Friday, 16 January 2015

Damages for breach of EU free movement law: an important Irish judgment


 

Steve Peers

It’s been well over twenty years since the CJEU established, in the case of Francovich, that individuals could sue Member States in damages for breach of EU law. Yet many of the cases concerned have been brought by businesses for lost profit. The CJEU has never had the opportunity to apply the principles relating to damages claims in a case concerning the free movement of EU citizens.

But in its recent judgment in Ogieriakhi, the Irish High Court delivered a ruling on this issue, awarding over €100,000 to the family member of an EU citizen for breach of EU free movement law. This judgment isn’t a precedent as such outside Ireland, but it is a useful indication of how such claims might be made. So I suggest below how it might be particularly relevant to some of the UK's current breaches of EU free movement law.

Background

The Irish judgment follows the CJEU’s ruling earlier last year in the same case (discussed here), which answered the High Court’s questions as regards substantive free movement law and damages issues. Mr. Ogieriakhi had been married to a French citizen in Ireland, then separated from her for several years while living with an Irish woman. Ultimately he got divorced from his French wife, married the Irish woman he had established a family with, and became an Irish citizen.

But in the meantime, he lost his job in the Irish post office, purely on the grounds that he was not legally entitled to be employed. He had been denied a renewed residence permit and had failed in his application to be considered a permanent resident on the basis of the EU citizens’ Directive, which awards that status to third-country national family members of EU citizens after five years’ legal residence.  

In light of developments in CJEU case law, he brought a claim for damages for loss of his job, which was the basis for the High Court asking the CJEU to clarify the substantive free movement law and damages issues. The CJEU ruled, following prior case law, that (a) third-country national family members of EU citizens still had free movement rights as long as the marriage was not formally dissolved, and (b) permanent residence could be acquired on the basis of time spent entirely before the deadline of 30 April 2006 to apply the EU citizens’ Directive, which created the notion of permanent residence. The Irish implementation of the Directive had taken a more restrictive approach on the latter point.

The national judgment

The CJEU judgment makes clear that Mr. Ogieriakhi was entitled to permanent residence status. However, while this will be relevant by analogy in similar cases, it was no longer directly relevant to his immigration status, since the Irish government had awarded him not only permanent residence but also citizenship in the meantime. On the other hand, it was very relevant to his claim for damages.

The High Court judge, Gerard Hogan, applied the EU law principles relating to damages. Mr. Ogieriakhi had to show that: the EU rules conferred rights upon him; the breach of EU law was sufficiently serious; and there was a direct causal link between the breach of EU law and the damages suffered. The CJEU judgment in this case had clarified one aspect of the second point: the mere fact that the national court had asked the CJEU for interpretation of EU law did not as such mean that the breach of EU law was not sufficiently serious.

Applying the principles in turn, the permanent residence rules in the citizens’ Directive aimed to confer rights on individuals. On the second point, the case law of the CJEU on damages says that there must be a manifest and grave disregard of the limits of Member States’ discretion, considering the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the degree of discretion left to Member States, whether the breach was intentional or excusable, the position of EU institutions and the existence of prior case law of the CJEU on the issue. A continuation of national breaches of EU law after a CJEU judgment will always constitute a sufficiently serious breach. In this case, Judge Hogan ruled that: the EU legislation was clear and precise; there was no national discretion; and the breach was not excusable, even though the CJEU did not confirm that pre-2006 periods of residence counted until 2010, since this should have been clear enough from the wording of the Directive. Finally, it was clear on the facts that Mr. Ogieriakhi only lost his job due to the breach of EU law.  

The judge then had to assess the amount of damages payable. Mr. Ogieriakhi had been unable to find work in the difficult economic climate in Ireland, and so was able to claim for several years’ lost wages. To a limited extent, he had failed to mitigate his losses, and so the award was reduced a little as a consequence. The final result was six years’ lost wages, amounting to €107,905, along with a further €20,000 for breach of Irish constitutional law (right to a good name).

Comments

This judgment shows how significant EU law can be in individual cases, in particular in the area of free movement of people. €127,000 is a small sum for a large corporation but a substantial amount for people of modest means, like the Ogieriakhi family. Moreover, Mr. Ogieriakhi doesn’t have to share any of this sum with lawyers, since he represented himself (congratulations to him for his success – and to those in Ireland who obviously taught him EU law very well). Of course, the award shouldn’t be regarded as an unjustified windfall, since it mostly constitutes money that Mr. Ogieriakhi would have earned if he had not been unlawfully dismissed due to breach of EU law.

What are its broader implications? Let’s examine them by applying this case to two other EU free movement issues: the position of EU citizens who move to another Member State to be with their family members, and then seek to return to their own Member State with their family; and the position of those who wish to visit the UK with their third-country national family members, without obtaining a visa.

For the first category of people (often known as Surinder Singh cases), the CJEU clarified last spring (as discussed here) that in principle it should be sufficient for them to spend three months in another Member State exercising free movement rights with their family members.  Then they could return to their home state. The CJEU judgment concerned a Dutch case, and I don’t know what the consequences have been in the Netherlands. But the UK government has continued to apply a ‘centre of life’ test that seems to be clearly more restrictive than the test in the Court’s judgment.

