Lorna Woods, Professor of Internet Law, University
of Essex*
Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights has heard
numerous challenges to surveillance regimes, both individual and mass
surveillance, with mixed results over the years. Following the Snowden revelations, the question would be
whether the ECtHR would take a hard line particularly as regards mass
surveillance, given its suggestion in Kennedy that indiscriminate
acquisition of vast amounts of data should not be permissible. Other human
rights bodies have condemned this sort of practice, as can be seen by the UN Resolution 68/167 the
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. Even within the EU there has been concern
as can be seen in cases such as Digital Rights Ireland (discussed here) and more
recently in Schrems (discussed here). The Human
Rights Court has now begun to answer this question, in the Grand Chamber
judgment in Zakharov v. Russia (47143/06), handed down on December 4 2015.
Facts
Zakharov, a publisher and a chairman of an NGO
campaigning for media freedom and journalists’ rights, sought to challenge the
Russian system for permitting surveillance in the interests of crime prevention
and national security. Z claimed that the privacy of his communications across
mobile networks was infringed as the Russian State, by virtue of Order No. 70,
had required the network operators to install equipment which permitted the
Federal Security Service to intercept all telephone communications without
prior judicial authorisation.
This facilitated blanket interception of mobile
communications. Attempts to challenge this and to ensure that access to
communications was restricted to authorised personnel were unsuccessful at
national level. The matter was brought before the European Court of Human
Rights. He argued that the laws relating to monitoring infringe his right to
private life under Article 8; that parts of these laws are not accessible; and
that there are no effective remedies (thus also infringing Art. 13 ECHR).
Judgment
The first question was whether the case was
admissible. The Court will usually not rule on questions in abstracto,
but rather on the application of rules to a particular situation. This makes
challenges to the existence of a system, rather than its use, problematic. The
Court has long recognised that secret surveillance can give rise to particular
features that may justify a different approach. Problematically, there were two
lines of case law, one of which required the applicant to show a ‘reasonable
likelihood’ that the security services had intercepted the applicant’s
communications (Esbester) and which favoured the Government’s position,
and the other which suggested the menace provided by a secret surveillance
system was sufficient (Klass) and which favoured the applicant.
The Court took the opportunity to try to resolve
these potentially conflicting decisions, developing its reasoning in Kennedy.
It accepted the principle that legislation can be challenged subject to two
conditions: the applicant potentially falls within the scope of the system; and
the level of remedies available. This gives the Court a form of decision matrix
in which a range of factual circumstances can be assessed. Where there are no
effective remedies, the menace argument set out in its ruling in Klass would
be accepted.
Crucially, even where there are remedies, an
applicant can still challenge the legislation if ‘due to his personal
situation, he is potentially at risk of being subjected to such measures’ [para
171]. This requirement of ‘potentially at risk’ seems lower than the
‘reasonable likelihood’ test in the earlier case of Esbester. The
conditions were satisfied in this case as it has been recognised that mobile
communications fall within ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ (see Liberty,
para 56, cited here para 173).
This brought the Court to consider whether the
intrusion could be justified. Re-iterating the well-established principles
that, to be justified, any interference must be in accordance with the law,
pursue a legitimate aim listed in Article 8(2) and be necessary in a democratic
society, the Court considered each in turn.
The requirement of lawfulness has a double aspect,
formal and qualitative. The challenged measure must be based in domestic law,
but it must also be accessible to the person concerned and be foreseeable as to
its effects (see e.g Rotaru). While these principles are generally
applicable to all cases under Article 8 (and applied analogously in other
rights, such as Articles 9, 10 and 11 ECHR), the Court noted the specificity of
the situation. It stated that:
‘…. domestic law must be sufficiently clear
to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and
the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to any such
measures’ [para 229].
In this, the Court referred to a long body of
jurisprudence relating to surveillance, which recognises the specific nature of
the threats that surveillance is used to address. In the earlier case of Kennedy for
example, the Court noted that ‘threats to national security may vary in
character and may be unanticipated or difficult to define in advance’ [para
159].
While the precision required of national law might
be lower than the normal standard, the risk of abuse and arbitrariness are
clear, so the exercise of any discretion must be laid down by law both as to
its scope and the manner of its exercise. It stated that ‘it would be contrary
to the rule of law … for a discretion granted to the executive in the sphere of
national security to be expressed in terms of unfettered power’ [para 247].
Here, the Court noted that prior judicial authorisation was an important
safeguard [para 249]. The Court gave examples of minimum safeguards:
§ The nature of
offences which may give rise to an interception order
§ A definition of the
categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped
§ A limit on the
duration of telephone tapping
§ Protections and
procedures for use, storage and examination of resulting data
§ Safeguards relating
to the communication of data to third parties
§ Circumstances in
which data/recordings must be erased/destroyed (para 231)
§ the equipment
installed by the secret services keeps no logs or records of intercepted
communication, which coupled with the direct access rendered any supervisory
arrangements incapable of detecting unlawful interceptions
§ the emergency
procedure provided for in Russian law, which enables interception without
judicial authorization, does not provide sufficient safeguards against abuse.
The Court then considered the principles for
assessing whether the intrusion was ‘necessary in a democratic society’,
highlighting the tension between the needs to protect society and the
consequences of that society of the measures taken to protect it. The Court
emphasised that it must be satisfied that there are adequate and effective
guarantees against abuse.
