The Dublin Regulation: Is the End Nigh? Where should unaccompanied children apply for asylum?

Steve Peers*

Two recent developments have raised controversy as regards the EU’s Dublin III Regulation, the set of rules which determines in which Member State asylum-seekers must make their asylum application. First of all, a British judgment yesterday stated that the UK was responsible for the asylum claims by unaccompanied children in France (in particular the Calais ‘Jungle’), who have a family member in the UK. Secondly, a press report indicated that the Commission is planning to propose a fundamental overhaul of the Dublin rules in the near future. Both developments have alarmed some commentators, but thrilled others. I will examine the legal and political context of each of them in turn.

Unaccompanied minors

Many describe the Dublin III Regulation as allocating responsibility to the ‘first Member State’ which an asylum-seeker entered. This is true for most asylum-seekers; technically it’s the first Member State which they entered without authorisation which has responsibility, but this amounts to the same thing. However, there are exceptions. In particular, since the very first version of the Dublin rules (the Dublin Convention), there have been special rules which apply where the asylum-seeker has a family member in one Member State. These were expanded in the Dublin II Regulation, among other things to add special rules where the asylum-seeker is an unaccompanied minor. Those rules were altered a little further in the Dublin III Regulation.

What are the rules for unaccompanied children? The priority is to place them in the same Member State as a family member. First of all, the Regulation gives responsibility to a Member State where they have a ‘family member’ (defined as a parent, spouse or child) or a ‘sibling’ who is ‘legally present’. Secondly, it gives responsibility to a Member State where they have a ‘relative’ (defined as an adult aunt, uncle or grandparent) who is ‘legally present’. In this second case, there are further conditions: there must be an individual examination to check that the relative is able to take care of the child, and the allocation of responsibility must be in the best interests of the child.

In the absence of a family member or relative, an unaccompanied minor – unlike any other asylum-seeker – in effect has a choice of which Member State to apply in. The CJEU has confirmed (in the case of MA) that this applies even after the child has already applied in one Member State. A subsequent proposal to confirm and extend this rule (which I discussed here) seems to be blocked for now. But this rule was not at issue in yesterday’s judgment.

Despite the consternation it caused in some quarters, that judgment is primarily straightforward. Once it’s clear that the asylum-seeker is a child who has family or relatives as defined by the EU rules in a particular Member State, the child must be transferred to that Member State to apply for asylum there. Sometimes it’s hard to prove the age of the child or the link to family or relatives, but it doesn’t seem like that was the case here (it’s hard to be certain, since the full text of the judgment is not reported yet).

One of the asylum-seekers in the case was not a child, but was dependent on a younger brother due to the effects of trauma suffered in Syria. His situation was covered by a separate clause in the Dublin III Regulation which says that ‘dependent persons’ should stay with a child, sibling or parent who can take care of them. This is a binding rule (‘shall normally keep or bring together’), as established in the CJEU judgment in K and confirmed in the preamble to the Dublin III Regulation.  

Why was the judgment controversial? First of all, there is a particular legal point: the rules in the Regulation only take effect for those who have applied for asylum, following which the Member State where they have applied is obliged to contact the responsible Member State and arrange for the transfer to that State. The judgment appears to circumvent that process, simply requiring the UK to admit the four plaintiffs despite the absence of any action by the French authorities. It appears from press reports that at least one of the applicants did have some proof of having applied for asylum in France, but it is not clear if all of them did. This will probably be the basis of an appeal which the UK government might make – although the applicants will be allowed into the UK in the meantime.

On the face of it, this is a valid legal objection: the proper procedures were not followed. Having said that, the judgment is indisputably consistent with the substantive intention of the drafters of the law: to ensure that children (and dependent persons) who apply for asylum are with people who can look after them. Since all the plaintiffs are Syrian, there seems little doubt that they intend to apply for asylum (and perhaps had done already) – or that their application will be successful (the refugee recognition rate for Syrians being over 90%). 

More fundamentally, the plaintiffs alleged that the French government did not (or would not) process their asylum applications. If this is true, the French government is in breach of EU law, and it is arguable that its breach should not be allowed to stand in the way of applying the rules on asylum responsibility. But this line of argument raises complex legal questions about how to prove such fault and who has the burden of proving it – and whether such a fault justifies a procedural shortcut at all. It would be best if these issues are sent to the CJEU to clarify (it can use an emergency procedure to decide on cases involving children). That would also make it more obvious that these issues do not just concern the UK and France: there may be unaccompanied children seeking asylum in Greece who seek to join family or relatives in Sweden, for instance.

Secondly, there are political objections on the grounds that UK immigration law has been infringed. It should be noted that the UK chose to opt in to the Dublin III Regulation – while it opted out of almost every other EU immigration and asylum law of the last twelve years. The attraction for the UK was the possibility that some asylum-seekers could be sent back to other Member States – which they are. But the rules are reciprocal: sometimes they are bound to mean that the UK has to accept asylum-seekers from other Member States. In practice, most or all such cases will involve family members. And quite frankly, anyone who argues that in principle an unaccompanied child who is seeking asylum from war or persecution should remain in squalor in Calais or Dunkirk, rather than join a family member legally in the UK who can look after him or her, is devoid of basic humanity.

What is the impact of the ruling? It cannot affect anyone who has not got family members in the UK, subject to the conditions mentioned above. In some cases, it will be hard to prove that the applicant is a child, or that the person they seek to join is a family member. The procedural aspects still need to be clarified. But for anyone else, as I discussed last summer, the French government quite rightly remains responsible for dealing with their asylum applications and providing humane living conditions, or for returning those who have not applied for asylum or whose applications have failed to their country of origin.

Plans to amend the Regulation

The key feature in the reported plans to amend the Regulation is the intention to replace the ‘first country’ rule with a set of criteria allocating responsibility to Member States based on some kind of ‘fair shares’ principle. Presumably some rules allocating responsibility based on family members will remain, perhaps with amendments. No further details are known, and it should not be forgotten that the Commission proposal would have to be agreed by both the European Parliament and the Council. But I will focus on two key issues: the feasibility of the new system, and the impact on the UK.

