject to judicial review
(§70). The requirement of judicial control serves primarily to protect the TCN against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty (§72). Nonetheless, the rules concerning the
extent of judicial control have not been harmonised so far at the EU level. The
modalities of such a control are therefore covered by the principle national
procedural autonomy of Member States (§73). The national legislation
determining the extent of judicial control must nonetheless comply with the
principles of effectiveness and equivalence. (§75).
Focusing on the assessment
of compatibility of national rule with
the principle of effectiveness the AG briefly referred to the so called ‘procedural
rule of reason test’ . According to this test, while examining the question
of whether national procedural rule renders the application of EU law ‘impossible’
or ‘excessively difficult’, the judge must take account of ‘the role of that
provision in the procedure, its conduct and its special features, viewed as a
whole, before the various national bodies’ (see eg. XC and Others, C‑234/17, §49). In that context, must be considered,
in particular, ‘the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of
legal certainty and the proper conduct of the procedure’ (XC and Others, C‑234/17, §49)
Yet, this test
was not of particular relevance in the cases at hand, as the AG indicated that
the ‘effectiveness requirement’ would not be satisfied if a procedural rule at
stake was incompatible with the right to an effective judicial protection
enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (§78). The central problem in the Joined
cases boiled down to the question of whether a national rule prohibiting ex
officio assessment of conditions pertaining to detention infringed the right to
an effective judicial protection.
The Court has
ruled on different occasions that the principle of effectiveness ‘does not
preclude a national provision which prevents national courts from raising of
their own motion an issue as to whether the provisions of Community law have
been infringed, where examination of that issue would oblige them to abandon
the passive role assigned to them by going beyond the ambit of the dispute
defined by the parties themselves’ (Van
Schijndel, C-430/93 and C-431/93,§22). Yet, none of the so-far examined
situations on ex-officio application of EU law has dealt directly with
protection of the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 6 of the Charter (§80).
Relying on Mahdi
case (C-146/14 PPU), the AG recalled that the Court assessing the
lawfulness of the detention measures ‘must be able to take into account both
the facts stated and the evidence adduced by the administrative authority and
any observations that may be submitted by the third-country national’ (Mahdi,
§62). He then drew attention to the paramount importance of the right to
judicial protection in guaranteeing respect of the right to liberty (§86).
Detention ordered on the basis of Return Directive, Reception Conditions
Directive or Dublin III Regulation must respect the principle of
proportionality and fundamental rights of the individuals concerned (§87).
Plunging into
the analysis of possible infringements on fundamental rights, the AG observed
that the limitation on the scope of judicial control of detention measures
constitutes a restriction of fundamental right to a remedy which shall be examined
under Article 52 of the Charter. He underlined that the very essence of the
right to effective judicial protection as well as protection against arbitrary
detention would be infringed if the judge could not release a person detained
even after having come to conclusion that detention was illegal (§91).
The
impossibility for a judge to examine all relevant issues concerning the
lawfulness of detention, may result in person being detained in situation where
the conditions pertaining to detention are not (or are no longer) met (§92).
This is inadmissible given that Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Return Directive
and Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Reception Conditions Directive state clearly
that when the detention is unlawful, the person concerned shall be released
immediately. The release shall be thus an immediate consequence of finding that
detention is illegal (§92).
The AG insisted
again on the importance of the right to liberty and underlined that national
procedural rules shall not allow doubts as to the lawfulness of detention to
persist (§95). In a nutshell, the jurisdiction called upon to assess the
lawfulness of detention order must control respect of general and abstract
rules setting the conditions and modalities of detention. The limitation on the
possibility for a judge to examine the issues and arguments which were not
raised by the parties does not respect the principle of effectiveness. The
Dutch legislation is incompatible with Article 15 of the Return Directive, Article
9 of the Reception Conditions Directive and Article 28 of the Dublin III
Regulation read in conjunction with Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter.
Comments
The Opinion of
AG de la Tour deserves attention for several reasons. Most importantly, the Joined
cases would be the first occasion for the Court to directly adjudicate upon the
question of an obligation to apply EU law ex officio in the context of detention
of TCNs. Should the Grand Chamber follow the solution proposed by the AG, the
judgement will be another example of the increasing influence of EU law on shaping
national procedural rules in the field of migration (I). Furthermore, the
Opinion sheds more light on the potential of EU fundamental rights to play a
key role in setting limits of national procedural autonomy (II).
Obligation of ex officio review of detention: a sign
of ‘progressive revolution’ in the ECJ’s approach towards national procedural
rules?
The AG underscored
the unprecedented nature of the subject-matter in the cases at hand. This will be the first time when the Court will
rule on the obligation of ex officio application of EU law in the context
involving the application of the fundamental right to liberty (§1 and §80). As
mentioned above, the Court has already stated that, in principle, national
courts do not have obligation to raise points of EU law of their own motion.
There are some exceptions to this rule, for instance in the field of consumer
law (see eg. case
Mostaza Claro, C-168/05). The AG proposed that in the situations concerning
fundamental right to liberty the judge must proceed to assessment of all
conditions pertaining to detention of his own motion, establishing thus a new
exception to the rule on the lack of obligation to apply EU law ex officio. Importantly,
the AG referred to obligation rather than a simple possibility for a national
judge to review the lawfulness of detention on the grounds different from those
relied on by the parties. In this regard, he opted for a more intrusive interference
with the national procedural rules.
The creation of
positive obligations and direct intervention into national procedures are a fairly
rare phenomenon in the ECJ’s case law which has nonetheless become more
visible in the recent years, at least as far as the field of migration and
asylum law is concerned. Suffice it to mention for
instance Országos (C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19
PPU) case in which Court stated that the national
judge had to declare himself competent to examine detention measures decided by
administrative body even though he did not have such a power under national law.
