Steve Peers
Most drivers, at one time or another, have felt an
unpleasant bump as their car ran over an unfortunate small animal which had
chosen precisely the wrong time to scoot across the road. Some drivers are
devastated, while others are mildly upset or indifferent. But a few are exhilarated
at the thought that they have eliminated an irritating obstacle in the way of
their unseemly rush to reach their destination.
The latter attitude aptly sums up the Conservative party’s
attitude to the role of EU law in their proposals to reform UK human rights
law, unveiled today.
I have already blogged on the problems with this proposal at
a domestic level, but there are problems as regards its relationship with EU
law too.
First of all, we should be clear what today’s proposal does not do. There is a widespread perception
that it suggests that the UK withdraw from the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). But it doesn’t suggest this, at least not yet. The assumption in
the document is that the UK will remain a party to this Convention, although it
raises the possibility that the UK will withdraw from it if the Council of
Europe raises too many objections to today’s plans. This may simply be a
concession to those who think that these proposals do not go far enough (!) in
eviscerating human rights protection in UK law. So while I blogged this summer
on what would happen to the UK’s EU membership if it withdrew from the ECHR,
that question does not yet arise.
Nor does today’s proposal suggest that the UK should
disapply the EU’s Charter of Rights in its domestic law. A House of Commons
committee suggested that earlier this year. The idea is utterly bonkers, for the
reasons I blogged on at the time. But again, it isn’t immediately relevant.
What today’s document does do is propose to weaken the
domestic system of human rights protection, decouple it from the ECHR system
and introduce new rules which weaken substantive protection of human rights for
any group of people which the drafters of the proposal deem sufficiently
despicable. How does that relate to EU law?
The key questions here are: are the new proposals compatible
with EU law? If not, to what extent? And what are the consequences?
At the outset, we should note that the EU Charter of Rights
and the rights protected by the ECHR don’t always overlap. So today’s proposals
could not create any conflict where (a) the Charter applies, but the ECHR does
not (as regards social rights, for instance), or (b) the ECHR applies, but the
Charter does not – because the Charter only applies where there is a link to EU
law, as the CJEU set out in the judgment in Fransson.
There’s only a possible conflict where both the Charter and the ECHR apply to
an issue.
What sort of cases would these be? I suggest three examples,
although this isn’t an exhaustive list. First of all, any limitations on the right
to a fair trial granted to criminal suspects which resulted from today’s
proposals could conflict with the EU legislation on their rights to interpretation and translation, and their
rights to information about proceedings, which the UK has opted in to. (There are
other EU measures and proposals in this area, but the UK hasn’t opted in to
them).
Secondly, any requirement that telecommunications service
providers retain data for handing over to law enforcement authorities falls
within the scope of EU law, since that would constitute a derogation from the
rule in the EU’s telecom privacy Directive. Derogations from EU law fall within
the scope of the Charter, as the CJEU recently ruled in Pfleger; I have discussed this point (as regards national data retention laws) in detail earlier on this blog.
This is relevant not just to the ‘DRIP’ Act passed by the UK Parliament earlier this year (as I pointed out at the time), but also to any requirement that telecommunications providers retain and hand over the content of communications, following the Home Secretary’s latest plans unveiled this week. On the other hand, interception of communications directly by the police or security services would not fall within the scope of EU law, since there are no EU measures dealing with such issues in a purely domestic context.
This is relevant not just to the ‘DRIP’ Act passed by the UK Parliament earlier this year (as I pointed out at the time), but also to any requirement that telecommunications providers retain and hand over the content of communications, following the Home Secretary’s latest plans unveiled this week. On the other hand, interception of communications directly by the police or security services would not fall within the scope of EU law, since there are no EU measures dealing with such issues in a purely domestic context.
Thirdly, the Conservative party would like to strip ‘illegal’
immigrants and foreign criminals of the possibility of invoking at least some
(if not all) human rights. Due to the UK’s opt-outs from EU justice and home
affairs law, not all EU measures dealing with immigration issues apply to the
UK. But depending on how these demonised groups are defined, this could result
in a conflict with EU rules on the free movement of EU citizens and their
family members, or with EU legislation on asylum (the UK is still bound by the
first phase of this legislation, and has also opted in to parts of the second
phase of it).