First, the feasibility has to be assessed in light of the EU’s existing rules on ‘relocation’ of some asylum-seekers who reached Greece or Italy. Two measures were adopted in September, and I discussed them in detail at the time. Four months on, there are significant problems applying these rules in practice, as the Commission’s regular reports indicate (see also the UNHCR’s assessment). A tiny fraction of the asylum-seekers have been relocated, due to the slow development of ‘hotspots’ for registering applications in Greece and Italy, as well as the reluctance of most Member States to receive asylum-seekers. Some Member States have flat-out refused to apply the system, and Slovakia and Hungary have challenged its legality (see the analysis of Slovakia’s challenge by Zuzana Vikarska here). The ‘hotspots’ are arguably not properly considering the asylum applications of many asylum-seekers who are not due for relocation (see analysis by Frances Webber here). While the Commission has proposed already to amend the Dublin III Regulation to make emergency relocation rules permanent, the Member States are objecting to this (see the leaked record of discussions here).

Overall, then, the relocation system is manifestly not working. It is therefore hard to see why the Commission could imagine that it could somehow work if it became the general rule, rather than the exception as at present (the relocation Decisions only apply to 160,000 asylum-seekers over two years, a small minority of the numbers that might be expected over that time).

Secondly, the UK, as already noted, has an opt-out from EU immigration and asylum law. This opt-out applies also to amendments to legislation that the UK already takes part in. Indeed, the UK has opted out of most of the ‘second phase’ of EU asylum legislation, even though it opted in to all the ‘first phase’ measures. So it is flagrantly not true to say that the UK could be ‘forced to accept more refugees’ under any new proposal. It could simply opt out.

However, that opt out could have consequences. The Protocol on the UK opt out says that if the opt out from an amendment to an existing law in which the UK participates makes the existing law ‘inoperable for other Member States or the Union’, that existing law can be revoked as regards the UK. This is a high threshold, and this clause has never been invoked to date. The UK was able to opt out of the relocation decisions, and of the recent proposal to amend Dublin III to add a permanent emergency system, without triggering this clause (as I discussed here). However, a complete overhaul of the Dublin system, replacing the core rules on the allocation of asylum responsibility, is likely to trigger it.

In that case, the UK would face a choice: (a) opt in to the new rules, and face more asylum-seekers as a result, or (b) opt out of the new rules, and face more asylum-seekers because the existing Dublin rules would be terminated for the UK. For those (like the UK government) who would not like to see more asylum-seekers, neither option is appealing. But it is likely that there would be a far smaller increase in asylum-seekers if the UK opts out. Recent statistics collated by Open Europe suggest that the UK only returns about 700 asylum-seekers a year to other Member States pursuant to the current Dublin Regulation in recent years; and yesterday’s ruling may mean that this may have to be offset against flows in the other direction. On the other hand, one estimate in The Independent suggests that a ‘fair shares’ rule could mean that the UK is responsible for 85,000 asylum-seekers a year.

Finally, what would be the impact of ‘Brexit’ on asylum-seeker numbers? Since the current Dublin rules are internal EU legislation (they ceased to take the form of a ‘Convention’ back in 2003), the UK would no longer be covered by them as from Brexit Day. The EU could sign a ‘Dublin’ treaty with the UK, but I rather doubt it would do so, for the reasons I discussed here). So Brexit would increase the numbers of asylum-seekers in the UK, assuming that the current Dublin rules are then still in force, and still result in a net removal of asylum-seekers from the UK. If there are new Dublin rules, and the UK has opted out of them, then Brexit would have no effect. Brexit would only reduce the number of asylum-seekers if the Dublin rules are still in force and have resulted in a net inflow of asylum-seekers to the UK.  In any event, Brexit would mean that unaccompanied children seeking asylum are left alone in other Member States rather than joining parents or other family members who are legally in the UK and able to look after them.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I.5

Photo: children in the Calais ‘jungle’

Photo credit: DailyMail.co.uk

 *Disclosure: I have done some work as a sub-contractor for a contractor advising on the evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation and the impact assessment on its replacement. However, while I am bound to confidentiality as regards that work, I was paid for my independent advice and remain free to express my views on the current or future Dublin system. 

Relocation of Asylum-Seekers in the EU: Law and Policy

Steve Peers

I last looked at the legal issues surrounding the refugee crisis two weeks ago, focussing on the international law dimension of the issue. But I left out the issue of relocation of asylum-seekers, pending further developments. Subsequently the EU has adopted a second, more controversial Decision on relocation of asylum-seekers within the EU this week (against the opposition of several Member States), following soon after the first Decision on this issue earlier in September. These measures are both provisional, in force for a total of two years, but there’s also a proposal for a permanent system of provisional measures. I will be looking at the relocation issue (including the pending proposal) in more detail in a report for a think-tank soon, but for now I’ll look briefly at three aspects of these measures: (a) the main content; (b) their legality, particularly since some Member States have threatened to sue to annul the second Decision; and (c) the merits of the relocation policy.

Content of the Decisions

First of all, two points about terminology. Some press reports refer to these Decisions ‘resettling’ refugees within the EU, but that’s not accurate. In both EU and international law, ‘resettlement’ refers to admitting people in need of protection from their country of origin or neighbouring countries. The EU uses the word ‘relocation’ instead, when addressing the issue of moving persons between Member States.

But that’s the process; how should we refer to the persons concerned? Technically, the most accurate term is ‘asylum-seekers’, since the relocation Decisions only apply to those who have applied for asylum but whose claim has not yet been determined. So I will use that term in this post. But since the Decisions only apply to those whose application is quite likely to succeed (more on that below), it should not be forgotten that the subsequent refugee determination procedure will likely conclude that the large majority of these asylum-seekers (but not quite all of them) are in fact refugees, or otherwise need protection. It would certainly be misleading to use the term ‘migrants’, since this word is sometimes interpreted as meaning that the people concerned have no protection need.

