Andreas
Stephan, Professor of Competition Law & Head of UEA Law School,
University of East Anglia*
On Friday 2 March 2018, in a
much-anticipated speech
meant to give clarity to the UK Government’s Brexit objectives, the Prime
Minister suggested that: (a) UK State Aid and Competition rules could remain
aligned with those of the EU, and (b) UK courts could continue to have regard
to judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Nevertheless, her speech
also made it abundantly clear that the ECJ could not continue to have
jurisdiction over the UK. While, on the face of it, this speech appears to
reiterate Theresa May’s commitment to a ‘hard Brexit’, these significant
concessions may signal a weakening of that resolve, as the Government
acknowledges for the first time that – if the UK is to maintain a close trading
relationship with the EU – the legal realities of Brexit will be
complicated.
Even before the PM delivered her
speech, the Government confirmed it was targeting a border with the EU that was
as ‘frictionless’ as possible. Yet it also maintained very hard lines on taking
back control of immigration and denying the ECJ any continued jurisdiction over
UK courts and laws. This appeared to make a trade agreement – i.e. something
akin to the EU-Canada
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) – the only viable option
for the UK.
What has brought the realities of
a hard Brexit into sharp focus are concerns over the border between the UK and
the EU in Ireland. A return to customs checks (a ‘hard border’) could
jeopardise the peace process in Northern Ireland. Yet the most sensible
solution (giving NI a special semi-autonomous status of being part of the UK
but also in regulatory alignment with the EU) risks bringing down the
Conservative Government. They rely on the voting
support of the Democratic Unionist Party, who want NI to have exactly the
same Brexit settlement as Great Britain, so as to ensure the outcome does not increase
the likelihood of an eventual Irish reunification.
So most commentators were
expecting a softening in the Prime Minister’s stance last week, but few were
expecting that softening to take the form of a discussion of competition
policy. She began by making an important statement about the future influence
of ECJ case law on UK law:
The second
hard fact is that even after we have left the jurisdiction of the ECJ, EU law
and the decisions of the ECJ will continue to affect us… When we leave the EU,
the Withdrawal Bill will bring EU law into UK Law. That means cases will be
determined in our courts. But, where appropriate, our courts will continue to
look at the ECJ’s judgments, as they do for the appropriate jurisprudence of
other countries’ courts. And if, as part of our future relationship, Parliament
passes an identical law to the EU law, it may make sense for our courts to look
at the appropriate ECJ judgments so that we both interpret those laws
consistently.
She then went further, using
competition policy to illustrate her point:
If we want
good access to each other’s markets, it has to be on fair terms. As with any
trade agreement, we must accept the need for binding commitments – for example,
we may choose to commit some areas of our regulations like state aid and
competition to remaining in step with the EU’s. The UK drove much of the policy
in this area and we have much to gain from maintaining proper disciplines on
the use of subsidies and on anti-competitive practices.
These statements are significant
because they represent the Government’s first significant departure from its
characterisation of Brexit as a simple ‘in/out’ choice. What the Prime Minister
is suggesting above, goes well beyond what might be expected from WTO rules
(which do not include competition provisions per se) or from a Canada-style
trade agreement.
For example, CETA contains a
recognition of the importance of Competition policy to trading relations and
the responsibility of each party to apply its domestic competition law. There
is no requirement of equivalence in rules – indeed, EU and Canadian competition
laws are very different in a number of respects. In terms of State Aid, the
agreement requires parties to report certain subsidies to each other every two
years and a non-binding mechanism through which each party must try and
minimise the adverse effects of the subsidy on the complaining party’s
interests. There is no requirement of pre-authorisation rules similar to those
under EU State Aid Law.
Continued Supremacy of EU Law by the Backdoor?
In the first
academic paper to be published on Competition Policy after Brexit, we
identified that there was a strong advantage in UK competition law remaining
closely aligned to EU law, so as to minimise the regulatory burden on
businesses operating in both jurisdictions.** We also
noted that it was not unusual for UK courts to consider the jurisprudence of
closely related jurisdictions (such as Australia and New Zealand) when dealing
with novel questions of law, even though they were under no obligation to do
so. This was echoed in the work of the Brexit Competition Law Working Group (Issues
Paper (October 2016) and Conclusions
and Recommendations (July 2017), as well as in Richard Whish’s recent contribution
to the House of Lords European Union Committee report on ‘Brexit: Competition
and State Aid’. Whish suggested that, at the very least, UK authorities should
be required to ‘have regard to’ EU law and precedent.
The Prime Minister’s statement,
in fact, goes even further. The idea that competition and state aid rules
should ‘remain in step’ may suggest a de facto obligation on UK authorities to
follow EU jurisprudence. Indeed, the suggestion that Parliament might have to
‘adopt identical law to the EU’ also implies that – after Brexit – EU law will
have a far greater influence on the UK than had been anticipated. Yet all this
will occur without the UK having a say in the creation of new EU rules or the
decisions of the ECJ, except via the limited levers that will be available
through the trading agreement itself. As the junior partner in the
relationship, the UK will largely become a rule-taker, reminiscent of the role
that other small jurisdictions are forced into when dealing with much larger
trading partners.
Without the UK’s continued
participation in European Union institutions, the UK’s designated competition
authority, the CMA, may find itself having to replicate the European
Commission’s work, while being simultaneously bound to produce the same
outcomes – something that would clearly constitute a waste of administrative
time and taxpayer’s money. The Prime Minister herself acknowledged that the UK
‘drove much of the policy’ in EU Competition Law. Yet, it is precisely for this
reason that EU competition policy will not necessarily continue along the same
path we expect it to. With the UK’s influence gone, it may become less
free-market oriented and begin to depart from its effects-based approach.
Similarly, the EU rules surrounding State Aid (which, as we point out in our paper,
the UK is a clear net beneficiary of) may become more relaxed.
Conclusion: The beginning of a soft Brexit?
In conclusion, the Prime
Minister’s discussion of competition policy is very sensible from a business
perspective. A commitment to UK and EU competition and state aid rules
remaining closely aligned will provide certainty and reduce the regulatory
burden on firms wishing to invest in the UK. But, from a legal perspective, the
speech raises more questions than it answers. What will the precise obligation
be on UK authorities to stay closely aligned to EU rules? Under what
circumstances will Parliament need to enact laws ‘identical’ to those of the
EU? Will Competition Policy have a special status, or will this sort of
arrangement extended to other areas? Will the UK accept being a ‘rule-taker’,
or does the Government expect to have some leverage over European lawmaking
through the wording of the final agreement?
Now the door to continued
alignment with EU rules has been opened slightly, many of the questions we
thought were resolved (about the autonomy of UK law after Brexit) are now open
once more. Indeed, the Prime Minister’s speech came only a week after the opposition
Labour Party said it would pursue a Customs Union arrangement if it was elected
to Government. The prospect of a softer Brexit now looks more conceivable than
it did a few months ago; and it may all have started with a few seemingly
innocuous words about competition policy.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 27,
chapter 17
Photo credit: hifi-forum.de
*Reblogged from Competition
Policy Blog
**B Lyons, D Reader and A
Stephan, ‘UK
Competition Policy post-Brexit: taking back control while resisting the siren
calls’ (2017) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 5(1), pp. 347-374. An early
draft is available as: ‘UK
Competition Policy Post-Brexit: In the Public Interest?’ (2016) CCP Working
Paper 16-12.
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