Professor Steve Peers,
University of Essex
There is an apparent risk that
the negotiations on the Brexit withdrawal agreement could break down over
forthcoming proposals to address the Irish border controls issue. It is
unfortunate that the UK government has not tabled its own treaty text or more
advanced proposals for customs facilitation away from the borders. And it is
tragic that the British public is burdened, in the form of their current Foreign
Secretary, with one of the most incompetent politicians in British history –
unable to grasp the obvious differences between levying a congestion charge at
the border of London boroughs and the vastly more complex task of avoiding
border checks between the UK and Ireland.
Be that as it may, in advance of
the Commission’s proposals due tomorrow, I have suggested (in Annex 1) a text on
the Irish border issues for the withdrawal agreement, which reflects the joint
report agreed in December (discussed here)
as much as possible. For ease of reference, Annex 2 includes the relevant excerpt
from the Joint Report.
I have reflected the text of the
joint report as faithfully as possible, with the exception of one contradiction
which I could not reconcile. Some parts of the joint report appeared to me to
be political commitments, so I suggest that they appear as Joint Declarations
or UK-only declarations which would be part of the Final Act of the withdrawal
agreement (this is a common approach to treaty drafting).
On the key issue of “regulatory
alignment”, my suggested text reflects that this is the third of three options,
and so suggests deferring negotiation on the details until after Brexit day. This
would also reflect the difficulty of negotiating the first or second option
before Brexit day, and would reduce the risk of a collapse of the talks, which
would jeopardise the two sides’ objectives on the border issue and the other
issues at stake in the talks (the protection of EU27 and UK citizens’ rights,
if they moved before Brexit day, and avoiding the economic impact of a WTO-only
“no deal” outcome on both sides).
However, this suggestion to support
the UK government’s argument to defer the “regulatory alignment” issues
presupposes that in the meantime the UK government puts full effort into the
first option, proposing a customs facilitation treaty that would avoid border
checks and a plan to give it effect. This should include any additional provisions
which may be necessary to keep the UK’s commitments to ensure North-South
cooperation functions on the island of Ireland after Brexit.
If the UK government cannot do so
then it should have the integrity to acknowledge that the promises on this
issue made during the referendum campaign were false, rather than blame the EU
or Ireland, or particularly Remain voters (whose concern about the possible complications
was dismissed as “scaremongering”) for the consequences.
Note that the “1973 reset” canard
that “the UK and Ireland never had controls before” ignores the fact that the
two countries never previously diverged as to whether they were EEC/EU members
or not. And the notion of Ireland leaving the EU – against the views of 88% of voters – seems
about as likely as the ghost of Eamon de Valera leading the next Orange order parade.
I have proposed alternative
wording, where relevant, to take account of the position of the current UK
government, on the one hand, and of a potential Labour government (see my comments
on Jeremy Corbyn’s speech yesterday) on the other.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 27
Photo credit: Forbes
Annex 1 – proposed
text of withdrawal agreement and declarations
Article 1
The withdrawal of the United
Kingdom from the European Union shall not prejudice the operation of the 1998 Good
Friday or Belfast Agreement, including its subsequent implementation agreements
and arrangements, and to the effective operation of each of the institutions
and bodies established under them.
This gives effect to part of paragraph 43 of the Joint Report. Unlike
the Joint Report, it does not refer only to the UK’s obligations.
Article 2
The United Kingdom and the
European Union shall refrain from installing any physical infrastructure or
related checks and controls at the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland.
This gives effect to the “no hard borders” part of paragraph 43 of the
Joint Report. Unlike the Joint Report, it does not refer only to the UK’s
obligations.
Article 3
1. This Part is without prejudice
to agreement on the future relationship between the European Union and the
United Kingdom.
2. This Part is specific to the
unique circumstances on the island of Ireland.
This partly reflects paragraph 46 of the Joint Report. The paragraph
goes on to say that the commitments “are made and must be upheld in all
circumstances, irrespective of the nature of any future agreement between the
European Union and United Kingdom”. However, this is inconsistent with the same
paragraph saying that the commitments “will not pre-determine the outcome” of
future talks; and it is questionable whether parties to a treaty can bind
themselves as to what replacement arrangement they might agree in future. The
provision on “unique” circumstances arguably points to a relaxation of the EU27’s
“no cherry picking” rule.
Article 4
1. Following the expiry of the [transitional]
[implementation] period, the obligation in Article 2 shall be ensured by a [customs
cooperation] [customs union] agreement to be negotiated before that date between
the United Kingdom and the European Union, which shall include any additional
provisions necessary to ensure the absence of physical infrastructure or
related checks and controls at the border and the protection of North-South
cooperation on the island of Ireland.