The first Decision

The first Decision provides for relocating asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece. It only applies to asylum-seekers who have applied for asylum in one of those States, and if that State would normally be responsible for considering the application under the Dublin rules. This will normally be the case, since the asylum-seeker will have crossed the border of Italy or Greece without authorisation. But in some cases, the Dublin rules would give priority to another Member State (if the asylum-seeker has close family there, for instance), and so in those case the Dublin rules would still apply, instead of the relocation procedure. 

The relocated asylum-seekers will be split 60/40 between Italy and Greece: 24,000 from Italy and 16,000 from Greece. They will be allocated to other Member States on the basis of optional commitments made by those other States. (The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opt-outs; see discussion of the UK opt-out here). While the intention was to relocate 40,000 people, Member States could ultimately not agree to offer that many relocation spaces, falling several thousand short (see the accompanying Resolution of Member States).

Relocation will be selective, applying only to those nationalities whose applications have over a 75% success rate in applications for international protection (refugee status, and subsidiary protection), on the basis of quarterly Eurostat statistics. On the basis of the most recent statistics, this means that only Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans will qualify. This might change over time, however, on the basis of each new batch of statistics.

In principle, the selection of asylum-seekers to be relocated will be made by Italy and Greece, who must give ‘priority’ to those who are considered ‘vulnerable’ as defined by the EU reception conditions Directive. However, the preamble to the Decision makes clear that the ‘contact points’ of the relocating Member States (national officials) will indicate a preference for specific asylum-seekers they are willing to accept. To this end, the preamble states that ‘specific account should be given to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the applicants concerned, such as their language skills and other individual indications based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their integration into the Member State of relocation’. But this preference is not binding: the main text of the Decision states that the relocation States must accept the asylum-seekers nominated by Italy and Greece, except that they can refuse relocation ‘only where there are reasonable grounds for regarding’ an asylum-seeker as a danger to their national security or public order or where there are serious reasons for applying the exclusion provisions in the qualification Directive (concerning acts such as war crimes, terrorism and genocide).

Relocation can only apply to asylum-seekers who have already been fingerprinted pursuant to the Eurodac Regulation. This simply restates an existing EU law obligation to fingerprint everyone over 14 who applies for asylum or is found crossing the external border without permission, although that obligation is sometimes not applied in practice. Also, ‘applicants who elude the relocation procedure shall be excluded from relocation’, although this rather states the obvious.

The relocation process should usually take no more than two months after the relocating Member State has indicated how many asylum-seekers it will take. Member States of relocation will be responsible for considering the application. After relocation, asylum-seekers will not legally be able to move between Member States, in accordance with the normal Dublin rules; if they do so, the Member State of relocation must take them back. The preamble to the Decision also notes that, to deter ‘secondary movements’ Member States can limit the suspensive effect of appeals against transfers, impose reporting obligations, provide benefits in kind, and issue national entry bans. They should refrain from issuing travel documents allowing the asylum-seekers to visit other countries. There might be carrots, as well as sticks: as an incentive to stay in the Member State of relocation, the Commission has proposed that relocated asylum-seekers should be allowed to work straight away, rather than after a 9-month wait (the longest period Member States can require under the reception conditions Directive). 

As for the asylum-seekers themselves, there is no requirement that they consent to their relocation or have the power to request it. The Decision only requires Italy and Greece to inform and notify the asylum-seekers about the relocation, and the preamble states that they could only appeal against the decision if there are major human rights problems in the country to which they would be relocated. So neither the relocation itself, nor the choice of Member State that a person will be relocated to, is voluntary. It is possible, however, that the asylum-seekers left behind in Italy or Greece will be disappointed that they are not picked. There is no specific remedy for them to challenge their non-selection, although arguably to the extent that Italy and Greece select people who are not vulnerable for relocation, vulnerable persons could challenge their non-inclusion, in light of the legal obligation to select vulnerable persons as a priority.  Asylum-seekers do have the right to insist that their core family members (spouse or partner, unmarried minor children, or parents of minors) who are already on EU territory come with them to the relocated Member State.

Finally, other Member States have an obligation to assist Italy and Greece, while those Member States must in return establish and implement an asylum action plan. If they do not, then the Commission can suspend the Decision as regards either country. Member States relocating asylum-seekers receive a lump sum of €6000 per person from the EU budget to help with costs. The Decision applies until 17 September 2017, and covers asylum-seekers who arrived after 15 August 2015.

The second Decision

The second Decision follows the same basic template as the first Decision, but there are some key differences. First of all, it applies to 120,000 asylum-seekers, on top of the 40,000 provided for – but not fully committed – in the first Decision (the first Decision remains legally valid; it wasn’t amended or repealed by the second one).

Secondly, the numbers of relocated asylum-seekers in the second Decision is not based upon voluntary commitments by Member States, but upon specific numbers set out in an Annex to the Decision. While most Member States agreed to these numbers (the Decision needed a qualified majority vote of ministers in the Council to pass), clearly not all did: Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic voted against the Decision. This means that there is a legal obligation to take these specific numbers of people.

Thirdly, the distribution of relocation is much different. Reflecting events on the ground over the summer, which has seen a much bigger influx of potential asylum-seekers into Greece, the second Decision provides for relocating 50,400 from Greece, but only 15,600 from Italy. The remaining 54,000 were meant to be relocated from Hungary, but Hungary did not want to be seen as a ‘frontline State’. So those 54,000 are ‘on ice’ for now. They will be relocated in a year’s time either from Italy and Greece on the same basis as under this Decision, or relocated on a different basis in light of changes in circumstances (subject to approval from the Council in either case).