For the second category of cases, the CJEU ruled in December in McCarthy (discussed here) that the family members should not have to obtain a visa, if they had a residence card in their country of origin issued to family members of EU citizens. This was a UK reference, but the UK courts have not followed it up yet. Nor has the UK government changed its practice, as far as I know.

So let’s apply the EU damages principles to these two breaches of EU law. In the first case, the right to return to the UK is based on the Treaty rules on free movement of people, which clearly aim to confer rights on individuals. Any delay in returning to the UK with family members is in principle caused by the UK’s wrongful application of EU law, although there might be other reasons in individual cases why people delayed their return (finding work back in the UK, finishing school years, and so on). As for the ‘sufficiently serious’ requirement, it is clearly met since the Court’s ruling last year, but it harder to argue that it applied before that date, due to the lack of legislation on this issue and the lack of clarity before the Court’s judgment. The calculation of damages due to the UK’s breach of EU law will depend on each case, and it might be harder in many cases to show losses as compared to the Ogieriakhi judgment, where the total absence of work was solely attributable to breach of EU law, and the resulting damages were fairly easy to calculate.

In the second case, the right to visit the UK without a visa is clearly a rule intending to confer rights on individuals. Any costs incurred to get a visa (mainly travel to a consulate) are clearly directly attributable to the breach of EU law by the UK. The breach of EU law is sufficiently serious since the McCarthy judgment, but in this case it is arguably sufficiently serious beforehand. It is blatantly obvious from the wording of the citizens’ Directive that third-country national family members with a residence card do not need a visa, and there is no provision in the Directive for the UK practice of requiring a family permit as a separate requirement for a visa exemption. Equally it was clear from prior CJEU case law that the concept of ‘abuse of rights’ could only apply in individual cases.

As always on this blog, the suggestions above do not constitute legal advice, and anyone considering legal action should consult a lawyer (unless they are sure that they can represent themselves as well as Mr. Ogieriakhi did). I don’t practice law, so this isn’t an attempt to drum up work for myself. Rather my concern is not only for the individuals who ought to be compensated for the losses caused by the illegal actions of the UK, but also for the broader principle of the rule of law. It simply is not acceptable for the UK government to flout its legal obligations as long as it has, and the more legal proceedings aiming to pressure it to comply with those obligations, the better.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 6, chapter 13

The right to be heard in immigration and asylum cases: the CJEU moves towards a definition


 
Elspeth Guild, Kingsley Napley

An essential element of a legal challenge is the right to be heard. It is often characterised as a component of rights of the defence but it has a wider ambit requiring state authorities to provide an individual with an opportunity to state his or her case before taking a decision. By and large in EU law, the right to be heard has been bundled into national procedural rights but it began to make guest appearances in CJEU judgments from 2008 and recently has taken central stage in two judgments on the Return Directive.

The starting place, however, is in a judgment about post clearance recovery of customs import duties (C-349/07 Sopropé), where the CJEU held that when state authorities take decisions within the scope of EU law they must provide the entity with the right to be heard. This is the case even in the absence of such a procedural requirement in EU law. Two conditions must be fulfilled: the right must be the same as that to which individuals or undertakings in comparable situations under national law are entitled (the principle of equivalence) and secondly the procedural rules must not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the right (the principle of effectiveness). These principles laid out in the 2008 judgment are having a considerable impact on EU law on third country nationals both in the context of asylum and return decisions.

Where does the right to be heard come from?

First, the source of the right: the CJEU found in 2008 (a year before the Charter became legally binding via the Lisbon Treaty) that there was an EU principle of the right to be heard. But note, in subsequent judgments it has been reluctant to embed the right in the Charter. Although the Charter has a right to good administration (Article 41(1)) which includes the right to be heard, the CJEU has held, most recently in two judgments (Mukarubega and Boudjlida, discussed here) on the Return Directive (Directive 2008/115), that this right only applies to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU (not to Member State bodies – a finding not entirely consistent with a previous ruling on an asylum matter see below).

So the right to be heard, for instance regarding a residence permit under the Return Directive, cannot be founded on Article 41 Charter. Further, Articles 47 and 48 Charter ensure respect for the rights of the defence and fair legal process in all judicial proceedings, but while the CJEU refers in its recent judgments to these two provisions in conjunction with Article 41, it has not expressly excluded them from applicability to Member State action (as to do so would limit them to really few situations).  Instead, the Court has chosen to determine that the right is inherent in respect for the rights of the defence which is a general principle of EU law (see Boudjlida).

There is an oddity here which the CJEU does not attempt to explain. On the one hand the right to be heard is critical for the individual or entity before the state authority reaches a decision. On the facts of the cases before the CJEU which were about the decisions of a national authority that individuals were unlawfully residing on the territory and therefore the consequence was a return decision (or expulsion order), this matters a lot. The individuals had to have an opportunity to explain why their residence was lawful or why it should be regularised on the basis of their personal circumstances in order to avoid a return decision being pronounced against them.

On the other hand, the rights of the defence apply after the state authority has made its decision and the individual seeks to appeal against it. It may be a ground of the defence that the individual was never provided an opportunity to make his or her case before the decision was reached but this is an ex post argument. It is a stretch of interpretation to push the rights of the defence backwards into an administrative obligation. Further Article 47 Charter, the fair trial provision, applies in respect of any right or freedom guaranteed by EU law. But Article 48 Charter, the rights of the defence, apply when the individual is charged (a criminal charge). There are a number of nuances here regarding the right to be heard.