In this oversight mechanisms are central,
especially where individuals will not – given the secret and therefore
unknowable nature of surveillance – be in a position to protect their own
rights. The court’s preference is to entrust supervisory control to a judge.
For an individual to be able to challenge surveillance retrospectively,
affected individuals need either to be informed about surveillance or for
individuals to be able to bring challenges on the basis of a suspicion that
surveillance has taken place.
Russian legislation lacks clarity concerning the
categories of people liable to have their phones tapped, specifically through
the blurring of witnesses with suspects and the fact that the security services
have a very wide discretion. The provisions regarding discontinuation of
surveillance are omitted in the case of the security services. The provisions
regarding the storage and destruction of data allow for the retention of data
which is clearly irrelevant; and as regards those charged with a criminal
offence is unclear as to what happens to the material after the trial.
Notably, the domestic courts do not verify whether
there is a reasonable suspicion against the person in respect of whose
communications the security services have requested interception be permitted.
Further, there is little assessment of whether the interception is necessary or
justified: in practice it seems that the courts accept a mere reference to
national security issues as being sufficient.
The details of the authorisation are also not
specified, so authorisations have been granted without specifying – for example
– the numbers to be interception. The Russian system, which at a technical
level allows direct access, without the police and security services having to
show an authorisation is particularly prone to abuse. The Court determined that
the supervisory bodies were not sufficiently independent. Any effectiveness of
the remedies available to challenge interception of communications is
undermined by the fact that they are available only to persons who are able to
submit proof of interception, knowledge and evidence of which is hard if not
impossible to come by.
Comments
The Court could be seen as emphasising in its
judgment by repeated reference to its earlier extensive case law on
surveillance that there is nothing new here. Conversely, it could be argued
that Zakharov is a Grand Chamber
judgment which operates to reaffirm and highlight points made in previous
judgments about the dangers of surveillance and the risk of abuse. The timing
is also significant, particularly from a UK perspective. Zakharov was
handed down as the draft Investigatory Powers Bill was published. Cases against
the UK are pending at Strasbourg, while it follows the ECJ’s ruling in Schrems, with Davis (along
with the Swedish Tele2 reference), querying whether the Digital Rights ruling applies to
national data retention schemes, now pending before the
ECJ (on that issue, see discussion here). The ECtHR noted the Digital Rights Ireland case
in its summary of applicable law.
In setting out its framework for decisions, the
Court’s requirement of ‘potentially at risk’ even when remedies are available
seems lower than the ‘reasonable likelihood’ test in Esbester. The
Court’s concern relates to ‘the need to ensure that the secrecy of surveillance
measures does not result in the measures being effectively unchallengeable and
outside the supervision of the national judicial authorities and of the Court’
[para 171]. This broad approach to standing is, as noted by Judge Dedon’s
separate but concurring opinion, in marked contrast to the approach of the
United States Supreme Court in Clapper where that court
‘failed to take a step forward’ (Opinion, section 4).
The reassessment of ‘victim status’ simultaneously
determines standing, the question of the applicability of Article 8 and the
question of whether there has been an infringement of that right. The abstract
nature of the review then means that a lot falls on the determination of ‘in
accordance with the law’ and consequently the question of whether the measures
(rather than individual applications) are necessary in a democratic society.
The leads to a close review of the system itself and the safeguards built in.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Court did not just look at the provisions of
Russian law, but also considered how they were applied in practice.
The Court seemed particularly sceptical about
broadly determined definitions in the context of ‘national, military, economic
or ecological security’ which confer ‘almost unlimited degree of discretion’
[para 248]. Although the system required prior judicial authorisation (noted
para 259], in this case it was not sufficient counter to the breadth of the
powers. So, prior judicial authorisation will not be a ‘get out of gaol free’
card for surveillance systems. There must be real oversight by the relevant
authorities.
Further, the Court emphasised the need for the
identification of triggering factor(s) for interception of communications, as
otherwise this will lead to overbroad discretion [para 248]. Moreover, the
Court stated that the national authorisation authorities must be capable of
‘verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person
concerned’ [260-2], which in the context of technological access to mass
communications might be difficult to satisfy. The Court also required that
specific individuals or premises be identified. If it applies the same
principles to mass surveillance currently operated in other European states,
many systems might be hard to justify.
A further point to note relates to the technical
means by which the interception was carried out. The Court was particularly
critical of a system which allows the security services and the police the
means to have direct access to all communications. It noted that ‘their ability
to intercept the communications of a particular individual or individuals is
not conditional on providing an interception authorisation to the
communications service provider’ [para 268], thereby undermining any
protections provided by the prior authorisation system.
Crucially, the police and security services could
circumvent the requirement to demonstrate the legality of the interception
[para 269]. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the equipment used does
not create a log of the interceptions which again undermines the supervisory
authorities’ effectiveness [para 272]. This sort of reasoning could be applied
in other circumstances where police and security forces have direct technical
means to access content which is not dependent on access via a service provider
(e.g. hacking computers and mobiles).
In sum, not only has the Russian system been found
wanting in terms of compliance with Article 8, but the Court has drawn its
judgment in terms which raised questions about the validity of other systems of
mass surveillance.
*Reblogged with permission from the IALS Information Lawand Policy Centre blog
Barnard & Peers: chapter 9
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