Steve Peers
Today’s CJEU judgment in Alimanovic clarifies again the meaning of the EU law rules on the
thorny issue of EU citizens’ access to benefits in another Member State. Like
last year’s judgment in Dano
(discussed here), it takes a more restrictive approach than suggested by
the Court’s prior case law. However, like that prior judgment, today’s ruling
leaves some issues open. I will discuss in turn the judgment itself, the impact on EU citizens' access to benefits, and the UK government's plans to renegotiate the country's EU membership.
As a starting point, on the issue of EU
citizens’ access to benefits, it is important to make distinctions as regards
three issues: (a) the status of the person applying for the benefit ((i) not
economically active; (ii) first-time job-seeker in the host State; (iii) previously
employed in the host State; (iv) currently in work; (v) permanent resident); (b) the type of benefit at
issue (social assistance, or concerning access to the labour market); and (c) whether
the dispute concerns access to benefits or expulsion of the person concerned.
The judgment
The Alimanovic case concerns a Swedish woman and her daughter who had
worked in Germany briefly, then lost their jobs. They sought a particular
benefit in Germany, and the national court asked the CJEU if they were entitled
to it.
First of all, the Court
reiterated and expanded on what it had said in Dano: the benefit in question was a ‘social assistance’ benefit,
not a benefit relating to labour market access. This distinction is important because
the EU citizens’ Directive states that access to ‘social assistance’ benefits
can be denied to first-time job-seekers, for as long as they are seeking work,
and to all EU citizens during their first three months of residence. Furthermore,
the Court’s previous case law (interpreting the Treaty rules on free movement
of workers) states that first time job-seekers were entitled to benefits
relating to labour market access, but not to social assistance benefits. The
Court references that case law obliquely in the Alimanovic judgment, but does not either reaffirm or denounce it;
it should be noted that a case about job-seekers’ access to this same benefit
is pending (Garcia-Nieto: see the
Advocate-General’s opinion in that case here).
Secondly, the Court then turned
to the question of whether EU citizens who were previously briefly employed in
the host State could be denied social assistance benefits. The previously
employed are not one of the two categories of people specifically excluded from equal treatment to social
assistance benefits by the citizens’ Directive; but that does not necessarily
mean that they have access to those benefits.
To determine whether they had
access to those benefits, the Court interpreted the equal treatment rule in the
Directive, which states that equal treatment applies to all those EU citizens ‘residing
on the basis of this Directive’ and their family members (leaving aside the
exclusions which were already mentioned, as well as other exclusions in the
Treaties or other EU legislation). So were the two benefit claimants residing
on the basis of the Directive?
The Court ruled that they were
not still covered by the Directive as former workers, since the Directive says that
those who work in the host State for less than one year (as in their case)
retain ‘worker’ status for at least six months after becoming unemployed. After
that point, a Member State can (as Germany did) terminate their worker status,
which means (unless they have another basis to stay, which was not relevant in
this case) they are no longer covered by the equal treatment rule, and lose
access to social assistance benefits. The national court also took the view
that they could be classified as first-time job-seekers, although the Court
pointed out that in that case, the Directive expressly permits Germany to
refuse access to social assistance benefits.
Next, the Court distinguished
prior case law which requires an individual assessment of whether an EU citizen
could be expelled or is an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social assistance
system of the host State. In this case, no such assessment was needed, because
the citizens’ Directive already took account of the individual position of
workers. The specific period of retaining worker status set out in the
Directive and national law ensured legal certainty, while ‘while complying with
the principle of proportionality’. Finally, when considering whether there was
an ‘unreasonable burden’ on national systems, the individual claim did not
count: rather the total of all claims
would be ‘bound to’ constitute such a burden.
Comments
As in Dano, the CJEU does not expressly overturn prior case law, but
makes it easier for Member States to justify refusal of benefits than might
otherwise have been the case under prior case law. (See by analogy the
comparison of Dano with prior case
law here). It’s unsurprising that the benefit at issue is ‘social
assistance’, as the Court previously assumed in Dano, although this postpones any further clarification of the questions
of access to labour-market related benefits for the various categories of EU
citizens.
However, it’s rather more
surprising that the Court simply applies the Directive’s definition of former
workers. As recently as last year, in its judgment in Saint-Prix (discussed here), the Court insisted that the concept
of ‘worker’ was set out in the Treaties, not secondary legislation, and so it
fell mainly to be defined by the Court. In that ruling, the Court asserted that
a woman who gave up work just before giving birth retained ‘worker’ status (and
so access to benefits) under certain conditions. Yet in today’s judgment, the
Court simply follows the Directive’s definition of former worker, without overruling
or distinguishing (or even mentioning) the prior judgment. Certainly, as the
Court said, following the precise wording of the Directive on this point
promotes legal certainty; but it hardly promotes legal certainty to simply
ignore apparently conflicting lines of case law.