In MM - an asylum case - the CJEU held that the right to good administration (Article 41 Charter) includes the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken. It went on to state that Article 41 Charter from its very wording is of general application. On this basis, and also after a consideration of the generally applicable principle of the right to be heard, the CJEU held that an asylum applicant must be heard by the national authorities responsible for determining the claim pursuant also to the rules of the Common European Asylum System. This seems to indicate that in the asylum context the CJEU was tempted to apply Article 41 Charter to national authorities but in the later decisions on the Return Directive it drew back from that position.

Nonetheless, in the Return Directive context (Boudjlida), the CJEU found that the right to be heard guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely.

What does the right mean?

There are two parts to the right to be heard – the first is the principle of equivalence and the second the principle of effectiveness. As far as the first principle goes, the comparator is the analogous situation under national law which applies to everyone (third country national or citizen). In a Return Directive procedure, the third country national must have the same right to be heard as a citizen in a comparable procedure. But what would a comparable procedure be? The CJEU does not tell us. One can begin to imagine what kind of administrative procedure should be the gold standard - a planning application? A compulsory purchase order? An access to education dispute? It is not clear that there is one specific kind of procedure which would necessarily provide the comparator. While this is not new – one encounters the same problem as regards the correct fee for EU registration certificates which must cost no more than an equivalent document for a citizen – it is particularly vivid here. The scope of the right to be heard for a third country national seeking to avoid an expulsion decision depends on the comparator chosen. One may presume then, that the comparable procedure under national law must be one with fairly enormous consequences for the individual. It could not be a trivial administrative matter (for instance parking fines?) as the intensity of the right to be heard may be lower in such cases than where the whole centre of life of an individual is in the balance. Thus it would need to be an important matter (for instance a decision to extinguish the mechanical means to prolong someone’s life?).

The second part of the test is the right to effectiveness. The national rules must not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the right to be heard. Assessing this part of the test may be controversial particularly where third country nationals are involved who may not speak the language and may need substantially more assistance in putting forward their case than a national would. What might be sufficient for the right to be heard to be respected for a national in a zoning dispute may be utterly inadequate for a third country national seeking to explain why he or she cannot go back to his or her country of origin. The CJEU has had to consider the meaning of effectiveness in the context of immigration matters already. In a series of cases pre-2004 on the association agreements with the Central and Eastern European (now) Member States, the CJEU had to determine whether various provisions of immigration laws in existing Member States rendered the right of establishment for nationals of association countries impossible or excessively difficult to exercise. The test of ‘impossible or excessively difficult’ came from the agreements themselves having been borrowed by the drafters from the WTO agreements. The CJEU held in those cases that so long as state authorities exercised their discretion under immigration rules in such a way that nationals of the association countries could in fact exercise their right of establishment the test was satisfied (Barkoci and Malik).

The effectiveness requirement has also been the subject of consideration by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In Conka v Belgium that court stated that the European Convention on Human Rights is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective. As regards the accessibility of a remedy this implies that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy (para 46). That court went on to provide guidance on the elements which make a remedy effective, namely whether: it is available and sufficient to provide redress; it is sufficiently certain in practice to be accessible and effective; practical information on remedies is clearly made available to individuals affected; the language used must be one the individuals are likely to understand and interpreters must be available in sufficient numbers; and the individuals must have real possibilities to obtain legal assistance (see the full extracts from the judgment in the Annex).

The ECtHR’s assessment of effectiveness has been played out in the context of remedies rather than the right to be heard per se, but the principles are likely to be the same. For the moment it is not entirely certain that the CJEU’s effectiveness test is fully compliant with that of the ECtHR. This doubt is intensified when one examines the facts of the two Return Directive cases – Mukarubega and Boudjlida. As Basilien-Gainche sets out in her blog post on the cases, the substance of the right to be heard for these two individuals was very thin indeed (short interview of 30 – 40 minutes, for which the individuals were unprepared and had no legal assistance). Not only that, an infringement of the right to be heard results in annulment only if, had it not been for such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see the MG & NR judgment on immigration detention).

What is the purpose of the right to be heard?

In every case, the right to be heard must be guaranteed in its context, according to the CJEU. In the context of the Return Directive, the purpose is to enable the person to express his or her point of view on the legality of his stay and on whether any exception to the expulsion presumption of the Directive should be applied (Boudjlida, para 47). The directive specifically sets out the need to consider the personal and family situation of the individual, the best interests of any children, family life and the state of health of the third country national. Further there must be full respect for the asylum principle of non-refoulement (no return to a country of persecution). The individual is under a duty to co-operate with the competent authorities and to provide them with all relevant information, in particular all information which might justify a return decision not being issued (Boudjlida, para 50).

The authorities are not under a duty to disclose, prior to making a return decision, their intention of doing so and the evidence on which they intend to rely to justify the decision (Boudjlida, para 53). Only where a third country national could not reasonably suspect what evidence might be relied on against him or her does such a duty of disclosure come into existence. This disclosure duty also applies where the individual objectively would not be able to respond until certain checks or steps were taken with a view to obtaining supporting documents (Boudjlida, para 56).