This gives effect to the first option in paragraph 49: “The United
Kingdom's intention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK
relationship”. The first set of square brackets reflect the UK government and
EU27’s different description of the period after Brexit Day. The second set of
square brackets offers an alternative wording reflecting the current UK’s
government’s position and a potential future Labour government position
respectively. See also the proposed joint declaration 3.
2. In the event that the agreement
referred to in paragraph 1 is not concluded, the United Kingdom will propose
specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland,
and the parties will negotiate in good faith on that basis to ensure the
absence of physical infrastructure or related checks and controls at the border
and the protection of North-South cooperation on the island of Ireland.
Reflects the second option in paragraph 49.
3. In the absence of on agreement
pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment
with those rules of the Internal Market [and the Customs Union] which, now or
in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the
protection of the 1998 Agreement. The list of those rules shall be established
by the Joint Committee within one year of the exit date.
The words in square brackets would be removed in the event of a Labour
government. This reflects the third option in paragraph 49. It adds an
obligation to agree on the list of relevant rules within one year of Brexit Day,
by which point it should be clearer whether discussions on the first or second
options lead to a possibility of agreement. The case for deferring this
discussion until after Brexit Day is that: a) it is premature in the absence of
discussions of the other options; and b) it increases the risk that no
withdrawal agreement can be concluded, putting at risk the intention to avoid a
hard border as well as all the other objectives of the agreement.
4. Each party will establish
mechanisms to ensure the implementation and oversight of any specific
arrangement to safeguard the integrity of the EU Internal Market [and the
Customs Union].
Based on paragraph 51 of the Joint Report. The precise intention of that
paragraph is not clear. The words in square brackets would be removed in the
event of a Labour government.
Declarations
Joint Declarations
1. Both Parties respect the
provisions of the 1998 Agreement regarding the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland and the principle of consent. This withdrawal agreement is fully
consistent with these provisions. The United Kingdom continues to respect and
support fully Northern Ireland's position as an integral part of the United
Kingdom, consistent with the principle of consent.
Based on paragraph 44
of the Joint Report.
2. Cooperation between Ireland
and Northern Ireland is a central part of the 1998 Agreement and is essential
for achieving reconciliation and the normalisation of relationships on the
island of Ireland. In this regard, both Parties recall the roles, functions and
safeguards of the Northern Ireland Executive, the Northern Ireland Assembly,
and the North-South Ministerial Council (including its cross-community
provisions) as set out in the 1998 Agreement.
Based on paragraph 47
of the Joint Report.
3. In order to give effect to
Article 4(1), the parties agree to enter into formal negotiations as soon as
possible after the exit date on the basis of the draft [customs cooperation]
[customs union] agreement proposed by the United Kingdom.
This would give concrete effect to the first option in paragraph 49 of
the Joint Report. It presupposes that the UK tables a draft treaty as soon as
possible in 2018. The options in square brackets offer alternative wording reflecting
the current UK’s government’s position and a potential future Labour government
position respectively.
4. Both Parties acknowledge that
the 1998 Agreement recognises the birth right of all the people of Northern
Ireland to choose to be Irish or British or both and be accepted as such. The people of Northern Ireland who are Irish
citizens will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they
reside in Northern Ireland. This Agreement respects, and is without prejudice,
to the rights, opportunities and identity that come with European Union citizenship
for such people.
Based on paragraph 52 of the Joint Report. That paragraph goes on to
sate that “in the next phase of negotiations”, the parties “will examine
arrangements required to give effect to the ongoing exercise of, and access to,
their EU rights, opportunities and benefits”, but it is not clear what this
refers to.
5. Both Parties recognise that
the United Kingdom and Ireland may continue to make arrangements between
themselves relating to the movement of persons between their territories
(Common Travel Area), while fully respecting the rights of natural persons
conferred by Union law, in accordance with the relevant Protocols attached to
the EU Treaties.
Based on the first part of paragraph 54 of the Joint Report, with an
additional reference to primary EU law.
6. In accordance with Part X [financial settlement], both Parties will honour their
commitments to the PEACE and INTERREG funding programmes under the current
multi-annual financial framework. Possibilities for future support will be
examined favourably, in accordance with Part Y [[transitional] [implementation]
period].
Based on the first part of paragraph 55 of the Joint Report, with
cross-references to the other parts of the agreement added. It would be odd if
the UK were not consulted on the proposal for a future peace programme during
the transition or implementation period, given that it is likely to be tabled
in spring 2018 but perhaps not formally adopted until after Brexit day.