Fourthly, Member States can request a temporary delay of 30% of their intake of asylum-seekers in ‘exceptional circumstances’, if it gives ‘duly justified reasons compatible with the fundamental values’ of the EU, such as human rights and non-discrimination. This delay can then be authorised by the Council on a proposal from the Commission. The preamble to the Decision indicates that such circumstances ‘could include, in particular’ a sudden inflow that places ‘extreme pressure’ upon even a well-prepared asylum system, or a ‘high probability’ of such an inflow.

Fifthly, the preamble contains stronger language as regards the ‘secondary movement’ of asylum-seekers. Member States can take measures as regards social benefits and remedies, and can ‘should’ detain asylum-seekers in accordance with the Returns Directive if no alternative means of preventing secondary movements are available.

Sixthly, in addition to the lump sum of €6000 per person from the EU budget for Member States of relocation, Italy and Greece will receive €500 per person to help with costs. Finally, the Decision will also apply for two years, but it will apply to all those who have arrived in Italy or Greece since the end of March this year, not just from mid-August.

Legality of the Decisions

Both decisions are based on Article 78(3) of the TFEU, which is a revised version of the ‘emergency power’ relating to immigration issues that has been in the Treaties since 1993 – but was never used until this month.

Article 78(3) reads as follows:

In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

This should be seen in the context of the purpose of Article 78(1), which states that the EU shall have:

a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.

Article 78(2) specifies that the EU shall have power to adopt measures to create ‘a common European asylum system’, listing seven areas where it can act by means of the ordinary legislative procedure. (Note that the proposed permanent system for relocation would be based on Article 78(2), not Article 78(3), so the legality of that proposal raises different issues; I’m not considering that proposal here).

Several elements of Article 78(3) are obvious: there must be a Commission proposal (which there was for both decisions); the Council votes by qualified majority (this isn’t expressly mentioned in the clause, but it’s the default rule); and the European Parliament (EP) is only consulted, whereas it has its usual joint decision-making power as regards other asylum legislation. It’s implicit that Article 78(3) measures can only relate to asylum, due to the placement of this clause in Article 78. Moreover, prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the previous version of this clause had been free-standing, and therefore applicable to all immigration and asylum issues; its placement in the asylum Article was surely no accident and must therefore be legally relevant.

The strongest legal argument against the validity of the second Decision is a procedural one. CJEU case law has always stated that where the EP has to be consulted on a measure, it must be reconsulted if the essential elements of the measure are then changed after it was initially consulted. That certainly applies here, because the removal of Hungary from the list of frontline States changed an essential element of the law. Against this, it might be argued that there is no obligation to reconsult, or a less stringent obligation to reconsult, in ‘emergency’ cases. But if the claim is successful on this point, it won’t accomplish much: the Council will only have to consult the EP again, and the CJEU might (as it often does) keep the Decision in force in the meantime, since the legal flaw is purely procedural.

As to the substance of the emergency measures power, first of all it must implicitly be consistent with Article 78(1), forming part of a ‘common’ policy, ensuring compliance with ‘non-refoulement’ and being in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The two Decisions meet those criteria; some alternative suggestions like closing the external border or returning people to unsafe countries would not.

Next, several terms in Article 78(3) have to be defined: an ‘emergency situation’, a ‘sudden inflow’, a ‘provisional measure’ and the ‘benefit’ of Member States. The idea of an ‘emergency’ suggests a situation which Member States find particularly difficult to handle, and the current crisis certainly qualifies for that. Some have questioned whether the inflow is ‘sudden’, given that it has been building up for years, with the Syrian civil war starting back in 2011. But the overall numbers have clearly increased sharply in 2015; the scale of that increase surely qualifies as a ‘sudden’ inflow, even if the inflow did not start overnight.

Surely it is up to the Member States in question to determine if they will ‘benefit’ from the measures concerned; that’s why it was legally necessary to remove Hungary from the list of beneficiaries. Just because another policy might, in the view of other Member States, be preferable, doesn’t mean that the Member States concerned will not benefit. Anyway, it’s manifestly clear that Italy and Greece will benefit from having fewer asylum-seekers on their territory, as things now stand.

There’s a strong literal argument that the measures in question can only benefit Member States, as distinct from (say) Serbia – although the EU could still assist Serbia by other means. But that issue doesn’t arise, since the two Decisions are only relocating asylum-seekers from Member States. A purely consequential impact on third States (fewer people will transit Serbia) isn’t sufficient to infringe this rule.

This leaves us with the definition of ‘provisional measures’. The notion of ‘provisional’ means that it must be limited in time. Since the Treaty of Lisbon removed the previous limitation to six months, this means that measures can last for longer than that. Although there may be a legal argument that two years is too long, a period of one year (during which time a permanent system may well be agreed) is surely legal. So the most a successful claim could do here is curtail the length of the validity of the second Decision, not annul it completely. If a provisional measure is renewed, or replaced with a similar provisional measure, the ‘provisional’ nature of the powers would be infringed, but we have not got to that stage yet.   

What ‘measures’ can be adopted? Can they amend existing legislation? This is relevant because the two Decisions derogate from the Dublin rules, as any relocation system would have to do. The EP’s role has been circumvented because it was only consulted. While I previously held the view that for this reason, emergency asylum measures could not derogate from EU asylum legislation, I no longer think that’s correct. Because the Treaty refers to a ‘common’ asylum policy, it must follow that the power to adopt emergency measures would be nugatory if it couldn’t amend existing legislation.