Otherwise, the extent of the right to be heard only goes so far as to require that the third country national be given to opportunity effectively to submit his or her point of view on the subject of the irregularity of stay and the reasons which might, under national law, justify the authorities to refrain from adopting a return decision (Boudjlida, para 55). The purpose is to ensure that the competent authorities adopt decisions in full knowledge of the facts and are able to provide adequate reasons for the decision (Boudjlida, para 59). This rather harsh position needs to be tempered by the finding in MG and NR that the rights of the defence include not only the right to be heard but also the right to have access to the file. According to the CJEU in that case, these are among the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the EU legal order (as well as enshrined in the Charter). Compliance with these rights is not dependent on express provision anywhere of such procedural requirements.

A Right to Legal Assistance?

Bearing in mind the importance of the right to be heard and the fact that a third country national may not have a clear idea of what the relevant facts are which the competent authorities need to take into account in order to decide whether the presumption in favour of a return decision has been displaced, legal assistance is clearly an issue. On the facts of the two cases, Mukarubega and Boudjlida, it seems very likely that neither of the individuals were aware of what they were supposed to be providing other than answering questions put to them by the police. Clearly the presence of a legal advisor who could present the relevant information in a manner designed to address displacing the presumption in favour of expulsion would have been very useful. In both cases, in a manner which seems to be one of omission, the two people gave up important rights such as to delays and reflection periods, which might have been central to the proper (and potentially successful) presentation of their situations. In both cases, under the relevant French law there were simultaneous decisions on their residence status (illegality) and expulsion (a return decision). The CJEU accepted that this procedure is consistent with the Return Directive. But in such cases it is even more important that individuals actually are able to get legal assistance as the consequences of such a truncated procedure may be very grave.

In the Boudjlida case, the third country national sought to register with the national authorities as a self-employed businessman. When he attended the appointment for his registration, the border police were waiting for him. The wording of the judgment states that he was invited by the border police to come to their offices either then or on the following day and that he accompanied them to their offices where he was interviewed forthwith. One wonders exactly how the invitation was made and whether there was any question of possible detention (Ms Mukarubega had been detained but her detention had been found by a national court to be without a legal basis). It seems most odd that an educated man such as Mr Boudjlida who had followed engineering studies, would not have been aware of the importance of legal assistance in such circumstances. One also cannot help but wonder why the border police were present at the national authority responsible for registration of businesses (associated with the social security authorities). Clearly some preparatory exchanges of information and personal data had taken place between the relevant authorities.

 The ECtHR has expressed concern about the use of incomplete communications with third country nationals in order to encourage them to present themselves at interviews, the actual purpose of which is to detain and expel them. In the Conka judgment, it held “In the Court's view, [any exception to the right to liberty] must also be reflected in the reliability of communications such as those sent to the applicants, irrespective of whether the recipients are lawfully present in the country or not. It follows that, even as regards overstayers, a conscious decision by the authorities to facilitate or improve the effectiveness of a planned operation for the expulsion of aliens by misleading them about the purpose of a notice so as to make it easier to deprive them of their liberty is not compatible with Article 5.”

In a concurring opinion, Judge Velaers stated that: “Although States are entitled to expel illegal immigrants in an effective manner and while there may not be many suitable alternatives and those there are in some cases have equally damaging consequences for the immigrants and their children, using a ruse such as that used by the Ghent police creates a danger that the public authorities will generally be perceived as not being credible in their administrative dealings with aliens illegally present on the national territory. In my opinion, that consequence means that the ruse used by the Ghent police contravened the principle of proportionality. In a State in which the rule of law applies, illegal immigrants are not without rights. They must be able to rely on communications of the administrative authorities that concern them.” One wonders whether the actions of the French police in the Boudjlida case were properly consistent with this principle of honest communication which the ECtHR has established. Perhaps the rather unclear description of Mr Boudjlida’s ‘invitation’ from the police to accompany them to the police station for an interview (which results in the very quick issuance of a return decision) reflects more than just this reader’s doubts.

According to Article 13 Return Directive, there is a right to legal assistance and legal aid where necessary, only after the return decision has been made and solely when an appeal has been brought. Nevertheless, the CJEU found that a third country national may always have recourse (but at his or her own expense) to the services of a legal advisor in the context of a return procedure (Boudjlida, para 65). The purpose of the right is to enjoy the benefit of the advisor’s assistance when being heard by the competent national authorities. But, the exercise of this right must not affect the due progress of the return procedure nor undermine the effective implementation of the Directive. It is difficult to see how access to legal advice could undermine the effective implementation of the Directive as an inadequately founded return decision is inconsistent with the Directive. Such a flawed decision is much more likely to occur where third country nationals do not receive legal advice and assistance to present their cases. For instance, individuals are not necessarily likely to know the full legal meaning of ‘best interests of the child’ or non-refoulement. A legal advisor may well be necessary in order to clarify to the competent authorities why one or other of these legal concepts, in the context of the specific facts of the case, require the issue of a residence permit to the individual rather than a return decision.

