tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8704899696538705849.post1691329998302567408..comments2024-03-29T04:53:16.437-07:00Comments on EU Law Analysis: The draft UK/EU renegotiation deal: is it 'legally binding and irreversible'? Steve Peershttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05869161329197244113noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8704899696538705849.post-41443672261727173572016-02-22T09:46:42.451-08:002016-02-22T09:46:42.451-08:00The analysis is of the draft as published on 3rd F...The analysis is of the draft as published on 3rd February. Steve Peershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05869161329197244113noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8704899696538705849.post-77517289659303863032016-02-22T07:50:29.152-08:002016-02-22T07:50:29.152-08:00How was this detailed analysis produced on 10th Fe...How was this detailed analysis produced on 10th February 2016 when the text wasn't available until 19th February 2016?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8704899696538705849.post-84770922029456610492016-02-10T10:04:00.371-08:002016-02-10T10:04:00.371-08:00Thanks for your comments, Andrew. To take the poin...Thanks for your comments, Andrew. To take the points in turn: <br />1. The draft doesn't call for a veto on Eurozone law-making. I tried to make clear that I am writing *as if* the deal were done, and I can only analyse the current draft - of course I recognise that the final text might differ. In my view Protocol 9 is deliberately ambiguous as to whether the 'consensus' to be reached in the European Council is legally binding or not. That's why I was cautious and do not argue that the decision would definitely be irreversible or would certainly survive a CJEU challenge. <br />2. In fact I think the Court would jump in the opposite direction than you think it would - given its deference in recent years to 'patch-ups' over EMU and benefits issues. I can't quite see the logistics of how the discontinuation of discussion of a proposal in the Council would be challenged. How is that a reviewable act? You refer to changes in the Council's rules of procedure, but the draft Decision does not mention that possibility. <br />3. Are you arguing that the EP and Commission have a veto in ordinary treaty revision proceedings? In point 4 you admit that the EP doesn't. Or is your point that the EP and Commission have informal influence beyond their formal role? I agree that the Convention is likely to influence the IGC, but a decent chunk of Giscard's text was ditched. And my point is that federalists should be careful what they wish for - I can easily imagine a strong national parliamentary block at a 2017 Convention pushing for red cards and/or limiting EU competences. <br />4. I don't doubt that you had an influence on the Czech government's decision to withdraw its request, considering also the change of government there. But somehow I suspect the current EP will not be as successful in any efforts it may make to dissuade the UK Conservative government from wanting to see any commitment to Treaty change implemented. Steve Peershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05869161329197244113noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8704899696538705849.post-66165486597224631672016-02-10T09:43:28.372-08:002016-02-10T09:43:28.372-08:00Thank you, Steve Peers, for another clear and stim...<br />Thank you, Steve Peers, for another clear and stimulating contribution to the Brexit debate. I will be writing a full critique of the Cameron negotiation if and when we have a final package deal. So just four points here.<br /><br />1. It is precisely because of the existence of Protocol 9 that the French, in particular, are worried about a UK veto on eurozone law making. I am not sure the deal on euro/non-euro is as 'done' as you infer. And I would point out that Protocol 9 speaks only of elevation to the European Council for a 'preliminary discussion' before the ordinary legislative procedure continues. <br /><br />2. You are right, of course, that the Council can change its own rules of procedure as it so chooses - but only if the new rules elaborate or build on EU primary law and do not contradict it. If an objection came to the CJEU about an abuse of the ordinary legislative process as a result of this intergovernmental Decision (either with respect to financial business or, more generally, involving the new-style 'red card'), we know which way the Court would jump.<br /><br />3. We disagree still about the potential power of the Commission, European Parliament and national parliaments in the treaty revision process. Only one thing is certain about a Convention, and that is that a Convention is very unpredictable. And it is improbable, in my view, that an IGC would clash openly with the considered and consensual view of a majority of the Convention. IGCs themselves can cause surprises, especially after one or more significant changes of government (NB 2017). And one should not underestimate that some national parliaments - notably, the Bundestag - are forceful players in the EU decision-making processes of their own governments. National parliaments have not yet been heard on Brexit.<br /><br />4. Lastly, on the Czech Protocol. It is not narcissistic of me, I hope, to put on record the very great interest that the Czech government(s), parliament and media displayed on the outcome of the Duff Report (which recommended No to Klaus's attempt to join Protocol 30). We could not veto the proposal, as you say, but we played a significant part in changing Czech opinion about the virtues of following Tony Blair's spurious 'opt-out' from the Charter. Today the European Parliament is neither disinterested nor uninterested in the outcome of the Brexit frolic. <br /> Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03228489288546943392noreply@blogger.com