Does the EU have power to adopt quotas of asylum-seekers? A power to adopt quota rules is ruled out under Article 79(5) TFEU in the case of those looking for work. But those limitations only apply to ‘that Article’, and the Treaty drafters chose to regulate asylum issues, including reception conditions for asylum-seekers and the status of refugees (which concern access to employment) on the basis of Article 78 instead. Indeed, as noted already, there’s no right to work for asylum-seekers on the basis of EU law unless they have been waiting nine months for a decision (although Member States can choose to be more generous if they wish), and some asylum-seekers will be too young to seek work or otherwise not seek work due to family responsibilities or illness, for example. So asylum-seekers aren’t within the scope of Article 79. Moreover, the issue of relocation quotas had been discussed several times before, to the Treaty drafters must have been aware of it. If they had wanted to rule out quotas for asylum-seekers in Article 78(3), they would therefore surely have done so expressly. Article 79(5) has an a contrario effect.

Should Article 78(3) be narrowly interpreted? The Treaty drafters chose to use broad wording, and indeed Article 80 TFEU refers broadly to the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing ('including', ie not limited to, financial support). Unlike Treaty provisions which stress the narrowness of the EU’s powers, such as the powers over health or education, Article 78 repeatedly refers to a ‘common’ or ‘uniform’ policy (there are more such references in Articles 67 and 78(2)). The Treaty drafters placed limits on the scope of the EU’s immigration policy (as we have seen already); and in the same Title of the Treaty, there are various special rules relating to competence or voting over various aspects of border controls, civil law, police cooperation, and criminal law. It’s quite striking that no comparable limits exist as regards the EU’s asylum powers. One may reasonably argue that there should be such limits, but I am not convinced that there are such limits at the moment.

Just because those powers exist, however, does not mean that they should necessarily be used. So finally I will turn to the question of whether relocation is a good idea in general, and whether it is wise to force it upon recalcitrant States – even if it is legal.

Appraising the relocation policy

In principle, the objectives of the relocation policy are entirely valid. Article 80 TFEU refers to the need for solidarity and burden-sharing among Member States as regards asylum, and this reflects also the burden-sharing principle of international law, set out in the preamble to the Geneva Convention on refugees. The numbers who have arrived in Greece and Italy in recent months are clearly unmanageable for those countries to handle alone, although it should not be forgotten that some of the (potential) asylum-seekers concerned have moved on to other Member States under their own steam in the meantime. While solidarity also can (and does) take the form of financial support and additional personnel, reception centres cannot be built overnight and officials from other Member States cannot simply become part of the Greek or Italian civil service for a while.

If anything, the relocation Decisions are insufficient. It’s clearly an overstatement to say that the EU has ‘done nothing’ to help those countries: the Decisions won’t relieve all the pressure upon Italy and Greece, but equally it should in principle relieve some of it. According to the preamble to the second Decision, it will relieve Greece and Italy of 43% of the asylum-seekers who clearly needed international protection (ie the nationalities with high success rates in asylum claims) who arrived there over July and August. But this is less impressive than it first appears, since it assumes that the further 54,000 asylum-seekers now ‘on ice’ will be relocated from those countries, whereas this is not yet certain. And while the asylum-seekers in question will be relocated over two years, the numbers referred to in the preamble arrived over two months. Although the first Decision will also relieve some pressure, the percentage of the asylum-seekers from priority countries who will arrive in Italy and Greece over the next two years who will be relocated will therefore be much less than 43%. It is even possible that the more systematic application of the obligation to fingerprint applicants will mean that Italy and Greece would end up responsible for more applicants from the priority countries than before. 

Overall, then, taking into account the numbers of asylum-seekers not subject to the Decisions because they are not from a priority country, the two Decisions are likely to prove insufficient. This can be addressed in practice by further such Decisions (or the proposed new permanent system for addressing these issues) in the near future.

The question of whether it is possible to reduce the numbers of asylum-seekers who arrive at the EU’s external borders in the first place is outside the scope of my analysis here – although this will ultimately determine whether a mass influx continues to occur in the years to come. 

As for the details of the Decisions, there are two particularly controversial issues: the role of asylum-seekers, and the wisdom of enforcing quotas upon unwilling Member States. On the first point, it is problematic to compel asylum-seekers to move to a country that they do not wish to be in, since this has already proved unworkable in the original Dublin context. It would have been preferable at least to give asylum-seekers the opportunity to express a (non-binding) preference (with reasons) for particular Member State, or perhaps a list of several preferred Member States. That would increase the likelihood that asylum-seekers will stay put, since they are would be in a Member States where they prefer to be. It will also increase the likelihood that they will integrate into the host State once obtaining protection status (as most people subject to the Decisions will), given that they may prefer particular destinations because they have extended family members, friends or acquaintances there. But it will probably not be possible to respect every asylum-seeker’s preferred destination – or every asylum-seeker who wants to relocate.

In the absence of any attempt to consider the asylum-seekers’ preferences, Member States instead fell back upon the idea of punishing them if they make secondary movements. Although the Dublin system has notably not worked well at ensuring that asylum-seekers always remain in the State which is responsible for their application, it has worked better when asylum-seekers have been fingerprinted, so that it is easy to ascertain the responsible Member State; and relocation under the Decisions will only be possible for those who have been fingerprinted. While the Decisions correctly state that asylum-seekers who make secondary movements have to be taken back (pursuant to the Dublin Regulation), the preamble to the second Decision wrongly claims that they could be detained pursuant to the Returns Directive. In fact, since that Directive doesn’t apply to asylum-seekers (see the CJEU rulings in Kadzoev and Arslan), the narrower grounds for detention in the Dublin Regulation would apply instead, if the person concerned applies for asylum.

It’s also not clear exactly what benefits sanctions and remedies restrictions could be legally applied to asylum-seekers who don’t stay in the Member State of relocation, beyond the possibility of limiting the suspensive effect of a legal challenge. As regards benefits, the CJEU ruled in Cimade and GISTI that benefits must still be paid to asylum-seekers even if they have moved to another Member State (by that Member State), until the point when they are transferred back to the responsible Member State under the Dublin rules. This is now reflected in the preamble to the Dublin III Regulation. It might prove more fruitful to take up the Commission’s suggestion of allowing relocated asylum-seekers to work at an earlier date.