In addition, if the right to a legal advisor is a component of the right to be heard (effectively) then the competent authorities must be under a duty to make this right known to the individual. On the facts of the Boudjlida case, the CJEU states baldly “it is evident that, when [Mr Boudjlida] was interviewed… he did not request the assistance of a legal advisor (Boudjlida, para 66). One wonders what lies behind that statement, in particular whether the third country national was fully aware of the seriousness of his situation.

The matter of the due progress of the return procedure and the right to legal advice needs a little more discussion as well. It is evident from the way in which French implementation of the directive has been designed that the objective is to speed up decision making. There is one single procedure where the legality of the individual’s residence is assessed and a decision to make a return order is made. So the question arises, how should the right to legal assistance and the due progress of the return procedure be reconciled. It seems likely that some kind of balancing must take place – but exact what this should be is not specified.

At this point someone is likely to suggest that the principle of proportionality may be useful. This may be true but to make an assessment using the proportionality principle one needs to have a clear indication of what are rights and what are exceptions. On the one hand there is the right to be heard which the CJEU has established as a principle of EU law, a corollary of which is the right to legal assistance. On the other hand, one has the principle of the Return Directive that the issue of a residence permit to an irregularly present third country national is an exception to the rule. One might suggest that a principle of EU law would take priority over a principle in a Directive though this has yet to be determined. In practice, however, the central question is likely to be how much delay can be countenanced in a return procedure to ensure that the individual has effective legal assistance.  

Conclusion

One thing is clear from the recent CJEU judgments: there is a right to be heard before an administrative authority reaches a decision with potentially adverse consequences which EU law principle is a free standing. The applicability of the EU Charter right to good administration (Article 41) to the procedures of national authorities has been thrown into doubt at least as far as the Return Directive is concerned. It may still be hoped that the Charter provision applies in asylum procedures but this is uncertain.

The right to be heard must be both equivalent (to other national procedures) and effective. This means it is subject to a type of non-discrimination requirement and additionally must be accessible for the individual. The effectiveness component has deep roots in ECHR jurisprudence and it is worth bearing in mind that line of cases when seeking to determine the scope of the EU principle.

Finally, third country nationals have a right to legal assistance at all stages of a return procedure but states are only required to provide legal aid (subject to means testing) at the appeal stage. The only limitation to legal assistance may be a claim that it is contrary to the due process of the return process or may undermine the effective implementation of the Directive. 

 

Annex

 

Extracts, judgments in Conka v Belgium

[1]43. That factor has a bearing on the issue to which the Court must now turn, namely the Government's preliminary objection, which it has decided to join to the merits. In that connection, the Court reiterates that by virtue of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1210, § 66).

44. In the instant case, the Court identifies a number of factors which undoubtedly affected the accessibility of the remedy which the Government claim was not exercised. These include the fact that the information on the available remedies handed to the applicants on their arrival at the police station was printed in tiny characters and in a language they did not understand; only one interpreter was available to assist the large number of Roma families who attended the police station in understanding the verbal and written communications addressed to them and, although he was present at the police station, he did not stay with them at the closed centre. In those circumstances, the applicants undoubtedly had little prospect of being able to contact a lawyer from the police station with the help of the interpreter and, although they could have contacted a lawyer by telephone from the closed transit centre, they would no longer have been able to call upon the interpreter's services; despite those difficulties, the authorities did not offer any form of legal assistance at either the police station or the centre.”

Tuesday, 13 January 2015

Racial discrimination & collateral damage – Coleman revisited


 

Simon Cox

In Luxembourg yesterday, the Court of Justice Grand Chamber heard arguments that any person who suffers adverse consequences of a racially discriminatory decision is entitled to a remedy under EU law. In a case of anti-Roma discrimination brought by a non-Roma woman, the Court was asked to clarify its Coleman ruling, concerning who has the capacity to invoke EU discrimination law. Detailed questions from the Court showed a close interest in the legal and practical issues.

Case C-83/14 CEZ is a preliminary reference of ten questions under the European Union Directive 2000/43 on race discrimination. The case comes from the Sofia Administrative Court, in an appeal by CEZ, one of Bulgaria’s three electricity companies, from a decision of the Bulgarian National Anti-Discrimination Commission. This commission had a complaint from Ms Nikolova that CEZ unlawfully discriminated against her by putting the meter for the legal supply of electricity to her grocery shop on the top of a 7 metre high pole. CEZ had not singled Ms Nikolova out for this treatment. They had done this to every meter in the district of Gizdova, but nowhere else in her town of Dupnitsa. Unable regularly to inspect her meter, Ms Nikolova considered CEZ had inflated her electricity bill. Since the Gizdova is widely seen as a predominantly ‘Roma’ area, she complained that the district had been chosen for that reason by CEZ. The commission had received numerous such complaints that only Roma districts were subjected to being publicly stigmatised as too dishonest to have access to meters. Armed with material that CEZ had cited Roma ethnicity as a factor for its decision, the Anti-Discrimination Commission agreed with Ms Nikolova and upheld her case. In her case to the CJEU she pressed for an expansive reading of EU anti-discrimination law.

This is the CJEU’s first opportunity to rule on the application of the Race Equality Directive to the Roma, Europe’s most disadvantaged minority. A previous reference to the Court on similar issues (Belov) was inadmissible, although the Advocate-General’s opinion had considered the substance of the issues.