For the record, the other
circumstances in which the Directive requires ‘worker’ status to be retained
are where: the worker is ‘temporarily unable to work’ due to illness or
accident (the words ‘temporarily unable’ are not further defined); the worker
is unemployed after more than one year’s work, if he or she is ‘registered as a
job-seeker with the relevant employment office’; or the worker has begun
vocational training, although this must be linked to the worker’s prior
employment unless the worker is involuntarily unemployed.
Equally, it’s surprising that the
Court ruled out a requirement for an individual assessment of the former worker’s
position, which the Advocate-General had advocated (see discussion here).
The Court draws a distinction between the individual assessment which the
Directive implicitly requires as regards expulsion (more on expulsion of the
unemployed after the Dano judgment here)
and the issue of access to benefits. And the protection of the right of
residence which the EU legislature expressly set out for beneficiaries of
social assistance in the Directive has effectively been removed by the Court’s
interpretation in today’s judgment, which seems to set out an irrebuttable
presumption that any individual application for social assistance constitutes
an ‘unreasonable burden’ on national systems, due to the applications made by
other people in the same situation.
EU citizens’ access to benefits and expulsion: where do we stand?
It’s useful to summarise where we
stand after this judgment as regards various categories of EU citizens’ access
to benefits and expulsion.
(i) not seeking work: not
entitled to social assistance, or labour market benefits; no automatic
expulsion;
(ii) first-time job-seeker in the
host State: not entitled to social assistance, entitled to labour market
benefits; no expulsion as long as they can show evidence of job-seeking and genuine
chance of employment;
(iii) previously employed in the
host State: retain worker status on conditions set out in the Directive, or
during break from employment due to maternity on conditions set out in Saint-Prix; therefore still entitled to social
assistance or labour market benefits; no expulsion; if they do not meet the
conditions to retain worker status, Alimanovic
assumes that the rules on first-time job-seekers apply by analogy;
(iv) currently in work: entitled to
social assistance or labour market benefits; no expulsion.
(v) permanent residents (those
resident for more than five years legally): full equal treatment regarding
benefits and their status is no longer dependent on not applying for social
assistance; no expulsion.
Of course, any EU citizen can be
expelled on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, subject
to the detailed rules in the Directive; the references to expulsion above refer
to expulsion on other grounds. Permanent
residents have enhanced protection against expulsion on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health.
Implications for the UK’s renegotiation of EU membership
Finally, this brings us to the
elephant in the room: does today’s judgment have any implications for David
Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership? Last year, Cameron outlined
nine objectives specifically related to the free movement of EU citizens (he
also has objectives on other issues, as discussed here).
I examined those nine objectives
in detail at the time (see here). Let’s look at those nine objectives
again, in light of today’s judgment. I have underlined the impact which the
judgment might have on certain issues (I haven’t copied all of the prior
analysis, but only those parts which might be affected by the judgment). As we
can see, in general the judgment makes it easier to achieve the negotiation
objectives of curtailing the benefits of former workers who are now unemployed,
but it reaffirms the difficulty of changing rules relating to expulsion of
job-seekers.
1. No access to tax credits, housing
benefits and social housing for four years for EU citizens
For
EU citizens who are not workers, work-seekers or former workers, this confirms
the status quo, as set out in Dano.
For
EU citizens who are work-seekers, the free movement of workers in the Treaties
(as interpreted by the CJEU) requires Member States to give them access to
benefits linked to labour-market participation. These benefits would probably
not be covered by that rule. So this confirms the status quo.
For
EU citizens who are workers (as defined by the Treaties and CJEU
interpretation) or former workers (as defined by EU legislation, and the CJEU
interpretation of the Treaties), there is a right to equal treatment. As
regards workers, changing this rule would require a Treaty amendment.
However, as regards former workers, the Alimanovic
judgment implicitly suggests that it is generally up the EU legislature to
determine when they retain the status of ‘worker’. So potentially access to
benefits could be curtailed for former workers by means of amending secondary law – although the CJEU did refer to the
principle of proportionality in this context.
2.
Removal if job-seekers do not find a job within six months
For
EU job-seekers, the EU legislation states that they cannot be expelled as long
as they ‘can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and
that they have a genuine chance of being engaged’. This reflects the case law
of the CJEU, interpreting the Treaties (Antonissen judgment).
Therefore this change would require a Treaty amendment. The Alimanovic judgment reaffirms this rule
in the legislation.
3. Ending the entry of non-EU family
members without restrictions
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment.
4. Tougher and longer re-entry bans
for foreign rough sleepers, beggars and fraudsters
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment. But note that re-entry bans are not possible
at the moment for rough sleepers and beggars: Article 15(3) of the EU citizens’
Directive states unambiguously that a ban on entry cannot be
imposed where a person was expelled for grounds other than public policy,
public security and public health; and Article 27(1) states clearly that such
grounds ‘cannot be invoked to service economic ends’. This rule could possibly
be overturned by EU legislative amendment, but it is possible that
the CJEU would find that this would constitute a disproportionate restriction
on free movement for those who were entering to obtain work later. So a Treaty
amendment might be needed.