In that judgement, the right to fundamental remedy enshrined in Article 47 of
the Charter as well as in the relevant provisions of secondary law (Article 15
of Return Directive and Article 9 of Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33)
played an eminent role in the Court’s reasoning.
Importantly, the
developments regarding the significance of the right to an effective remedy in
protection of procedural rights of migrants are not confined to the cases dealing
with detention: they are also present in other areas of EU migration law. In a
relatively recent case H.
A. v État belge (C‑194/19) concerning
the scope of the right to a judicial remedy as guaranteed under Dublin III Regulation,
the Court ruled that, when examining the lawfulness of transfer decision, the
national judge shall be able to take due account of circumstances subsequent to
the adoption of that decision. These findings were similarly the fruit of
generous interpretation of the right to an effective remedy and a limited
application of the doctrine of national procedural autonomy. Earlier, in the
context involving the application of the Visa
Code, building on the potential of Article 47 of the Charter, the Court
interpreted the provision on the right to bring appeal against the refusal of
visa (Article 32(3)) as requiring the establishment of judicial (and not solely
administrative) remedy (El
Hassani, C‑403/16). On several occasions, Article 47 of the
Charter has thus served as a tool for unearthing the ‘creationist’
side of the principle of effective judicial protection which allows the
Court to readjust or directly establish new remedies for the protection of
rights guaranteed by EU law.
Given that, in the
past, the Court directly conferred to national judges’ power to review the
legality of detention (Országos), the imposition of duty to raise the point of
EU law of their own motion would not constitute a revolutionary move in the
Court’s case law on national procedural rules. Yet,
cumulatively, case law on procedural rights and obligations is a significant
step forward for enhanced protection of fundamental rights which may lead to
renewal of the Court’s approach towards the doctrine of national procedural
autonomy.
Concern for protection of fundamental rights as a key
rationale for further limitation of national procedural autonomy in EU
migration law
The principle of
national procedural autonomy has traditionally been subject to requirements
resulting from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, subsequently
complemented by the principle of effective judicial protection currently
enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. It has been argued that analysis
focused on the respect of Article 47 of the Charter had a vocation to replace
the ‘traditional test’ of effectiveness. The present opinion does not
provide much clarification on the blurred relationship between effectiveness
and effective judicial protection. The principle of national procedural
autonomy, effectiveness and the ‘procedural rule of reason test’ are the
starting point of the AG’s examination of compatibility of national legislation
with EU law. Yet, very quickly the focus shifts towards the assessment of the
effects the said legislation may have on the protection of fundamental right to
liberty and right to a judicial remedy. All in all, fundamental rights-based
analysis trumps the ‘procedural rule of reason test’. Whereas Article 47
constitutes a natural benchmark for assessing the compatibility of national
procedural rules with EU law, the extensive reliance on the fundamental right
to liberty in the AG’s reasoning illustrates a new trend in the field.
At the very
beginning of his Opinion, AG de la Tour underlined that the importance of the
right to liberty and the essential role of judges in protection of the latter
justify a certain distrust (‘une certaine méfiance’) towards national
procedural rules limiting the powers of judges (§1). The reasoning of the AG
conspicuously marked by the concern for protection of the fundamental right to
liberty (see in particular §86 and following).
On many
occasions the AG refers to Article 6 of the Charter and to the provisions of
secondary law concerning the detention conditions. The intrinsic links between
the effective access to judge and adequate protection against arbitrary
detention underlie a more demanding approach towards national procedural rules.
The prominent role of the right to remedy in the protection of fundamental
right to liberty justified the creation of obligation for national judge to
examine the respect of all detention conditions of his own motion.
The Opinion
illustrates that the concern for protection of fundamental rights may
significantly affect the process of drawing the boundaries of national
procedural autonomy. Presumably, in the future, the Court will leave less
margin of manoeuvre for the application of national procedural rules in
situations where the protection of EU fundamental rights is at stake. Such a
stricter approach towards national rules could have been observed in previous
case law. In the aforementioned cases Mahdi and Országos, the extension of
powers of national judges served primarily as a mean of protection of
fundamental right to an effective remedy and right to liberty. In those two cases
however, the Court relied mostly on the sources of secondary law, making only
minor references to Article 6 of the Charter. By contrast, the latter provision,
together with Article 47 of the Charter constituted the very basis of the AG’s analysis.
The Opinion confirms that the limitation of constantly shrinking area of
national procedural autonomy may result not solely from the large scope Article
47 of the Charter but also, the necessity to protect substantive fundamental
rights such as the right to liberty.
Finally, it is
worth noting that, as the Council of State accurately pointed out (§39), ex
officio examination of the conditions of lawfulness of detention has not been
so far imposed by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). Assuming that
the Court will follow the solution proposed by the AG, the standard of
protection of fundamental right to liberty and right to an effective remedy
under EU legal framework will be arguably higher than the one guaranteed within
the system of the European Convention of Human Rights. In this regard, the joined
cases at hand have potential to become
another example of judgement in which the CJEU did not hesitate to go further
than the ECtHR in terms of protection of basic freedoms of migrants.
It will be
interesting to observe whether the Grand Chamber’s judgement in C, B and X will
be, alike the AG’s Opinion, centred around the concern for protection of fundamental
rights and whether such an approach would result in a more thorough review of
national procedural rules. Should the ECJ decide to impose a new duty to
national judges, the judgement will confirm the tendency in recent case law on
adjusting the application of national procedural rules for the sake of
protecting the fundamental rights. Independently of the of the outcome of the
judgement, the Opinion of AG de la Tour confirms that Article 47 of the Charter
has already become as a powerful tool for boosting effective judicial
protection, in particular in situations where it is relied upon for purposes of
securing the respect of substantive fundamental rights.
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