Yesterday, the CJEU Grand Chamber heard argument from CEZ, Ms Nikolova, the Bulgarian Government and the European Commission.

The central issue on which the parties divided was the extent of protection under the Directive. Ms Nikolova argued - as she had in her written submissions -  that Directive 2000/43 bars all discrimination ‘based on race or ethnic origin’ regardless of the actual race or ethnic origin of the victims. The purpose of this law is to eliminate all such discrimination: it does not require the victims or the complainant to have the same race or ethnic origin as the basis for a discriminatory decision. The Commission agreed, pointing to para 50 of the CJEU’s judgment in C-303/06 Coleman where discrimination ‘based on disability’ under Directive 2000/78 was found to include adverse action against an employee on account of her disabled son.

Counsel for CEZ argued that Coleman was a case of discrimination ‘by association’. Directive 2000/43 allows leeway to states to define this term. Ms Nikolova’s shop in Gizdova is not the link to Roma origin required by Bulgarian law. The case was different from Coleman. The Bulgarian Government agreed.

Judge Prechal, rapporteur in the case, invited Nikolova’s comment on she called the ‘restrictive’ Bulgarian definition. Nikolova took a maximalist position: ‘based on’ covers any adverse decision where actual, apparent or perceived origin was in fact taken into account by the decision-maker. Only this way could the Directive eliminate all racial discrimination.

Responding on the question of comparators, Nikolova argued that where only Roma neighbourhoods are subjected to adverse treatment, the burden of proof for direct discrimination shifts under Directive Article 8. Unless CEZ then prove race was not taken into account, there is no need to consider a hypothetical comparator: direct discrimination based on race had already been proved.

CEZ denied any racial motivation: the measures had been adopted due to the problem of illegal connections to the electricity supply. Illegally constructed dwellings cannot legally be connected so users connect illegally. The costs of changing meters would be passed on to customers. No judge could determine whether a measure stigmatises Roma communities, since the notion is too subjective.

Several judges questioned CEZ on their defence. Had CEZ considered adopting the smart meter solution of other Bulgarian companies? CEZ’s counsel was not familiar with the detail but smart meters are expensive. Judge Rodin pressed CEZ:

Rodin: How does CEZ decide whose meters to put out of reach?

CEZ: A technical decision based on their engineers’ assessment.

Rodin: Do the engineers know the payment record of individuals when they make this assessment?

CEZ: No, they look at the situation of the district.

Rodin: Can the electricity consumer appeal?

CEZ: No.

Judge Borg Barthet weighed in by asking whether only Roma districts have the meters on poles. CEZ’s Counsel didn’t know. Judge Lenaerts said he would make it easier:

Lenaerts: Does this happen in many districts?

CEZ: Define “many”.

Lenaerts: In how many districts have you done this?

CEZ: Ten or twenty.

The Court moved to replies. CEZ’s counsel was quick, arguing that CEZ needed flexibility. When Judge Lenaerts invited him to respond to the other parties, he declined.

Nikolova’s counsel replied asking for guidance to the national court on indirect discrimination. The comparator is other districts of Dupnitsa. Differences of illegal connection rates are relevant only to the objective justification stage. They are not relevant to the question of comparator, since that would preclude the Directive addressing grossly disparate consequences in treatment. CEZ say race was no factor in their decision but claim their relevant records have been destroyed. CEZ claim’s costs of change would be too high, but has not assessed them. CEZ confirm their practice is both compulsory - no appeal - and collective – applied to the whole district, not case by case. CEZ demand flexibility but deny that to Ms Nikolova. She cannot disprove the public sign that she is an illegal connector.

Advocate-General Kokott’s opinion will be issued 12 March.

The hearing began in the language of the case: Bulgarian. The CJEU President had refused Ms Nikolova’s request to plead in English as the language of her English lead counsel.  His co-counsel of the Sofia Bar therefore opened in Bulgarian. When questions began, Judge Lenaerts invited Ms Nikolova’s team to respond in English: and her English counsel pleaded the rest of her case.

Ms Nikolova is represented by the Open Society Justice Initiative through Simon Cox of the Bar of England and Wales, Yonko Grozev of the Sofia Bar, and Maxim Ferschtman of the Amsterdam Bar.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20
Photo: Bjorn Steinz, for the Open Society Foundation

Thursday, 8 January 2015

Does the EU need more anti-terrorist legislation?


 

Steve Peers

In the wake of the appalling attacks in Paris two days ago, it only took 24 hours for the EU Commission to state that it would propose a new wave of EU anti-terrorist measures in a month’s time. It’s not yet known what the content of this law will be; but the very idea of new legislation is a profound mistake.

Of course, it was right for the EU institutions to express sympathy for the victims of the attack, and solidarity as regards defence of free speech. Equally, it would not be problematic to use existing EU anti-terrorism laws if necessary, in order (for instance) to surrender the suspects in this crime on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW), in the event that they fled to another Member State.  The question is whether the EU needs more such laws.