On the second point, historically calls for asylum burden-sharing have relied upon moral suasion, not legal imposition. The relocation process will in any event be difficult to carry out if the outvoted Member States refuse to cooperate with it. (It’s not clear if they will suspend their commitments under the first Decision too – although note that Hungary made no such commitments in the first place). The Commission can begin infringement proceedings for non-cooperation, but this will take time, and the Member States in question might prefer to pay a fine (the sanction for non-compliance with a CJEU infringement ruling) than cooperate with relocation.

While the recalcitrant Member States’ objections to burden-sharing are not very convincing, more efforts should have been made to offer them an alternative. The original suggestion of a financial contribution to alleviate the costs of the Member States with the biggest burden was dropped, since it was (wrongly) perceived as a sanction, rather than as an alternate type of burden-sharing. Perhaps a better idea would have been to offer the option of assisting the neighbouring countries hosting Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans, either by resettling more people directly from those countries or by making bigger financial contributions to those countries (and thereby reducing ‘push’ factors). Either option could have indirectly relieved the burden on Greece or Italy.

Finally, to what extent can the outvoted Member States (or others) reduce their obligations under the Decisions? As we have seen, the second Decision allows them to reduce their intake temporarily, if the Council approves. They must have good reasons, in particular relating to reception capacity. Given the exceptional nature of the rule, it is hard to see how other reasons can easily be accepted; certainly paranoia cannot. And the grounds for the request must be compatible with EU values, so Islamophobia is equally an impermissible ground too.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Photo credit: Istvan Zsiros

The new EU Migration Agenda takes shape: analysis of the first new measures

Steve Peers

This week the European Commission took its first steps towards implementing its new EU Migration Agenda (previously discussed here). A number of the items in the agenda have already been addressed (for instance, the military mission against smugglers on the Libyan coast, as discussed here). Others will be addressed later: a broader reform of legal migration law and changes to the rules on asylum procedures and the ‘Dublin’ rules on responsibility for asylum-seekers.

The first batch of measures contained five different elements. First of all, the Commission launched a public consultation on the reform of the existing EU law providing for a ‘Blue Card’ for the admission of highly-skilled non-EU migrants. I have commented previously here on the implementation of this law and the reforms to it which should be adopted.

Secondly, the Commission released an Action Plan against migrant smuggling. This mainly elaborates upon several ideas mentioned already in the main agenda. This includes: a revision of EU anti-smuggling law, planned for 2016, to increase smugglers’ penalties and clarify humanitarian exceptions from the rules; possible new rules on immigration liaison officers in 2016; a Handbook on expulsion in 2015; a possible revision of the rules on trafficking victims, in 2016, to include ‘victims’ of smuggling; a revision of the legislation on Frontex (the EU border agency), to give it more powers relating to expulsion; changes to the rules on the Schengen Information System in 2015-16, so that all Schengen Member States’ entry bans are applicable across the Schengen area; a handbook on prevention of migrant smuggling in 2017; readmission agreements with sub-Saharan countries; and stronger enforcement of the rules prohibiting employment of irregular migrants. Most of these measures concern all irregular migrants, not just those who were smuggled to the EU.

Thirdly, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on the resettlement of refugees directly from outside the EU to EU Member States. As a Recommendation it is non-binding, and as an act of the Commission, it does not need the approval of the Council or the European Parliament. According to the new Immigration Agenda, there will be EU funds attached to each resettled refugee, so Member States are encouraged to resettle people. It is a useful measure to ensure that a bigger number of persons are rescued without having to risk their lives or pay smugglers to cross the Mediterranean, although the overall numbers are likely to be modest.  In the event that Member States do not make use of the Recommendation to resettle refugees, the Migration Agenda promises a proposal for a binding measure, although it might be hard to find sufficient support in Council for its adoption.

Fourthly, the Commission issued guidance on the fingerprinting of asylum-seekers, as provided for in the EU’s Eurodac legislation, which sets up a database of such fingerprints in order to apply the ‘Dublin’ rules more effectively. In the Commission’s view, any irregular border-crosser who refuses to give fingerprints ought to be detained, expelled and subjected to an entry ban, in accordance with EU asylum law and the Returns Directive. Alternatively, Member States could force them to take fingerprints, with a possible exception for pregnant women and minors. Frankly, the correct application of the EU’s Dublin system is not worth the health of life of a single unborn child.

Moreover, the Commission appears to be confused about the details of the relevant legislation. It would be necessary to prove that refusal to take fingerprints ‘avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process’ to justify detention under the Returns Directive; but the purpose of the fingerprinting is mainly to apply the Dublin asylum rules, not to ‘prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process’, which is the legal basis for detention of irregular migrants under the Returns Directive. Furthermore, the rules on entry bans in that Directive make no reference to the issue of fingerprinting. As for asylum-seekers, the paper is correct to say that they can be detained in order to ‘verify their identity and/or nationality’ in the EU’s Reception Conditions Directive. However, for asylum-seekers who have been fingerprinted already by a Member State and then apply for asylum in a second Member State, the Commission fails to mention that the Dublin rules apply. They permit detention only where there is a ‘significant risk of absconding’, which does not automatically follow from a refusal to be fingerprinted.

Fifthly, the Commission proposed a Decision on relocation of asylum-seekers between Member States. This is the only one of this week’s proposals which would (if adopted) be legally binding. Like most Commission proposals, this needs a qualified majority of Member States to support it in the Council; unlike most EU law, the European Parliament need only be consulted. It seems from press reports that there will be a ‘blocking minority’ of Member States preventing its adoption, unless some of them change their position. It’s also possible that it will be agreed, but with major changes. But for now, let’s look at what the proposal would do if adopted.