5.
Stronger measures to deport EU criminals
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment.
6.
Longer waiting periods for free movement of persons from new Member States
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment.
7.
EU citizens to have a job offer before entry
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment. But the CJEU reiterated the current rule
in EU legislation that EU citizens can stay if they are a job-seeker, subject
to the proviso that they have a genuine chance of getting work. So this
proposal would require a legislative amendment and a Treaty amendment, since
the CJEU has said (in Antonissen) that the Treaty right to free
movement of workers also applies to job-seekers, giving them the right to enter
and stay in a Member State to look for work.
8.
No taxpayer support for job-seekers
The
EU legislation already rules out social assistance for job-seekers, so this
reflects the status quo. However, the CJEU has said that job-seekers have a
right to access benefits linked to labour market participation, if they have a
link already with the labour market in question. While David Cameron suggested
that the UK’s future Universal Credit would not fall within the scope of the
CJEU’s case law, that would likely be challenged in practice. So a Treaty
amendment is likely necessary as regards current rules, and possibly
necessary as regards universal credit. As regards job-seekers who are former
workers, the Alimanovic
judgment makes it easier to deny them social assistance, and to tighten the
rules to this end by means of amending secondary EU law, as discussed above.
9.
Payment of child benefit to children abroad
Not
relevant to the Alimanovic judgment. But note that there is a case
pending before the CJEU on the separate question of the UK’s restrictions on payment
of child benefit to children of some EU citizens living in the UK (the ‘habitual
residence’ test).
Thank you for a very interesting review of state of play. Indeed, it can be questioned if this case promote legal certainty not only considering conflicting case law but also with the opinion of Mr Wathelet in mind.
ReplyDeleteI am at this point however particularly interested in the UK position and to what extent a Treaty change might be necessary. As far as I've understood it, quite a few changes could be achieved by means of secondary legislation thanks to art. 20 in fine and art. 21.1 FEUF. According to the Treaty, the right of every citizen to move and reside freely shall be subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. Thus, on the mere facts of it, I am wondering if it really would be necessary to amend the Treaty in order to revise for example the Antonissen judgement? Many thanks in advance for your view on this more theoretical question (to what extent it would be possible to agree on such an amendment in practice is another question). /Sara Bratberg
Thanks for your comments. I think the case certainly promotes more legal certainty than the AG opinion, which would have left every case where an EU worker became unemployed before the one-year minimum period subject to an individual assessment as regards access to benefits.
DeleteAs for changing secondary legislation, see further my previous blog posts. The Dano judgment indeed ruled, in line with Arts 20 and 21 TFEU, that the secondary legislation restricted the access to benefits for persons who had not moved to take up or look for work, so there was no ground to argue for access to benefits in that case based on the Treaties. But look carefully at the wording of the Treaty articles: the citizenship rules are subject to the *Treaties* and secondary legislation. So the rights derived directly from the Treaties (notably as regards workers, the self-employed, service providers and recipients and students) are also still applicable, and only a Treaty amendment could limit them. Cases like Antonissen are an example of that: the right of job-seekers to stay on the territory to look for work derives from (what is now) Art 45 TFEU, according to that case. Ditto job-seekers' limited access to benefits, according to the Collins judgment. As recently as last year, the Court applied Art 45 TFEU in the Saint-Prix case to say that the Treaty, not the citizens' Directive, defined the meaning of 'worker' for former workers. It is always possible that the Court will overrule itself, and indeed in Alimanovic it decides instead to let the EU legislature define the meaning of a different category of former workers. But since the latest ruling makes no mention of Saint Prix I think we cannot deduce from this alone that as a general rule, changes to secondary legislation can rescind rights which the CJEU has said in the past are derived from the Treaties.
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteReally useful post.
Would you argue that in regards to Alimanovic, the fact that the CJEU held an individual assessment is not needed as the gradual system within Directive 2004/38 provides for this ensures all affected citizens will be subjected to the same criteria?
Therefore, the use of the gradual system within Directive 2004/38 prevents Member States from adopting individual assessments which may vary from state to state?
Thanks. It is always open to Member States to be more generous than the Directive provides - the Directive expressly provides for that. But I agree that in effect the Court concluded that a phased-in system meant there was no requirement for any case-by-case assessment.
DeleteThank you very much for a very interesting post. I have a quick question regarding the "irrebuttable presumption" you mentioned. Am I correct in understanding that you believe that para 62 of the judgment applies not just to EU citizens in a situation similar to that of Ms Alimanovic (i.e. someone who no longer retains the status of worker) but also to someone like Ms Dano and Mr Brey (i.e. any EU citizen relying on Article 7(1)(b))? In other words, do all economically inactive EU citizens automatically lose their right to reside as soon as they ask (and qualify) for social assistance, since the unreasonable burden test developed in Brey has been emptied of any substance?
ReplyDeleteThat should logically follow.
Delete