For the EU has already reacted to prior terrorism offences, first as regards 9/11 and then to the atrocities in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005. The result is a huge body of anti-terrorism law, catalogued here by the SECILE project. This comprises not only measures specifically concerning terrorism (such as substantive criminal law measures, adopted in 2002 and amended in 2008), but many other measures which make it easier to cooperate as regards terrorism as well as other criminal offences, such as the EAW, the laws on exchange of police information and transmission of evidence across borders, and so on.  

Moreover, there are proposals already under discussion which would apply to terrorism issues (among others), such as a new law on Europol, the EU’s police intelligence agency (discussed here), and proposed EU legislation on the transfer of airlines’ passenger name records (PNR).  

So what new laws is the Commission likely to propose? It may suggest a new version of the data retention Directive, the previous version of which was struck down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) last spring, in the Digital Rights judgment (discussed here). Other ideas under discussion, according to leaked documents (see here and here) are new laws strengthening mandatory checks at borders .  

Are any of these laws really necessary? Member States can already adopt laws on retention of communications data, pursuant to the EU’s e-privacy directive. As the European Parliament’s legal service has confirmed (see its advice here), if Member States adopt such measures, they will be subject to the constraints of the Digital Rights judgment, which bans mass surveillance carried out in the absence of safeguards to protect privacy. Equally, Member States are free to establish their own PNR systems, in the absence of any EU-wide measure (besides EU treaties with the USA, Canada and Australia on PNR). The question of whether mass surveillance is as such compatible with human rights has already been sent to the CJEU by the European Parliament, which has asked the Court to rule on this issue in the context of the EU/Canada PNR treaty (see discussion here).

It would be possible to adopt new laws calling for systematic border checks in specific cases. In practice, this would likely mean checks on Muslims who are returning after travel to places like Syria. It is questionable whether asking detailed further questions at the external borders will, by itself, really do a lot to prevent terrorism. After all, in the Paris attacks, it unfortunately proved impossible to prevent an apparent terrorist attack despite extensive anti-terrorist legislation on the books, and bodyguards protecting the staff of a known terrorist target.

There’s also a question of principle here. The Paris attacks were directed at free speech: the foundation of liberal democracy. Of course efforts should be stepped up to prevent such attacks from happening again; but existing laws allow for targeted intelligence gathering and sharing already, The Commission’s immediate response reeks of panic. And the direct attack on fundamental democratic principles this week in Paris is precisely the wrong context to consider that new legislation curtailing other fundamental freedoms is limited.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25

Wednesday, 7 January 2015

The Missing Link: Direct Effect, CETA/TTIP and Investor-State Dispute Settlement


 


 

By Daniel Thym, Chair of Public, European and International Law, University of Konstanz

International treaties have rarely received more attention than the proposed free trade deals between the EU and the US and Canada. This entails that many law students and practitioners are confronted with a theme that does not feature prominently in legal education. In debates with students, I realise that preconceptions about the functioning of domestic legal systems are regularly projected upon the international sphere. One example is a demand that companies should challenge state action before domestic courts instead of dispute settlement bodies under the planned EU/US agreement (TTIP) and the proposed EU/Canada trade agreement (CETA). These claims often assume that national courts hold the competence to enforce corresponding rules. For lawyers working on domestic issues it seems self-evident that courts can apply the law.

Against this background, this blogpost focuses on a provision in the Draft CETA with Canada (Article 14.14: see the text below), whose relevance has not been acknowledged so far, including by the stimulating contributions to the Verfassungsblog Symposium on Investment Protection. On page 470 of the roughly 1600 pages of the consolidated CETA Draft Agreement, which the Commission regards as a template for free trade negotiations with the United States, we come across a final provision of seemingly minor relevance on ‘private rights’, which rejects the applicability of the agreement en passant. This reaffirms that the implications of the free trade deals would be less dramatic than some suggest.

Background: CETA and TTIP as International EU Agreements


In order to understand the relevance of Article 14.14 on private rights, we should apprehend that most segments of the free trade agreements would be binding upon Member States as an integral part of EU law. Axel Flessner may try to argue that the arrangements would constitute an ultra-vires-act (thereby initiating more tweets than any other contribution to the said symposium), but the plain Treaty text demonstrates that the legal picture is fairly evident. Article 207 TFEU declares that the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) allows for the conclusion of trade agreements on goods and services and embraces, among others, ‘foreign direct investment’, while Article 3 TFEU maintains that the conclusion of agreements in this area shall be an exclusive Union competence.

These provisions were a deliberate policy choice after decades of wrangles about the precise scope of the CCP. The Treaty of Lisbon was meant to replace earlier and ambiguous formulations with an overarching competence for the European Union. In its Lisbon Judgment, the German Federal Constitutional Court recognised the pertinence of this change: ‘With the exclusive competence as set out above, the Union acquires the sole power of disposition over international trade agreements which may result in an essential reorganisation of the internal order of the Member States.’ Judges in Karlsruhe gave the green light to the changes nonetheless, albeit with a minor caveat that ‘much argues in favour of assuming that the term “foreign direct investment” only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise’ and excluded so-called portfolio investments (ie, non-controlling interests in companies) as a result.