The main thrust of the proposal is to derogate from the usual ‘Dublin’ rules as regards Italy and Greece, and distribute about 40% of the asylum-seekers which would normally be the responsibility of those Member States under the Dublin rules to other Member States. Due to opt-outs, the other Member States will not include Denmark or the UK, although it seems possible that Ireland will opt in. The proposal also will not apply to the non-Member States bound by the Dublin rules (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein). It would effectively be a regime within a regime, with only 25 or 26 of the 32 Dublin States applying it.

The relocated asylum-seekers will be split 60/40 between Italy and Greece, and will be allocated to other Member States on the basis of the criteria set out in the Annexes to the proposal. Relocation will be selective, applying only to those nationalities whose applications have over a 75% success rate in applications for international protection. It’s clear from the proposal that the Commission believes that only Syrians and Eritreans will qualify. The Member State of relocation will be responsible for considering the application, and asylum-seekers and refugees will not be able to move between Member States, in accordance with the normal Dublin rules. (After five years’ residence, refugees can move between Member States, according to the EU’s long-term residence Directive).

Besides the nationality criterion, who will be relocated? Asylum-seekers must be fingerprinted in order to qualify. The selection of asylum-seekers will be made by Italy and Greece, who must give ‘priority’ to those who are considered ‘vulnerable’ as defined by the EU reception conditions Directive. This refers to a long list of people:

‘such as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims of female genital mutilation’

Implicitly, the other Member States must accept the asylum-seekers nominated by Italy and Greece, except that they can refuse relocation if it’s ‘likely that there are national security or public order concerns’.

What about the asylum-seekers themselves? There is no requirement that they consent to their relocation or have the power to request it. The proposed Decision only requires Italy and Greece to inform and notify the asylum-seekers about the relocation, and the Commission suggests that they could only appeal against the decision if there are major human rights problems in the country to which they would be relocated. So neither the relocation itself, nor the choice of Member State that a person will be relocated to, is voluntary. This is problematic, since forcing asylum-seekers to a country that they don’t want to be in is one of the key problems facing the Dublin system already.

Of course, it’s possible that like children left in an orphanage who weren’t picked by new parents, there will be rather more asylum-seekers disappointed that they were not selected for relocation.  Do they have the right to a legal challenge? Arguably yes, to the extent that Italy and Greece select people who are not vulnerable for relocation, in light of their legal obligation to select vulnerable persons as a priority.  

Asylum-seekers do have the right to insist that their core family members (spouse or partner, unmarried minor children, or parents of minors) who are already on EU territory come with them to the relocated Member State. It’s not clear if Member States could count the transfer of family members towards their overall quota. If the asylum-seekers obtain refugee status in the State of relocation, they could also apply for family reunion under the EU’s family reunion Directive.

Similarly, it’s not clear if Member States can count towards their overall quota asylum-seekers who would normally be the responsibility of Italy and Greece, but who have already found their way on to another Member State’s territory. This might be termed relocation sur place. According to the rules in the Decision, this would in any event depend upon the willingness of Italy and Greece to designate such asylum-seekers for relocation. And as the Commission notes, persons who would already be the responsibility of Greece cannot be sent back there anyway due to the collapse of the asylum system in Greece, according to the CJEU ruling in NS (the position regarding Italy is more qualified: see the discussion of last year’s Tarakhel judgment). Of course, it is possible that the relocation of significant numbers of asylum-seekers away from Greece will contribute to solving the systemic problems with that country’s asylum system in the foreseeable future.

Overall, if the Council is willing to agree to the proposed Decision, it is likely to make a significant contribution to solving the problems with the asylum systems of some Member States, although only the more significant review of the Dublin rules promised for 2016 (or a profound improvement in the situation of countries of origin or transit) could provide a long-term solution. It is very striking that while this proposal effectively admits that the Dublin system is profoundly dysfunctional, the separate set of fingerprinting guidelines issued on the same day adopts a tone of head-banging savagery to try and get that system to work.

A final question arising is the impact of the proposed asylum measures on the UK. While the UK has an opt out, some suggest that all asylum-seekers who reach the EU could ultimately obtain EU citizenship and then move to the UK. However, the proposed Decision only relocates asylum-seekers who have already reached the EU, rather than increase the total number of asylum-seekers. Furthermore, a recent fact check suggests that only a modest number of non-EU citizens get Italian nationality each year, and that Italy only grants refugee status to a handful of people. Indeed, the only prominent Italian citizen with an African background currently in the UK is Mario Balotelli - but I don't want to intrude into the private grief of Liverpool football fans.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Photo: GlobalNation.Inquirer.net

Can the UK opt-out of mandatory EU refugee quotas?

 

Steve Peers

In two days’ time (Wednesday May 13^th), the EU Commission is due to present a communication on a new EU immigration and asylum agenda. I’ll look at this agenda in detail later, but one key issue calls for comment already: will the UK have an opt-out from mandatory refugee quotas?

Part of the Commission paper has been leaked, and it’s clear that at least on the issue of resettlement of refugees, the current draft of the paper is more ambitious than the conclusions of EU leaders, agreed a couple of weeks ago (see my comments on their conclusions here). In particular, the Commission plans to propose mandatory rules on ‘relocation’ of asylum-seekers and ‘resettlement’ of refugees. In EU jargon, ‘relocation’ refers to those already in the EU, while ‘resettlement’ applies to those currently in non-EU countries. The first group do not necessarily have valid asylum claims, while the latter group usually have their status as refugees positively assessed before they are admitted to the territory.

According to press stories in the Guardian and the Times (the latter is paywalled) there may be a conflict with the UK as regards refugee quotas, because of a doubt that the UK can opt out of these proposals. Let’s look at this from the legal and political point of view in turn.