UK Declarations
1. The United Kingdom respects
Ireland's ongoing membership of the European Union and all of the corresponding
rights and obligations that entails, in particular Ireland's place in the
Internal Market and the Customs Union. The United Kingdom also recalls its
commitment to preserving the integrity of its internal market and Northern
Ireland's place within it, as the United Kingdom leaves the European Union's
Internal Market and [Customs Union][enters into a Customs Union with the European
Union].
Based on paragraph 45 of the Joint Report. The two alternatives in
square brackets reflect the positions of the current UK government and a
potential Labour government respectively.
2. The United Kingdom remains
committed to protecting and supporting continued North-South and East-West
cooperation across the full range of political, economic, security, societal
and agricultural contexts and frameworks of cooperation, including the continued
operation of the North-South implementation bodies.
Based on paragraph 48
of the Joint Report.
3. In the event that Article 4(3)
of this agreement becomes applicable, the United Kingdom will ensure that no
new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the
United Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern
Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate
for Northern Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to
ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland's businesses to the
whole of the United Kingdom internal market.
Based on paragraph 50
of the Joint Report.
4. The United Kingdom commits to
ensuring that no diminution of rights is caused by its departure from the
European Union, including in the area of protection against forms of
discrimination enshrined in EU law. The United Kingdom commits to facilitating
the related work of the institutions and bodies, established by the 1998
Agreement, in upholding human rights and equality standards.
Based on paragraph 53 of the Joint Report. There is an interesting
question as to whether this was intended to become a binding obligation, in
which case it should be reciprocated.
5 The United Kingdom confirms and
accepts that the Common Travel Area and associated rights and privileges can
continue to operate without affecting Ireland’s obligations under Union law, in
particular with respect to free movement for EU citizens.
Based on the second part of paragraph 54 of the Joint Report.
Annex II – joint report text
42. Both Parties affirm that the
achievements, benefits and commitments of the peace process will remain of
paramount importance to peace, stability and reconciliation. They agree that
the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement reached on 10 April 1998 by the United
Kingdom Government, the Irish Government and the other participants in the
multi-party negotiations (the '1998 Agreement') must be protected in all its
parts, and that this extends to the practical application of the 1998 Agreement
on the island of Ireland and to the totality of the relationships set out in
the Agreement.
43. The United Kingdom’s
withdrawal from the European Union presents a significant and unique challenge
in relation to the island of Ireland. The United Kingdom recalls its commitment
to protecting the operation of the 1998 Agreement, including its subsequent
implementation agreements and arrangements, and to the effective operation of
each of the institutions and bodies established under them. The United Kingdom
also recalls its commitment to the avoidance of a hard border, including any
physical infrastructure or related checks and controls.
44. Both Parties recognise the
need to respect the provisions of the 1998 Agreement regarding the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the principle of consent. The
commitments set out in this joint report are and must remain fully consistent
with these provisions. The United Kingdom continues to respect and support
fully Northern Ireland's position as an integral part of the United Kingdom,
consistent with the principle of consent.
45. The United Kingdom respects
Ireland's ongoing membership of the European Union and all of the corresponding
rights and obligations that entails, in particular Ireland's place in the
Internal Market and the Customs Union. The United Kingdom also recalls its
commitment to preserving the integrity of its internal market and Northern
Ireland's place within it, as the United Kingdom leaves the European Union's
Internal Market and Customs Union.
46. The commitments and
principles outlined in this joint report will not pre-determine the outcome of
wider discussions on the future relationship between the European Union and the
United Kingdom and are, as necessary, specific to the unique circumstances on
the island of Ireland. They are made and
must be upheld in all circumstances, irrespective of the nature of any future
agreement between the European Union and United Kingdom.
47. Cooperation between Ireland
and Northern Ireland is a central part of the 1998 Agreement and is essential
for achieving reconciliation and the normalisation of relationships on the
island of Ireland. In this regard, both Parties recall the roles, functions and
safeguards of the Northern Ireland Executive, the Northern Ireland Assembly,
and the North-South Ministerial Council (including its cross-community
provisions) as set out in the 1998 Agreement. The two Parties have carried out
a mapping exercise, which shows that North-South cooperation relies to a
significant extent on a common European Union legal and policy framework.
Therefore, the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union gives rise to
substantial challenges to the maintenance and development of North-South
cooperation.
48. The United Kingdom remains
committed to protecting and supporting continued North-South and East-West
cooperation across the full range of political, economic, security, societal
and agricultural contexts and frameworks of cooperation, including the continued
operation of the North-South implementation bodies.
49. The United Kingdom remains
committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of
avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these
overarching requirements. The United Kingdom's intention is to achieve these
objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible,
the United Kingdom will propose specific solutions to address the unique
circumstances of the island of Ireland. In the absence of agreed solutions, the
United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal
Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South
cooperation, the allisland economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.