This reference to the limits of the CCP is relevant, since it indicates, in general terms, that there remain uncertainties about the precise delimitation of competences for corollary aspects of international trade. For that reason, most national governments maintain that CETA and TTIP should be concluded as so-called ‘mixed agreements’, with the EU and all 28 EU Member States as signatories. If that view prevailed, national parliaments would have to give their consent as well. However, this would not modify the internal allocation of powers; the EU institutions are in the driving seat in the vast field of Union competence – both during the negotiations and with regard to legal effects. It is established case law that the legal effects of mixed agreements follow the rules of Union law for all matters that are covered by the Common Commercial Policy.

Domestic Application of Agreements concluded by the EU


The predominance of Union law in legal practice can obscure our awareness of the specificities of the international legal system. Law students across Europe learn in their undergraduate courses about the direct and supreme effect of supranational rules, but are not always familiar with public international law. Domestic courts have to apply Union law in pretty much the same was as national law, but this assumption cannot be extended to public international law without modification, including in situations in which the EU concludes international agreements with third states.

It is true that the ECJ maintains that international agreements can have direct effect as an integral part of the Union legal order – and an example demonstrates that this can have critical implications: for example, judges in Luxembourg decided in July that Member States cannot automatically require the spouses of Turkish nationals to acquire basic language skills of the host country. Legally, this conclusion rests upon an interpretation of the so-called standstill provision for the self-employed in the Additional Protocol of 1970 to the Association Agreement between Turkey and today’s European Union. In the terminology of international trade law, the case concerned a so-called non-tariff barrier to the freedom of establishment. It is these non-tariff barriers that take centre stage in both CETA and TTIP negotiations (neither of the latter treaties will affect migration, though).

If the underlying legal arguments about direct effect and court jurisdiction extended to free trade deals with Canada and the United States, the implications could be dramatic indeed. Both the ECJ and domestic courts would hold the power to correct domestic or supranational legislation, whenever it falls foul of CETA or TTIP. Yet, this outcome is no foregone conclusion, since the ECJ opts for a direct applicability of international agreements ‘only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this.’ In deciding whether this is the case, the Court considers, among other things, the purpose of the agreement, the will of the parties and the question of reciprocity, i.e. whether the Union would be alone in recognising direct effect. Luxembourg may have largely ignored the question of reciprocity with regard to Turkey and other neighbours of the EU, but it traditionally takes centre stage in the evaluation of trade liberalisation agreements.

Article 14.14 of the CETA Draft Treaty


Once we have understood the far-reaching implications of direct applicability, we may appreciate the bearing of the clause on private rights in the final provisions of the consolidated Draft CETA Agreement, which states: ‘Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties.

That is nothing less than the official denial of direct effect in the operative treaty text; neither the ECJ nor domestic courts would hold the power to apply CETA rules in domestic proceedings or to annul legislation which contradicts trade law. CETA and TTIP would get the same treatment that the ECJ accords to WTO law, which also does not have direct effect in the EU legal order and the domestic legal systems of the Member States – not even in situations, in which the appellate body of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism confirmed that EU legislation falls foul of WTO standards.

Denial of direct effect is an important stumbling block for the long-term success of any free trade agreement, especially when it comes to the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, since corresponding rules are often formulated in an open manner. The real-life implications of such vaguely formulated provisions depends decisively upon the continued will of the parties and the availability of control and enforcement mechanisms – as the experience with non-tariff barriers to trade in the EU single market and the example of language requirements for spouses of Turkish nationals demonstrate. Without institutional control mechanism, vague treaty formulations are often ineffective.

Implications for the Debate about Investor-State-Dispute Settlement


In the light of Article 14.14 of the CETA Draft Agreement, we may have to re-consider our perspective on the proposed investor-state-dispute settlement rules in both CETA and TTIP. Critics will use the absence of direct application as an argument to decry the special treatment for investors; supporters, by contrast, will argue with the Commission that the dispute settlement bodies are a compensation for domestic legal remedies, which would not be available for the substantive rules of CETA and TTIP. I personally share the opinion of Christian Tams that the debate should focus on the desirability of special rules for investors (and not the question of procedure). The latter may be superfluous in relations with the US and Canada, but to abandon them would render it difficult to insist upon similar provisions in negotiations with China, Russia or other states we trust less.

In any case, the absence of direct effect in domestic proceedings shows that the legal implications of CETA and TIIP would be less dramatic than some commentators in the public debate suggest. Courts in Europe would not hold the power to annul domestic or supranational legislation, which violates the agreements – a power that also the dispute settlement bodies would be denied explicitly, together with the option for the state parties to force their reading of the agreements upon the arbiters by means of an authoritative interpretation. This would orientate the dispute settlement rules in CETA and TTIP towards inter-state bargaining, pretty much like in the WTO context.

The denial of direct application demonstrates that both the CETA Draft Agreement and the TTIP negotiation position are far removed from resembling anything like EU-style integration through law – and I consider this to be a good thing given that any dynamic interpretation would lack much of the democratic legitimacy and procedural constraints, which we have, notwithstanding all the deficits, in the European context. It seems to me that it is the biggest benefit of the debate about CETA and TTIP to this date that the broader public has started discussing the governance of economic globalisation. That debate will stay with us, even if an seemingly unimpressive provision on page 470 of the CETA Draft Agreement excludes the domestic enforcement of the transatlantic trade rules.

This blogpost has been published previously on ‚Verfassungsblog – On Matters Constitutional‘

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 25
Image credit: capreform.eu