In most of these cases, we can’t be certain that the new
plans would conflict with EU law until we see the exact text of the proposals
(coming later this year). However, it’s already clear, in my view, that the
DRIP Act conflicts with the EU Charter in part.
What happens in the event of a conflict? There are two
issues here. First of all, the EU Charter refers to the ECHR as regards those
Charter rights which ‘correspond’ to ECHR rights, such as the right to a
private and family life and the prohibition on torture. It says that the
relevant Charter rights have the same ‘meaning and scope’ as their ECHR equivalents.
The explanations to the Charter make clear that the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights also applies in this context.
Secondly, the Treaties provide for the EU itself to become a
party to the ECHR. Negotiations on the treaty to this effect are complete (the Conservative
policy document is simply wrong when it states that they are ‘ongoing’). However,
the signature and ratification of this treaty is held up while the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) considers the question of whether this
process is compatible with EU law. Its judgment is expected soon. The EU must
also adopt internal rules governing this issue.
Today’s policy document recognises that there might be a
conflict between EU law and the Conservative party’s plans. It states that the
document’s position will be ‘reflected in the rules that will govern the EU’s
interaction with the [Human Rights] Court’. It also threatens a veto over the
ratification of the EU’s accession treaty to the ECHR if ‘the UK’s new human
rights framework is [not] respected’.
More generally, the document concludes that human rights
issues might be an issue forming part of the overall renegotiation of the UK’s
role in the EU which the Conservative party supports. If there is anything in
EU law which ‘encroaches upon our new human rights framework’, then the
renegotiation will have to address it.
Obviously these human rights plans will not come to fruition
unless the Conservative party forms a majority government, since the Labour and
Liberal Democrat parties strongly oppose them. If that does happen, though,
what are the systemic implications for EU law?
First of all, it seems possible that they will complicate
the process of the EU’s accession to the ECHR. This will be clearer once the
draft UK Bill is unveiled, the CJEU has ruled on the ECHR accession issue, and
the Commission proposes the internal rules which will govern the EU/ECHR
relationship. There would be no conflict if those internal rules provide, or
the CJEU requires, that the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights will
have, after the EU’s accession to the Convention, as weak an impact on EU law (and
Member States’ actions within its scope) as the Conservative party suggests
should be the case for the UK. Time will tell whether this is the case.
Secondly, and more immediately, it seems unlikely that the
Conservative plans are compatible with the Charter as interpreted in light of
the ECHR, and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, by the
CJEU. The CJEU’s case law for many years
has insisted that EU law must be interpreted not only in light of the
Convention but in light of the other Court’s case law. But these are precisely
the two elements of the UK’s Human Rights
Act which the Conservative strategy paper most strongly opposes.
So the new proposals would only be compatible with EU law if
they contain a general savings clause, making the new ‘British Bill of Rights’ entirely
subject to the special role for EU law in the UK as set out in the European Communities Act. Conservative Eurosceptics are no more likely
to suggest this than the proverbial turkeys are likely to vote for Christmas.
Indeed, the strategy document implicitly foresees as much,
when it suggests that human rights protection will likely be on the negotiation
table in the event of UK renegotiation of its EU membership. The problem with
this is that human rights protection is a general legal rule that forms part of
the constitutional foundations of EU law.
So it is not easy to provide a general exemption from human
rights protection (as the failed attempt to do so for the UK already, the
infamous Protocol 30 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, confirms). Nor is it
very likely that other Member States would be keen to allow it if it were. It
follows that today’s strategy document, if the Conservative party wins a majority and
takes the document seriously once in office, is likely to increase the risk of a failed renegotiation
and, therefore, the UK’s exit from the EU.
Barnard & Peers: chapter 2, chapter 9
The 'elephant in the room' is that the Judiciary carries out judicial acts that are made unlawful under Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. They have denied the clear provisions in Section 7(1) (a) and (b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, in terms of their and their fellow Judges breaches of the Act. They have been supported in this by the Court of Appeal and, in effect, by The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Until this denial of access to justice, a fair hearing before an independent judge and an effective remedy is addressed, other important discussions including a possible Bill of Rights are relatively meaningless.
ReplyDelete