50. In the absence of agreed
solutions, as set out in the previous paragraph, the United Kingdom will ensure
that no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest
of the United Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern
Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate
for Northern Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to
ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland's businesses to the
whole of the United Kingdom internal market.
51. Both Parties will establish
mechanisms to ensure the implementation and oversight of any specific
arrangement to safeguard the integrity of the EU Internal Market and the
Customs Union.
52. Both Parties acknowledge that
the 1998 Agreement recognises the birth right of all the people of Northern
Ireland to choose to be Irish or British or both and be accepted as such. The people of Northern Ireland who are Irish
citizens will continue to enjoy rights as EU citizens, including where they
reside in Northern Ireland. Both Parties therefore agree that the Withdrawal
Agreement should respect and be without prejudice to the rights, opportunities
and identity that come with European Union citizenship for such people and, in
the next phase of negotiations, will examine arrangements required to give
effect to the ongoing exercise of, and access to, their EU rights,
opportunities and benefits.
53. The 1998 Agreement also
includes important provisions on Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity
for which EU law and practice has provided a supporting framework in Northern
Ireland and across the island of Ireland. The United Kingdom commits to
ensuring that no diminution of rights is caused by its departure from the
European Union, including in the area of protection against forms of
discrimination enshrined in EU law. The United Kingdom commits to facilitating
the related work of the institutions and bodies, established by the 1998
Agreement, in upholding human rights and equality standards.
54 Both Parties recognise that
the United Kingdom and Ireland may continue to make arrangements between
themselves relating to the movement of persons between their territories
(Common Travel Area), while fully respecting the rights of natural persons
conferred by Union law. The United
Kingdom confirms and accepts that the Common Travel Area and associated rights
and privileges can continue to operate without affecting Ireland’s obligations
under Union law, in particular with respect to free movement for EU
citizens.
55. Both Parties will honour
their commitments to the PEACE and INTERREG funding programmes under the
current multi-annual financial framework. Possibilities for future support will
be examined favourably.
56. Given the specific nature of
issues related to Ireland and Northern Ireland, and on the basis of the
principles and commitments set out above, both Parties agree that in the next
phase work will continue in a distinct strand of the negotiations on the
detailed arrangements required to give them effect. Such work will also address
issues arising from Ireland’s unique geographic situation, including the
transit of goods (to and from Ireland via the United Kingdom), in line with the
approach established by the European Council Guidelines of 29 April 2017.
Hi There is merit in your text. The issue remains though, fundamentally Option 3. Deciding jointly which elements will be covered is really just postponing the inevitable crux. As this is the crux. There already has been a scoping operation that identifies 141 areas of North South cooperation that Ireland and the EU will want covered. That is effectively a border on the Irish Sea on all things from animal feed to water quality. If the DUP are still putting pressure on the British Govt they will want very few of any areas covered. If agreement is not reached then what happens to the Border? Will any subsequent UK/EU deal be contingent upon agreement? There is no way out of this and the EU will not want to risk a hard border by playing semantic games with the British and their delusions.
ReplyDeleteAgreed the issue can't be postponed for ever. My argument is that it should be postponed *for now* - on the condition that the UK government agree to put a serious customs cooperation proposal forward - because there's too much to lose if these talks crash over an issue which doesn't have to be agreed yet.
DeleteI agree with Johnito.
DeleteUltimately May's red lines (unless substantially relaxed) means a hard brexit either in March 2019 or December 2020. Deferring the issue to the transition period only means postponing the inevitable if it is that Tories would reject the Option 3 backstop while not putting forward any proposals for Options 1 and 2. It's been over a year since the Article 50 negotiation and almost 2 years since the referendum and the UK government is still no closer to putting forward a coherent post-Brexit trade policy with the EU. It is very doubtful that an extra 2 years grace period will enable them to move further along to formulating such a policy.
The only merit I see in postponing the fleshing out of Option 3 is that it gives the EU time to prepare in case the Britsh crashing out of the single market and customs union really is inevitable. On the other hand, fleshing out the proposals now has the plus that if the clock continues to run down and the British government really does begin to feel the pressure of a car-crash Brexit, then they may simply agree to the only text available on the negotiating table out of desperation, or (far more remotely) might even reconsider Brexit altogether.
Note that the “1973 reset” canard that “the UK and Ireland never had controls before” ignores the fact that the two countries never previously diverged as to whether they were EEC/EU members or not.
ReplyDelete--
And it's not actually true. The UK and Ireland has a tariff-based (and highly asymmetrical) trade war shortly after Ireland's independence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Irish_Trade_War
And the NI/IE border not only had checkpoints, but militarised checkpoints.
I don't think you can trust the UK government to put forward serious proposals.
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