Legal analysis

The draft Commission plan refers to the ‘legal base’ of the relocation proposals as being Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides that:

3. In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Article 78(3) is part of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) provisions of the Treaty. All of these provisions are found in Title V of Part Three of the TFEU. But the UK has an opt-out from these JHA provisions. In particular, Article 1 of Protocol 21 of the Treaties provides that (my emphasis):

Subject to Article 3, the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Article 1 refers to Article 3 of the Protocol, which is the power for the UK and Ireland to opt in to proposals on a case-by-case basis if they want to. For the avoidance of doubt, Article 2 of the Protocol reiterates that (my emphasis):

In consequence of Article 1 and subject to Articles 3, 4 and 6, none of the provisions of Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, no measure adopted pursuant to that Title, no provision of any international agreement concluded by the Union pursuant to that Title, and no decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any such provision or measure shall be binding upon or applicable in the United Kingdom or Ireland; and no such provision, measure or decision shall in any way affect the competences, rights and obligations of those States; and no such provision, measure or decision shall in any way affect the Community or Union acquis nor form part of Union law as they apply to the United Kingdom or Ireland.

Article 2 refers to Articles 4 and 6: these rules give the UK power to opt into a JHA measure after it’s adopted (Article 4) and make clear that if the UK opts in to a JHA act, all the rules in the Treaty (ie the CJEU’s jurisdiction) apply (Article 6).

It’s beyond doubt that the opt-out Protocol applies to all JHA measures. This is confirmed because a specific clause (Article 9) does, by way of exception, state that one JHA rule (on anti-terrorist sanctions) applies to Ireland without any opt-out. There’s a similar sort of exception in a parallel Protocol which sets out JHA opt-outs for Denmark. So by a contrario reasoning, the UK can opt out of any JHA measures. If there were any exception for Article 78(3), it would obviously appear in the Protocol.

So it seems clear enough that the UK does not have to opt in to any refugee law measure, as long as it falls within a JHA legal base. The Commission paper does not contemplate the dubious strategy of trying to propose a refugee law measure on a non-JHA legal base, in order to circumvent the UK’s opt-out.

However, there is a specific rule which applies where an EU proposal would amend existing EU legislation which the UK is already bound by. In fact, the UK is not bound by most current EU asylum legislation, but it is bound by the Dublin Regulation, which determines which Member State is responsible for the application of an asylum-seeker who is on the territory (or in the territorial waters) of a Member State.  

There seems no reason to amend the Dublin Regulation as regards any resettlement proposal, since resettlement concerns recognised refugees currently in third countries, not asylum-seekers currently on the territory of the EU Member States. However, the relocation proposal probably would have to amend the Dublin Regulation, since it would necessarily alter the current rules on which Member State is responsible for an asylum application.

The special rule applying to the cases where a JHA proposal amends a JHA act which already binds the UK is set out in Article 4a of the Protocol:

1. The provisions of this Protocol apply for the United Kingdom and Ireland also to measures proposed or adopted pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union amending an existing measure by which they are bound.

So the UK opt-out continues to apply in such cases. However, there’s a catch: if the UK opts out of such proposals, it’s possible for it to be turfed out of its participation in the existing law, ie the law which the proposal seeks to amend. In this case that would mean that the UK would be turfed out of its participation in the Dublin Regulation, which results in a net allocation of asylum-seekers from the UK to other Member States.

Article 4a sets out the details of how this would work. First of all, the Council (by a qualified majority vote of participating Member States, ie without the UK’s vote), on a proposal from the Commission, decides that the revised law would be ‘inoperable’ for other Member States or the UK, if the UK doesn’t participate. That decision in effect gives the UK an ultimatum to opt in to the amending law within two months. If the UK doesn’t opt in within that period, then the original measure (ie, the current Dublin Regulation) automatically ceases to apply to the UK.  

This ‘ultimatum’ clause dates from the Treaty of Lisbon, and has never been used. It would obviously cause considerable political friction if it were, given that the UK is attached to continuing its participation in the Dublin rules.

The new proposals might alternatively (or additionally) take the form of amendments to the current EU temporary protection Directive, which the UK also participates in. The same considerations about using the ultimatum clause would apply, except that there would not be so much political sensitivity: that Directive has never been used in practice, and the current UK government would probably not be upset about being expelled from it (this Directive dates back to 2001; the UK opted in under the previous Labour government). However, the proposals might also take the form of amendments to the EU’s Asylum and Migration Fund, which the UK participates in and would be reluctant to be expelled from (the previous coalition government opted in to it).

It should also be noted that there might be a legal argument about the use of Article 78(3), because the European Parliament (EP) would likely prefer another asylum ‘legal base’ to apply which would give it its usual power over EU legislation. But using a different asylum legal base would not alter the rules relating to the UK’s opt-out.

Political context

First and foremost, it has to be pointed out that the Commission’s proposals may not be accepted. Indeed, given the many previous failed attempts to agree EU rules on relocation and resettlement, and the obvious lack of willingness of EU leaders to commit themselves on these issues even in light of the recent migrant death toll, such proposals might well be dead on arrival. It’s clear from the wording of the Treaty that there has to be a qualified majority of Member States in the Council to approve such proposals, although the EP is only consulted.

Similarly, the UK could not be given an ultimatum as regards its participation in existing EU law unless the Commission proposes a Council decision to this end, and the Council agrees by qualified majority (without a UK vote). The EP has no role in that case. It’s far from certain that this would happen, even if the Council were enthusiastic about these Commission proposals.

In light of this, in combination with the election of a majority Conservative government committed to holding a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, is it really wise for the Commission to make these proposals and suggest that they might bind the UK despite its opt-out? Admittedly it’s not realistic to expect the Commission to avoid making any proposal which might cause the least offence to the UK for the many months up until the referendum date. But if it wants the UK to remain in the EU – as the Commission President says it does – it has to avoid making proposals which are liable to cause the most offence. That particularly applies to proposals relating to immigration, which is by far the most sensitive issue for the UK’s relations with the EU.

After all, if the UK leaves the EU, there would anyway be no prospect of relocating asylum-seekers here in any event. While it’s understandable that the Commission wants bold solutions to the EU’s migrant crisis, there are times when discretion is the better part of valour.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

Photo: bbc.co.uk